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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

CHRIS FARLEY, IRENE IMSON,
SHELBY WARD, and DARLENE
GRIFFITH, individuals, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a
California Corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **37-2021-00006007-CU-OE-CTL**

[Consolidated with Case No.
37-2021- 00047190-CU-OE-CTL]

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS**

Hearing Date: April 19, 2024
Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.
[Hearing scheduled by Minute Order dated
December 1, 2023]

Judge: Hon. Robert Longstreth
Dept: 65

Action Filed: February 9, 2021
Trial Date: Not set

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement"), a true and correct copy of which is
4 attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal ("Blumenthal Decl.").¹ In accordance
5 with the Preliminary Approval Order dated December 1, 2023 ("Preliminary Approval Order"), the
6 approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs the Estate of Chris Farley, Shelby Ward, Darlene Griffith, and Irene
9 Imson ("Plaintiffs") respectfully submit this memorandum in support of the unopposed motion for final
10 approval and the proposed entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The
11 settlement represents an excellent result for the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further
12 litigation. After disseminating the notice to the members of the Class, there were **no objections and only**
13 **ten (10) requests for exclusion**, which means that almost the entire Class has elected to participate in
14 the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class evidencing their
15 collective approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the class settlement
16 should be finally approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as
17 fair, reasonable, and adequate.

18 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

19 Plaintiffs and Defendant Sharp Memorial Hospital ("Defendant") reached a full and final
20 settlement of the above-captioned action, which is embodied in the Agreement filed concurrently with
21 the Court. As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount is Four Million Sixty
22 Thousand Dollars (\$4,060,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement
23 Amount consists of the following elements: (i) all Individual Class Payments and Individual PAGA
24 Payments; (ii) the LWDA PAGA Payment; (iii) the Class Counsel Fees Payment and the Class Counsel

25 _____
26 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

27 ² The "Class" is defined as "all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant in
28 California who were classified as non-exempt employees during the Class Period." The "Class Period"
is defined as "February 9, 2017 through April 23, 2023." (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.5, 1.13.)

1 Litigation Expenses Payment; (iv) the Class Representative Service Payments; and (v) the Administration
2 Expenses Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(a). The Gross Settlement Amount does
3 not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall
4 be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following
5 is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

6 **\$4,060,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)

- 7 - \$40,000 (Plaintiffs' proposed service awards - not to exceed \$10,000 each)
8 - \$48,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
9 - \$1,353,333 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed one-third of settlement)
10 - \$125,000 (PAGA Penalties - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
11 - \$60,000 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)

12 **\$2,433,667** (Net Settlement Amount)

13 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and
14 are set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

15 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for the
16 same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement is
17 "fair and reasonable". (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 2.) In sum, the Settlement valued at \$4,060,000
18 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact that liability
19 and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted by Defendant.
20 Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class certification, along with
21 the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and
22 should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

23 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF**
24 **CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

25 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259,
26 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
27 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
28 *v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are the
preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable
settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting

1 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
2 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
3 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
4 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
5 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

6 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
7 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
8 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
9 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
10 intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is experienced in
11 similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. Here,
12 the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the proposed settlement satisfies that standard and
13 the presumption applies.

14 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

15 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v. Ford*
16 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688
17 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement
18 is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The well-recognized
19 factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement
20 agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
21 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
22 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views
23 of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
24 proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 128 (2008) (internal
25 citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 408
26 (2010).

27 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
28 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties. *Id.*

1 The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is
2 not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the
3 settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.* “Ultimately, the
4 [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations
5 and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

6 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
7 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

8 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

9 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel and
10 the Court to Act Intelligently

11 Over the course of more than three years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of
12 the claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full
13 and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history and
14 investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval. The
15 Settlement was the product of arms-length and contentious negotiations through an all-day mediation
16 presided over by Tripper Ortman, Esq., a respected and experience mediator of wage and hour class
17 actions. The details of the litigation are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(h).

