

1 Zachary Crosner (SBN 272295)
zach@crosnerlegal.com
2 Blake Jones (SBN 211221)
blake@crosnerlegal.com
3 Chad Saunders (SBN 257810)
chad@crosnerlegal.com
4 **CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.**
9440 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste. 301
5 Beverly Hills, CA 90210
Tel. (310) 496-5818
6 Fac. (310) 510-6429

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff MAGGIE BLAND

8
9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA**
10 **IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN**
11

12 MAGGIE BLAND, on behalf of herself and
13 all others similarly situated,

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 MARIN AIRPORTER, a California
corporation, and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

17 Defendants.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CASE NO. CIV 2003640

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT**

[Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion and
Motion; Declaration of Zachary M. Crosner;
[Proposed] Order]

Date: TBD
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE	1
III.	THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS	3
A.	Certification of the Settlement Class	4
B.	The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class	4
C.	Settlement Administration	5
D.	The Class Notice	5
E.	Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object.....	5
F.	Release of Claims.....	6
IV.	ARGUMENT	6
A.	Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement.....	6
B.	The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified.....	7
C.	The Proposed Settlement Meets the Kullar Factors and is within the Range of Reasonableness	8
D.	Attorney’s Fees and Costs.....	13
E.	Plaintiffs’ Enhancement Awards.....	13
V.	CONCLUSION	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th	
1135, 1150.....	12
Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1203-4	11
Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504	11
Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert.	
denied, 506 U.S. 953	6
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801	6, 7
Fleming v. Covidien (C.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590, *8-9.....	11
Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836,	
839.....	7
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Federal Motor Carrier	
Safety Administration (9th Cir. 2021) 986 F.3d 841	10
Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS	
171356, at *27	12
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996	8
Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128	9
Lane v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819	12, 13
North County Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27	
Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90.....	6, 7

1	Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 602	6
2		
3	Rodriguez v. W Publ'g Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59	13
4	Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist.	
5	LEXIS 11630	11
6		
7	Staton v. Boeing (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977	13
8	Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis	
9	48557	11
10	Van Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist.	
11	LEXIS 137182	11
12		
13	Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.....	6, 7, 12
14	White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098.....	13
15		
16	Williams v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353	8
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

STATUTES

Cal. Rule of Court 3.769 6

Cal. Rule of Court. 3.769(c)..... 6

Cal. Rules of Court 3.769(f)..... 5

Cal. Rules of Court 3.766(d) 5

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 7

Labor Code § 2699(d)(2) 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for
Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at www.fjc.gov/sites/ 13

H. Newberg & A. Conte, 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; 6

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Maggie Bland hereby moves the Court for an order granting preliminary approval
3 to a proposed non-reversionary class action settlement to resolve wage and hour claims on behalf
4 of approximately 217 individuals employed by Defendant Marin Airporter (“Marin” or
5 “Defendant”) as non-exempt employees in California during the period of December 14, 2016
6 through April 15, 2022. The proposed \$450,000 settlement will provide about \$257,500 in cash
7 payments to the class, with an average award currently estimated at about \$1,185. The balance of
8 approximately \$192,500 will cover reasonable attorney’s fees and actual litigation costs,
9 settlement administration costs, an enhancement award to plaintiff, and civil penalties to the
10 State. The settlement is the product of Plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation, formal discovery and a
11 pre-mediation exchange of information, and arms-length negotiations overseen by experienced
12 mediator Cynthia Remmers, Esq.

13 The proposed settlement is within the “range of reasonableness” for approval and
14 Plaintiff’s counsel submit the settlement is a fair result given the substantial risks inherent in this
15 matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests the Court enter an order: (1) granting preliminary
16 approval to the proposed class action settlement; (2) conditionally certifying the settlement class
17 as defined below; (3) appointing Zachary M. Crosner, Blake R. Jones, and Chad Saunders of
18 Crosner Legal, P.C. as Class Counsel; (4) appointing Plaintiff Maggie Bland as the Class
19 Representative; (5) appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; (6) approving
20 the form of notice to the class and the notice procedure; and (7) scheduling a final fairness
21 hearing.

