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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

CHRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, an individual,  
on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all  
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHAXON INDUSTRIES, INC., a California  
corporation, and DOES 1-50, Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No: 30-2022-01289124-CU-OE-CXC

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS  
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**

Date: December 19, 2025

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Reservation ID: 74707355

Judge: Hon. William Claster

Dept.: CX101

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Plaintiff Christina Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of the Stipulation of  
3 Settlement of Class and PAGA Action Claims and Release of Claims (“Agreement”),<sup>1</sup> which if  
4 approved, would provide valuable monetary relief for approximately 132 Class Members. The basic  
5 terms of the Agreement provide for the following:

6 1. The “**Class**” and “**Class Period**” shall mean all current and former non-exempt  
7 employees who worked for Defendant Shaxon Industries, Inc. at any time during the between October  
8 28, 2018, through November 7, 2024. (“Class Period”). Agreement at §§ I(H), I(I).

9 a. The “**Settlement Class Members**” all Class Members who have not submitted a  
10 timely and valid request for exclusion. Agreement at § I(KK).

11 b. The “**Class Size**” is comprised of approximately 132 individuals who collectively  
12 worked approximately 15,808 Workweeks. Agreement at § III(A)(2).

13 2. The “**Aggrieved Employees**” and “**PAGA Period**” means all current and former non-  
14 exempt employees who worked for Defendant Shaxon Industries, Inc. in California at any time during  
15 the period beginning on August 11, 2021, through November 7, 2024 (“PAGA Period”). Agreement at  
16 §§ I(C), I(Y). Aggrieved Employees do not have the ability to opt-out of the PAGA portion of the  
17 settlement. Agreement at § III(L)(7). At the time of mediation, there were approximately 110 Aggrieved  
18 Employees during the PAGA Period. JCL Dec., ¶ 5.

19 3. The “**Gross Settlement Amount**” is Three Hundred Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents  
20 (\$300,000.00). Agreement at § I(P). The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary and includes  
21 the following:

22 a. A “**Service Award**” in the amount of \$10,000, or in an amount that the Court  
23 authorizes to be paid to the Class Representative, in addition to her Individual Settlement Payment and  
24 her individual Aggrieved Employee Payment, in recognition of her efforts and risks in assisting with  
25 the prosecution of the Action. Agreement at § III(M)(9);

26 b. “**Class Counsel Award**” of fees and expenses that the Court authorizes to be

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> The Agreement is attached as Ex “1” to the Declaration of Jean-Claude Lapuyade (“JCL Dec.”) at ¶ 3. All citations to  
the Agreement incorporate by this reference a citation to the JCL Dec., ¶ 3. Further, unless indicated otherwise, capitalized  
terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Agreement.

1 paid to Class Counsel for the services they have rendered for Plaintiff, the Class Members, and the  
2 Aggrieved Employees in the Action, consisting of attorneys' fees currently not to exceed 35% of the  
3 Gross Settlement Amount currently estimated to be \$105,000.00 *plus* costs of up to \$30,000.00.  
4 Attorneys' fees will be divided between Class Counsel in the following percentages (50% to JCL Law  
5 Firm, APC, and 50% to Zakay Law Group, APLC). Agreement at §§ III(M)(10); I(E);

6 c. A "**PAGA Payment**" of Fifteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$15,000.00)  
7 to be allocated from the Gross Settlement Amount, with 25% of the payment (\$3,750.00) going to the  
8 Aggrieved Employees ("Aggrieved Employee Payment") and 75% of the payment (\$11,250.00) going  
9 to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA Payment"). The amount of the PAGA  
10 Payment is subject to Court approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(s). Agreement at  
11 §§ I(X); and

12 d. "**Settlement Administration Costs**" paid to the Settlement Administrator from  
13 the Gross Settlement Amount for administering the Settlement currently estimated not to exceed  
14 \$6,500.00. Agreement at §§ III(M)(11).

15 4. The "**Net Settlement Amount**" of approximately \$133,500.00 (Gross Settlement  
16 Amount, less the requested Class Counsel Award, Service Award, PAGA Payment, and Settlement  
17 Administration Costs) which will be allocated to all Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis  
18 according to the number of Workweeks each Settlement Class Member worked during the Class Period.  
19 Agreement at §§ III(M)(1). The entire Net Settlement Amount will be paid to all Settlement Class  
20 Members who do not opt out of the Settlement resulting in an average Individual Settlement Payment  
21 of ***\$1,011.36***. JCL Dec., ¶ 5.

22 An objective evaluation of the Settlement confirms that the relief negotiated on behalf of the  
23 Class is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement was negotiated by the Parties at arm's length.  
24 The Settlement confers substantial benefits to the Class Members. The relief offered by the Settlement  
25 is particularly impressive when viewed against the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs pursuing wage  
26 and hour cases (*see infra*). Indeed, by settling now rather than proceeding to trial, Class Members will  
27 not have to wait (possibly years) for relief, nor will they have to bear the risk of class certification being  
28 denied or of Defendants Shaxon Industries, Inc., Benjamin Wang and Gilbert Wang (collective,

1 “Defendants”) prevailing at trial. JCL Dec., ¶ 8.

2 As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary settlement  
3 approval and falls within the range of reasonableness. The average Individual Settlement Payment to  
4 the Settlement Class Members meets awards in similar wage and hour class actions. Moreover, the  
5 proposed Class is appropriate for provisional certification. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully request  
6 the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 9.

## 7 **II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE**

### 8 **A. Overview of the Litigation and Mediated Settlement**

9 Defendants manufacture and distribute products for the data and telephone communications  
10 industry in the State of California, including in Orange County where Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff was  
11 employed by Defendants from April 1994 to February 2025 as a non-exempt employee. Declaration  
12 of Christina Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Dec.”) at ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that she was denied legally  
13 compliant minimum wage and overtime compensation, meal and rest breaks, accurate itemized wage  
14 statements, and reimbursements at all times during her employment. Throughout her employment,  
15 Plaintiff was subject to Defendants’ written policies and procedures contained in, among other  
16 documents, the “Employee Handbook.” Rodriguez Dec Dec., ¶¶ 4-5.

