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on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

TEODORO S. FRANCISCO on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated

Plaintiff,

vs.

CURIO MANAGEMENT LLC a Delaware
limited liability company, HILTON
MANAGEMENT LLC a Delaware limited
liability company, HILTON DOMESTIC
OPERATING COMPANY, INC. and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 20CV365920
ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO:
JUDGE: Hon. Charles F. Adams
DEPT: 7

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT**

(Declarations of Anthony Draper, Teodoro S.
Francisco and [Proposed] Order are
concurrently filed herewith)

Date: July 24, 2025
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept. 7

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 24, 2025, in Department 7 of the above-
entitled court located at 191 N. First Street, San Jose, California 95113, Teodoro S. Francisco
("Plaintiff") will and hereby does move the Court for an Order: (1) provisionally certifying the
Class for Settlement purposes only; (2) preliminarily approving James R. Hawkins, Isandra

1 Fernandez, and Anthony Draper of James Hawkins APLC as Class Counsel in this matter, (3)
2 provisionally approving Plaintiff as the Class Representative; (4) preliminarily approving
3 Simpluris, Inc., as the Settlement Administrator; (5) preliminarily approving the Joint
4 Stipulation of Class and Representative Action Settlement and Release (“Settlement
5 Agreement”); (6) approving and directing distribution of the Notice of Class and Representative
6 PAGA Action Settlement Class Notice; and (7) scheduling a Hearing Date for Final Approval.

7 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California *Rules of Court*, which
8 provides for court approval of the settlement of a purported class action and allows the Court to
9 preliminarily certify a class for settlement purposes. The basis for this Motion is that the
10 proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and the procedures proposed by the Parties
11 are adequate to ensure the opportunity of Class Members to participate in, opt out of, or object to
12 the Settlement.

13 This Motion will be based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities included
14 herein, the Declaration of Anthony Draper, the Settlement Agreement attached to the Declaration
15 of Anthony Draper as Exhibit 1, the Declaration of Teodoro S. Francisco and upon the oral
16 arguments of counsel (should there be any) and upon the complete records and file herein.

17
18 Dated: July 1, 2025

JAMES R. HAWKINS, APLC

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21 By: 

Isandra Y. Fernandez
Anthony Draper
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Teodoro S. Francisco

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1 Teodoro Francisco as the Class Representative (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”); (iv)
2 provisionally appointing Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) as the Settlement Administrator; (v)
3 provisionally granting preliminary approval of the Join Stipulation of Class and Representative
4 Action Settlement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”); (vi) provisionally directing
5 distribution of the Notice of Class and Representative PAGA Action Settlement (“Class Notice”)
6 pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement; and (vii) scheduling
7 a final approval hearing.

8 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

9 **A. Pleadings**

10 On April 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a wage and hour class action in Santa Clara County
11 Superior Court on behalf of himself and all current and former non-exempt employees employed
12 by Defendants in the State of California to work in the Juniper Hotel Cupertino, Curio Collection
13 by Hilton, based on allegations that Defendants: (1) failed to pay all lawful wages owed
14 including minimum wage and/or overtime; (2) failed to provide statutorily compliant meal
15 periods and/or to pay one (1) hour of compensation at the employees regular rate of pay for each
16 workday that a compliant meal period was not properly provided; (3) failed to timely pay all
17 wages owed at the termination of employment; (4) failed to provide accurate itemized wage
18 statements; and (6) UCL violations (See concurrently filed Declaration of Anthony Draper
19 “Draper Decl.”, ¶ 2.)

20 On April 1, 2020, Plaintiff also gave notice to Defendants and the Labor Workforce
21 Development Agency (“LWDA”) of his intention to file a PAGA complaint based on the above
22 violations. (Draper Decl., ¶ 3.) On June 5, 2020 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
23 (“FAC”) adding a cause of action for PAGA violations (Draper Decl., ¶ 4.) The FAC is the
24 Operative Complaint in the Action. (*Id.*)

25 Throughout this litigation, Defendants have denied Plaintiff’s allegations and raised
26 appropriate defenses, both individually and on a class wide basis. Defendants maintain that their
27 policies and/or practices are consistent with the requirements of the California Labor Code, and
28 all applicable Wage Orders. (Draper Decl., ¶ 5.) To date, no class has been certified and the

1 Court has not made any findings that Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing or in violation of
2 any state law, rule or regulation, with respect to the issues presented in the litigation. (Draper
3 Decl., ¶ 6.)

4 Through informal discovery, Plaintiff and Defendants have exchanged extensive
5 documents and information related to the claims asserted. (Draper Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants have
6 produced thousands of pages of information, including timecard records and wage reports of
7 putative Class Members (*Id.*) Defendants also provided Plaintiff with class data and random
8 samples of time records, wage statements, and information regarding the number of non-exempt
9 employees during the relevant time-period (*Id.*)

