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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

SHARISSE ARBOLEDA, an individual,
on behalf of herself and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GUARDIAN PHARMACY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, LLC, a
Limited Liability Company; GUARDIAN
PHARMACY OF ANAHEIM, LLC, a
Limited Liability Company; GUARDIAN
PHARMACY, LLC (Doe 1), a Limited
Liability Company; and Does 2 through
50, Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2021-00008791-CU-OE-CTL

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARD**

Hearing Date: July 31, 2026
Hearing Time: 10:30 a.m.
[Hearing scheduled by Order dated February 27,
2026]

Judge: Hon. Loren Freestone
Dept.: 64

Action Filed: March 1, 2021
Trial Date: Not set

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which
4 is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In
5 accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated February 27, 2026 (“Preliminary Approval
6 Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiff Sharisse Arboleda (“Plaintiff”) respectfully moves for final
9 approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service award, and the proposed entry of the Final
10 Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent result for
11 the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the Class
12 Notice to the 297 members of the Class, **to date there have been no objections and only one (1)**
13 **request for exclusion** from the Class, which means that nearly the entire Class (99.66%) has elected
14 to participate in the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class
15 evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiff respectfully submits that
16 the settlement should be finally approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved
17 the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

18 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

19 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendants
20 Guardian Pharmacy of Southern California, LLC, Guardian Pharmacy of Anaheim, LLC, and Guardian
21 Pharmacy LLC (“Defendants”) is Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$700,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.)
22 Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment
23 of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment
24 and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class

25
26 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

27 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who were employed by Defendants in California and
28 classified as non-exempt employees at any time during the Class Period.” The Class Period is October
9, 2019 through September 24, 2025. (Preliminary Approval Order, at ¶5).

1 Representative Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and (5) the PAGA Penalties payment, which is to be
2 allocated 25% to the Aggrieved Employees and 75% to the LWDA. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) The Gross
3 Settlement Amount does not include Defendants' share of employer-side payroll taxes which will be
4 paid separately and not out of the Gross Settlement Amount. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross
5 Settlement Amount shall not revert to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The
6 following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

7 **\$700,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)

- 8 - \$10,000 (Plaintiff's proposed service award - not to exceed amount)
- 9 - \$30,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- 10 - \$233,333 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- 11 - \$15,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
- 12 - \$9,400 (Administration Expenses Payment)

13 **\$402,267** (Net Settlement Amount)

14 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
15 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

16 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
17 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
18 is "fair, adequate, and reasonable" (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶3.) In sum, the Settlement valued
19 at \$700,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact
20 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted
21 by Defendants. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class
22 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,
23 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

24 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
25 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

26 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
27 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
28 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are
the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable

1 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
2 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
4 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
5 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
6 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

7 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
8 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
9 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
10 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
12 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
13 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
14 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

15 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

16 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v.*
17 *Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). The trial court has broad discretion to determine
18 whether the settlement is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009).
19 “The well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a
20 class action settlement agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity
21 and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the
22 amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
23 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the
24 class members to the proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116,
25 128 (2008) (internal citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186
26 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

27 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
28 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.

1 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
2 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
3 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
4 “Ultimately, the [trial] court’s determination is nothing more than ‘an amalgam of delicate balancing,
5 gross approximations and rough justice.’ [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

6 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
7 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

8 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

9 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
10 and the Court to Act Intelligently

11 Over the course of more than five (5) years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation
12 of the claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for
13 the full and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural
14 history and investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary
15 approval. The Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations
16 through an all-day mediation presided over by Jon Andrews, Esq. The details of the litigation are set
17 forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

18 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

19 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations
20 before an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendants have expressly denied and continue
21 to deny any wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and
22 Class Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released
23 Class Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class
24 Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

25 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Jon Andrews, a respected and
26 experienced mediator of wage and hour class and representative actions, in order to reach this
27 Settlement. In preparation for the mediation, Defendants provided Class Counsel with payroll, time
28 and employment data, along with other information regarding the Class Members, various internal

1 documents, and other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the
2 data with the assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation
3 brief to the mediator. Following the all-day mediation, the Parties agreed to the Settlement, which was
4 memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

5 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
6 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
7 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (where settlement was “negotiated
8 and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the litigation, with the assistance of a
9 well-respected mediator” this factor supports approval of the settlement).

10 From September of 2025 to January of 2026, the settlement agreement and exhibits thereto
11 were finalized and executed. On February 27, 2026, the Court granted the Motion for Preliminary
12 Approval, and entered the Order granting preliminary approval of the settlement as fair and reasonable
13 to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

14 3. Class Counsel Is Experienced in Similar Litigation

15 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
16 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
17 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
18 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
19 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
20 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the
21 Blumenthal Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement
22 discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and in the best interests
23 of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

24 4. There Are No Objections and Only One (1) Request for Exclusion

25 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On April 3, 2026,
26 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each
27 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial
28 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award that were being sought,

1 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to
2 that individual. See Declaration of Stacey Shim (“Shim Decl.”) at ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the
3 notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary
4 Approval Order. The Administrator received no written objections and received only one (1) request
5 for exclusion. Shim Decl. at ¶¶ 11-12. As such, 99.66% of the Class will participate in the Settlement
6 and will be sent a settlement check. Shim Decl. at ¶14; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

7 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
8 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
9 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
10 adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznier v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
11 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
12 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
13 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
14 approval of the class is evident.