17 Generally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to provide compliant meal and rest periods,  
18 failed to pay for all time worked, failed to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, failed to  
19 reimburse for mandatory business expenses, and failed to pay all wages upon separation. Defendants  
20 deny liability for each of Plaintiff’s claims. Further, Defendants assert that they fully complied with all  
21 applicable employment laws and raised several other significant defenses to Plaintiff’s claims,  
22 including but not limited to, facially compliant meal and rest period policies, compliant wage  
23 statements, compliant reimbursement practices, and they timely paid all wages due upon separation of  
24 employment. JCL Dec., ¶ 10.

25 On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff served Defendants and the Labor and Workforce Development  
26 Agency (“LWDA”) with a Notice of Violations (“PAGA Notice”). Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice set forth  
27 the facts and theories supporting Defendants’ alleged violations of various provisions of the California  
28 Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commissions (“IWC”) Wage Order and of her intent to

pursue claims under California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code Sections 2698 *et seq* (“PAGA”). JCL Dec., ¶ 11.

On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action and PAGA complaint against Defendant Shaxon Industries, Inc. (“Shaxon”) in the San Diego County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2022-01289124-CU-OE-CXC (the “Action”). The Action alleged nine causes of action against Defendants for: (1) Unfair Competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et. seq.*; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197, 1197.1; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, *et seq.*; (4) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (5) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (6) Failure to Reimburse for Required Expenses in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements in violation of Cal. Lab Code §226; (8) Failure to Pay Wages When Due in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202, and 203; and (9) Violation of PAGA. JCL Dec., ¶ 12.

On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant Shaxon participated in an all-day mediation presided over by Hon. Steven R. Denton (Ret.), a respected jurist and experienced mediator of wage and hour class and representative actions. This mediation did not result in a settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 13.

The Parties engaged in formal discovery beginning in July 2023. Plaintiff propounded Special Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Request for Production of Documents, and Request for Admissions. In response, Defendant served objections, some responses, and over three thousand pages of documents. Over the course of two years, the Parties also prepared for, briefed, and participated in two separate informal discovery conferences related to discovery disputes. JCL Dec., ¶ 14. Plaintiff also noticed and prepared for the deposition of Defendant Shaxon’s Person Most Knowledgeable. This deposition notice was ultimately withdrawn. JCL Dec., ¶ 15.

On June 11, 2024, having learned the true names of the Defendants Does 1-2, Plaintiff amended her complaint to designate Benjamin Wang as Doe 1 and Gilbert Wang as Doe 2. JCL Dec., ¶ 16. On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Violations with the LWDA, designating Gilbert Wang and Benjamin Wang as Plaintiff’s joint employers. Plaintiff served the same on Defendants.

1 JCL Dec., ¶ 17.

2 On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff and Shaxon participated in a second all-day mediation with  
3 presided over by Hon. Steven R. Denton (Ret.), which again did not result in a settlement. On April 1,  
4 2025, the Parties participated in a half-day mediation presided over by Hon. Steven R. Denton (Ret.).  
5 The mediation concluded with a settlement, after the Parties agreed to a Mediator's proposal which was  
6 subsequently memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. JCL Dec., ¶ 18.  
7 Thereafter, the Parties drafted and negotiated a long-form settlement agreement, which is the subject  
8 of the instant motion. JCL Dec., ¶ 19.

9 **B. Class Counsel Thoroughly Investigated the Factual and Legal Issues**

10 Months before filing the Action, Class Counsel began its pre-filing investigation into the  
11 Plaintiff's complaints. Class Counsel's investigation started with several lengthy interviews with  
12 Plaintiff. As part of the interview process, the Plaintiff produced documents related to her employment,  
13 including payroll records. At the conclusion of the interviews, Class Counsel determined that Plaintiff's  
14 complaints justified further inquiry. JCL Dec., ¶ 20.

15 Class Counsel subsequently requested Plaintiff's employee files from Defendants. In response,  
16 Defendants produced various documents, including but not limited to Plaintiff's hiring documents and  
17 payroll and time records. Class Counsel reviewed and analyzed the documents and determined the  
18 documents appeared to substantiate Plaintiff's claim that Defendants failed to, among other things,  
19 provide compliant meal and rest periods, to provide accurate wage statements, and to reimburse for  
20 mandatory business expenses. JCL Dec., ¶ 21.

21 Defendants produced a sample of approximately 30% of the time and payroll records for the  
22 Class Members, aggregate workweek and pay period data for the Class Members, aggregate meal  
23 premiums paid to the Class Members, average hourly rate for the Class Members, and copies of  
24 applicable handbooks, policies, and agreements. In total, Class Counsel reviewed thousands of pages  
25 of time and payroll records. JCL Dec., ¶ 22.

26 Class Counsel then retained the statisticians and economists at BCG to evaluate the Class  
27 Members' payroll and time data. BCG provides data analysis and damage modeling consulting services,  
28 specializing in wage and hour class actions. BCG's team of financial and data analysts are credentialed

1 and experienced experts in their fields and have provided their expertise on thousands of cases. JCL  
2 Dec., ¶ 23.

3 BCG analyzed a sampling of nearly 30% of the Class's time and payroll data to assist in the  
4 development of various damage models. Among other things, BCG determined the approximate  
5 amount of unpaid wages, amount of unpaid overtime wages, number of workweeks, pay periods,  
6 average length of shifts and average number of hours worked per week. BCG also estimated the number  
7 of missed, late, or truncated meal and rest periods, the amount of unreimbursed expenses, and the  
8 amount of missed meal and rest period premiums paid during the Class Period. JCL Dec., ¶ 24.