10 On April 15, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendants participated in mediation before Kelley
11 Knight, a respected mediator for wage and hour class actions. (Draper Decl. ¶ 8.) The Parties
12 were unable to reach a settlement at the conclusion of the mediation. (*Id.*) Subsequently, on
13 November 16, 2023, after engaging in numerous discussions and exchange of information
14 regarding the claims alleged, the Parties participated in a second full-day mediation with Lisa
15 Klerman, another respected mediator for wage and hour class actions. (Draper Decl., ¶ 9.) With
16 the assistance of Ms. Klerman, the parties were able to reach a settlement. (*Id.*) Thereafter, the
17 Parties exchanged multiple drafts of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). (Draper
18 Decl., ¶ 10.) After execution the MOU, the Parties exchanged numerous drafts of the long form
19 settlement agreement and engaged in numerous communications regarding the settlement terms
20 (*Id.*) The final terms and provisions of the settlement agreement were approved and executed by
21 all the parties on or about January 27, 2025 (Draper Decl., ¶ 11; Exhibit 1.- Join Stipulation of
22 Class and Representative Action Settlement and Release - “Settlement Agreement”)

23 Based on their own respective independent investigations and evaluations and after
24 taking into account the sharply disputed factual and legal issues involved in this matter, the risks
25 attending further prosecution in light of certification issues faced due to the *Brinker Rest. Corp.*
26 *v. Super. Ct.*, (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (“*Brinker*”) decision, the discovery and investigation
27 conducted to date, Plaintiff and his counsel are of the opinion that settlement for the
28 consideration and on the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and

adequate and is in the best interests of the named Plaintiff and Class Members. (Draper Decl., ¶ 12.)

III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Settlement Class

The “Class” and/or “Settlement Class” means all current and former non-exempt employees employed by Defendants in the State of California to work in the Juniper Hotel Cupertino, Curio Collection by Hilton during the Class Period (April 1, 2016 through July 31, 2024) (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 8.3, 8.8.)

B. PAGA Members

PAGA Members means the group of Class Members employed by Defendants in the State of California to work in the Juniper Hotel Cupertino, Curio Collection by Hilton during the PAGA Period (April 1, 2019 through July 31, 2024) who constitute the allegedly Aggrieved Employees within the meaning of PAGA in this Action. (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 8.20, 8.23.)

C. Allocation of the Maximum Settlement Amount

1. The Maximum Settlement Amount (“MSA”) is Six Hundred and Five Thousand Dollars (\$605,000). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 8.18.) This Settlement Amount is in addition to the employer’s share of the payroll taxes, inclusive of all settlement payments to Participating Class Members and PAGA Members, Class Counsel’s Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs, the Court-approved Enhancement Payment to the Class Representative, Settlement Administration Expenses, and the LWDA’s share of PAGA penalties. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 8.18, 8.19.)

2. Subject to Court approval, Class Counsel may seek approval from the Court of a maximum of Two Hundred Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars (\$211,750). in attorneys’ fees (35% of the MSA), and a maximum of Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$30,000) in actual litigation costs. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 8.2.)

3. Subject to Court approval, the Class Representative may seek approval from the Court of an Enhancement payment not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000) from the MSA

1 for a general release of his claims and for serving as a Class Representative. (Settlement
2 Agreement, ¶¶ 8.13.)

3 4. Subject to Court approval, reasonable Settlement Administration Costs to be
4 taken from the MSA which are estimated to be Seven Thousand Dollars (\$7,000). (Settlement
5 Agreement, ¶ 11.4.)

6 5. Subject to Court approval, Twenty Five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000) shall be
7 allocated to PAGA penalties, from which Eighteen Thousand and Seven Hundred and Fifty
8 Dollars (\$18,750) (75%) shall be payable to the LWDA and Six Thousand Two Hundred and
9 Fifty Dollars (\$6,250) will be distributed to the PAGA Members. (Settlement Agreement, ¶
10 8.22.)

11 6. “Individual Settlement Payment” means the total amount a Participating Class
12 Member will receive consisting of his/her share of the Net Class Settlement Amount and his or
13 her share of the portion of the PAGA Payment that will be distributed to allegedly Aggrieved
14 Employees under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Subject to Court approval, each
15 Individual Settlement Payment will be allocated as follows: 20% as disputed wages; 40% as
16 interest; and 40% as penalties. (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 8.16, 14.7.)

17 7. The portion of the MSA remaining after subtracting the Settlement
18 Administration Expenses, Court-approved attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, Court-approved
19 Enhancement payment and the portion of PAGA penalties payable to the LWDA, shall be
20 designated the “Net Class Settlement Amount” or “NSA” (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 8.19.)

21 8. Defendants shall be responsible for paying the employer’s share of payroll taxes,
22 separately and in addition to the Maximum Settlement Amount. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.18.)

23 9. Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated by dividing the NSA by the
24 total number of work weeks for all Participating Class Members during the Class Period (“Class
25 Work Week Value”), and then multiplying the Class Pay Work Week Value by the number of
26 work weeks worked by each Participating Class Member during the Class Period. (Settlement
27 Agreement, ¶ 11.6(3).)

1 10. PAGA Payment will be calculated by dividing \$6,250 by the total number of pay
2 periods for all PAGA Members during the PAGA Period (“PAGA Pay Period Value”), and then
3 multiplying the PAGA Pay Period Value by the number of pay periods worked by each PAGA
4 Member during the PAGA Period. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 11.6(4).)