22 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE**

23 Defendant Marin Airporter primarily provides shuttle service to and from San Francisco
24 Airport and various locations in Marin County, transit bus services in Marin County, and also
25 operates a charter bus service. Plaintiff Maggie Bland was employed by Marin as a cashier, and
26 typically worked 10 hours per shift. Plaintiff contends Marin failed to pay her and other class
27 members for their overtime wages, even though they regularly worked daily and/or weekly
28

1 overtime hours, for a substantial part of the class period. She also contends Marin did not
2 maintain a compliant meal and rest break policy, and that the class members did not receive all
3 required breaks. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff further contends Marin failed to provide
4 accurate wage statements, failed to timely pay wages due on separation of employment, and
5 engaged in unfair business practices. Lastly, Plaintiff also alleges violation of PAGA based on the
6 same Labor Code violations discussed above, as well as an allegation under PAGA that Marin
7 failed to provide suitable seating for certain job positions, including cashiers. [Declaration of
8 Zachary M. Crosner (“Crosner Decl.”), ¶ 4.]

9 Marin has at all times denied Plaintiff’s allegations and maintained its meal and rest break
10 and payroll policies and procedures comply with California and federal law, that it paid the class
11 member wages due, and provided them with required meal and rest breaks. Additionally, Marin
12 strongly contends certain aspects of the case are preempted under Federal law, and that the case
13 cannot be maintained as a class action, arguing for example that to the extent class members
14 missed meal and/or rest breaks, or that such breaks were non-compliant, it was intermittent and
15 infrequent and evidence of such missed breaks would be anecdotal, and therefore individualized
16 issues would predominate. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 5.]

17 Plaintiff filed her class action complaint in this Court on December 14, 2020. After
18 Defendant removed the complaint to the Northern District of California on March 10, 2021,
19 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on April 28, 2021 that dismissed Plaintiff’s
20 meal and rest period claims and paid sick leave claim. On May 12, 2021, individual defendant
21 Lawrence Laporte was dismissed without prejudice by stipulation and order. The District Court
22 then granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court on July 2, 2021. Following
23 remand, the Parties stipulated to filing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. [Crosner Decl., ¶
24 6.]

25 After the remand from federal court, and after undertaking lengthy discovery meet and
26 confer sessions and discussions about the merits of the case, the Parties ultimately agreed to
27 attempt early mediation. The Parties also agreed on a protocol for an exchange of substantial
28 documents and information before the mediation to facilitate the settlement discussions.

1 Consequently, Plaintiff's counsel reviewed payroll records, compensation plans, personnel
2 policies/handbooks, meal and rest break policies, personnel files, and a random of sampling of
3 paystubs and time records for about 20% of the class. Plaintiff then had those records analyzed by
4 Berger Consulting Group to look for, inter alia, violation rates for missed, late and/or short meal
5 breaks, potential damages from unpaid overtime, etc. Defendant also provided data regarding the
6 total number of putative class members, the estimated total amount of workweeks and pay periods
7 they worked, and average pay rates, among other relevant data. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 7; Exh 2.]

8 The Parties then engaged Cynthia Remmers, Esq., a respected professional neutral with
9 substantial wage and hour and class action experience and, in January 2022, the Parties
10 participated in a full day mediation with Ms. Remmers. Throughout the day, the arms-length
11 negotiations were hard-fought and adversarial as the Parties exchanged extensive information on
12 their legal and factual positions, and made numerous offers and counter-offers. After a full day of
13 negotiations, the Parties ultimately reached agreement on all major issues. The Parties then
14 collaboratively drafted the Joint Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Settlement
15 Agreement") setting forth the settlement terms now before the Court for approval. A true and
16 correct copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached to the Crosner Declaration as Exhibit 1.
17 Also, in order to effectuate the settlement, the Parties agreed Plaintiff will file a third amended
18 complaint to re-allege the meal and rest break claims, and paid sick leave claim, as well as a
19 claim for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 8.]

