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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

VERONICA JAUREGUI SILVA, individually,
and on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated;

Plaintiff,

v.

BEN MYERSON CANDY CO., INC. d/b/a
WINE WAREHOUSE, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: 20STCV21665

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Honorable Lawrence P. Riff
Department 7

CLASS ACTION

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL
CERTIFICATION, APPROVAL OF CLASS
NOTICE, SETTING OF FINAL
APPROVAL HEARING DATE;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

[Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel
(Douglas Han); Declarations of Proposed Class
Representatives (Veronica Jauregui Silva and
Matthew Young); Declaration of Seth
Weisburst; Declaration of Shaun Voigt;
Declaration of Eugene Lupario; Declaration of
Erin Connolly; Declaration of Lisa Mullins; and
[Proposed] Order filed concurrently herewith]

Hearing Date: May 14, 2024
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
Hearing Place: Department 7

Complaint Filed: June 4, 2020
FAC Filed: January 25, 2021
SAC Filed: November 12, 2021
Trial Date: None Set

1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May 14, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon as the matter
2 may be heard, before the Honorable Lawrence P. Riff in Department 7 of the Los Angeles County
3 Superior Court located at 312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiffs
4 Jauregui Silva and Matthew Young (“Plaintiffs,” “Plaintiff Silva,” and “Plaintiff Young”) will and
5 hereby do move for an order:

- 6 • Granting Preliminary Approval of the class action settlement described herein and
7 as set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement
8 Agreement,” “Settlement,” or “Agreement”), attached as **Exhibit 2** to the
9 declaration of Douglas Han, including, and not limited to, the means of allocation
10 and distribution of funds;
- 11 • Conditionally certifying the Class for settlement purposes only;
- 12 • Appointing Plaintiffs as the class representatives;
- 13 • Appointing Justice Law Corporation as Class Counsel;
- 14 • Approving the Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing
15 Date for Final Court Approval (“Class Notice”) attached as **Exhibit A** to the
16 Settlement Agreement;
- 17 • Directing the mailing of the Class Notice with a postage-paid return envelope to
18 the Class;
- 19 • Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process;
- 20 • Approving ILYM Group, Inc. as the Administrator; and
- 21 • Scheduling a hearing to consider whether to grant Final Approval of the Settlement
22 Agreement, at which time the Court will also consider whether to grant Final
23 Approval of the requests for the Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
24 Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payments,
25 Administration Expenses Payment, and approval of the allocation of the Private
26 Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) Penalties.

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1 This motion is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities;
2 Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel (Douglas Han); Declarations of Proposed Class
3 Representatives (Veronica Jauregui Silva and Matthew Young); Declaration of Seth Weisburst;
4 Declaration of Shaun Voigt; Declaration of Eugene Lupario; Declaration of Erin Connolly;
5 Declaration of Lisa Mullins; [Proposed] Order filed concurrently with this motion; pleadings and
6 other records on file with the Court in this matter; and such documentary evidence and oral
7 argument as may be presented at the hearing.

8
9 Dated: March 4, 2024

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION


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11 By: 
12 Douglas Han
13 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This motion seeks preliminary approval of a non-reversionary proposed wage-and-hour
3 class action settlement by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and: (1) all individuals who worked
4 for Defendant Breakthru Beverage California, LLC *fka* Ben Myerson Candy Co., Inc. (“Defendant
5 Ben Myerson”) as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State of California at any time
6 during the period from June 4, 2016, through October 13, 2023; and (2) all individuals who were
7 assigned by Defendant Silicon Valley Technical Staffing, Inc. (“Defendant SVS”) to work for
8 Defendant Ben Myerson as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State of California
9 at any time during the period from June 4, 2016, through October 13, 2023 (“Class,” “Class
10 Members,” and “Class Period”). At the time of this filing, the number of Class Members is
11 estimated to be nine hundred fifty-nine (959), which was confirmed by Defendants. (Declaration
12 of Douglas Han In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
13 Settlement (“Han Decl.”), ¶¶ 8-9.)

14 **II. BACKGROUND**

15 On June 4, 2020, Plaintiff Silva filed a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit in the Superior
16 Court of California, County of Los Angeles, against Defendant Ben Myerson, alleging seven (7)
17 causes of action. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 10.)

18 On September 24, 2020, Plaintiff Young provided written notice to the California Labor
19 and Workforce Development Agency. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 11; Exhibit 3.)

20 On January 22, 2021, Defendant Ben Myerson filed a cross-complaint against Defendant
21 SVS, alleging six (6) causes of action. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 12.)