9 During the litigation, Defendants raised the possibility that it would be unable to satisfy a larger  
10 class-wide settlement due to its financial condition. Class Counsel retained Certified Public  
11 Accountant, Kenneth L. Creal, to review and analyze Defendants' publicly available financial  
12 information. Based on Mr. Creal's review, he determined that the Gross Settlement Amount and  
13 funding dates represent a fair and reasonable settlement in this matter and would not be destructive to  
14 the Defendant's ongoing business. Declaration of Kenneth L. Creal, ¶ 7.

15 Overall, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims at issue, including: (1) determining  
16 Plaintiff's suitability as a putative class representative through interviews, background investigations,  
17 and analysis of her employment files; (2) evaluating all of Plaintiff's potential claims; (3) researching  
18 similar wage and hour class actions as to the claims brought, the nature of the positions, and the type  
19 of employer; (4) analyzing the Class Member's time and payroll records; (5) analyzing Defendants'  
20 labor policies and practices; (6) researching settlements in similar cases as well as outstanding issues  
21 which could affect settlement approval; (7) evaluating Plaintiff's claims and estimating Defendants'  
22 liability for purposes of settlement; (8) drafting the mediation brief; (9) retaining an independent CPA  
23 and forensic consultant to analyze Defendants' financial statements, and (10) participating in the  
24 mediation. This investigation allowed Class Counsel to fully assess the nature and magnitude of the  
25 claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, such as to make an independent  
26 assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the Parties have agreed. JCL Dec., ¶ 25.

27 Class Counsel only agreed to enter the Settlement following this thorough investigation and  
28 evaluation of Plaintiff's claims. Based on its investigation of the facts, applicable law, and marketplace

for similar settlements, and considering the risk of significant delay and uncertainty associated with litigation, and the various defenses asserted by Defendants, Class Counsel firmly believe this Agreement to be in the best interests of the Class Members. Because the Settlement's terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 26.

**C. The Proposed Settlement Fully Resolves Plaintiff's Claims**

1. The Composition of the Settlement Class Members

The proposed Class consists of all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California at any time during the period between October 28, 2018 and November 7, 2024. Agreement at § I(H), I(I). The Settlement Class Members exclude any person who submits a timely and valid request for exclusion. Agreement at § I(KK). At the time of mediation, Defendants estimated that the Class was comprised of 132 individuals that worked approximately 15,808 Workweeks during the Class Period. Agreement at § III(A)(2).

2. The Settlement Consideration

The Parties agreed to settle the underlying class claims in exchange for the Gross Settlement Amount of \$300,000.00. The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Individual Settlement Payments to the Settlement Class Members; (2) a Service Award of \$10,000 to Plaintiff for her services on behalf of the Class; (3) a PAGA Payment in the amount of \$15,000; (4) Settlement Administration Costs estimated at \$6,500; (5) Class Counsel Award in the amount of \$135,000.00, comprised of attorneys' fees equal to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount estimated to be \$105,000.00 plus costs of up to \$30,000.00. See generally Agreement at § III(A)(1).

Subject to the Court approving the Service Award, Class Counsel Award, PAGA Payment, and the Settlement Administration Costs, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed to each Settlement Class Member. Agreement at §§ III (M)(1). There is no reversion to Defendants and Defendants must separately pay for their share of the employer payroll taxes. Agreement at § I(P).

3. The Funding Date and Installment Plan

Assuming there are no objectors, and no appeal is filed, Defendants will fund the Gross Settlement Amount in four (4) installments. The First Installment in the amount of \$50,000.00 shall be paid by Defendant Shaxon within ten (10) calendar days after the Court grants preliminary approval.

Defendant Shaxon shall pay the second installment of \$50,000 to the Settlement Administrator within one hundred eighty (180) days after the Court grants preliminary approval. Defendant Shaxon shall pay its third installment of \$50,000 within three hundred sixty (360) days after the Court grants preliminary approval. Defendant Wang shall pay their portion of the Gross Settlement Amount (\$150,000.00) within fifteen (15) calendar days after the Court grants final approval. Agreement at § I(O).

4. Formula for Calculating Individual Settlement Payments

Settlement Class Members will receive an Individual Settlement Payment. The Individual Settlement Payment will be proportional to the number of Workweeks each Class Member worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period. Agreement at § III(M)(1). The Class Data provided by Defendants to the Settlement Administrator will include each Class Member's full name; last known address; Social Security Number; start dates and end dates of employment, and any other information necessary to accurately calculate the number of Workweeks and Pay Periods worked by each class member during the Class Period and Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. Agreement at § I(G). The Settlement Administrator will calculate each Class Member's final Individual Settlement Payment by dividing a particular Class Member's total number of Workweeks by the total number of Workweeks for all Class Members, resulting in a Class Payment Ratio for each Class Member. Agreement at § III(M)(1). Each Class Member's Class Payment Ratio will then be multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount to calculate each Class Member's estimated Individual Settlement Payment. Each Individual Settlement Payment will be reduced by any legally mandated employee tax withholdings (e.g., employee payroll taxes, etc.). *Id.* Individual Settlement Payments for members of the Settlement Class Members who submit valid and timely requests for exclusion will be redistributed to Settlement Class Members who do not submit valid and timely requests for exclusion on a pro rata basis. Agreement at § *Id.*

Given that there are approximately 132 Class Members, the average gross recovery is approximately \$1,011.36 (Net Settlement Amount divided by Settlement Class Members). JCL Dec., ¶ 8.

5. Release by Settlement Class Members

Generally, as of the Effective Date, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members will agree to

1 release the Released Parties from the Released Class Claims that accrued during the Class Period.  
2 Agreement at § III(B).

3 6. PAGA Release by the State of California on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees

4 Generally, as of the Effective Date, Plaintiff, the LWDA, and the State of California will release  
5 the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims that accrued during the PAGA Period.  
6 Agreement at § III(C).