20 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS**

21 Under the settlement, Marin will pay \$450,000 into a common fund, the Gross Settlement
22 Amount ("GSA"). Attorney's fees of up to \$150,000 (one-third of the GSA), litigation costs of up
23 to \$20,000, settlement administration costs of no more than \$10,000, and a service award to
24 Plaintiff of no more than \$5,000, and \$7,500.00 to the California Labor & Workforce Development
25 Agency ("LWDA") for the State's share of civil penalties, all will be paid from the GSA. The
26 remainder of around \$257,500 will be allocated pro rata to the Class Members based on their weeks
27 worked during the Class Period. No portion of the GSA will revert to Marin. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 9]

28 /////

1 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class**

2 The settlement provides for conditional certification of a settlement class including all
3 individuals employed by Marin as a non-exempt employee in the State of California during the
4 period December 14, 2016 through April 15, 2022. The Settlement Class consists of approximately
5 217 individuals. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 10.]

6 **B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class**

7 As noted, the settlement obligates Marin to pay \$450,000 to resolve the Settlement Class's
8 claims, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. At least \$257,500,000 from the GSA will be
9 distributed to the Participating Class Members. This is a cash settlement that does not require
10 Participating Class Members to submit a claim form to receive their settlement share.
11 Participating Class Members will receive their settlement checks automatically via First Class
12 U.S. Mail. Twenty-five percent of each settlement share will be allocated to wages and the
13 remaining seventy-five percent will be allocated to non-wage premiums, penalties, and interest,
14 which allocation is consistent with Marin's potential liability as discussed below. Marin will pay
15 any and all applicable employer-side payroll taxes separately and in addition to the GSA. Subject
16 to the Court's approval, any amounts not claimed (because a class member does not cash their
17 settlement check) will be forwarded to Legal Aid of Marin as the proposed *cy pres* beneficiary.
18 [Crosner Decl., ¶ 11.]

19 Each Participating Class Member will receive a share of the Net Settlement Amount based
20 on his or her total weeks worked in California as a non-exempt employee during the Class Period.
21 Thus, each Class Member's Individual Settlement Payment will be calculated using criteria
22 typically used in determining appropriate amounts of unpaid wages, unpaid premium wages for
23 missed meal and rest breaks, and potential statutory penalties under applicable law. These
24 methods are intended to ensure each Class Member receives a settlement award corresponding to
25 the relative value of their potential claims. The proposed allocation provides a reasonable way to
26 compensate Class Members based on the amount of time they worked for Marin and the amount
27 unpaid wages, etc. The average gross award is estimated to be around \$1,185. [Crosner Decl., ¶
28 12.]

1 As discussed below, the overall settlement amount is reasonable in light of the
2 considerable risks associated with Plaintiff's claims, and the delay and risk posed by continuing
3 to litigate such disputed allegations. In counsel's judgment, the total value recovered for the class
4 is substantial and within the range of reasonableness.

5 **C. Settlement Administration**

6 Subject to the Court's approval, the Parties have agreed on ILYM Group, Inc. ("ILYM")
7 as the Settlement Administrator. ILYM is qualified and has significant experience administering
8 class action settlements, including numerous wage and hour matters. ILYM's fees and costs will
9 not exceed \$10,000.00. If the Court approves less than the above amount, the difference will
10 remain in the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating Class Members.

11 [Crosner Decl., ¶ 13; Exh. 3.]