22 On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff Silva filed a First Amended Complaint that: (1) added
23 Plaintiff Young and Alden Allen as named plaintiffs; and (2) added a cause of action for violation
24 of Labor Code section 2698, *et seq.* (PAGA). (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 13; Exhibit 4.)

25 On November 12, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint that: (a) removed
26 Alden Allen as a named plaintiff; and (b) added Defendant SVS as a named defendant. (Han Decl.,
27 *supra*, at ¶ 14; Exhibit 5.)

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On December 14, 2021, Defendant Ben Myerson filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint against Defendant SVS alleging the same causes of action as the original complaint. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 15.)

After engaging in extensive discovery, investigations, and negotiations, the Parties remotely attended mediation with the mediator Jeffrey A. Ross on August 9, 2023, resulting in a settlement via a mediator's proposal. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 16.)

III. INVESTIGATION/ LITIGATION HISTORY

a. Discovery, Investigation, and the Parties' Staunchly Conflicting Positions

Plaintiffs propounded form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 18.) Defendants propounded special interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (*Ibid.*) The Parties responded to the formal discovery requests. (*Ibid.*) The Parties met and conferred and agreed to engage in an informal exchange of information and then eventually remotely attended mediation. (*Ibid.*)

Prior to the mediation, Defendants produced several documents relating to their policies, practices, and procedures. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 19.) As part of Defendants' production, Plaintiffs also reviewed time records, pay records, and information relating to the size and scope of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Several putative class members were also located and interviewed to attain a better understanding of the extent and frequency of the alleged day-to-day violations. (*Ibid.*)

Based on the information provided by Defendants and interviews with putative class members, Plaintiffs contend – and Defendants deny – Defendants: (1) failed to provide employees with legally mandated meal and rest breaks; (2) failed to pay employees for all hours worked; (3) failed to include non-discretionary bonuses in employees' regular rate of pay; (4) failed to pay short-shift differentials; (5) failed to reimburse employees for necessary business expenses; (6) issued noncompliant wage statements; and (7) is liable for waiting time penalties. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 21-29.)

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1 **b. The Parties Were Able to Reach an Agreement on Settlement of the Action**

2 **i. The Parties Attended Mediation Which Led to the Settlement**

3 The Parties remotely attended mediation with an experienced mediator on August 9, 2023.
4 (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30.) Under the auspices of the mediator, the Parties reached a settlement,
5 the terms were memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 30; Exhibits 2, 6.)

6 **ii. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

7 The Settlement was reached because of arm’s-length negotiations. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
8 33.) Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have always been adversarial
9 and non-collusive in nature. (*Ibid.*) At the mediation, the Parties’ counsel conducted extensive
10 arm’s-length settlement negotiations until an agreement was ultimately reached. (*Ibid.*)

11 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of additional proceedings
12 necessary to continue the litigation through trial and any possible appeals. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
13 34.) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel also considered the uncertainty and risk of further litigation,
14 potential outcome, and difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. (*Ibid.*) Based on the
15 foregoing, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe the Settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable
16 settlement and is in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

17 **iii. The Settlement Is the Result of Thorough Investigation and Discovery**

18 The Parties investigated and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and
19 defenses before reaching the Settlement and engaged in research and discovery to support the
20 Settlement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 35.) The Settlement was only possible following significant
21 investigation and evaluation of the relevant policies and practices, permitting Class Counsel to
22 engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. (*Ibid.*) This case has
23 reached the stage where the Parties understand “the strength of the case; the reasonableness of the
24 settlement in light of the attendant risks of litigation, and in light of the best possible recovery”
25 sufficient to support the Settlement’s reasonableness, adequacy, and fairness. (Han Decl., *supra*,
26 at ¶ 35; *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.Cal. 1979) 485 F.Supp. 610, 617.)

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1 **c. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

2 **i. Deductions from the Settlement**

3 The Parties agreed (subject to the Court’s approval) this action be settled and compromised
4 for the non-reversionary total sum of \$1,601,920 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) which includes:
5 (1) Class Counsel Fees Payment up to \$560,672 (35% of the Gross Settlement Amount); (2) Class
6 Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment up to \$25,000; (3) Class Representative Service Payments
7 totaling \$20,000; (4) Administration Expenses Payment up to \$20,000; and (5) PAGA Penalties
8 up to \$125,000. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 31.)