7 **III. ARGUMENT**

8 **A. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Proposed Class Action Settlement**

9 The proposed Settlement, including a Gross Settlement Amount of \$300,000.00 meets the  
10 standards for preliminary approval. Pre-trial settlement of complex class actions is a judicially favored  
11 remedy. (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625 (“Voluntary  
12 conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution.”).) Class action settlement  
13 approval requires an early “preliminary” review by the trial court and a subsequent “final” review after  
14 notice of the settlement has been distributed to class members for their comments and objections.  
15 (C.R.C. 3.769(c)-(g); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2010) (the  
16 court first “preliminarily approves the settlement” and later “conducts a final approval hearing to  
17 inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement”).)

18 Although Rule of Court Rule 3.769 does not provide detail as to the scope of review of the  
19 proposed settlement, preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a “reasonable  
20 range.” (*See North County Contractor’s Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Services* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th  
21 1085, 1089-90; Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions*, §§ 11.26 (4th ed. 2002).) Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where: (1) the settlement is reached through “arms-length  
22 bargaining;” (2) investigation and discovery are “sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act  
23 intelligently;” (3) counsel is “experienced in similar litigation. . . .” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996)  
24 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.) The presumption of fairness is consistent with California’s public policy  
25 goal of favoring settlements. (*Stambaugh v. Super. Ct* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236 (“the law wisely  
26 favors settlements”); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 (“public  
27 policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation”); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair*  
28

1 *Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (“voluntary conciliation and  
2 settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution ... [t]his is especially true in complex class  
3 action litigation”).)

4 Additionally, in reviewing the fairness of a class action settlement, due regard should be given  
5 to what is “otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Cellphone Termination*  
6 *Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389.) The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary  
7 to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or  
8 collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable  
9 and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.*)

10 1. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arm’s-Length Bargaining Led by  
11 Experienced Counsel.

12 “[W]hat transpires in settlement negotiations is highly relevant to the assessment of a proposed  
13 settlement’s fairness.” (*State v. Levi Strauss & Co.* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460, 482.) Courts presume the  
14 absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is  
15 offered; thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are conducted in good faith. (Newberg,  
16 § 11.51.)

17 The Parties participated in 3 separate mediations the mediator Hon. Steven R. Denton (Ret.).  
18 Judge Denton managed the Parties’ expectations and provided a useful, neutral analysis of the issues  
19 and risks to both sides. (*In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litig.* No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008  
20 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108195 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (mediator’s participation weighs considerably  
21 against any inference of a collusive settlement); *D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank* (2d. Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d  
22 78, 85 (a “mediator’s involvement in pre-certification settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the  
23 proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure.”).) The Parties participated in an unsuccessful  
24 mediation on May 31, 2023 and a second unsuccessful mediation on November 7, 2024. The Parties  
25 participated in a third mediation on April 1, 2025, which concluded with a settlement after both sides  
26 agreed to a Mediator’s proposal, which was subsequently memorialized in the form of a Memorandum  
27 of Understanding. JCL Dec., ¶ 27.

28 Once the Parties agreed to the Mediator’s proposal, the Parties engaged in negotiations regarding

1 the written terms of the settlement. The Agreement is the final product of the mediated negotiations.  
2 Objectively, the Settlement terms are fair, adequate and represent a reasonable compromise of the  
3 claims at issue. JCL Dec., ¶ 28.

4 2. Class Counsel’s Thorough Investigation Provided an Objective Measurement of the  
5 Settlement’s Reasonableness.

6 As set forth in greater detail above, Class Counsel conducted a very thorough investigation into  
7 the factual and legal issues in dispute. In addition to formal and informal discovery, document review,  
8 data analysis and legal research, Class Counsel also researched similar wage and hour actions.  
9 Although no two cases are identical, this research provided Class Counsel with a marker to inform  
10 settlement discussions and, ultimately, to measure this settlement against. The investigation allowed  
11 Class Counsel to realistically assess the value of Plaintiff’s claims and intelligently engage defense  
12 counsel in settlement discussions that culminated in the proposed settlement now before the Court. JCL  
13 Dec., ¶ 29.

14 Class Counsel only agreed to enter the Settlement following their thorough investigation and  
15 evaluation of Plaintiff’s claims. Based on this investigation of the facts, applicable law, and marketplace  
16 for similar settlements, and considering the risk of significant delay, uncertainty associated with  
17 litigation, and the various defenses asserted by Defendants, Class Counsel firmly believes this  
18 Agreement to be in the best interests of the Class Members. Because the Settlement’s terms are fair,  
19 reasonable, and adequate, the Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 30.

20 3. The Settlement Falls Within the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.

21 The Gross Settlement Amount of \$300,000.00 is within the range of reasonableness. To  
22 determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court should “consider enough information  
23 about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to  
24 make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the parties have agreed.”  
25 (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.) In making this determination,  
26 the court is “not to try the case” but rather “satisfy itself that the class action settlement is within the  
27 ‘ballpark of reasonableness.’ ” (*Id.* (emphasis added).) For this analysis, courts do “not require any such  
28 explicit statement of value; [they] require[] a record which allows an understanding of the amount that

1 is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation. ” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*  
2 *Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (internal citation omitted).) The reasonableness of a  
3 settlement is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential recovery plaintiffs might  
4 have received if they had succeeded at trial.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, “[t]he determination whether a settlement is  
5 reasonable does not involve the use of a ‘mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.’ ”  
6 (*Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 FRD. 174, 186 (quoting *In re Michael Milken and*  
7 *Assoc. Sec. Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 150 F.R.D. 57, 66).)

8 a. The Gross Settlement Amount Meets the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.