5 Here, there are estimated to be 270 putative Class Members. The NSA, subject to Court
6 approval, is Three Hundred Twenty- Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$327,500). Thus,
7 subject to Court approval, the estimated average net recovery of Class Members will be
8 approximately One Thousand Two Hundred Thirteen Dollars (\$1,213). This average net
9 recovery amount is significantly more than other wage and hour class action settlements
10 approved by California state and federal courts. *See, e.g., Ressler v. Federated Department*
11 *Stores, Inc.*, Case No. BC335018 (L.A. County Super. Ct.) (average net recovery of
12 approximately \$90); *Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D.
13 Cal.) (average net recovery of approximately \$65); *Sorenson v. Defendants, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-
14 CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal.) (average net recovery of approximately \$60); *Lim v.*
15 *Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213 (Orange County Super. Ct.) (average net
16 recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus Salon, Inc.*, Case No. BC392297 (L.A.
17 Super. Ct.) (average net recovery of approximately \$20); and *Jones v. Bath& Body Works, Inc.*,
18 No. 2:13-cv-05206-FMO-AJW (C.D. Cal.) (average net recovery of approximately \$50).

19 **D. Releases**

20 1) Class Member Released Claims Summary

21 The claims released by Plaintiff and Participating Class Members shall include all claims
22 under state, federal, or local law, whether statutory or based in common law, arising out of the
23 claims expressly pleaded in the Action and all other claims that could have been pleaded based
24 on the facts pleaded in the Action including but not limited to failure to pay wages owed,
25 including minimum and overtime wages; failure to provide compliant meal periods and
26 associated meal break premiums; failure to timely pay all wages due to discharged or quitting
27 employees; failure to provide accurate wage statements; alleged violation of Business and
28 Professions Code Section 17200 based on the alleged Labor Code violations; alleged violation of

1 the IWC Wage Orders based on the claims alleged; any claims for injunctive relief; liquidated
2 damages, penalties, interest, fees, and costs; and all other claims and allegations made or that
3 could have been made in the Action based on the facts and alleged in the Action. (Settlement
4 Agreement, ¶ 8.27.)

5 2) PAGA-Released Claims Summary

6 The claims released by the PAGA Members shall be the following: all claims for civil
7 penalties, attorneys' fees, and costs arising out of the Labor Code claims and allegations
8 expressly pleaded in the PAGA Notice and the Action, and all other Labor Code claims that
9 could have been asserted based on the facts and allegations pleaded in the PAGA Notice and the
10 Action, including but not limited to: failure to pay wages owed, including minimum and
11 overtime wages; failure to provide compliant meal periods and associated meal break premiums;
12 failure to timely pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees; and failure to provide
13 accurate wage statements. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 8.29.)

14 3) Class Representative Released Claims

15 Plaintiff, as the Class Representative, shall separately release the following: all claims,
16 demands, rights, liabilities, and/or causes, of any form whatsoever, arising under federal, state or
17 local wage-and-hour laws, rules, or regulations, whether known or unknown, unforeseen,
18 unanticipated, unsuspected or latent, that have been or could have been asserted by Plaintiff, or
19 the heirs, successors and/or assigns of Plaintiff, whether directly, indirectly, representatively,
20 derivatively or in any other capacity, against Defendants, and each of them, or any of the other
21 Released Parties, arising at any time prior to entry of the Final Approval Order. Plaintiff also
22 expressly waives all rights and benefits under the terms of California Civil Code § 1542.
23 (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 12.3.)

24 **E. Notice Procedure**

25 Defendants will provide the name, last known address, social security number, and dates
26 of employment of Class Members ("Class Data") to the Settlement Administrator no later than
27 fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court issues and order granting Preliminary Approval of the
28 settlement. (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 8.5, 13.2.)

1 Within twenty-one (21) calendar days from the date Defendants provide the Class Data to
2 the Settlement Administrator, Simpluris shall mail the Class Notice to the Class Members via
3 First Class Mail. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13.3.) With respect to any returned envelopes, the
4 Settlement Administrator will skip-trace return mail and re-mail within five (5) calendar days.
5 The Settlement Administrator shall take all reasonable steps to locate any Class Member whose
6 Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, such as a skip-trace procedure or other independent
7 research, to obtain a current address and, if an updated address is located, then re-mail the
8 envelope to such address within five (5) business days of obtaining an updated address.
9 (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13.4.)

10 Class Members shall have forty-five (45) calendar days from the date of mailing of the
11 Settlement Documents to return a valid Request for Exclusion from the Settlement to the
12 Settlement Administrator (the “Opt-Out Period”). Class Members submitting untimely or invalid
13 Requests for Exclusions shall be bound by the Settlement Agreement and its releases (Settlement
14 Agreement, ¶ 13.7.) PAGA Members have no right to object or exclude themselves from the
15 settlement of the PAGA claims. Thus, any timely request for exclusion from the Settlement
16 shall be construed as relating only to the Released Class Claims and shall have no effect on the
17 settlement of the Released PAGA Claims. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13.9.)

18 **IV. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT IS APPROPRIATE**

19 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases in which
20 substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost and rigors of formal litigation.
21 (*City of Seattle* 955 F.2d at 1276; *Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Company*, (1951) 37 Cal. 2d.
22 592, 602-603.; 4 NEWBERG § 11.41.) To grant preliminary approval of this class action
23 settlement, the Court need find only that the settlement falls within the “range of
24 reasonableness.” (*North County Contractor’s Ass. Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Svcs.*, (1994) 27 Cal.
25 App 4th 1085, 1089-1090.) In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and
26 reasonable, courts must consider the following relevant factors: the strength of the Plaintiff’ case,
27 the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining
28 class action status through trial, the amount of offered settlement, the extent of discovery

completed and the range of the proceedings, and the experience and views of counsel. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, (1996) 48 Cal. App 4th 1794, 1801; *Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC*, (2009) 175 Cal. App 4th. 785,799.) The list of factors is not exclusive and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” (*Clark*, 175 Cal. App 4th at 799; *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App 4th at 245.)