9 **ii. Calculating Settlement Payments**

10 After all Court-approved deductions from the Gross Settlement Amount, it is estimated
11 \$851,248 (“Net Settlement Amount”) will be paid to Participating Class Members – with a gross
12 *average* Individual Class Payment estimated at \$887.64. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 32.)

13 The Participating Class Members will receive a proportionate share of the Net Settlement
14 Amount using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30;
15 Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § C(2)(d).) Individual Class Payments will be allocated two percent (20%) to
16 the settlement of wage claims and eighty percent (80%) to the settlement of claims for interests
17 and penalties. (*Id.* at § C(2)(d)(i).)

18 In addition, the portion of the PAGA Penalties that is to be paid to each PAGA Group
19 Member shall be determined using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl.,
20 *supra*, at ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § C(2)(e)(i).) PAGA Group Members’ portion of the PAGA
21 Penalties will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties. (*Id.* at § C(2)(e)(ii).)

22 **iii. Notice to the Class**

23 No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval of
24 the Settlement, Defendants will deliver the Class Data to the Administrator. (Han Decl., *supra*, at
25 ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § G(4)(a).) No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after receiving the
26 Class Data, the Administrator will send the Class Notice with a translation to all Class Members
27 identified in the Class Data via first-class United States Postal Service mail. (*Id.* at § G(4)(c).)

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1 **iv. Distribution of Funds**

2 The Gross Settlement Amount will be funded and distributed pursuant to the timeline and
3 manner set forth in the Settlement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at §§ D(2), D(3).)
4 Uncashed settlement checks will be canceled and transmitted to the California Controller's
5 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member. (*Id.* at §§ D(3)(a), D(3)(c).)

6 **v. Release of Claims**

7 Effective on the date when Defendants fund the remaining Gross Settlement Amount and
8 fund all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, all
9 Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their former and present representatives,
10 agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release the Released Parties from
11 the Released Class Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § E(2).)

12 Effective on the date when Defendants fund the remaining Gross Settlement Amount and
13 fund all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, all
14 Participating and Non-Participating Class Members, who are PAGA Group Members, are deemed
15 to release, on behalf of themselves and their former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
16 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from the Released PAGA
17 Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § E(3).)

18 Effective on the date when Defendants fund the remaining Gross Settlement Amount and
19 fund all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments,
20 Plaintiffs and their former and present spouses, representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
21 administrators, successors, and assigns generally release and discharge Released Parties from the
22 Plaintiffs' Release. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § E(1).) Plaintiffs also expressly
23 waive and relinquish the provisions, rights, and benefits, if any, of section 1542 of the Civil Code.
24 (*Id.* at § E(1)(a).)

25 With regards to class action releases, ““[A] court may release not only those claims alleged
26 in the complaint and before the court, but also claims which ‘could have been alleged by reason of
27 or in connection with any matter or fact set forth or referred to in’ the complaint.”” (*Amaro v.*
28 *Anaheim Arena Management, LLC* (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537.) The scope of the releases in

1 this case are acceptable because they are limited to the scope of the allegations in the operative
2 complaints. Moreover, the released claims are ““based on *the identical factual predicate* as that
3 underlying the claims in the settled class action.”” (*Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC*,
4 *supra*, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 537.) In other words, the released claims do not ““go beyond the scope
5 of the allegations in the operative complaint”” (*Ibid.*)

6 **d. Counsel for Both Parties Are Experienced in Similar Litigation**

7 The Parties’ counsel are experienced in wage-and-hour employment law and class actions.
8 (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7; Exhibit 1.) Class Counsel have prosecuted numerous cases on behalf
9 of employees for Labor Code violations and are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class
10 claims, settlement versus trial on a fully informed basis, and viability of the defenses. (*Ibid.*) This
11 experience instructed Class Counsel on the risks and uncertainties of further litigation and guided
12 their determination to endorse the Settlement.¹ (*Ibid.*)

13 **IV. ARGUMENT**

14 **a. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Court Review**

15 California Rules of Court, rule 3.769 requires court approval for class action settlements.²
16 “Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed
17 settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).) Rule 3.769 further requires a noticed motion for
18 preliminary approval of class settlements:

- 19 (a) A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or a cause of action in
20 a class action, or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after
21 hearing.

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24 ¹ The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* – the number of objectors – is not determinable until
25 the Class Notice has been provided to the Class, and they have had an opportunity to respond. This
26 information will be provided to the Court in conjunction with the Motion for Final Approval of
27 Class Action Settlement.