9 The Gross Settlement Amount of \$300,000.00 is fair and reasonable considering the nature and  
10 magnitude of the claims being settled and the various potential impediments to recovery. Prior to  
11 mediation, Class Counsel retained BCG to develop economic damage models measuring Defendants’  
12 liability exposure while accounting for the uncertainties of continued litigation. The various models  
13 were informed by Class Counsel’s investigation, including the analysis of a significant sample of time  
14 and payroll data. Class Counsel projected Defendants’ liability exposure for *class claims* (excluding  
15 PAGA Penalties) ranged between \$879,734.08 (“Realistic Damages”) and \$1,847,669.75 (“Maximum  
16 Damages”) if successful at trial. This range reflects the uncertainty regarding several of the claims.  
17 Thus, the Gross Settlement Amount represents a recovery of between 34% (“Realistic Damages”) and  
18 16% (“Maximum Damages”) of Defendants’ class-wide exposure – well within the recognized range  
19 of reasonableness. The following summarizes Defendants’ liability exposure. JCL Dec., ¶ 31.

20 (1) Estimated Damages for Meal Period Violations

21 Plaintiff’s primary claim in this Action alleges that Defendants failed to provide compliant meal  
22

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23 <sup>2</sup> Federal district courts recognize that there is an inherent “range of reasonableness” in determining whether to approve a  
24 settlement “which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular case and the concomitant risks and costs  
25 necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to completion.” *Newman v. Stein* (2d. Cir. 2002) 464 F.2d 689, 693; *see In re*  
26 *Omnivision Tech, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F.Supp.2d 1036; *see also Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. Directv. Inc.* (C.D.  
27 Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“well settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to  
28 only a fraction of the potential recovery”); *In re Global Crossing Sec. and ERISA Litig.* (S.D.N.Y 2004) 225 F.R.D. 436,  
460 (“settlement amount’s ratio to the maximum potential recovery need not be the sole, or even dominant, consideration  
when assessing settlements fairness”); *In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc Sec Litig.* (E.D. Pa. 2000) 194 F.R.D. 166, 184 (“the  
fact that a proposed settlement constitutes a relatively small percentage of the most optimistic estimate does not, in itself,  
weigh against the settlement; rather the percentage should be considered in light of strength of the claims”); *Officers for*  
*Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 628 (it is “the complete package, taken as a whole rather than the  
individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness”).

1 periods. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of their rigorous work schedules, Plaintiff, Class  
2 Members, and Aggrieved Employees were not able to take timely and duty-free meal first and second  
3 periods. Upon review of Defendants' time records, Plaintiff's expert determined that over 40% of first  
4 meal periods were shorter than 30 minutes, and nearly 60% of all meal periods were shorter than 30  
5 minutes. Moreover, Defendants did not pay any meal period premiums until January 2023, after this  
6 Action was filed. JCL Dec., ¶ 32. Defendants argued, among other things, that it provided all their  
7 employees, i.e., Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, with the opportunity to take compliant meal  
8 periods, including second meal periods during shifts longer than ten (10) hours. Thus, to the extent  
9 Class Members and Aggrieved Employees were recording non-compliant breaks, this was done at their  
10 election, and not at the instruction of Defendants. Defendants further argued that there was no potential  
11 liability for Plaintiff's alleged meal period violations, that it maintained facially compliant meal period  
12 policies, and any claimed violations required a highly individualized inquiry not suitable to class  
13 treatment. JCL Dec., ¶ 33. Taking Defendant's defenses into account, Plaintiff applied a 50% discount  
14 to this claim. Plaintiff estimated that the damages for this claim ranged from approximately  
15 \$329,353.50 to approximately \$658,707.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 34.

16 (2) Defendants' Estimated Exposure of Rest Period Violations

17 Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants failed to provide compliant rest periods. Specifically,  
18 Plaintiff alleged that due to her rigorous work schedule, her rest breaks were interrupted 2-3 times a  
19 month, and she at times missed her second rest break due to the rigorous work schedules, however  
20 Defendants did not pay rest period premiums. JCL Dec., ¶ 35. Defendants denied liability and asserted  
21 that it maintained legally compliant rest period policies and practices throughout the Class Period.  
22 Moreover, Plaintiff recognizes the evidentiary burdens establishing this claim. Establishing Plaintiff's  
23 rest period claim would rely, almost entirely, on Class Member testimony, making it a riskier claim at  
24 class certification and liability stages. Certification likely would have required depositions of Class  
25 Members who provided declarations, and Defendants surely would have obtained opposing  
26 declarations stating either rest breaks were taken, or rest breaks were voluntarily waived. *See, e.g.,*  
27 *Ordonez v. Radio Shack, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) 2013 WL 210223, at \*11 ("Because of the  
28 competing testimony before the Court, plaintiff's evidence that defendant may have an illegal, written

1 rest break policy is insufficient for this Court to find that common issues predominate.”); *Villa v. United*  
2 *Site Servs. of California, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) 2012 WL 5503550, at \*8 (“Indeed, Plaintiff’s  
3 own evidence confirms that the written policy does not generate uniform practices.”). JCL Dec., ¶ 36.  
4 Accordingly, Plaintiff applied a 50% discount to the rest break claim. Plaintiff estimated the range of  
5 potential outcomes for this claim was between approximately \$91,473.38 to approximately  
6 \$182,874.75. JCL Dec., ¶ 37.

7 (3) Defendants’ Estimated Exposure for Unreimbursed Business Expenses

8 Plaintiff alleged that Defendants required Class Members and Aggrieved Employees to use their  
9 personal computers and internet for work purposes. Starting in or around March 2020, as a result of the  
10 Covid-19 pandemic, Plaintiff and other employees worked from home approximately 2-3 days per  
11 week. California employers who require employees to incur personal business expenses for work  
12 purposes must reimburse the employee for the cost incurred. (*See* Cal. Labor Code § 2802(a), providing  
13 that “An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred  
14 by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience  
15 to the directions of the employer...”). Without using their personal computer and internet during this  
16 time, Plaintiff and other employees could not carry out their essential job duties. Again, Defendants  
17 denied any liability for this claim. BCG estimated a \$50 monthly reimbursement rate for Class  
18 Members for the use of their personal cell phones. JCL Dec., ¶ 38. Plaintiff applied a 75% discount to  
19 account for the time periods during the Class Period before and after the Covid-19 pandemic in which  
20 Class Members were not required to work remotely and estimated that Defendants’ exposure for this  
21 claim ranged between approximately \$47,800.00 and approximately \$191,200.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 39.