12 **D. The Class Notice**

13 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement)
14 sets out information about this case and explains the basic settlement terms in plain language.
15 The Notice also sets forth the individualized information used to calculate Class Members'
16 Individual Settlement Payments and each Class Member's estimated settlement award. The
17 Notice likewise details the procedures for Class Members to dispute their individual information,
18 the procedure for submitting an objection to the Settlement, the procedure to request exclusion,
19 and the fact that any final judgment will bind all class members who do not opt out. Cal. Rules of
20 Court 3.769(f) and 3.766(d). In sum, the Notice provides the Class Members with the
21 information necessary to evaluate the Settlement and decide to participate in, opt out of, or object
22 to the proposed Settlement, and meets all requirements imposed by the California Rules of Court.
23 Coupled with the notice procedure, the Notice provides the best notice practicable. [Crosner
24 Decl., ¶ 14.]

25 **E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object**

26 Class Members will have sixty (60) days to dispute the information in their Notice used to
27 calculate their settlement award, and also have 60 days to submit any objections to the settlement
28 or to request exclusion. If a Class Member disputes their individual information, the Settlement

1 Administrator will review the Class Member's records and any other information submitted, and
2 make a final determination. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 15.]

3 **F. Release of Claims**

4 All Participating Class Members will release Marin from all claims alleged in the
5 operative complaint, or that could have been brought based on the factual allegations in the
6 operative complaint during the Class Period. The release is limited to the claims that were actually
7 pleaded or could have been pleaded based on the alleged facts in the operative complaint.

8 [Crosner Decl., ¶ 16.]

9 **IV. ARGUMENT**

10 **A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement**

11 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can be
12 conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of formal litigation. H. Newberg & A. Conte, 4
13 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir.
14 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953; Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.
15 (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 602. Nevertheless, to ensure the rights of absent class members are not
16 unjustly compromised, settlement of a class action requires court approval. Cal. Rule of Court.
17 3.769; Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.
18 (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. This judicial review protects against fraud or collusion, and
19 ensures fairness to the absent class members. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-01. Judicial review
20 occurs via a two-step process to determine, under all the circumstances, if the proposed settlement
21 is fair, reasonable and adequate. Id. at 1801; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

22 The first step is a motion for preliminary approval, through which the parties present the
23 court with the proposed settlement and seek a determination that it is sufficiently fair and
24 reasonable to warrant notice to the class and further proceedings as to its fairness and adequacy.
25 Cal. Rule of Court 3.769(c). This preliminary evaluation determines if the proposed settlement is
26 within the "range of reasonableness" and if notice should be provided to the class regarding the
27 settlement's proposed terms and conditions, and whether a final fairness hearing should be
28 scheduled. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-35; North County Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v.

1 Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90. Considering the strong judicial
2 policy favoring settlement of class actions, courts generally apply a presumption of fairness to
3 class action settlements when (1) the settlement results from arms-length bargaining, (2)
4 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3)
5 counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48
6 Cal.App.4th at 1802; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

7 If the court grants preliminary approval, it then orders the class be given notice in an
8 appropriate manner, establishes a schedule and procedures for class members to request exclusion
9 or object, and sets the matter for a final fairness hearing. Typically, any motion for attorney's
10 fees and costs is filed subsequent to preliminary approval and heard with the motion for final
11 approval, as part of the second step of the two-step approval process. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at
12 1800; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 232. The proposed settlement in this matter warrants
13 preliminary approval under the liberal standard discussed above, as it is fair, reasonable and
14 adequate under all the circumstances, and represents a favorable result for the class.

15 **B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified**

16 The purpose of conditional class certification for purposes of settlement is to facilitate
17 provision of notice of the proposed settlement's terms, and the date and time of the final fairness
18 hearing. In this context, courts apply lesser scrutiny than they would otherwise in the context of
19 certifying a class. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1807, n.19; Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v.
20 Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 839 ("[I]t is well established that trial courts should
21 use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class.")

