

Kane Moon (SBN 249834)
H. Scott Leviant (SBN 200834)
Mariam Ghazaryan (SBN 341119)
MOON & YANG, APC
1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 232-3128 / Facsimile: (213) 232-3125

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales

Anthony J. Orshansky (SBN 199364)
Jennifer L. Connor (SBN 241480)
COUNSELONE, P.C.
9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
Beverly Hills, California 90210
Telephone: (310) 277-9945

Attorneys for Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF ORANGE

VERONICA TAPIA, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

HOME & BODY COMPANY, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2020-01155185-CU-OE-CXC

Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Lon F. Hurwitz, Dept. CX-103

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR AN ORDER APPROVING
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BROUGHT
PURSUANT TO THE PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ACT OF 2004;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

Date: January 27, 2023
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Courtroom: Dept. CX-103

Action Filed: August 13, 2020
Trial Date: Not Set

ELIZABETH REYES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HOME & BODY COMPANY, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2020-01169522-CU-OE-CXC

Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Lon F. Hurwitz, Dept. CX-103

Action Filed: November 10, 2020
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 27, 2023, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard, in Department CX-103 of the above-captioned Court, located at 700 Civic Center
4 Drive West, Santa Ana, CA 92701, Plaintiffs VERONICA TAPIA, CLAUDIA MORALES, and
5 ELIZABETH REYES ("Plaintiffs") will and hereby do move this Court for an order approving of the
6 PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT AMENDED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
7 RELEASE ("Agreement" or "Settlement") reached with Defendant HOME & BODY COMPANY
8 ("Defendant"), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of H. Scott
9 Leviant submitted herewith.

10 Specifically, the Plaintiffs move for an order to:

11 1. grant approval of the terms of the Agreement pursuant to the Labor Code Private
12 Attorney Generals Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.*, including the amount of the settlement
13 and all allocations thereof; and,

14 2. direct disbursement of the Gross Settlement Amount pursuant to the Agreement.

15 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court, which permits
16 the Court to extend the page limit for memoranda.

17 This motion is based on this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
18 Declarations of H. Scott Leviant, Jennifer Connor, and Sean Hartranft (for ILYM Group, Inc.) submitted
19 herewith, all other pleadings and papers on file in this action, and any oral argument or other matter that
20 may be considered by the Court.

21 Dated: January 4, 2023

MOON & YANG, APC

22
23 By: 

Kane Moon
H. Scott Leviant

24 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and
25 Claudia Morales

COUNSELONE, P.C.

26 Anthony J. Orshansky
27 Jennifer L. Connor

28 Attorneys for Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes

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7 Witkin, B.E., CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (2007 Supp.) §§ 255-26114

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 In this matter, Plaintiffs VERONICA TAPIA, CLAUDIA MORALES, and ELIZABETH
3 REYES (“Plaintiffs”) asserted wage and hour claims against Defendant HOME AND BODY
4 COMPANY (“Defendant”) (Plaintiffs and Defendant collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”),
5 which is a manufacturer of personal care and home products (mainly hand soaps and lotions).

6 Recognizing that an arbitration agreement would likely preclude class treatment, Plaintiffs
7 dismissed class and individual claims, proceeding under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
8 of 2004, Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). The *Tapia* matter was eventually related to and
9 consolidated with the *Reyes* matter. Under that claim, Plaintiffs seeks penalties from Defendant, arising
10 from alleged deficient wage and hour policies and procedures. Defendant disputes these allegations.

11 After exchanging documents and voluminous data prior to mediation, Plaintiffs and Defendant
12 reached a proposed settlement to resolve the PAGA claims in this consolidated action (the “Lawsuit”).
13 However, after that initial settlement was reached, the *Viking River* decision issued, and Defendant
14 indicated that it would oppose the settlement and refuse to enter into a revised agreement if the initial
15 settlement was not approved by the Court in the first instance; an outcome Plaintiffs’ counsel concluded
16 was unlikely, based on the totality of their many years of experience with approval motions. Because of
17 this additional risk factor, the Parties negotiated a lower Gross Settlement Amount; however, in
18 exchange, Plaintiffs obtained a covenant from Defendant in the newly submitted Agreement that it would
19 work in good faith to address any conditions imposed by the Court on approval. (Agreement, ¶ 13.)