22 (4) Defendants’ Estimated Exposure for Unpaid Wages

23 Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants failed to pay their employees for all hours worked.  
24 Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants engaged in time rounding which benefitted Defendants,  
25 rather than the Class. A review of the records produced by Defendants showed that approximately 57%  
26 of shifts were underpaid due to rounding. JCL Dec., ¶ 40. Plaintiff estimated Defendants’ exposure for  
27 this claim to be \$141,000.00. This number was calculated by determining the amount of time Class  
28 Members were underpaid due to rounding, including both regular and overtime hours. JCL Dec., ¶ 41.

1                                   (5) Defendants’ Estimated Exposure for Wage Statement Violations

2           Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants failed to furnish its employees with accurate itemized  
3 wage statements. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Defendants’ failure to provide meal  
4 and rest periods as required by the California Labor Code, failure to adequately compensate due to  
5 rounding, Plaintiff and other Class Members are entitled to derivative wage statement penalties. (See  
6 *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services* (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 93 (concluding that meal premiums are  
7 “wages” entitling employees to derivative wage statement penalties). Defendants argued that even if  
8 it failed to furnish accurate wage statements, Plaintiff could not establish the injury requirement on a  
9 class-wide basis. As a result, Plaintiff discounted this claim 60% to account for this risk. Plaintiff  
10 estimated that Defendants’ exposure on this claim ranged between \$147,240.00 and \$368,100.00. JCL  
11 Dec., ¶ 42.

12                                   (6) Defendants’ Estimated Exposure for Waiting Time Penalties

13           Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendants’ labor code violations resulted in derivative liability for  
14 waiting time penalties. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not prove the “willful”  
15 prong needed to obtain waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203. In light of the uncertain  
16 nature of the claims, Class Counsel’s Realistic Model discounted the waiting time penalty claim by  
17 60% and estimated Defendants’ exposure for these claims ranged between \$121,923.20 and  
18 \$304,808.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 43.

19                                   (7) Defendants’ PAGA Exposure

20           Class Counsel’s damage models also estimated Defendants’ exposure for PAGA penalties. At  
21 the time of mediation, Plaintiff estimated Defendants’ exposure for PAGA penalties were approximately  
22 \$973,600. JCL Dec., ¶ 44. The proposed PAGA allocation of the Gross Settlement Amount is fair, just,  
23 and reasonable. *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.* (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77. Where settlements “negotiate  
24 a good faith amount” for PAGA penalties and “there is no indication that this amount was the result of  
25 self-interest at the expense of class members,” such amounts are generally considered reasonable.  
26 *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009).  
27 Courts routinely approve of amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the  
28 settlement. *See id.* at \*1, 9 (approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%); *Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, No.

09cv1683 MMA (JMA), 2011 WL 4899942, at \*6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%); *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.*, No. CV 10-02420 GAF (PLAx), 2012 WL 12882124, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement).

Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith PAGA Payment in the amount of \$15,000.00 which is 5% of the Gross Settlement Amount. This amount falls well within the range of approved PAGA Payment. Seventy-Five percent (75%) of the PAGA Payment (\$11,250.00) will be paid to the LWDA ("LWDA Payment") with the remaining twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Payment (\$3,750.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees ("Aggrieved Employee Payment"), which is within the range of PAGA Payment approved by courts and should be approved. JCL Dec., ¶ 45.

Under PAGA, Courts have considerable discretion to reduce the penalty award. In *Fleming v. Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590 (C.D. Cal. 2011), a federal court reduced PAGA penalties from \$2,800,000 to \$500,000, a reduction of 82.2%, because the court found maximum penalties "unjust" because the employees had suffered no injuries. Some trial courts have actually awarded no civil penalties, even when Labor Code violations are established. See *In re Nordstrom Com. Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010) (affirming an award of \$0 in PAGA penalties in a wage and hour class action); *In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557, \*40-43 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (PAGA penalties denied after trial).

*Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal. App. 5th 504 (2018), illustrates the risk of PAGA claims. In *Carrington*, while the plaintiff prevailed on his PAGA claim upon trial, the trial court reduced the maximum PAGA penalty amount by 90%, citing the employer's good faith attempt at complying with the law. *Id.* at 517. Upon review, the Court of Appeal found such reduction to be proper. *Id.* at 539. Again, the *Carrington* decision was after Plaintiff actually prevailed at trial, and even then, the PAGA penalties were reduced by 90%.

For the aforementioned reasons, the PAGA allocation of the Gross Settlement Amount is fair, just, and reasonable.

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1                   **b.       Inherent Risks of Continued Litigation Support Preliminary Approval.**

2                   “It can be difficult to ascertain with precision the likelihood of success at trial. The Court cannot  
3 and need not determine the merits of the contested facts and legal issues at this stage, [Citation], and to  
4 the extent courts assess this factor, it is to ‘determine whether the decision to settle is a good value for a  
5 relatively weak case or a sell-out of an extraordinary strong case.’” (*Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co.*  
6 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 4581276, at \*7.)