Furthermore, courts must give “proper deference to the private consensual decision of the parties,” since “the court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, (9th Cir. 1998), 150 F.3d 1011, 1027.)

A. The Terms of the Proposed Settlement are Fair

A preliminary review of the terms of the Settlement Agreement provides no reason to doubt its fairness. A presumption of fairness exists where: 1) the settlement is reached through arms-length negotiations; 2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; 3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and 4) the percentage of objectors is small (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, *supra*, at 1802.) The first three of these factors apply at the preliminary approval stage; the percentage of objectors is determinable only at the final approval stage.

1. The Settlement was Reached Through Extensive Arm’s Length Bargaining and Based on the Recommendation Proposed by the Mediator

As already discussed herein, the Parties have conducted themselves in informed, good faith arm's-length negotiations after exchanging extensive information about the claims and defenses of this lawsuit and engaging in pre-mediation and post mediation discussions aimed at settling their dispute. In attempts to settle this lawsuit, the Parties participated in two full day mediations with experienced wage and hour class action mediators, Kelly Knight and Lisa Klerman, respectively. (Draper Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) In sum, armed with all of the relevant information and with the help of experienced mediators, counsel for the parties participated in lengthy,

1 serious and informed negotiations which have resulted in the proposed Settlement Agreement
2 that is now placed before this Court.

3 2. Investigation and Discovery Were Sufficient for the Parties to Evaluate the
4 Risks Intelligently

5 Plaintiff conducted significant investigation of the facts and law both before and after the
6 Action was filed. Plaintiff's counsel reviewed voluminous supporting documents provided by
7 Defendants through informal discovery and in exchanges of information in preparation for
8 mediation (Draper Decl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also undertook an extensive expert analysis of
9 timekeeping and payroll data for the class. (*Id.*)

10 3. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

11 Moreover, counsel for Plaintiff has represented, mediated and settled hundreds of other
12 employee class actions in wage and hour litigation and have knowledge of the strengths and
13 weaknesses of the claims against Defendants and the benefits of the proposed Settlement under
14 the circumstances of the case (Draper Decl., ¶¶ 19-22.)

15 4. The Settlement Provides For Reasonable Compensation To Class
16 Members

17 In seeking approval, a settling party must provide sufficient information to "enable the
18 court to make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the settlement terms." (*Kullar v.*
19 *Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008). 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 131-32.) However, "[i]t is well-settled
20 law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery will not per se
21 render the settlement inadequate or unfair." (*See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of*
22 *City & Cty. of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 628.) "The proposed settlement is not
23 to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by
24 the negotiators." (*Id.* at 625.) "Estimates of a fair settlement figure are tempered by factors such
25 as the risk of losing at trial, the expense of litigating the case, and the expected delay in recovery
26 (often measured in years)." (*In re Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc.--Fair & Accurate Credit*
27 *Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig.*, (C.D. Cal. 2014) 295 F.R.D. 438, 453.) In other words, in
28 valuing the claims within a realistic range of outcomes, the settling plaintiff should discount the

1 value of the settled claims for risks such as changes in the law, the probability of success, and
2 other factors.

3 Settling parties are not, however, required to partake in a hypothetical accounting
4 exercise: “**Kullar does not ... require any such explicit statement of [maximum] value;** it
5 requires a record which allows ‘an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the
6 realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.’” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186
7 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409-10 (citing *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 120 (emphasis added).) Overall,
8 “the most important factor” in determining “whether a settlement is fair and reasonable” is the
9 “strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in the
10 settlement.” (*Id.* at 409 n.6 (quoting *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 130).) As discussed below, the
11 recovery of \$605,000 is within the range of reasonableness, undeniably fair, adequate, and
12 reasonable considering the risks and hurdles of continued litigation.

13 Plaintiff’s counsel analyzed the potential liability in this matter based on documents and
14 information produced by Defendants in formal discovery and in preparation for mediation,
15 expert analysis of timekeeping records and payroll data, and took into account the nature of the
16 claims and Defendants’ defenses thereto. (Draper Decl., ¶ 13.)

17 The damages model used in calculating potential liability was largely based on the
18 number of class members, the number of workweeks and pay periods, the average rate of pay
19 and a random sample of time records, wage statements and documents produced by Defendants
20 in preparation for mediation. Based on the information provided by Defendants, the estimated
21 number of work weeks is 21,784 and estimated number of shifts is 84,834 during the Class
22 Period. There is an estimated 11,656 pay periods during the PAGA Period. The average hourly
23 rate of pay is approximately \$18.88 (Draper Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s counsel estimated the
24 maximum potential liability as follows:

25 a. Failure to Pay Lawful Wages for All Hours Worked

26 Plaintiff’s claim for failure to pay all lawful wages owed, including minimum wage and
27 overtime, is primarily based on allegations that during the liability period, he and class member
28 worked “off the clock” during their work shifts without compensation.

Defendants adamantly dispute the allegations that employees were required to perform any work “off the clock.”