20 Under the new Agreement, Defendant shall pay a maximum sum of **\$450,000.00**, referred to as
21 the “Gross Settlement Amount,” for aggrieved employees employed in California as non-exempt hourly
22 employees during the designated PAGA period (there were approximately **1,086** individuals meeting this
23 definition of aggrieved employee as of the mediation date of January 25, 2022). This is a good result,
24 based upon the facts and circumstances discovered to exist and current state of the law.

25 The proposed settlement will dispose of the PAGA claim alleged in this matter on behalf of the
26 California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and certain current and former
27 California employees of Defendants who were employed at any time after October 5, 2019. This motion
28 is brought pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(b)(4). This motion and the Agreement were served on the

LWDA prior to filing. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2).

For the reasons below, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter an order approving the settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

The full terms of the settlement are in the Agreement. The key material terms are as follows:

- (a) The Aggrieved Employees: The Aggrieved Employees (also known as the “PAGA Members”) are: “All non-exempt employees who are or were employed by Defendant within the State of California between July 1, 2019 and April 30, 2022.” It is estimated that there are approximately 25,172 pay periods. (Agreement, at 2, and ¶ 7.)
- (b) No Reversion: The Settlement is *non-reversionary*. (Agreement, ¶ 5.)
- (c) Gross Settlement Amount: Defendant agrees to pay the maximum sum of **\$450,000.00** (hereinafter referred to as the “Gross Settlement Amount” or “GSA”) for settlement of the PAGA Penalties, which shall be inclusive of Plaintiffs’ Counsel attorney’s fees and costs, a general release payment to Plaintiffs, and the settlement administrator’s fees and costs. (Agreement, ¶ 5.) The GSA will be funded in two installments; payments will be completed six months and ten days after the Effective Date. (Agreement, ¶ 10.a.)
- (d) Net Settlement Amount: At least **\$242,577.49** will be available for distribution to the Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA. Of this amount, the LWDA will receive at least **\$181,933.12** under the Agreement, and Aggrieved Employees will receive at least **\$60,644.37**. (Agreement, ¶ 5.d.)
- (e) Attorney’s Fees: Plaintiffs’ Counsel request an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of **\$157,500.00**, with \$78,750.00 (50%) awarded to Moon & Yang, APC, and \$78,750.00 (50%) awarded to CounselOne, PC. (Agreement, ¶ 5.a; Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)¹ The requested fee is 35% of the GSA.

¹ Moon & Yang, APC, and CounselOne, PC, have entered into a written fee-sharing agreement that was approved and signed by their respective clients. Under that agreement, Moon & Yang, APC, is to receive 50% of the fees awarded and CounselOne, PC, is to receive 50% of the fees awarded.

- (f) Litigation Costs: Plaintiffs' Counsel seek reimbursement of actual litigation costs, to a maximum amount of \$40,000. Those costs are \$9,256.94 for Moon & Yang, APC, and \$8,445.57 for CounselOne, PC. (Agreement, ¶¶ 5.b; Leviant Decl., ¶ 38 and Exh. 2.) The total reimbursement requested is \$17,702.51.
- (g) Settlement Administration: Payment to Aggrieved Employees and administration will be accomplished through third-party settlement administrator ILYM Group, Inc., which has agreed to perform Administrator duties for a flat fee not to exceed \$14,220.00, which is reasonable, based on all of the services offered. (Agreement, ¶ 11; Leviant Decl., ¶ 39 and Exh. 3; ILYM Decl., ¶ 9.)
- (h) General Release Payments to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs request approval of an allocation of \$6,000.00 to each Plaintiff from the GSA (for a total of \$18,000.00) for their general releases of all potential claims against Defendant and for their efforts in bringing and prosecuting these Actions. (Agreement, ¶ 5.c.)
- (i) Uncashed Checks: Funds represented by checks returned as undeliverable, and funds represented by checks remaining un-cashed for more than 180 days, will be tendered to the Unclaimed Property Fund. (Agreement, ¶ 10.c.)
- (j) Release: In exchange for the above settlement consideration, Defendant shall be entitled to a *limited* release from the LWDA and each and every Aggrieved Employee, including Plaintiffs.² (Agreement, ¶ 2; Leviant Decl., Exh. 1.)
- (k) Other Actions: No other class or representative actions are known to exist. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 44.)
- (l) Notice to the LWDA: Attorney declarations show notice of service of the Settlement on the LWDA. (Leviant Decl., Exh. 4.)

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engaged in practices and procedures that violated the California

² This comports with settled California Supreme Court authority. *See Arias v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (2009) (concluding that "with respect to the recovery of civil penalties, nonparty employees as well as the government are bound by the judgment in an action brought under the act....").