18 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

19 This Settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
20 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
21 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and Class
22 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
23 Claims in accordance with this Settlement. Class Counsel are experienced and qualified to evaluate the
24 class claims, the viability of the defenses asserted, and the risks and benefits of trial and settlement, and
25 Class Counsel are experienced in wage and hour class actions, as Class Counsel has previously litigated
26 and certified similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

27 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Tripper Ortman. In preparation for
28 the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with necessary information for the members of the

1 Class, including time punch data, payroll data and data concerning the composition of the Class.
2 Plaintiffs analyzed the data with the assistance of damages expert, Berger Consulting, and prepared and
3 submitted a mediation brief and damage valuation to the Mediator. Following this all-day mediation, the
4 Parties agreed to this Settlement, which was memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of
5 Understanding. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

6 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
7 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
8 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
9 (“The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the litigation, with
10 the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment litigation[, and]
11 this factor supports approval of the settlement”).

12 From March of 2023 to June of 2023, the Agreement and exhibits thereto were finalized and
13 executed, and then presented by motion to this Court for preliminary approval. On December 1, 2023,
14 the Court issued its Minute Order granting preliminary approved of the settlement as fair and reasonable
15 to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

16 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

17 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
18 of persons in class actions including employment litigation and wage and hour actions. Class Counsel
19 has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and claims similar to this case
20 and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested motions in state and federal courts
21 throughout California. As such, Class Counsel is experienced and knowledgeable in this area of law.
22 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 2; Declaration of Launa Adolph at ¶¶ 5-13. Class Counsel have participated in
23 every aspect of the settlement discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and
24 reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

25 4. There Are No Objections and Only Ten (10) Requests for Exclusion

26 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On January 4, 2024,
27 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each
28 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial

1 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being sought,
2 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to
3 that individual. See Declaration of Nicole Bench ("Bench Decl.") ¶7, Exh. A. In disseminating the notice,
4 the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary Approval
5 Order. Significantly, there have been no objections and only ten (10) requests for exclusion. Bench
6 Decl. ¶¶11-14. As such, almost the entire Class will participate in the Settlement and will be sent a
7 settlement check. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

8 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
9 Settlement. *See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
10 2000) ("If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
11 adequacy of the settlement."); *Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
12 objections out of 281 member class "strongly favors settlement"); *Laskey v. Int'l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
13 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should be
14 considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the approval
15 of the class is evident.

16 5. The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

17 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid all
18 regular and overtime wages for hours worked, were not provided meal and rest periods, were not timely
19 paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not provided accurate
20 itemized wage statements, were not paid all wages at the time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid
21 wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and
22 owing to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl.
23 ¶5.

24 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
25 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
26 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
27 that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that all work time
28 was properly recorded and paid for all time actually worked and that their neutral rounding actually

1 overpaid the employees so that there were no unpaid wages. Defendant argues that there was no
2 underpayment of wages due to the alleged miscalculation of the regular rate. Defendant at all times took
3 the position that it correctly calculated and paid the regular rate for overtime, sick pay and premiums.
4 Defendant contends that its meal and rest period policies fully complied with California law and
5 Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. In addition,
6 Defendant argued that Plaintiffs failed to consider that most of the employees signed meal period waivers
7 that are applicable to employees in the healthcare field who can waive one of their two meal periods,
8 and/or otherwise waived their meal periods, that meal period premiums were automatically paid based
9 on a facially non-compliant meal period based on an employee's waiver, and that employees could put
10 into be paid a "no break" premium if not authorized and permitted to take a legally required break, and
11 did so every pay period. Defendant could argue that its payment of significant meal period premiums was
12 evidence of their lawful practices. As to expense reimbursement, Defendant contended that it did not fail
13 to provide reimbursement for necessary business expenses and that claimed cellphone expenses were
14 incurred voluntarily and/or for the convenience of employees and is therefore not required reimbursement.
15 Defendant further provided evidence and argued that hospital phones were provided to employees to use
16 in order for them to perform their job duties. Defendant argued that the decisions in *Brinker v. Superior*
17 *Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), *Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Ct.*, 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1108 (2003),
18 and *Salazar v. See's Candy Shops Inc.*, 64 Cal.App.5th 85 (2021), weakened Plaintiffs' claims, on
19 liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also argues that
20 based on its facially lawful practices, it acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted
21 would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. If successful,
22 Defendant's defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiffs
23 believe that these defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and
24 therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