22 In the present matter, conditional certification is proper since this matter satisfies all
23 requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. First, the class is
24 both sufficiently numerous, consisting of approximately 217 individuals, and ascertainable by
25 reference to Defendant's personnel and payroll records. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 17.] Next, Plaintiff is
26 an adequate class representative, as her claims do not conflict with and are not antagonistic to the
27 claims of other class members. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 18.] Further, her claims are typical given she is
28 a member of the class and her claims arise from the same employment practices and course of

1 conduct giving rise to the claims of the other class members. [Id.] Lastly, her counsel is
2 experienced and adequate class counsel. [Crosner Decl., ¶¶ 31-36.]

3 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a
4 settlement class – as the Class Members all were paid via substantially similar compensation
5 plans that underpaid them for overtime hours worked, and subject to the same policies that
6 resulted in missed/non-compliant meal and rest periods. Since the focus of the claims against
7 Marin concerns the legality of common policies applied uniformly to the entire class, common
8 issues predominate over individualized inquiries concerning liability. For instance, Marin’s
9 compensation plans either properly paid the class members for overtime hours worked or they did
10 not, and they further either are preempted by federal law or they are not. Regardless of these
11 determinations, they will decide liability for all Class Members one way or another. [Crosner
12 Decl., ¶ 19.]

13 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy
14 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.
15 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy
16 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
17 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court
18 (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question fact or
19 law that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to other
20 means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 20.]

21 **C. The Proposed Settlement Meets the Kullar Factors and is within the Range of**
22 **Reasonableness**

23 The proposed settlement resulted from serious, arms-length negotiations facilitated by
24 respected mediator, Cynthia Remmers Esq., who has considerable experience mediating wage
25 and hour class action cases. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 8.] Plaintiffs’ counsel Zachary M. Crosner, Blake
26 R. Jones, and Chad Saunders of Crosner Legal, P.C. have years of experience litigating wage and
27 hour class actions. Plaintiff’s counsel is well-qualified to evaluate the risks and benefits of
28 pursuing further litigation or settling the matter. [Crosner Decl., ¶¶ 31-36.]

1 Next, California law recognizes several factors bearing on the fairness, adequacy, and
2 reasonableness of a proposed class settlement. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
3 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. These factors include: 1) the amount offered in settlement 2) the strength of
4 plaintiff's case; 3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; 4) the risk
5 of maintaining class action status throughout trial; and 5) the experience and views of counsel. Id.
6 As demonstrated below, the proposed settlement satisfies these requirements.

7 Prior to mediation, the parties engaged in informal discovery to facilitate settlement
8 discussions. Thus, Plaintiff reviewed documents and information regarding Marin's payroll
9 practices, a random sampling of pay stubs and time records from class members, applicable
10 compensation plans, meal and rest break policies, etc., and information from Defendant regarding
11 class size and breakdown, work weeks/pay periods, rates of pay, and other information used to
12 formulate a damages model. Plaintiff then had that information analyzed by a consulting expert to
13 assist in determining potential violation rates and other data used to formulate a damages model.
14 Plaintiff's counsel are confident they obtained sufficient information to understand the law and
15 facts of this case and make an informed decision regarding the proposed settlement and whether it
16 is fair and reasonable. [Crosner Decl., ¶¶ 7-8, 21.]

17 Next, the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonableness warranting
18 preliminary approval. The proposed settlement involves a significant sum that, when distributed,
19 will confer direct monetary benefits on the class members. Each class member will be entitled to a
20 monetary payment without having to file a claim and each payment will be relative to the value of
21 his or her potential claims. Through the information exchanged and analysis undertaken, Plaintiff
22 weighed the risks of continued litigation against the benefits of the proposed settlement and
23 determined settlement to be the most reasonable option.

24 Using that data, Plaintiff ran various calculations and estimated Marin's theoretical
25 maximum exposure on the class claims at about \$4.611 million. More specifically, the
26 theoretical maximum includes approximately \$237,000 on the unpaid overtime claims,
27 \$3,148,000 on the meal and rest break claims, approximately \$660,000 on the wage statement
28 claims, and approximately \$566,000 on the waiting time penalty claims. Plaintiff's counsel

1 substantially discounted the value of these claims, however, in light of the multiple and
2 considerable risks posed by proceeding with the litigation, as Defendant raised numerous
3 defenses and vigorously defended against these claims. [Crosner Decl., ¶¶ 22-23.]