1 Labor Code. These alleged statutory violations subject Defendant to potential liability for PAGA
2 penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 2698. Through this action, Plaintiffs seek to recover penalties
3 pursuant to Labor Code § 2698, *et. seq.* (Leviant Decl., ¶ 4.)

4 Defendant is a manufacturer of personal care and home products (mainly hand soap, lotions sold
5 in Bath & Body Works and other stores). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 5.) For purposes of this settlement,
6 Defendant employed individuals in various positions in California. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs
7 worked for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant contends
8 it had lawful policies, including break and pay policies, in effect throughout the statutory period, and
9 viable legal defenses to a substantial portion of the alleged penalty claims. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 8.)

10 **IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

11 On August 12, 2020, Plaintiff's Counsel sent a letter to the LWDA on behalf of Plaintiffs
12 Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales, in compliance with California Labor Code § 2699.3. (Leviant
13 Decl., ¶ 9.) More than 65 days passed after the letter was sent to the LWDA, and the LWDA did not
14 indicate that it intended to investigate the alleged violations referenced in the letter. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 10.)
15 On August 13, 2020, Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales filed a class action complaint in the
16 Orange County Superior Court, entitled *Tapia et al. v. Home & Body Company*, Orange County Superior
17 Court Case No. 30-2020-01155185-CU-OE-CXC ("*Tapia*") (the "Lawsuit"). On or about April 23,
18 2021, Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales filed a First Amended Complaint, adding a claim
19 for violation of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). Due to an
20 enforceable arbitration agreement, Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales filed an application
21 requesting dismissal of their class and individual claims without prejudice, leaving PAGA only claims in
22 the *Tapia* action. On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes filed a class action and PAGA
23 complaint in *Reyes v. Home & Body Company*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2020-
24 01169522-CU-OE-CXC ("*Reyes*"). As did Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales, Plaintiff
25 Elizabeth Reyes requested dismissal of class and individual claims, proceeding only under the PAGA
26 claim. *Tapia* and *Reyes* are substantially similar in their allegations. On February 4, 2021, the Court
27 issued a ruling relating the *Tapia* and *Reyes* cases. The *Tapia* and *Reyes* were consolidated by stipulation
28 on March 23, 2022. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 11.) Defendant denies all liability and admits to no claim by virtue

of its agreement to settle. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 12.) Because Court approval of a PAGA settlement is required, the settlement is presented for approval. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 13.)

V. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Counsel for Plaintiffs have thoroughly investigated the facts relating to the claims alleged in the operative complaint and have made a thorough study of the legal principles applicable to the claims asserted against Defendant. Based on their investigation and evaluation of this case, Plaintiffs' Counsel have concluded that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the defenses asserted by Defendant, potential adverse findings regarding liability, and numerous potential appellate issues. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 14.)

The Parties agreed to participate in a mediation in an effort to resolve the PAGA claims asserted in this matter. The Parties selected mediator Lynn Frank, Esq., a neutral with extensive experience mediating wage and hour class and representative actions. Prior to the mediation, Plaintiffs requested substantial data from Defendant, and Defendant provided requested data. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 15.)

The Parties participated in a full-day mediation on January 25, 2022, reaching a settlement at that time. The Parties then spent many weeks thereafter negotiating the detailed terms of the Settlement memorialized in a long-form agreement to resolve this matter. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 16.) However, after that initial settlement was reached, the *Viking River* decision issued, and Defendant indicated that it would oppose the settlement and refuse to enter into a revised agreement if the initial settlement was not approved by the Court in the first instance; an outcome Plaintiffs' counsel concluded was unlikely, based on the totality of their many years of experience with approval motions. (*Ibid.*) Because of this additional risk factor, the Parties negotiated a lower Gross Settlement Amount; however, in exchange, Plaintiffs obtained a covenant from Defendant in the newly submitted Agreement that it would work in good faith to address any conditions imposed by the Court on approval. (*Ibid.*)

DISCUSSION

VI. THE QUI TAM NATURE OF PAGA CLAIMS

This case is solely a PAGA claim, and the standard for determining the reasonableness of a settlement has not been the subject of significant judicial discussion. In 2003, California enacted the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 to remedy systemic underenforcement of many worker

1 protections. *Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 545 (2017). The Legislature’s solution enacted
2 by the deputized private citizens to recover civil penalties for the State, where those penalties were
3 previously only available to State law enforcement agencies. *Arias v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. 4th 969,
4 980 (2009).

