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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

NEIL MODINO, RITA ORTIZ, and VALERIE
J. FOWLER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAUREL AVENUE, LLC DBA TERRACINA
POST ACUTE, a Delaware limited liability
company, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVDS2009538
[Consolidated with Case Nos.
CIVDS2023687 and CIVDS2022866]

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Jessica Morgan, Dept. S26]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed with the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, Declaration of Neil Modino, Declaration of Rita Ortiz, Declaration of Valerie J. Fowler, and Proposed Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: April 2, 2024
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: S-26

Complaint filed: May 29, 2020
FAC filed: June 15, 2020
SAC filed: February 7, 2024
Trial date: Not set

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10 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie J. Fowler*

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m., in Department S-26 of the San
3 Bernardino Superior Court, located at 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, California 92415,
4 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiffs
5 Neil Modino, Rita Ortiz, and Valerie J. Fowler (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for
6 an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs
7 and Defendant Laurel Avenue, LLC DBA Terracina Post Acute (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs further
8 move the Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
10 and Class Notice;
11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
13 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Neil Modino, Rita Ortiz, and Valerie J. Fowler as Class
14 Representatives for settlement purposes;
15 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Justin F. Marquez and Arsiné Grigoryan of Wilshire
16 Law Firm, PLC and David D. Bibiyan and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law Group, P.C.
17 as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
18 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
19 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

20 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
21 authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Neil Modino, Rita Ortiz, and Valerie Fowler,
22 filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or
23 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

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
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2 Dated: March 8, 2024
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Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

4 By: 
Justin F. Marquez
Ariné Grigoryan

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6 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Neil Modino, Rita Ortiz, and Valerie Fowler (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seeks
4 preliminary approval of a proposed \$3,000,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action
5 settlement with Defendant Laurel Avenue, LLC DBA Terracina Post Acute (“Defendant”). The
6 Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 1,954 class members. And,
7 as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval
8 under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and
9 negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class
10 action mediator, Jeffrey A. Ross, over the course of a full day of mediation and many subsequent
11 negotiations. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses
12 of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement on October 4, 2023.
13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify
14 the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

15 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

16 **A. Plaintiffs’ Claims**

17 This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiffs and
18 putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for
19 Defendant during the class period. Defendant operated a subacute and rehabilitation facility
20 consisting of one location in the City of Redlands, California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez
21 in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez
22 Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

23 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
24 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
25 worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally
26 compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based
27 on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage
28 statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil

penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

On May 29, 2020, Plaintiff Modino filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); and (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.). (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On April 10, 2020, Plaintiff Modino sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Labor Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*). On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff Modino filed a First Amended Complaint to include the PAGA violation. (*Id.*)

On October 23, 2020, Plaintiff Fowler filed a putative wage and hour class action on behalf of herself and all hourly-paid, non-exempt employees in California against Defendant and an individual named Steve Power for: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to provide rest periods; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) wage statement violations; (7) failure to indemnify; and (8) unfair competition. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) On the same date, Plaintiff Fowler also filed a separate PAGA Complaint against Defendant and Steven Power to assert her PAGA allegations. (*Id.*)

On February 7, 2024, as per the terms of the Settlement Agreement reached between the Parties, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint adding Plaintiff Rita Ortiz as a new class representative and consolidating the class and PAGA actions of Plaintiff Fowler into one action. The Second Amended Complaint is the Operative Complaint. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices

1 during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former
2 employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.)

3 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
4 analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
5 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
6 Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) Class Counsel also
7 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
8 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

9 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

10 On September 15, 2022, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced
11 class action mediator Jeffrey A. Ross. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom.
12 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
13 manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
14 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through
15 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) The mediation did not resolve the
16 matter, however, the parties continued negotiations with Mr. Ross’ assistance. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs
17 also did formal written discovery after the mediation and took Defendant’s deposition. (*Id.*)
18 After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
19 Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, on October 4, 2023 the Parties reached a settlement
20 of the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 10, Ex. 1 [Class
21 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

22 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
23 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
24 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
25 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
26 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
27 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 18.)

28 Indeed, the \$3,000,000.00 Settlement represents **76.8% of the realistic maximum**

1 **recovery of \$3,907,119.65.** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s
2 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$28.8 million, when the risk of
3 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that
4 Defendant’s realistic exposure was \$3,907,119.65, meaning the Settlement achieves a
5 significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-31.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at
6 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 29.) Indeed,
7 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
8 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

9 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

10 The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA
11 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the parties made to the
12 template in redline is attached to the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez as Exhibit 2. The
13 Settlement’s key terms include:

14 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
15 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons who worked
16 for any Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the
17 relevant Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

18 2. Class Period: “means the period from May 29, 2016 to July 31, 2023.” (Settlement,
19 § 1.12.)

20 3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
21 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.36.)

22 4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Laurel Avenue in California
23 and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the PAGA Period from April 10,
24 2019 to July 31, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.32.)

25 5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$3,000,000.00, for all claims, including
26 Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class
27 Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payments and the
28 Administrator’s Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

1 6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator
2 as undeliverable, within 7 days, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a
3 valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified, shall
4 mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks that are uncashed and
5 cancelled after the void date shall be transmitted to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property
6 Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the
7 requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, §§ 4.4.2,
8 4.4.3.)