7                   With respect to the most immediate challenge, i.e., class certification, the risks attendant to the  
8 certification of similar wage and hour claims are demonstrated by *Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates,*  
9 *Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 999 F.3d 668. There, the Ninth Circuit vacated, reversed, and remanded a \$110  
10 million judgement against an employer for, *inter alia*, inaccurately paying overtime, and directed the  
11 trial court to enter judgement in favor of the employer. *See also O’Conner v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*  
12 (9th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1087 (decertification of wage and hour misclassification action); *see also*  
13 *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 31 (reversing a trial verdict in favor  
14 plaintiffs in a wage and hour class action)); *Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th  
15 1077, 1088 (“[T]he reason, if any, that employees might not take their breaks were predominantly  
16 individualized questions of fact not susceptible to class treatment.”); *a.S.A. Cab Ltd.* (2009) 176  
17 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341 (affirming denial of certification because employees’ declarations attesting to  
18 having taken meal and rest breaks demonstrated that individualized inquiries were required to show  
19 harm); *Campbell v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5302217 at \*11-13 (following  
20 *Brinker* and denying certification of proposed off-the-clock and rest and meal break classes due to lack  
21 of uniform policy); *Brown v. Fed Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 587-88 (denying  
22 certification of driver meal and rest period claims based on the predominance of individual issues).  
23 Collectively, the examples cited above illustrate the uncertain nature of class litigation. Consequently,  
24 the uncertainty of obtaining certification through a contested motion is a significant risk factor favoring  
25 settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 46.

26                   “The Settlement eliminates these and other risks of continued litigation, including the very real  
27 risk of no recovery after several years of litigation.” (*In re Nvidia Derivs. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 2008  
28 WL 5382544, at \*3.) Indeed, potential appeals aside, litigating a complex case through trial is

1 inherently perilous regardless of the strengths of merits of the claims:

2 [N]othing is assured when litigating against commercial giants with vast  
3 litigative resources, particular in such complex litigation as this, which  
4 would strain the cognitive capacities of any jury. Defense judgments were  
5 hardly beyond the realm of possibility. Accordingly, this factor weighs in  
6 favor of preliminary approval.

7 (*Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1140, *opinion modified* (June 18, 1990).)

8 Defendant's financial condition was also a factor in reaching this Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 47.  
9 Due to Defendant Shaxons's financial condition, even if Plaintiff prevailed on all claims at trial, she  
10 may never recover the damages. A large class action judgment likely would put Shaxon out of business  
11 and/or would interfere with the company's ability to carry out its contractual obligations. In short, the  
12 "poor financial health of [the defendants will] seriously increase [] the chance that Plaintiffs would be  
13 left with nothing if they continued to litigate their claims." *Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.* (9th Cir.  
14 1993) 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (the financial condition of defendant predominated in assessing the  
15 reasonableness of settlement); *Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2016) 211 F. Supp. 3d 1244,  
16 1256 (uncertainty concerning defendant's financial stability "strongly supports the reasonableness of  
17 the settlement"); *Laguna v. Coverall N. Am., Inc.* (9th Cir. 2014) 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10259 at \*11  
18 (finding potential insolvency to be additional risk that favors approval of a class action settlement).  
19 Accordingly, Defendant's financial condition supports this settlement.

20 Finally, continuing to litigate this action would require continued and extensive resources  
21 coupled with significant Court time to proceed through trial and post-trial motions; which can often  
22 take years. Furthermore, wage and hour litigation is complex and expensive, as it often necessitates  
23 extensive expert testimony, particularly with regards to damages. But even if Plaintiff is successful at  
24 trial, Plaintiff is acutely aware that a judgment does not end the litigation. Plaintiff fully expects that  
25 Defendants would appeal any favorable judgment. As demonstrated by *Magadia, supra*, 999 F.3d 668,  
26 the risk of an appeal and subsequent reversal is real. JCL Dec., ¶ 48. "Avoiding such a trial and the  
27 subsequent appeals in this complex case strongly militates in favor of settlement rather than further  
28 protracted and uncertain litigation." (*Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop v. DirecTV* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221

1 F.R.D. 523, 527.) Thus, “unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are  
2 preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” (*Id.* at 526.)

3 In this matter, Class Counsel negotiated a Gross Settlement Amount of \$300,000.00 that is  
4 roughly between approximately 16% and 34% of Defendants’ *class-wide* liability exposure. Given the  
5 amount of the settlement here, as compared to potential value of the claims, offset by the various  
6 inherent risks to continued litigation, the settlement is fair and reasonable. JCL Dec., ¶ 49.

7 **B. The Proposed Notice Informs the Class about the Case and Settlement**

8 The Settlement Class Members are entitled to the best practical notice under the circumstances.  
9 (*Kass v. Young* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 100, 106.) The purpose of the notice is to give class members  
10 sufficient information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue  
11 their own remedies, or object to the settlement. (*Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed Savings & Loan Assn.*  
12 (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151-52.) The notice must advise class members “that they may be excluded  
13 from the class if they so request and that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not,  
14 if they do not request exclusion.” (*Kass*, 67 Cal.App.3d at 106.) Authorities generally require service  
15 of the class notice by mail or similar reliable means. (*Chance v. Super. Ct.* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 290;  
16 *Cart v. Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 972.)<sup>3</sup>

17 The Parties jointly drafted the Notice Packet which fairly and neutrally informs the Class  
18 Members of their rights and remedies. The Settlement Administrator will first verify addresses, then  
19 mail the proposed Notice Packet to all Class Members. The Notice will include information regarding  
20 the nature of the lawsuit, a summary of the substance of the Settlement’s terms, the class definition, the  
21 procedure, and time period within which to requests for exclusions or objections to the Settlement, the  
22 date for the final approval hearing, the formula used to calculate settlement payments, and the terms  
23 and scope of the Released Claims. Agreement at § III(L)(2). The Parties negotiated this method to  
24 ensure delivering the most reasonable method of notice to the Class Members while ensuring cost  
25 effective administration of the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 50.

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26 <sup>3</sup> Due process does not require that each class member actually receive a notice, but rather a procedure reasonably certain to  
27 reach class members. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1789, at 253 (2d ed. 1986). If  
28 appropriate notice is given, class members will be bound by the judgment even if they never actually receive the notice.  
*Fontana v. Elrod* (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 729, 732.

1 Accordingly, both the method of disseminating the Notice Packet and content of the Notice  
2 Packet satisfy due process. (See C.R.C. 3.776(e)-(f); *State of Cal. v. Levi Strauss* (1986) 41 Cal.3d  
3 460,485 (the class notice must “fairly apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed  
4 compromise and of the options open to dissenting class members.”).) JCL Dec., ¶ 51.