5 “Because an aggrieved employee’s action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
6 of 2004 functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government itself, a judgment in that action
7 binds all those, including nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be bound by a judgment in an
8 action brought by the government.” *Arias*, 46 Cal. 4th at 986. With limited exceptions, “[o]f the civil
9 penalties recovered, 75 percent goes to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, leaving the
10 remaining 25 percent for the ‘aggrieved employees.’” *Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC*, 59
11 Cal. 4th 348, 380 (2014) *certiorari denied sub nom. CLS Transportation Los Angeles v. Iskanian*, —
12 U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1155, 190 L.Ed.2d 911 (Jan. 20, 2015). Thus, a PAGA claim is, predominantly, a
13 claim belonging to the State.

14 “The civil penalties recovered on behalf of the state under the PAGA are distinct from the
15 statutory damages to which employees may be entitled in their individual capacities.” *Iskanian*, 59 Cal.
16 4th at 381. Because of this distinction, and the fact that the penalties made available through PAGA
17 fell previously within the exclusive domain of State enforcement, the California Supreme Court
18 explained that PAGA suits are best viewed as a species of *qui tam* action. *Iskanian*, 59 Cal. 4th at 382.
19 After recognizing that PAGA actions are a form of *qui tam* action, *Iskanian* concluded that because the
20 State was the real party in interest in a PAGA suit, it would violate public policy to compel an individual
21 employee to waive representative claims under PAGA: “[W]here, as here, an employment agreement
22 compels the waiver of representative claims under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and
23 unenforceable as a matter of state law.” *Iskanian*, 59 Cal. 4th at 384.

24 **VII. THE STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF A PAGA SETTLEMENT**

25 Prior to *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources of persuasive
26 guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in federal court
27 decisions. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement, could be
28 reasonable if the settlement of the underlying wage and hour claims is robust and serves the deterrent

1 purpose of the PAGA statute. *O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D.
2 Cal. 2016) (“By providing fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial
3 monetary relief, a settlement not only vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have
4 a deterrent effect upon the defendant employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”).

5 *Moniz* then provided explicit confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to
6 measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with
7 federal courts, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along with a
8 consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law
9 violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

10 The class action settlement factors used to assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a
11 class action settlement are well understood. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996), held
12 that “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length
13 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
14 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is
15 small.”³ *Id.* at 1801. The court should also consider the expense, complexity and likely duration of
16 further litigation. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. “It is, of course, the strong public policy of this state to
17 encourage the voluntary settlement of litigation.” *Osumi v. Sutton*, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1359 (2007).
18 Finally, these factors are not exclusive and the court is free to balance and weigh, based on
19 circumstances. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 244-245 (2001).

20 While class settlement factors provide some guidance as to how a Court may approach the
21 evaluation of a PAGA settlement, there are significant differences between PAGA settlements and class
22 action settlements that must be recognized. Unlike a class action settlement, the scope of release
23 permitted in a PAGA settlement is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on
24 the named employee plaintiff but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party
25 to the proceeding,” *Arias*, 46 Cal. 4th at 986, “the nonparty employees, because they were not given
26 notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to
27

28 ³ PAGA provides no notice or claim procedures as exist in class action cases.

remedies other than civil penalties.” *See id.*, at 987. Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is confined to PAGA penalties, and not related individual claims available under the Labor Code.⁴

Applying the above standards to this settlement, the settlement meets all criteria for approval.

VIII. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS ALL THE CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL

Applying the class settlement fairness factors discussed above – limited to those compatible with the unique features of PAGA claims – the proposed settlement embodies all of the key features of a settlement that is fair, reasonable, adequate, and as such, meets all the criteria necessary for approval.

A. The Relative Strength of the PAGA Claim, and the Realistic Range of Outcomes in the Litigation, Strongly Favor Approval of the Settlement

“In determining whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonableness, perhaps the most important factor to consider is plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). Here, the relative strength of the PAGA claim brought by Plaintiffs weigh in favor of the Court finding that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, since there are significant risk factors that Plaintiffs would face if they did not settle this matter.

Most significantly, the ultimate decision as to the amount of penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Subdivision (a) states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action

⁴ This is contrasted with the much broader release permitted in a class action context, which may be based on “any matter or fact” alleged in the complaint. *See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation*, 643 F.2d 195, 221 (5th Cir. 1981). In this matter, the Agreement will not affect the rights of Aggrieved Employees who may possess individual wage and hour claims.