28 ² The California Supreme Court has authorized California’s trial courts to use Federal Rule
23 and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. (See *Vasquez v. Superior Court*
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821; see *Green v. Obledo* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146.) Where appropriate,
the Parties cite Federal Rule 23 and federal case law in addition to California law.

1 (c) Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of
2 motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement
3 agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the
4 motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.

5 Courts have discretion to approve settlements that are fair, not collusive, and consider “all
6 the normal perils of litigation as well as the additional uncertainties inherent in complex class
7 actions.” (In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 167, 179, cert. den. sub
8 nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass’n (1981) 452 U.S. 905.)

9 **b. The Proposed Settlement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims**

10 An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor in whether the
11 settlement “of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of
12 the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
13 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (2010) 186
14 Cal.App.4th 399, 409.) The most important factor in this regard is ““the strength of the case for
15 plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.”” (Kullar, at p. 130;
16 see also Munoz, at p. 409.)

17 Kullar instructs the court is not to “decide the merits of the case or to substitute its
18 evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of the attorneys.” (Kullar v. Foot Locker
19 Retail, Inc., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) Kullar does not require a statement of the maximum
20 amount the class could recover if plaintiff prevailed on all his claims, provided there is a record
21 that allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of
22 outcomes of the litigation.” (Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 186
23 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) “[A]s the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under
24 Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is
25 within the ‘ballpark’ of reasonableness.” (Kullar, at p. 133.)

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1 **i. The Settlement Amount of \$1,601,920 Is Fair and Reasonable**

2 The Settlement Agreement was only possible following significant investigation and
3 evaluation of the relevant policies and procedures, as well as the data produced, as referenced in
4 Section III above, permitting Class Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and
5 potential damages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 35.)

6 The claims are predicated on the purported: (1) failure to properly calculate and pay
7 overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks and
8 pay applicable premium wages; (4) failure to timely pay wages; (5) failure to issue compliant wage
9 statements; (6) failure to reimburse business expenses; (7) violation of PAGA; and (8) violation
10 of Business & Professions Code section 17200, *et seq.* (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 36.) Defendants
11 vehemently deny the theories of liability. (*Id.* at ¶ 37.)

12 While Plaintiffs believe the case is suitable for certification, uncertainties with respect to
13 certification are always present. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 38.) As the California Supreme Court
14 ruled in *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, class certification is
15 always a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. (*Ibid.*) Decisions following *Sav-On Drug*
16 *Stores, Inc.* have reached different conclusions concerning certification of wage-and-hour claims.³
17 (*Ibid.*) Thus, the calculations for potential damages were discounted.

18 **ii. The PAGA Penalties of \$125,000 Is Reasonable**

19 The provisions of the Labor Code potentially triggering PAGA penalties include Labor
20 Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 218.5, 221, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 510, 512(a), 558, 1174(d),
21 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 50.) Defendants asserted,
22 regardless of the results of the underlying causes of action, PAGA penalties are not mandatory but
23 permissive and discretionary. (*Ibid.*) Defendants also maintained they had a strong argument that

24 _____
25 ³ (See e.g. *Harris v. Superior Court* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 164 [reversing decertification
26 of class claiming misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees],
27 review granted Nov. 28, 2007, (2007) 171 P.3d 545 [not cited as precedent, but rather for
28 illustrative purposes only]; *Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc.* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440
[affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification]; *Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 121 [reversing denial of certification]; *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.* (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1422 [affirming denial of certification].)

1 it would be unjust to award maximum PAGA penalties given the law’s current unsettled state
2 concerning PAGA penalties. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 50; *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt.*
3 (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 [reducing penalties by 30% under this authority].) Furthermore,
4 Defendants argued without stacking and limited to the initial violation, the PAGA penalties would
5 be limited to about **\$53,000** (530 employees x \$100 penalty for initial violation) on the low end
6 and **\$318,000** (530 employees x \$100 penalty for initial violation x 6 theories of recovery) on the
7 high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 51-53.)

8 Plaintiffs recognized the risk that any PAGA award could be reduced. (Han Decl., *supra*,
9 at ¶ 54.) Many of the causes of action brought were also duplicative of the statutory claims. (*Ibid.*)
10 Allocating \$125,000 to PAGA civil penalties was reasonable given that Defendants are also paying
11 an additional \$1,476,920 in the class settlement. (*Ibid.*) When PAGA penalties are negotiated in
12 good faith and “there is no indication that [the] amount was the result of self-interest at the expense
13 of other Class Members,” such amounts are reasonable.⁴ (*Ibid.*)

14 Considering the defenses, supporting evidence, and position that the case is not suitable for
15 class treatment, the Settlement Agreement is reasonable, adequate, and fair.