Plaintiff’s counsel calculated the estimated potential maximum value for this claim at approximately \$543,225 based on twenty (20) minutes of “off the clock” work per shift. However, taking into consideration the nature of the claim and Defendants’ defenses thereto, including the inability to establish the violation with respect to the majority of the Class Members, this claim was valued at an estimated maximum potential liability between \$108,645 (20%) and \$27,161.25. (Draper Decl., ¶ 15(a.))

b. Meal Period Claim

The meal break violation claim is also based primarily on Plaintiff’s allegations that due to the requirements in the performance of their job duties, time constraints and Defendants’ policies and practices, Plaintiff and Class Members were frequently not provided a timely, uninterrupted thirty (30) minute meal breaks during their shifts as required by law. Plaintiff also contends that, in the shifts in which he and Class Members were scheduled to work over 5 hours up to six hours, they were not provided a 30 minute meal period nor did he sign a meal break waiver.

Defendants adamantly deny Plaintiff’s meal break allegations in their entirety and maintains that Plaintiff and Class Members were provided with the opportunity to take full, timely and uninterrupted meal periods as per its policies and the law. Defendants dispute the propriety of certification on this claim as well, under the holding in *Brinker* and other state and federal decisions.

Based upon Plaintiff’s review of the documents and information provided in anticipation of mediation and the analysis provided by the expert, the estimated maximum potential of the meal break claim was \$638,231. However, taking into consideration the nature of the claim, Defendants’ defenses and issues faced due to *Brinker*, for purposes of settlement, the meal break was valued at an estimated maximum potential liability between \$319,115.50 (50%) and \$191,469.30 (30%) (Draper Decl., ¶ 15(b.))

c. Failure to Timely Pay Wages

1 This claim is derivative of the other claims asserted. Pursuant to Labor Code sections
2 201, 202 and 203, each employee in the relevant statutory period (i.e., three years before the
3 filing of the initial Complaint) is entitled to 30 days' worth of wages as a waiting time penalty
4 for not being paid all wages upon the separation of employment. Plaintiff alleges that penalties
5 are owed under Labor Code section 203 due to, at a minimum, Defendants' failure to pay wages
6 for all hours worked and failure to pay premium wages. With respect to Lab. Code §203 claim,
7 there were an estimated total of 166 former Class Members to whom this claim applied. The
8 estimated maximum potential liability was determined to be \$658,157 using the formula (30 x
9 \$18.88 x average 7 hours worked per day x 166).

10 Defendants once again defend that no unpaid wages are owed as Defendants did not fail
11 to pay the correct wages. Defendants further contend that its actions were not willful as required
12 for penalties to issue and that, thus, waiting time penalties cannot be awarded. For purposes of
13 settlement negotiations, said claim was valued between \$197,447 (30%) and \$98,723.55. (15%)
14 (Draper Decl., ¶ 15(c.))

15 d. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

16 Under Lab. Code § 226(e), an employee suffering "injury as a result of a knowing and
17 intentional failure by an employer" to provide accurate wage statements is entitled to \$50 for the
18 initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation up to \$4,000. This claim is derivative of
19 the alleged unpaid wages claims asserted. Defendants deny that they provided inaccurate wage
20 statements. Defendants also state that because they believe no wages are unpaid, there can be no
21 derivative penalties. Further, Defendants argue that, if any wage statements were in fact
22 inaccurate, they did not "knowingly and intentionally" fail to provide accurate statements and
23 that Plaintiff and the class did not suffer any "injury" from such inaccurate wage statements.

24 Per information provided by Defendants, Plaintiff believes there were approximately
25 163 Class Members working during the relevant time period for this claim. Thus, if a
26 calculation is performed using the maximum exposure permitted per Class Member under
27 Labor Code section 226, this amounts to a maximum exposure for Defendants of \$652,000
28 based on 163 Class Members x \$4,000. For purposes of settlement negotiations, said claim

1 was valued between an estimated maximum of \$195,600(30%) and \$130,400 (20%). (Draper
2 Decl., ¶ 15(d.))

3 e. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Claim

4 The only remedies available under the unfair competition law (“UCL”) Business and
5 Professions Code Section 17200 *et seq.* are restitution and injunction, as opposed to damages
6 *Clark v. Superior Court*, (2010) 50 Cal. 4th605, 610. The UCL provides that “[t]he court may
7 make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any
8 money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair
9 competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203.) Restitution under the UCL includes “earned
10 wages.” *Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co.*, (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 163, 177-78.
11 Restitution under the UCL is not available for all violations of the Labor Code. (*See Pineda v.*
12 *Bank of Am., N.A.* (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1401-02.) In *Pineda*, the California Supreme Court
13 held Labor Code section 203 is “not designed to compensate employees for work performed
14 [but] it is intended to encourage employers to pay final wages on time, and to punish employers
15 who fail to do so.” (*Id.*) Like Labor Code section 203, section 226 for wage statement violations
16 is also intended to “punish” the employer and is not an action brought to recover wages. (*See*
17 *Gomez v. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc.* (2019) 334 F.R.D. 234, 267-268.)