4 On the overtime claims, there are two issues. First, Plaintiff alleges many of defendant's
5 non-driver employees, such as Plaintiff, were not paid overtime at all until approximately April
6 2019, and accordingly are owed overtime wages under the Labor Code and Wage Order 9. As to
7 the driver employees, Defendant alleged they are exempt from California overtime requirements
8 since they drove commercial vehicles of a size/weight that rendered them subject to U.S.
9 Department of Transportation regulations concerning hours of work and overtime for drivers.
10 Plaintiff also alleges, however, the drivers are not exempt from federal overtime requirements
11 since they drove entirely within California and therefore were not engaged in interstate commerce
12 and as a result were entitled to overtime under the FLSA. In response, Defendant argued its
13 drivers were fully exempt from overtime requirements under both state and federal law, and by
14 virtue of transporting passengers to and from SFO, were engaged in more than a de minimus
15 amount of interstate commerce. Further, as noted, Marin began pay its employees for overtime in
16 April 2019. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 24.]

17 On the meal and rest break issue, Plaintiff argued Marin's written meal and rest policies
18 are not compliant with California law, and further argued review of Defendant's time records
19 suggest numerous de facto violations for missed, late, and short breaks. In response, Marin
20 similarly argued such claims are preempted as to the driver employees since they engaged in
21 interstate commerce and are exempt from state wage and hour laws under the Ninth Circuit's
22 decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
23 Administration (9th Cir. 2021) 986 F.3d 841. Beyond that, Marin also argued its written policies
24 are compliant and that to the extent there are potential de facto violations, if individuals did not
25 take a meal, if a meal period was taken late in a shift, or lasted less than the required 30 minutes,
26 it was in violation of company policy and a multitude of individual inquiries would be necessary
27 to determine if the potential violation occurred due to an employee's personal choice or for some
28 other reason. These defenses collectively justify a sharp compromise on the meal and rest period

1 claim. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 25.]

2 The claims for penalties under Labor Code sections 203 and 226 are derivative of the
3 underlying claims, and accordingly are subject to the same risks and uncertainties as the primary
4 meal and rest break violations and unpaid wage violations, plus additional risks posed by the need
5 to take into account the discretionary nature of such awards and the “good faith” and other
6 defenses available to Defendant. Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157,
7 1203-4 (employer did not willfully fail to pay wages under Labor Code § 203 even though class
8 prevailed on underlying claim for failure to pay living wages). Thus, while these claims largely
9 are derivative of the unpaid wage claim, they also are subject to additional defenses and
10 accordingly Plaintiff likewise applied a significant risk discount. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 26.]

11 As far as potential PAGA liability, the theoretical penalties theoretically totaled around
12 \$1.3 million should Plaintiff prevail on all claims and establish violations of the multiple Labor
13 Code sections at issue for every single eligible pay period. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 27.] As with the
14 class claims, Plaintiff discounted the potential PAGA penalties for the multi-layered defenses
15 proffered by Defendant on the merits, and further discounted these claims since the Court
16 possesses wide discretion to reduce such penalties even if Plaintiff ultimately prevailed. Labor
17 Code § 2699(d)(2); Fleming v. Covidien (C.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590, *8-9
18 (court reduced the potential penalties by over 82% after a bench trial); Carrington v. Starbucks
19 Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (after a bench trial, the trial court awarded penalties of just \$5
20 per pay period, a 90% reduction, which decision was upheld on appeal); In re Taco Bell Wage
21 and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48557 (PAGA penalties denied
22 after trial). Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$10,000 to PAGA penalties, which amount is
23 reasonable and in line with comparable settlements in other class actions in California. Van
24 Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182
25 (granting final approval of \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of
26 total settlement); Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S.
27 Dist. LEXIS 116303 (finding a \$7,500 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the
28 overall settlement of \$345,000 and the possible weaknesses in plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of

1 total settlement). Additionally, the LWDA has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion
2 of the settlement, and will be able to weigh in as necessary. Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc.
3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with
4 PAGA penalties of 0.6% where "[p]laintiffs [have] submitted the settlement agreement to the
5 LWDA, and the LWDA has not objected to the settlement").