1 brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees
2 pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3.” Subdivision (f) specifies the penalties in
3 instances where the underlying statute does not specify any civil penalty. In other words, where the facts
4 and circumstances of the case demonstrate that an unreduced award would be “unjust, arbitrary and
5 oppressive, or confiscatory,” the court (or arbitrator) may reduce the award to ameliorate such.

6 In *Cotter*, the court found a significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate
7 because “[t]his does not appear to be a case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.”
8 *Cotter*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 941. Here, Defendant can state a strong case that, as the Court concluded in
9 *Cotter*, its efforts to devise compliant operational policies do not indicate an organization that has
10 deliberately sought to evade the law. This is a very significant risk factor. Defendant disputes that
11 Plaintiffs could find a coherent method for proving liability for roughly **1,086** employees working in
12 different departments and/or positions in Defendant’s business. Establishing violations for purposes of
13 PAGA would be difficult in this matter.

14 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiffs have concluded that the value of this
15 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 23.)

16 Using the most straightforward formulation of applying the “catch-all” \$100 penalty specified in
17 Labor Code § 2699(f)(2) to each pay period per employee, for all of the estimated 25,172 pay periods
18 through mediation, the maximum plausible exposure under that direct approach is **\$2,517,200.00**. The
19 Settlement of **\$450,000.00** is about 17.9% of that roughly estimated maximum exposure value. When
20 considering the serious risks discussed herein, and the Court’s inherent power to adjust penalties
21 downward to reflect an employer that sought to be in compliance with wage and hour laws, even if
22 mistakes were sometimes made, the compromise figure is reasonable.

23 The Settlement can also be evaluated by looking at each allegation and the penalty that would
24 attach thereto. (*Id.*) The maximum calculated plausible exposure is **\$5,841,575.00**, *when examining each*
25 *penalty provision separately and including liberal assumptions about proof rates for all violations.* (*Id.*)
26 That exposure consists of the following components:

- 27 • The reasonably estimated penalty exposure for unpaid minimum wage off-the-clock
28 work (Labor Code § 1194) was estimated to be **\$503,400**. Based on allegations of some

1 problems with timeclocks, underpaid wages from rounding, and infrequent post-work
2 assignments, the risk-adjusted exposure is estimated to be **\$125,850.00**, based on a risk
3 reduction of 75%, before any Court-imposed reductions for Defendant's good faith.

- 4 • The reasonably estimated penalty exposure for unpaid overtime work (Labor Code §
5 558) was estimated to be **\$580,900.00**. Based on allegations of occasional problems with
6 timeclocks, underpaid wages from rounding, and infrequent post-work assignments, the
7 risk-adjusted exposure is estimated to be **\$145,225.00**, based on a risk reduction of 75%,
8 before any Court-imposed reductions for Defendant's good faith.
- 9 • The reasonably estimated penalty exposure for late payment of wages owed (Labor Code
10 § 210) was calculated to be **\$1,258,600.00**. Based on allegations of occasional problems
11 with timeclocks, underpaid wages from rounding, and infrequent post-work assignments,
12 the exposure is estimated to be **\$314,650.00**, based on a risk reduction of 75%, before any
13 Court-imposed reductions for good faith conduct by Defendant. This penalty is
14 contingent on unpaid wage penalties.
- 15 • The reasonably estimated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was
16 calculated at **\$856,800.00**. Based on the records of facial violations and the serious risk
17 that employee choice would become an issue that impeded proof, the risk-adjusted
18 exposure is estimated to be **\$85,680.00**, based on a risk reduction of 90%, before any
19 Court-imposed reductions for good faith conduct by Defendant.
- 20 • The reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was
21 calculated at **\$628,175.00**. Based on allegations of missed or interrupted rest breaks, and
22 the serious risk that employee choice would become an issues that impeded proof, the
23 risk-adjusted exposure is estimated to be **\$157,043.75**, based on a risk reduction of 75%,
24 before any Court-imposed reductions for Defendant's good faith.
- 25 • The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for violation of Labor Code § 203 was estimated to be
26 approximately **\$100,680.00**, on a maximum exposure of **\$503,400.00**. A risk reduction
27 of 80% was applied to reflect the contingent nature of this claim and the additional need
28 to demonstrate willful misconduct.

- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for violation of Labor Code § 226 was estimated to be approximately **\$125,860.00**, on a maximum exposure of **\$1,258,600.00**. A risk reduction of 90% was applied to reflect the contingent nature of this claim and the additional need to demonstrate willful misconduct.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$1,105,328.75**. (*Id.*) This Settlement is 43% of that amount.

The concurrently-filed Leviant Declaration sets forth claim valuation. (*See*, Leviant Decl., ¶ 23.)

B. The Risk, Expense, and Complexity of Further Litigation Balances Strongly in Favor of Approval of the Settlement

To assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a class action settlement, the court should consider the expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future litigation was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the foundational violations that would support a substantial penalty award, tremendous time and expense would be invested. To adequately establish that aggrieved employees experience the alleged violations, and at what frequency, most of the aggrieved employees would need to be interviewed in a systematic fashion and their testimony cataloged in way sufficiently meaningful to permit the submission of summary evidence at trial, such as via survey. *First*, the burdensome nature of such a process would be expensive and time-consuming. *Second*, the individuals already interviewed confirmed substantial risk that the Court would either substantially reduce any penalty ultimately awarded *or* conclude that the conduct was insufficient to support a penalty award. *Third*, it would be essentially impossible to formulate an objectively reliable means of summarizing testimonial experiences, other than by an extraordinarily detailed survey. And formulating such a survey would have been important, since frequency of violations would need to be established before any penalties could be recovered. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 22.) In sum, the evidence collected to date leads Plaintiffs to conclude that, to the extent violations occurred, a fact which Defendant disputes, the violations were **not** systematic and **not** uniform across all of Defendant's employees who worked during the relevant period. Alternatively, direct testimony would have been required from as many of the roughly 1,356 aggrieved employees as could be obtained, which would be, at best, very difficult.

1 **C. The Amount Offered in Settlement Under the Agreement**

2 The Settlement provides a monetary benefit that falls well within “the range of an acceptable
3 settlement” under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant Settlement must be
4 judged. A settlement may be fair and reasonable even where it only provides a fraction of what could
5 have been obtained at trial. *See Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998).

6 **1. The Total Amount Offered in Settlement is \$450,000.00**

7 Under the Agreement, Defendants shall pay a maximum sum of \$450,000.00. Plaintiffs’
8 Counsel, with the assistance of a data analyst, assess the maximum plausible penalty exposure to be
9 **\$5,841,575.00**. (Leviant Decl., 23.) This estimate is overly optimistic. The Settlement is 8% of that
10 maximum plausible exposure before factoring in the many risk adjustments (*e.g.*, many employees
11 would have chosen on-site rest breaks, donning and doffing would be shown to take negligible time, *etc.*)
12 and the Court’s ability to reduce the penalty at its discretion.

13 Furthermore, Defendant asserted a number of defenses that potentially could have undermined
14 Plaintiffs’ claims if they were to be litigated. For example, Defendant contended that Plaintiffs claims
15 would be unmanageable under *Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC*, 68 Cal. App. 5th 746, 865
16 (2021). Specifically, Defendant argued that numerous individualized inquiries would be needed to
17 determine liability on Plaintiffs’ claims, including (1) whether employees worked off-the-clock with
18 knowledge of a supervisor or Defendant, (2) whether each individual took a particular meal period or rest
19 break on a particular occasion, (3) whether the meal period was waived, and (4) where the individual
20 skipped the meal or rest period, *why* it was skipped for each of the allegedly aggrieved employees.
21 Defendant argued the cases would be unmanageable, given that alleged aggrieved employees encompass
22 multiple hospitals, the university, and thousands of positions.

23 In addition, as noted above, Defendant would have refused to enter into an amended settlement
24 agreement if the initial settlement had not been approved by the Court with no changes, an occurrence
25 that Plaintiffs’ counsel concluded, based on experience, to be highly unlikely.

26 **2. Payment of At Least \$242,577.49 in Penalties**

27 Under the Agreement, the amount available for distribution as penalties under PAGA is at least
28 **\$242,577.49**. The amount is a significant penalty, but it is not confiscatory, nor is it, in the terms of the

PAGA statute, “unjust, arbitrary, or oppressive.” Labor Code § 2699(e)(2).

a) *The LWDA shall receive at least \$181,933.12*

As 75% of the penalties are allocated to the LWDA, the LWDA stands to receive at least **\$181,933.12** under the Agreement. Further, pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(b)(4) the “provisions of the settlement relating to health and safety laws shall be submitted to the division at the same time that they are submitted to the court. This requirement shall be construed to authorize and permit the division to comment on the settlement provisions, and the court shall grant the division's commentary appropriate weight.” The LWDA will have an opportunity to comment upon the amount to be paid to the LWDA. This provision protects against collusive settlements for less than a reasonable value of the claim.

b) *Aggrieved Employees shall receive at least \$60,644.37*

Approximately 29,000 Aggrieved Employees shall receive at least **\$60,644.37** (25% of the penalty) under the terms of the Agreement and by operation of PAGA. The distribution formula reduces the weight applied to part-time student worker pay periods to more fairly allocate the penalties.