18 Here, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is solely premised on the failure to pay lawful wages and
19 premium wages claims discussed above. Plaintiffs’ Counsel assigned a zero-dollar value to the
20 UCL claim because it does not provide any additional value in this Action other than to increase
21 the statute of limitations to four years for the underlying claims. Those claims are valued and
22 analyzed above based on the four-year statute of limitations provided by the UCL. However, the
23 UCL claim in and of itself does not provide any additional damages. Therefore, there is no
24 additional or separate monetary value that this statute provides based on the facts of this Action.
25 (Draper Decl., ¶ 15(e.))

26 f. Lab. Code § 2699 *et seq.* (PAGA Claim)

27 Plaintiff’s claims under PAGA are primarily predicated on or derivative of the other
28 claims asserted. The estimated maximum PAGA penalty was calculated as \$1,165,600. This

1 figure attributes a \$100 penalty to each of the estimated 11,656 pay periods in scope during the
2 PAGA period. The figure also assumes that there is a 100% violation rate during the PAGA
3 period, such that every single pay period in question involved at least one Labor Code violation,
4 despite disputes regarding Defendants' liability. However, PAGA claims under the facts and
5 circumstance of this case may result in no award or at best a very minimal award by the trial
6 court. See specifically §2699(e)(2) which states in its pertinent part: "[A] court may award a
7 lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts
8 and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust,
9 arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory."

10 For instance, in *Fleming v. Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590 (C.D. Cal. 2011), a
11 federal court reduced PAGA penalties from \$2,800,000 to \$500,000, a reduction of 82.2%,
12 because the court found maximum penalties "unjust" because the employees had suffered no
13 injuries. Some trial courts have actually awarded no civil penalties, even when Labor Code
14 violations are established. See *Makabi v. Gedalia*, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. 1489, *5 7 (2nd Dist.
15 Ct. of App. Mar. 6, 2016) (no PAGA penalties were awarded by the Los Angeles County
16 Superior Court) (unpublished decision); *In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions*, 2016 U.S. Dist.
17 LEXIS 48557, *40 43 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (PAGA penalties denied after trial).

18 In order to recover any PAGA penalties, Plaintiff would be required at trial to prove each
19 of the underlying Labor Code violations. See *Cardenas v. McLane Foodservice, Inc.*, 2011 U.S.
20 Dist. LEXIS 13126, *10 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Given the statutory language [of PAGA], a plaintiff
21 cannot recover on behalf of individuals whom the plaintiff has not proven suffered a violation of
22 the Labor Code by the defendant."). Here, Plaintiff would need to prove that each Alleged
23 Aggrieved Employee suffered all violations for each pay period the alleged employee worked.
24 As discussed herein, the nature of the PAGA based claims (i.e., failure to pay all wages owed,
25 meal period, wage statements, failure to timely pay wages) and Defendants' asserted defenses
26 thereto present a strong risk that some or all of the PAGA penalties sought may not be awarded.

27 Defendants deny that a violation for each pay period can be established. Defendants state
28 that because the PAGA Action heavily relies on the same allegations made in the Class Action,

1 they are subject to the same defenses, and, thus, for the same reason Defendants believe there
2 will be no damages collectible in the class action, no PAGA penalties would be awarded, either.
3 Defendants also assert that individualized issues predominate the PAGA claims, making the
4 claims unmanageable for trial. Given the nature of these claims, as analyzed above and
5 Defendants' defenses thereto, Plaintiff's Counsel believes it to be likely that if there were any
6 award, it could be reduced considerably. Therefore, the amount of \$25,000 (which has been
7 reserved for the PAGA claim) is both fair and reasonable. (Draper Decl., ¶ 15(f.))

8 Through his counsel, Plaintiff took into consideration the significant risks that class
9 certification could be denied on the central claim, or that a merits decision on the central claim
10 would not favor the Class. Plaintiff has considered the expense and length of continued
11 proceedings necessary to continue the Action against Defendants through trial and any possible
12 appeals. Plaintiff is also aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for the
13 claims asserted in the Action, Defendants' defenses thereto, and the difficulties in establishing
14 Plaintiff's damages (Draper Decl., ¶ 16.)

15 The proposed Settlement requires Defendants to pay each Class Member who does not
16 opt out a portion of the Settlement Amount as specifically set forth in the Settlement Agreement
17 (Draper Decl., ¶ 17.) The amount to be paid to the Class Members is undoubtedly fair, adequate
18 and reasonable especially in light of the significant risk to Plaintiff and Class Members in
19 continuing with the litigation and not prevailing on class certification or at trial. (*Id.*)

20 For all the foregoing reasons, the proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate and
21 reasonable, and is in the best interests of the Class Members.

22 **B. The Plaintiff's Class Representative Enhancement Payment and Class**
23 **Counsel Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable and Should be Awarded**

24 The Settlement Agreement provides for an award to be paid to the Class Representative.
25 The primary purpose is to provide Plaintiff an enhancement payment, taking into consideration
26 the risks, time, effort and expenses incurred by his coming forward to provide invaluable
27 information and negotiate and litigate this matter on behalf of all Class Members. (Draper Decl.,
28 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff actively participated in this litigation by providing significant supporting

documents and information and assisting counsel in developing information necessary to litigate and settle this case which has resulted in a favorable settlement for the putative Class Members. (*Id.*) Thus, the payment to the Class Representative of \$10,000 represents a small portion of the aggregate settlement amount and should be awarded.