16 **c. Discount Analysis Justifies the Settlement**

17 Excluding the civil penalties, which could be completely discretionary, the total estimated
18 potential exposure, assuming certification and prevailing at trial, would be about **\$11,666,877.62**
19 on the low end and around **\$12,491,942.42** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 55.)

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26 ⁴ (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D.Cal. Apr. 3, 2009, No. CV-08-0844 EDL) 2009
27 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 33900, at *24; see e.g. *Nordstrom Com. Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 579,
28 “[T]rial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement which does not allocate any
damages to the PAGA claims”.)

Category	Potential Exposure	Certification Risk	Merits Risk	Realistic Exposure
Rest Break Premiums	\$2,137,375.71	70%	60%	\$256,485.09
Meal Break Premiums	\$1,557,569.10	60%	60%	\$249,211.06
Overtime/Minimum Wage: Off-the-Clock Work	\$1,650,129.60 to \$2,475,194.40	60%	50%	\$330,025.92 to \$495,038.88
Regular Rate	\$189,425.40	40%	50%	\$56,827.62
Alternate Workweek Schedule	\$142,589.81	30%	50%	\$49,906.43
Unreimbursed Business Expenses	\$869,260	30%	70%	\$182,544.60
Wage Statement Penalty	\$2,120,000	60%	60%	\$339,200
Waiting Time Penalty	\$3,000,528	60%	60%	\$480,084.48
MAXIMUM TOTAL EXPOSURE	\$11,666,877.62 to \$12,491,942.42⁵			\$1,944,285.20 to \$2,109,298.16⁶

The realistic recovery for this case is about **\$1,944,285.20** on the low end and **\$2,109,298.16** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 64.) The Gross Settlement Amount is about thirteen percent (12.82%) of the maximum potential exposure and around seventy-six percent (75.95%) of the maximum realistic exposure at trial, which is a reasonable settlement. (*Ibid.*)

The only question at preliminary approval is whether the settlement is within the range of possible approval. (*In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation* (7th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 1106, 1124; *Acosta v. TransUnion, LLC* (C.D. Cal. 2007) 240 F.R.D. 564, 575.) “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” (*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455; see also *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship* (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242, “[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators”). This settlement is in line with the realistic exposure

⁵ (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 39-49.)

⁶ (*Id.* at ¶¶ 56-63.)

1 if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial and provides a significant recovery for the Class Members.

2 **d. Conditional Certification of the Class Is Appropriate**

3 Code of Civil Procedure section 382 “authorizes class actions ‘when the question is one of
4 a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
5 impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*,
6 *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) California courts certify class actions if plaintiff identifies “both [1]
7 an ascertainable class and [2] a well-defined community of interest among class members.” (*Ibid.*)

8 The Class is ascertainable and numerous as to make it impracticable to join all Class
9 Members, and there are common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions
10 affecting any individual Class Member. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs contends their
11 claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately protect
12 the interests of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs assert the prosecution of separate actions by individual
13 Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. (*Ibid.*)

14 **i. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous**

15 “Ascertainability is required in order to give notice to putative class members as to whom
16 the judgment in the action will be res judicata.” (*Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp.* (2001)
17 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) “A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs
18 by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify
19 himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (*Bartold v. Glendale*
20 *Federal Bank* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828.) The proposed class must also be sufficiently
21 numerous. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)

22 This case involves approximately nine hundred fifty-nine (959) Class Members, meaning
23 the Class is sufficiently numerous. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 66; *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*
24 (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531, n.5 [finding a proposed class of “as many as 190 current and
25 former employees” is sufficiently numerous].)

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1 **ii. Class Members Share a Well-defined Community of Interest**

2 The community of interest requirement “embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
3 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
4 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*
5 *Superior Court, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) “[T]he community of interest requirement for
6 certification *does not mandate that class members have uniform or identical claims.*” (*Capitol*
7 *People First v. Department of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 692 (emphasis
8 in original).) Rather, courts focus on the defendant’s internal policies and “pattern and practice . .
9 . in order to assess whether that common behavior toward similarly situated plaintiffs renders class
10 certification appropriate.” (*Ibid.*) The application of each of these factors is discussed below.