15 5. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

16 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiff and other Class Members were not properly paid all
17 overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate, were not provided meal and rest periods, were
18 not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not
19 provided accurate itemized wage statements, were not paid all accrued and used sick pay at the correct
20 rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages,
21 penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing
22 to Plaintiff and the other Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

23 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
24 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by
25 Defendants present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members.
26 Defendants asserted that Defendants’ practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendants
27 argued that Class Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded
28 and compensation for that time was correctly compensated. Defendants contend that its meal and rest

1 period policies fully complied with California law and Defendants did not fail to provide the
2 opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendants could argue that their payment of
3 meal premiums is evidence of its lawful practices and good faith. Defendants contend that there was
4 no failure to pay for business expenses and any cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary
5 such that reimbursement was not legally required. Finally, Defendants could argue that the Supreme
6 Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's claims, on
7 liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendants also argue that
8 based on their facially lawful practices, Defendants acted in good faith and without willfulness, which
9 if accepted would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See
10 e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (May 6, 2024) ("if an employer
11 reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage statement in
12 compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to
13 comply with the wage statement law.") Defendants' defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce
14 any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiff believes that these defenses could be overcome, Defendants
15 maintain these defenses have merit and therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class.
16 Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

17 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

19 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
20 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
21 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

22 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
24 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
25 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

26 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
27 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
28 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today

1 outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
2 the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

3 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
4 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

5 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
6 to certify a class and maintain that certification through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf of any
7 employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendants forcefully opposed the
8 propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as
9 demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal.
10 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the class
11 has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
12 certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial was
13 by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

14 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
15 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendants asserted serious and
16 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average
17 class member allocation are \$3,112.68 and \$1,359.01, respectively. *See* Shim Decl. ¶ 16. Given the
18 complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed
19 Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

20 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

21 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
22 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendants would post a bond and appeal in the event
23 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendants would have required many more years
24 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the
25 case could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
26 outweigh an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

27 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendants
28 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have

1 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
2 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
3 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
4 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
5 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
6 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement
7 set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

8 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendants
9 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
10 the Action continued. As the court explained in *Glass*, where similar faced uncertainties were faced:

11 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
12 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of
13 how this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
14 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

15 *Id.* at *12.

16 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

17 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendants' defenses
18 to Plaintiff's claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
19 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
20 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 296 Class Members who worked an estimated 39,622
21 work weeks (Shim Decl., at ¶¶ 14-15), the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of
22 \$2,364 per Class Member and \$17.66 per workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount
23 provides an average recovery of \$1,359.01 per Class Member and a recovery of \$10.15 per workweek.
24 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

25 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
26 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff's damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
27 issue in this Action, Plaintiff used this expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
28 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$19,074 for the

1 alleged unpaid overtime, \$2,566,796 for the alleged unpaid wages for off-the-clock work at 1 hour per
2 week, \$578 for the alleged underpaid overtime due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$1,458 for
3 the alleged unpaid meal break premiums and sick pay due to the miscalculation of the regular rate,
4 \$375,885 for alleged missed meal period damages based upon a 5.9% violation rate observed in the
5 time records and after deduction of meal premiums already paid by Defendants, \$409,406 for alleged
6 rest period damages based upon the same 5.9% violation rate observed in the meal period records,
7 \$51,760 for alleged unreimbursed cell-phone expenses at \$5 per month. As a result, the total damage
8 valuation was calculated such that Defendants were subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount
9 of \$3,103,704. As to potential penalties, Plaintiffs calculated that potential waiting time penalties were
10 a maximum of \$1,950,074, and potential maximum wage statement penalties were \$1,456,000.³
11 Defendants vigorously disputed Plaintiff's calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶
12 8(d).

13 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$700,000 represents more than 22% of the
14 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴
15 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*
16 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for
17 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum
18 calculations should then be realistically risk-adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class
19 certification and class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to
20

21
22 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
23 226, at mediation Plaintiffs recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses
24 asserted by Defendants, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for
25 meal or rest periods or other wages were owed given Defendants' position that Plaintiff and Class
26 Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584
27 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith
28 dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

29 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
30 Plaintiffs has not included the PAGA claim in her discussion of the value of the class claims. The
31 PAGA claim was addressed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval in the Declaration of Nordrehaug
32 at paragraph 33.

1 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendants, this settlement is fair
2 and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met.