Further, as will be discussed in more detail in Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, class counsel fees in the amount of \$211,750 is reasonable within California's standard benchmark and well within the range customarily approved by the California courts in comparable class actions.

V. PROVISIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION IS APPROPRIATE

In addition to such terms as class definition, settlement amounts and payment procedures, the Settlement Agreement reached between the Parties contains a provision by which the Parties stipulate to the Court's provisional certification of the Class, but do so for the purposes of this settlement only. Plaintiff now requests that this Court to provisionally certify the Class.

It is well established that trial courts should use a lower standard for determining the propriety of certifying a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th at 1794, 1807, fn. 19.) Under California law, a class action is appropriate when the Class is ascertainable and there is a "well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact affecting the parties to be represented." (Code Civ. Proc., §382; *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806.) State law requirements under *California Code of Civil Procedure* section 382 for class certification largely mirrors *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure* Rule 23 – namely, numerosity and typicality of the class representative's claims, adequacy of representation, predominance of common issues and superiority. As discussed below, although Defendants adamantly disputed and continues to dispute Plaintiff's ability to certify a litigation class, all of the requirements of certification for settlement purposes are met for the proposed settlement Class Members.

A. The Proposed Class is Ascertainable

Here, the proposed class is ascertainable because all of the Class Members are/were employed directly by Defendants and received their compensation directly from Defendants. The

1 Class Members have been identified through Defendants' employee and personnel files. (*See*
2 *Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932 ["Class Members are 'ascertainable'
3 where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to
4 official records"].)

5 **B. Numerosity of the Class is Sufficient**

6 If the class is sufficiently large that joinder of all members is impractical or that
7 individual joinder is impractical, the numerosity requirement is met. (*Hebberd v. Colgrove*
8 (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030.) Here, the proposed class consists of 270 members, consisting
9 of current and former employees of Defendants. Therefore, joinder of individual claims would be
10 impractical and the numerosity requirement is met.

11 **C. There are Common Questions of Law and Fact to the Class**

12 Commonality is met if there are common questions of fact and law to the class. (*Hanlon*
13 *v. Chrysler Corp.* 150 F.3d at 1019 ["The existence of shared legal issues with divergent legal
14 factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal
15 remedies within the class"].) Here, Plaintiff alleges that the proposed Class Members' claims all
16 stem from the same alleged conduct. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated
17 California wage and hour law by (1) failure to pay lawful wages; (2) failure to provide lawful
18 meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (3) failure to timely pay wages at termination; (4)
19 knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions;
20 (5) violation of the Unfair Competition Law; and (6) PAGA. Plaintiff seeks recovery of all
21 alleged wages, premium wages, penalties, and interest pursuant to the California Labor Code, the
22 California Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Orders, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 *et*
23 *seq.*, and PAGA. Although Defendants disagree with these contentions for purposes of certifying
24 a litigation class, for purposes of a settlement class, these circumstances create questions of law
25 and fact common to all proposed Class Members.

26 **D. The Typicality Requirement is Met**

27 The typicality requirement is met if the claims of the named Class Representative(s) are
28 typical of those of the class, though "they need not be substantially identical." (*Hanlon* 150 F.3d

1 at 1020.) Factual differences may exist between the Class Members and the Class
2 Representative so long as the claims arise from the same events or course of conduct and are
3 based on the same legal theories (*Id.*) Here, the claims of the Class Representative are typical of
4 the other Class Members because they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the
5 same legal theories as those applicable to all Class Members. (*Wherner v. Syntex* (N.D. Cal.
6 1987) 117 F.R.D. 641, 644.) Thus, for purposes of a settlement class, the typicality requirement
7 is met.

8 **E. The Adequacy Requirement is Met**

9 If the named representative and his counsel have no interests adverse to the interest of the
10 proposed Class Members and are committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the
11 class, then the adequacy requirement is met. (*McGhee v. Bank of America*, (1976) 60 Cal. App.
12 3d 442,450.) Here, under the proposed settlement, the Class Representative will receive a
13 reasonable award for his time and efforts assisting counsel with factual issues surrounding the
14 case and risk incurred in bringing this action on behalf of the Class Members. Other than this
15 specific payment, all Class Members will receive a percentage of the NSA based on his or her
16 respective number of covered work weeks. Therefore, no “settlement allocation” questions are
17 raised. (*Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020.)

18 Any Class Member who wishes to opt-out of the settlement shall have forty-five (45)
19 days from the date of mailing of the Settlement Documents to return a valid Request for
20 Exclusion from the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13.4.)
21 As a result, there is no conflict of interest between the Class Representative and the Class
22 Members. Additionally, the Class Representative and his counsel have been committed to
23 prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class.

24 **F. Common Issues Predominate and Class-wide Settlement is Superior**
25 **to Other Available Methods of Resolution**

26 Class certification is authorized where common questions of law and fact predominate
27 over individual questions and where class-wide treatment of a dispute is superior to individual
28 litigation. (*Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*, (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469.) The test is whether the

1 proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*Hanlon, supra*,
2 at p. 1022.) Plaintiff contends that the proposed Class in this case is sufficiently cohesive, since
3 all Class Members share a “common nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies.” Specifically,
4 the Class Members and the Class Representative seek compensation for alleged unpaid wages,
5 premium wages for failure to provide compliant meal periods, as well as penalties and interest
6 for the allegations described herein; common questions about compensation or lack thereof for
7 worked performed by Class Members predominate over individual questions, and the Class
8 Members’ potential legal remedies are identical. Although Defendants disagree with Plaintiff’s
9 contentions, they have agreed the Class may be certified for settlement purposes only.