6 Thus, Defendant raised various defenses to Plaintiff's claims that, if successful, could
7 have negatively impacted Plaintiff's claims or potentially reduced potential damages, particularly
8 with respect to the federal preemption issue. Accordingly, Plaintiff faced considerable risk going
9 forward with this litigation and, given the need to secure class certification, try the case, and deal
10 with post-trial appeals, it would have taken years to realize any recovery in this action. Plaintiff
11 discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the risks discussed above, and carefully
12 weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially greater benefit if the litigation
13 continued. Plaintiff and her counsel concluded – in light of these very real and substantial risks –
14 settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly litigation was in the best
15 interests of the class. The overall \$450,000 recovery represents a significant percentage of
16 Defendant's potential exposure, and is roughly 10% of the theoretical maximum value of the class
17 claims. Given these risks, a total recovery for the class of \$450,000, with an average award of
18 over \$1,185 per class member is a fair result within the range of reasonableness considering all
19 potential outcomes. [Crosner Decl., ¶¶ 28-.]

20 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might
21 be achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
22 adequate. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 ("even if the relief afforded by the proposed
23 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,
24 this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary
25 settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation"); 7-Eleven
26 Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150 ("The fact that
27 a proposed settlement may amount to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of
28 itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved"); Lane

1 v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 ("[T]he question whether a settlement is
2 fundamentally fair . . . is different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the
3 estimation of the reviewing court"). Importantly as well, the proposed settlement is non-
4 reversionary and will provide benefits to the Class Members without a claims process. White,
5 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket
6 Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at [www.fjc.gov/sites/](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)
7 [default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf) (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome claims process may
8 indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and her counsel submit the settlement is within the "range of
9 reasonableness," and is fair and adequate for the Class.

10 **D. Attorney's Fees and Costs**

11 The terms of the Parties' settlement also allow Plaintiff's counsel to apply for an award of
12 attorney's fees of up to one-third of the GSA, or \$150,000 and reimbursement of actual costs and
13 expenses of up to \$20,000.00. Plaintiff's counsel will submit a separate motion for attorney's
14 fees and actual litigation costs per the terms of the Settlement Agreement and applicable law, and
15 will provide the Court with appropriate information and evidence regarding hourly rates, tasks
16 performed, and time expended on the case. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 29.]

17 **E. Plaintiffs' Enhancement Awards**

18 A modest incentive award for Plaintiff is appropriate under applicable law. See Staton v.
19 Boeing (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977 (collecting cases awarding class representatives service
20 and incentive payments ranging from \$2,000 to \$25,000). She devoted time and resources to the
21 litigation, provided documents, assisted Class Counsel with investigating the claims asserted and
22 in preparing for mediation. The service payment provided to Plaintiff as the class representatives is
23 typical in class action cases and reasonable. Rodriguez v. W Publ'g Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d
24 948, 958-59 (incentive awards are "intended to compensate class representatives for work done on
25 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action,
26 and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general."). Plaintiff will
27 provide the Court with a declaration detailing her efforts in assisting counsel and the time she
28 devoted to the case. [Crosner Decl., ¶ 30.]

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion,
3 conditionally certify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval to the proposed class action
4 settlement, and enter the [Proposed] Order filed herewith.

5
6 Dated: May 20, 2022

CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.

7 

8 Zachary M. Cronser
9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Maggie Bland