3 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
4 **BE APPROVED**

5 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund**
6 **Method**

7 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
8 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
9 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a
10 percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple*
11 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co.*
12 *v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir.
13 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread
14 litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear
15 the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

16 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in
17 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common
18 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
19 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
20 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
21 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund,
22 the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
23 fund created"). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the

24 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
25 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
26 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
27 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where the settlement "represents approximately 10% of what
28 class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL
5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full
value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour
class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of maximum valuation).

1 market” in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

2 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
3 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
4 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
5 in legal services. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503 (2016), the California Supreme
6 Court both endorsed the award of a fee as a percentage of that fund, and expressly approved one-third
7 (1/3) as a reasonable percentage in a contingent common fund class settlement. Such similar awards
8 by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

9 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the
10 fund. Here, Plaintiff and her counsel secured a \$700,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class and only
11 one (1) of the Class Members elected to opt out. Similarly, not one Class Member objected. The
12 Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was (presumably) able to convince Defendants
13 that Plaintiff could potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability, maintain class
14 certification, overcome difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial if need be.
15 Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed the
16 necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above, there
17 were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*, 297
18 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**
19 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

20 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is
21 relevant to the...reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
22 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
23 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class
24 that Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

25 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
26 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly
27 contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the
28 risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant

1 who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency**
2 **fee basis, whether in private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above**
3 **their hourly rate in order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g.*
4 *Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk
5 enhancement); *Stetson v. Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to
6 apply risk multiplier).

7 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
8 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$233,333 is also established by reference to Class
9 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
10 **that through July 7, 2026, Class Counsel's total lodestar is \$255,215, with significant additional**
11 **fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** (*See* Blumenthal
12 Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibits #3 and 4).⁶ The requested fee award is therefore currently less than Class
13 Counsel's total lodestar representing a "negative" multiplier cross-check of 0.9, and there will be
14 additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the
15 settlement distribution and reports. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12.) Such a lodestar cross-check is well
16 below the positive multipliers approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*,
17 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁷ Because the multiplier cross-check is within this accepted range
18 it is not "extraordinarily high" so as to justify an adjustment of the percentage under *Laffitte*, *supra*, 1
19 Cal. 5th at 505. For such reasons, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in the amount of one-third
20 of the common fund is reasonable and should be approved.

21
22
23 ⁶ Class Counsel changed billing systems in June 2022, so Exhibit #3 is the billing from inception
24 to June 2022, and Exhibit #4 is the billing from June 2022 to July 7, 2026.

25 ⁷ *See Laffitte*, *supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
26 *supra*, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278
27 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
28 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
Cases, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as "fair and reasonable"); *Chavez*
v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight,*
Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

1 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

2 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel
3 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$30,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
4 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$27,602.84. Class Counsel have incurred
5 expenses of \$27,602.84 based upon counsel's billing records; therefore, this requested amount is less
6 than the allocation in the Agreement. These litigation expenses include the expenses incurred for filing
7 fees, legal research charges (Lexis Nexis), court docket document downloading charges, mediation
8 expenses, expert expenses (Berger Consulting), and attorney service charges (OneLegal and Knox), all
9 of which are costs normally billed to and paid by the client. The details of the litigation expenses
10 incurred are set forth the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and 4.⁸ These costs were reasonably
11 incurred in the prosecution of the Action. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13.) Because these costs were
12 reasonable and necessary to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request is reasonable and
13 should be granted.

14 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

15 Plaintiff respectfully submits that for her service as the sole class representative, Plaintiff should
16 be awarded the agreed service award of \$10,000 in accordance with the Agreement for her time, risk
17 and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representative. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).)
18 Defendants have agreed to this payment and there have been no objections to the requested service
19 award. The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in
20 California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Plaintiff's Declaration
21 in support of the request is attached as Exhibit #5 to the Blumenthal Decl.

22 As the only representative of the Class, Plaintiff performed her duties to the Class admirably
23 and without exception. Plaintiff worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the
24 litigation, responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and
25 reviewing the settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Plaintiff's Declaration
26 details the involvement, stress and risks she undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiff also assumed

27
28 ⁸ Class Counsel changed billing systems in June 2022, so Exhibit #3 is the billing from inception
to June 2022, and Exhibit #4 is the billing from June 2022 to July 7, 2026.

1 the serious risk that she might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the
2 reputational risk of being “blacklisted” by other future employers for having filed a class action on
3 behalf of employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiff’s participation, cooperation and
4 information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

5 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount
6 is within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews v. Plains All Am.*
7 *Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (service awards of \$15,000 each
8 are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal.
9 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S.
10 Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class member payment was
11 \$351); *Louie, supra*, 2008 WL 4473183 at *7 (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs
12 in overtime class action); *Glass, supra*, 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17 (awarding \$25,000 service award).
13 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests approval of the Class Representative Service Payment
14 in accordance with the Agreement.

15 **VI. CONCLUSION**

16 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
17 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate
18 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

19 Respectfully submitted,

20
21 Dated: July 7, 2026

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

22 By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
23 Kyle R. Nordrehaug
24 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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