10 Additionally, particularly in the settlement context, class resolution is superior to other
11 methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. (*Hanlon*, 150 F. 3d at p. 1023;
12 *Dunk, supra*, 45 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1087.) The superiority requirement involves a “comparative
13 evaluation of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution.” (*Hanlon, supra*, at p. 1023.) Here,
14 the alternative methods of resolution are a plethora of individual claims from potentially over
15 270 Plaintiffs. The class action device can thus conserve judicial resources by avoiding the waste
16 and delay of repetitive proceedings and prevent inconsistent adjudication of similar issues and
17 claims. (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 319, 340; *Bell v Farmers*
18 *Ins. Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 741.) Therefore, settlement on a class-wide basis is
19 superior.

20 **VI. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE**

21 The Class Notice is attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement. The Class Notice
22 provides the requisite, pertinent information to Class Members and the options available to them.
23 Should any Class Members wish to exclude themselves from the Settlement, they can send a
24 Request for Exclusion to the settlement administrator. Should a Class Member wish to object to
25 the Settlement, they can object as described in the Notice. If a Class Member does nothing in
26 response to the Notice, the Class Member will be mailed an individual settlement payment.
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1 **A. The Class Notice Satisfies Due Process**

2 California statutory and case law vests the Court with broad authority to fashion an
3 appropriate notice process. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.760 *et seq.*) A proposed method of notice of a
4 proposed settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable if it has “a reasonable chance of reaching a
5 substantial percentage of the Class Members. (*Cartt v. Superior Court*, (1975) 50 Cal. App. 3d
6 960, 974.) The Class Notice plan described herein entails mailing the Class Notice to all known
7 and reasonably ascertainable Class Members based on Defendants’ payroll records and provides
8 for a reasonable chance of reaching a significant percentage of Class Members. (*See* Settlement
9 Agreement, ¶¶ 13.2,13.3.) Further, such individual notice by first class mail is routinely
10 approved as consistent with due process. (*See, e.g.*, MANUAL at §§21.311, 21.312; Wright &
11 Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure §1797.6 [“Of course, notice by mail to all of the identified
12 Class Members . . . will suffice.”] (citing cases).) The Class Notice is consistent with the class
13 certification notices approved by numerous state and federal courts and is the best notice
14 practicable under circumstances of this case.

15 **B. The Proposed Class Notice is Accurate and Informative**

16 Not only is the manner of the proposed notice proper, so too is the content of the said
17 notice. The proposed notice provides information on the meaning and the nature of the proposed
18 settlement, the terms and provisions of the settlement, the relief the settlement will provide the
19 Class Members, the application of Plaintiff’s counsel for reimbursement of costs and for
20 attorneys’ fees from the settlement amount, the date, the time and place of the Final Approval
21 Hearing, and the procedure and deadlines for opting out of the Settlement or for submitting
22 comments and objections. (Cal. Rule of Court 3.769(f).)

23 The Class Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (2
24 NEWBERG §8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the
25 settlement in an informative and coherent manner, in compliance with the MANUAL’S
26 statement, “the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to class members.....”
27 (MANUAL at §30.21.) The Class Notice clearly states the settlement does not constitute an
28 admission of liability by Defendants and recognizes the Court has not ruled on the merits. It also

1 states the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice
2 complies with the standards of fairness, completeness and neutrality required of a settlement
3 class notice disseminated under the authority of the Court. (F.R.C.P. 23(c)(2).)

4 Moreover, the Class Notice complies with CA Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(d) because it
5 provides for an opt-out procedure for the class members and includes the following: (1) a brief
6 explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the parties; (2) a statement
7 that the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified
8 date; (3) a procedure for the member to follow in requesting exclusion from the class; (4) a
9 statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members who do not request
10 exclusion; and (5) a statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the
11 member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel. The Class Notice contains the
12 information required under Rule 3.766(d).¹ (See Ex. A attached to the Settlement Agreement.)

13 **VII. CONCLUSION**

14 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter the [Proposed]
15 Order Granting Preliminary Approval submitted concurrently herewith, and thus: (1) grant
16 preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, and certify the Settlement Class for the
17 purposes of settlement only; (2) confirm Plaintiff Teodoro S. Francisco as Class Representative;
18 (3) confirm James Hawkins, Isandra Fernandez and Anthony Draper of James Hawkins APLC
19 provisionally as Class Counsel; (4) approve and appoint Simpluris, Inc. as Settlement
20 Administrator; (5) enter an Order preliminarily approving the proposed Settlement and
21 approving of the Class Notice; and (6) schedule the Final Approval Hearing Date on _____,
22 _____ 2025 (to be determined by the Court at the hearing for preliminary approval of
23 settlement)

24 ///

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26 _____
27 ¹ The Class Notice also contains, in compliance with Santa Clara County Superior Court complex litigation
28 requirements: (1) contact information for class counsel (2) a URL to a web site, maintained by the claims
administrator or plaintiffs' counsel, that has links to the notice and the most important documents in the case; (3)
and the URL for the Court's electronic filing and service website.

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Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 1, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS, APLC



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