11 **1. Common Issues Predominate**

12 The “common issues” requirement “involves analysis of whether the proponent’s ‘theory
13 of recovery’ is likely to prove compatible with class treatment.” (*Capitol People First v.*
14 *Department of Developmental Services, supra*, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) In other words, courts
15 determine whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible to common proof,
16 even if the class members must individually prove their damages. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.*
17 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1024). These types of claims are regularly granted class
18 certification when the plaintiff can present evidence of common policies. (See e.g. *Jones v. JGC*
19 *Dallas LLC* (N.D.Tex. Nov. 29, 2012, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-2743-O) 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
20 185042 [certified collective action involving 190 dancers]; *Espinoza v. Galardi South Enters.*
21 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 11, 2016, No. 14-21244-CIV-GOODMAN) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 2904 [court
22 certified class of dancers on state law claims].)

23 Plaintiffs assert common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims
24 alleged. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 67.) Plaintiffs contend all Class Members were subject to the same
25 or similar employment practices, policies, and procedures described in detail above. (*Ibid.*)

26 **2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims**

27 Typical claims rely on legal theories and facts that are substantially like those of other class
28 members. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.)

1 Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendants and allege they and the Class Members were
2 employed by the same company and injured by the common policies and practices related to the
3 claims described above. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 68; Declaration of Veronica Jauregui Silva Re
4 Adequacy In Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Silva Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13;
5 Declaration of Matthew Young Re Adequacy In Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval
6 (“Young Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13.) Plaintiffs seek relief for these claims and derivative claims on
7 behalf of the Class. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 68; Silva Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13; Young Decl.,
8 *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13.) Thus, the claims arise from the same employment practices and are based
9 on the same legal theories applicable to the Class. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 68; Silva Decl., *supra*,
10 at ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13; Young Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7, 11-13.)

11 **3. Plaintiffs Are Adequate to Represent the Class**

12 Plaintiffs have proven to be adequate class representatives. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 69;
13 Silva Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19; Young Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19.) Plaintiffs conducted
14 themselves diligently and responsibly in representing the Class in this litigation, understand the
15 fiduciary obligations, and actively participated in the prosecution of this case. (Han Decl., *supra*,
16 at ¶ 69; Silva Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19; Young Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19.) Plaintiffs
17 spent time in meetings and conferences with Class Counsel to provide them with a complete
18 understanding of the work experience and environment. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 69; Silva Decl.,
19 *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19; Young Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19.) Plaintiffs also have no interest
20 averse to the interests of the other Class Members. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 69; Silva Decl., *supra*,
21 at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19; Young Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 8-10, 14-19.)

22 **4. Class Action Is Superior for the Fair and Efficient Adjudication** 23 **of this Controversy**

24 A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of
25 this controversy. Plaintiffs contend the joinder of all Class Members is impractical and that class
26 treatment will permit many similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims for
27 settlement purposes simultaneously in a single forum without the duplication of effort and expense
28 that numerous individual actions would necessitate. Because several Class Members are also

current employees, Plaintiffs believe fear of retaliation further supports the superiority of class-wide relief as this fear often discourages current employees from seeking legal redress.

e. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 382, the Court must find a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) A proposed class action settlement is presumed fair under the following circumstances: (1) parties reached settlement after arm’s-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery were sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) percentage of objectors is small. (*Id.* at p. 1802.) All these elements are present here.

f. Notice to the Class Complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f), provides:

If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval hearing must be given to class members in the manner specified by the court. The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.


The Class Notice meets all these requirements. The Class Notice advises the Class Members of their right to participate in the Settlement, how and when to object to or request exclusion from the Settlement, and date, time, and location of the Final Approval Hearing.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs submit the Settlement is in the Class’s best interests. Under the applicable class action criteria and guidelines, the Settlement should be preliminarily approved by the Court, Class should be conditionally certified for settlement purposes, and Class Notice should be approved.

Dated: March 4, 2024

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

By: 
Douglas Han
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) CCP**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 751 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Ste. 101 Pasadena, California 91103. My electronic service address is manderson@justicelawcorp.com

On March 4, 2024, I served the foregoing document described as

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION, APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE, SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

for the following case: **Silva v. Ben Myerson Candy Co., Inc. d/b/a Wine Warehouse**
LWDA/Court Case No.: **LWDA-CM-807643-20**
Court Case No.: 20STCV21665
Los Angeles County Superior Court

on interested parties in this action by electronically submitting as follows:

State of California
Labor & Workforce Development Agency
800 Capitol Mall, MIC-55
Sacramento, California 95814

[X] BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

Pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 836, I caused the documents described above to be electronically submitted by and through the procedure stated on the website of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

[X] STATE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on March 4, 2024, at Pasadena, California.



Mariah Anderson