5 **C. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Service Award**

6 Service awards “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (*Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*  
7 (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 (affirming incentive awards of \$10,000); *Rodriguez v. West*  
8 *Publishing Corp.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958, *citing* 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002)  
9 § 1 1:38, and Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study*, 53  
10 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006).) Service awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for  
11 work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing  
12 the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.”  
13 (*Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 958-59.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to  
14 named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in  
15 conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Clark v. American Residential Services LLC*  
16 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785.)

17 The Settlement provides for a Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. The service award is  
18 fair and reasonable compensation for the Plaintiff’s efforts bringing the action, assisting Class Counsel  
19 with the litigation and settlement, regularly conferring with Class Counsel on the status of her case and  
20 the strategies for prosecuting the claims, reviewing the proposed Settlement to ensure that its terms are  
21 fair and provide adequate relief for the Settlement Class Members, and agreeing to provide Defendants  
22 a general release of all claims arising out of her employment. JCL Dec., ¶ 52.

23 Class Counsel on behalf of Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Service Award  
24 once preliminary approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above  
25 showing is sufficient for preliminary approval of the negotiated Service Award. JCL Dec., ¶ 53.

26 **D. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Class Counsel Award**

27 The purpose of a payment of a Class Counsel Award in class action litigation is to reward counsel  
28 who took the risk of non-payment and invested in a case that achieved a substantial positive result for

1 the class. Class Counsel took this matter on a contingency fee basis and invested significant time and  
2 expense successfully prosecuting Plaintiff's claims. As discussed *supra*, the estimated average  
3 Individual Settlement Payment illustrates the demonstrably positive outcome for the Settlement Class  
4 Members. Considering the positive outcome for the Class Members, and in light of the supporting  
5 authority, the proposed Class Counsel Award is fair and reasonable. JCL Dec., ¶ 54.

6 Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Class Counsel Award once preliminary  
7 approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above showing is sufficient  
8 for preliminary approval of the negotiated attorneys' fees. JCL Dec., ¶ 55.

9 **E. Provisional Certification for Settlement Purposes Is Appropriate**

10 For Settlement purposes only, Plaintiff contends, and Defendants do not dispute, that provisional  
11 certification of the Class is appropriate. JCL Dec., ¶ 56.

12 1. The Standard for Class Certification

13 Class actions are statutorily authorized "when the question is one of common or general interest,  
14 of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the  
15 court" (*Cal.Civ.Proc. Code* § 382; *Lee v. Dynamex, Inc.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1332.) Class  
16 certification is appropriate when there is an "ascertainable class and a well-defined community of  
17 interest among class members." (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc.* (2014) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.) Class treatment  
18 is appropriate even if class members at some point may be required to make an individual showing as  
19 to eligibility for recovery. (*Bufile v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207;  
20 *Sav-On*, 34 Cal.4th at 333.)

21 2. The Proposed Participating Class is Ascertainable and there is a Well-Defined  
22 Community of Interest Among the Class Members.

23 Whether a class is "ascertainable" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 is  
24 "determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available  
25 for identifying class members." (*Lee*, 166 Cal.App.4th at 1334.) Class members are ascertainable where  
26 they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.  
27 (*Id.*)

28 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common

1 questions of law or fact; (2) a class representative with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3)  
2 a class representative and counsel who can adequately represent the class. (*Cal. Civ. Proc. Code* § 382.)

3 In April 2012, the Supreme Court expounded on the element of predominance: The “ultimate  
4 question” the element of predominance presents is whether “the issues which may be jointly tried, when  
5 compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the  
6 maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.”  
7 (*Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022 (citations omitted).)

8 Because all Class Members are Defendants’ current and former employees, the class is readily  
9 ascertainable from Defendants’ regular business records, i.e., payroll records. JCL Dec., ¶ 57.

10 The statutes relating to each of Plaintiff’s claims apply with equal force and effect to the entire  
11 Class. Factually, Defendants’ policies and practices apply class-wide and Defendants’ liability can be  
12 determined by facts common to all members of the class. The wage and hour issues are both numerous  
13 and substantial, and a class action is the most advantageous method of dealing with the claims of the  
14 Settlement Class Members. JCL Dec., ¶ 58.

15 Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims are typical of the proposed Class because they arise from the  
16 same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the other Class Members.  
17 Likewise, Plaintiff’s interests are entirely coextensive with the interests of the Class. Plaintiff alleges  
18 that she was injured by the same company-wide practices to which the proposed Class Members were  
19 subject to and seeks the same relief. Plaintiff has already demonstrated her ability to advocate for the  
20 interests of the Class Member by initiating this litigation, undertaking class discovery, and evaluating  
21 the proposed settlement to assure that it is fair. JCL Dec., ¶ 59.

22 Additionally, Plaintiff is represented by competent Class Counsel who have extensive experience  
23 in litigating wage and hour class action cases. Class Counsel successfully briefed, argued, certified, and  
24 gained state court settlement approval of the same class-wide causes of action that are at issue in this  
25 case. Class Counsel’s wage and hour class action experience establishes that they are well qualified to  
26 represent the interests of this Class. JCL Dec., ¶¶ 60 - 67, Declaration of Shani Zakay, ¶¶ 1-3.

27 A class action is superior to a multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of  
28 each individual claim, the Class Members likely have little incentive to litigate their claims on an

1 individual basis because the out-of-pocket expense and personal commitment necessary to litigate each  
2 claim outweighs any potential recovery. In sum, class treatment is superior to individual, case-by-case  
3 adjudication. JCL Dec., ¶ 61.

#### 4 IV. CONCLUSION

5 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of claims. Having appropriately  
6 presented the materials and information necessary for preliminary approval, the Parties request that  
7 the Court preliminarily approve the settlement.

8  
9 Dated: November 18, 2025

**JCL LAW FIRM, APC**

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12 Attorneys for PLAINTIFF  
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