D. The Presence of a Government Participant

As set forth above, 75% of the penalty is paid to the LWDA. In connection therewith, Labor Code § 2699.3(b)(4) permits the LWDA to comment on the penalties. This provides an independent check on collusive settlements. The LWDA was notified of the Settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 43.)

E. PAGA Counsel Are Experienced and Negotiated Aggressively

The court may also consider that negotiations were conducted at arm's length, in an adversarial manner, despite a mutual desire to settle. (Leviant Decl. ¶¶ 15-16.) The court may consider the opinion of all counsel that the settlement arrived at is fair, reasonable and in the best interests of aggrieved employees. PAGA Counsel are experienced with employment class and representative actions, as set forth more fully in the Declarations of H. Scott Leviant and Jennifer Connor filed herewith.

F. The Substantial Exchange of Data and the Stage of the Proceedings Favor Approval

In evaluating the Parties' basis for valuing a settlement, ““formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table.”” *Linney*, 151 F.3d at 1239.

Here, the substantial exchange of data was sufficient to enable Plaintiffs' Counsel to evaluate the strength and value of the claim for purposes of settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21-22.) As discussed

1 above, Plaintiffs' Counsel spoke with employees, reviewed policies, performed calculations with data,
2 and inspected related documents, such as handbooks and wage statements, to assess exposure and risk.

3 Based on Plaintiffs' Counsel's experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
4 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claim, and to evaluate the strength of this
5 claim for purposes of settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 21.)

6 **G. Additional Factors Weigh in Favor of Approving the Terms of the Proposed**
7 **Settlement, Including the Requested Fees and Costs**

8 In addition to the factors presented above, the proposed settlement does not possess any obvious
9 deficiencies with respect to its other terms, including the agreed-upon fees and costs.

10 **1. Fees and Costs**

11 Courts in the Ninth Circuit and California generally use the "percentage method" rather than the
12 lodestar approach when awarding attorneys' fees in a common fund settlement. *See* 7 Witkin, B.E.,
13 CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (2007 Supp.) §§ 255-261 at 236-241 (describing prevalence of percentage
14 method under California law); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) ("[A] litigant or a
15 lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled
16 to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole"); *In re Activision Sec. Litig.*, 723 F. Supp. 1373,
17 1377-78 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (Patel, J.) (endorsing percentage method). *See generally*, *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d
18 at 25; *accord Hanlon*, 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998). While this settlement is what is traditionally
19 imagined when using the term "common fund," it does create benefit for others beyond Plaintiff.

20 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "No general rule can be articulated on what is a
21 reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee
22 award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the
23 recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." *See*
24 Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03. Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of
25 the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in***
26 ***cases where the settlement is relatively small.*** *See id*; *see also*, *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield*
27 *Company*, 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded
28 involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million).

1 While this is not a class action, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately
2 one-third of a fund as a fee award. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008)
3 (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used,
4 fee awards in class actions average around *one-third* of the recovery.”) (emphasis added). The proposed
5 attorney fee award here is 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount, and amount reasonably comparable to
6 “average” fees awarded in California state court class action cases used for comparison purposes here.
7 *Chavez*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 66 n. 11. Again, this is *not* a class action. It is more akin to contingent
8 representation with an additional requirement of Court review due to PAGA’s qui tam nature.