9 7. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not Aggrieved Employees:
10 “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and
11 present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release
12 Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged,
13 based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint or ascertained in the course of
14 the Action, including: (a) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§
15 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (b) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and
16 1198); (c) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (d) failure to
17 authorize and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (e) failure to timely pay final wages
18 at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§201-203); (f) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
19 statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); and (h) Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
20 17200, et seq.); and (i) civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Action (Lab. Code §§
21 2699, et seq.). Except as set forth in Paragraph 6.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class
22 Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful
23 termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance,
24 disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the
25 Class Period.” (Settlement, § 6.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when
26 Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes
27 owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, § 6.)
28

1 8. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are Aggrieved Employees:

2 “All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on
3 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
4 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA
5 penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period
6 facts stated in the Operative Complaint, the PAGA Notice, and ascertained in the course of the
7 Action, including (a) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204,
8 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (b) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198);
9 (c) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (d) failure to authorize
10 and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (e) failure to timely pay final wages at
11 termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§201-203); (f) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
12 (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); and (h) Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et
13 seq.); and (i) civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Action (Lab. Code §§ 2699, et
14 seq.). This includes, but is not limited to, claims for alleged violations of California Labor Code
15 §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 226, 226.7, 510, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1198, and 2802.” (Settlement, ¶
16 6.3.)

17 9. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Laurel
18 Avenue.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

19 10. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$150,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs’
20 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$112,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
21 (\$37,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.35.) Class Counsel
22 submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary
23 Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12.)

24 11. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains
25 and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted:
26 Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payments,
27 Class Counsel Fee Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration
28 Expenses Payment. (Settlement, § 1.28.)

12. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$37,500.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00 each. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 6.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$1,000,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$40,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 8.4.) ILYM Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-

mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

///

///

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
4 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
6 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
7 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
8 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
10 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
11 to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
13 mediation and multiple follow-ups over the course of more than a year with experienced
14 employment mediator, Jeffrey A. Ross. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 9.) The settlement negotiations were at
15 arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties
16 went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each
17 side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had
18 not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
19 weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached an agreement.
20 (Marquez Decl. ¶ 10.)

21 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted formal and informal discovery
22 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping
23 and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the
24 provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at
25 separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of
26 current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period
27 premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 7-8.) In conjunction with their extensive factual
28 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses

1 asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and
2 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

3 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
4 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 42-53.) Again, this supports the position that the
5 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
6 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
7 action.

8 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 9 **Respective Legal Positions**

10 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
11 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
12 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
13 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
14 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
15 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
16 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

17 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
18 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 29.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate
19 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving
20 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
21 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

22 The proposed settlement of \$3,000,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
23 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-31.) Because of the proposed
24 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
25 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
26 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
27 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$3,000,000.00 is within
28 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) **Indeed,**

1 *each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately*
2 *\$898.16. (Id. at ¶ 30.)*

3 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

4 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
5 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
6 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-
7 53.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
8 litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

9 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

10 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
11 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
12 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
13 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
14 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
15 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

16 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

17 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
18 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$1,000,000.00, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
19 Settlement Amount, and up to \$40,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
20 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

21 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"**
22 **Method**

23 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
24 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
25 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
26 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
27 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
28 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

1 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/ common
2 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
3 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
4 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
5 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in
6 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
7 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
8 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
9 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
10 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

11 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
12 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
13 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
14 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
15 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
16 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
17 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
18 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
19 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
20 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

21 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

22 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
23 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
24 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
25 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
26 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
27 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
28 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also

1 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
2 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
3 million].)

4 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
5 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature
6 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
7 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
8 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
9 Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
10 by the parties and requested herein.

11 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

12 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
13 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
14 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover her actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
15 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
16 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
17 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
18 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
19 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-41.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
20 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
21 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
22 ahead of all other concerns.

23 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 24 **Requested Fee Award**

25 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
26 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶¶ 42-53.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
28 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class

counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions”). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

///

1 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
2 a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to each named Plaintiff. This amount is also in
3 exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims against Defendant. Class Counsel represent
4 that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated
5 with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in
6 contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.) This amount is
7 reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members.
8 (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-
9 DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for
10 339 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each
11 named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 36.)

12 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
13 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
14 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
15 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
16 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
17 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
18 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
19 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
20 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
21 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
22 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
23 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

24 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

25 **A. Legal Standard**

26 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
27 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
28 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the

1 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
2 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
3 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
4 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
5 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
6 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
7 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
8 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
9 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
10 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
11 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
12 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

13 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
14 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
15 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
16 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
17 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
18 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

19 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
20 **Settlement Purposes.**

21 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

22 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
23 approximately 1,954 employees of Defendant.

24 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
25 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
26 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
27 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
28 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

1 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
2 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
3 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
4 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
5 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
6 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
7 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
8 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
9 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

10 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

11 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
12 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
13 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
14 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
15 Cal.App.3d 605.)

16 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
17 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
18 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
19 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
20 overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
21 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
22 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
23 compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified
24 class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress
25 for, the same alleged injuries.

26 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

27 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
28 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the

1 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
2 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
3 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
4 situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they
5 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
6 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant; as
7 such, they allege that she was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
8 employees.

9 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

10 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
11 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
12 a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
13 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

14 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
15 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
16 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-53.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
17 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
18 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
19 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing her dedication. Plaintiffs’
20 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her serious commitment to bringing about
21 the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

22 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

23 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
24 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
25 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
26 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
27 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
28 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a

practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: March 8, 2024

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

6 By: _____

7 *Justin F. Marquez*
Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
Arsiné Grigoryan, Esq.
8 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

PROOF OF SERVICE

Modina v. Laurel Avenue, LLC dba Terracina Post Acute, et al.
CIVDS2009538

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Dariane Rose, am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Fl., Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is drose@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On March 8, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:


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CARLSON & RAUTH**
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Telephone: (949) 725-4109
Facsimile: (949) 725-4100

Attorneys for Defendants

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **March 8, 2024**, at Los Angeles, California.



Dariane Rose