9 As a PAGA claim is unique to California, it is also appropriate to consider how California treats
10 common fund recoveries. The California Supreme Court removed all doubt about the use of the
11 percentage of the fund method to award attorney’s fees in California, stating, “We join the overwhelming
12 majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary
13 fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel
14 a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
15 percentage of the fund created.” *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016).⁵

16 Thus, Ninth Circuit and California state courts regard circumstances in which class counsel’s
17 work is wholly contingent, such as in class actions and other common fund type cases, as a factor
18 weighing in favor of approving a negotiated fee award that approximates market rates. *Ketchum v.*
19 *Moses*, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001). This matter has been litigated by Plaintiff’s Counsel in a
20 manner that is reasonable, diligent, and efficient. The actual lodestar incurred by Counsel for Plaintiffs
21 Veronica Tapia and Claudia Morales to date is no less than **\$78,588.00** not including at least \$3,975 in
22 unbilled time and \$3,975 in estimated future work. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 35-36.) The actual lodestar
23 incurred by Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes’ Counsel to date exceeds **\$65,275.00**. (Connor Decl., ¶ 18.)
24 Attorneys for Plaintiffs invested substantial amounts of time evaluating data before the mediation in this
25

26
27 ⁵ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing
28 doubt about the use of the percentage method: “The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method
inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport
to bar its usage generally in common fund cases.” *Laffitte*, at 501.

1 matter, revising damage models, and in preparing for the mediation. Those efforts led to this reasonable
2 settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 34-36.) Plaintiffs' Counsel requests **\$157,500.00**, as specified in the
3 Settlement Agreement, which constitutes a lodestar multiplier of **1.03**, when compared to total recorded,
4 unbilled, and estimated future lodestar of **\$151,813.00**.⁶ (Leviant Decl., ¶ 37.)

5 The Agreement also provides for the award of actual costs, up to \$40,000, based on Plaintiffs'
6 Counsel's actual out of pocket expenses in taking on representation in this Lawsuit on a contingency
7 basis. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 38.) Costs requested by Moon & Yang, APC are \$9,256.94. (Leviant Decl., ¶
8 38.) Costs requested by CounselOne, PC are \$8,445.57. (Connor Decl., ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs therefore
9 request an aggregate award of **\$17,702.51** in costs.

10 2. Administration Fees Are Very Reasonable

11 Administration will be completed by ILYM Group, Inc. for **\$14,220.00**, a very reasonable
12 amount for the services rendered. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 39 and Exhibit 3.)

13 IX. CONCLUSION

14 For the above reasons in fact and law, Plaintiffs requests this Court enter an order approving the
15 settlement memorialized in the Agreement.

16 Respectfully submitted,

17 Dated: January 4, 2023

18 **MOON & YANG, APC**

19 By: _____

20 H. Scott Leviant

21 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Veronica Tapia and
22 Claudia Morales

23 **COUNSELONE, P.C.**

24 Anthony J. Orshansky
25 Jennifer L. Connor

26 Attorneys for Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes

27 ⁶ Not included in this figure are the many hours expended by all members of Plaintiffs' Counsel on
28 follow-up negotiations with Defendant's counsel after it was disclosed that Defendant would not support
the original settlement.

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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the State of California, County of Los Angeles. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within suit; my business address is 1055 W. 7th Street, Suite 1880, Los Angeles, CA 90017.

On the date indicated below, I served the document described as: **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ACT OF 2004; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** on the interested parties in this action by sending ☐ the original [or] ☒ a true copy thereof ☒ to interested parties as follows [or] ☐ as stated on the attached service list:

Joseph G. Naddour
Shawn M. Larsen
LARSEN & NADDOUR LLP
15615 Alton Parkway, Suite 450
Irvine, CA 92618
Telephone: (949) 769-6601
Facsimile: (949) 222-1044
Email: jnaddour@larsennaddour.com
slarsen@larsennaddour.com

Anthony J. Orshansky
Jennifer L. Connor
COUNSELONE, P.C.
9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
Beverly Hills, California 90210
Telephone: (310) 277-9945
Email: anthony@counselonergroup.com
jennifer@counselonergroup.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Elizabeth Reyes

Counsel for Defendant

- ☐ **BY MAIL (ENCLOSED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE):** I deposited the envelope(s) for mailing in the ordinary course of business at Los Angeles, California. I am "readily familiar" with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, sealed envelopes are deposited with the U.S. Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California.
- ☒ **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known e-mail address or e-mail of record in this action.
- ☐ **BY PERSONAL SERVICE:** I delivered the document, enclosed in a sealed envelope, by hand to the offices of the addressee(s) named herein.
- ☐ **BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY:** I am "readily familiar" with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery. Under that practice, overnight packages are enclosed in a sealed envelope with a packing slip attached thereto fully prepaid. The packages are picked up by the carrier at our offices or delivered by our office to a designated collection site.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this **January 4, 2023** at Los Angeles, California.

H. Scott Leviant
Type or Print Name


Signature