25 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
26 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

27 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
28 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim that full-time Service
Associates were misclassified as exempt. In addition to the uncertainties raised by

1 Defendants at the preliminary stage regarding Plaintiffs' chance of success in this case,
2 Defendants notes that the question of an employer's duty to provide rest and meal periods
3 is an open one, signaling even less certainty for Plaintiffs. [...T]he gross settlement
amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other costs are
deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of litigation.

4 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007 U.S.
5 Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
6 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
7 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

8 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
9 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
10 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
11 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

12 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
13 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

14 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiffs would be unable to
15 obtain class certification and thereby not recover on behalf of any employees other than themselves.
16 Defendant argued that the individual experience of each putative class member varied with respect to the
17 claims. Defendant could also contest class certification by arguing injury and good faith were
18 case-by-case determinations that precluded class certification. Plaintiffs are aware of other cases where
19 class certification of similar claims was denied. *See e.g. Cacho v. Eurostar, Inc.*, 43 Cal. App. 5th 885
20 (2019) (denying certification of rest break claims). Finally, even if class certification was successful, as
21 demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal.
22 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class wide recovery even where the class has
23 been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
24 certification in this action would have been hotly disputed and was by no means a foregone conclusion.
25 Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

26 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
27 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and substantial
28

1 defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average class member
2 allocations are \$865.43 and \$365.14, respectively. Bench Decl. at ¶18. Given the complexities of this
3 case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair,
4 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

5 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

6 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
7 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event of
8 an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years to
9 resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case
10 could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh
11 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

12 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant through
13 possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have taken into
14 account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as this one. Class
15 Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and alleged defenses to,
16 the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would have been inevitable.
17 Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied, thereby reducing the
18 benefits of an ultimate victory. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that the Settlement confers
19 substantial benefits upon the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have
20 determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal
21 Decl. ¶8(c).

22 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
23 continues to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
24 these Actions continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
25 to those in this litigation:

26 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity, and
27 likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how this
28 Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely would
 have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of litigating
 an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be considered in

1 evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement." See *In re Mego Financial Corp.*
2 *Securities Litigation*, 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the risk of further litigation
3 is substantial.

4 *Id.* at *12.

5 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

6 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses to
7 Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval which
8 discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares favorably to the
9 value of the claims. The calculations to compensate for the amount due to the Class Members at the time
10 this Settlement was negotiated were calculated by Plaintiffs' expert, Berger Consulting, in advance of
11 mediation. Class Counsel analyzed the data for putative class members and determined the potential
12 maximum damages for the class claims. For the Class, the maximum value of the claim for unpaid wages
13 based on the alleged regular rate miscalculation for meal period premiums and sick pay was \$157,351,
14 the maximum value of the claim for unpaid minimum and overtime wages due to alleged rounding
15 practices was \$1,717,608, the maximum potential unpaid meal period wages were estimated to be
16 \$23,279,949, the maximum potential rest period damages were estimated to be \$15,192,523, and the
17 maximum potential damages for failure to provide expense reimbursement were calculated to be
18 \$1,011,565. In total, the damages for the Class were calculated to have a maximum potential total value
19 of \$41,358,996. In addition, Plaintiff calculated that the maximum value of the potential waiting time
20 penalties were between \$1,847,760 and \$11,821,894 and the maximum value of the potential wage
21 statement penalties were between \$3,501,150 and \$12,394,250, both ranges depending on the predicate
22 violation giving rise to the penalty.³ Defendant contends that these valuations grossly overstate the
23 damages (and therefore the resulting penalties) because they do not account for the fact that rounding
24 overpaid employees and the existence of meal period waivers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

25 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
26 226, at mediation Plaintiffs recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses
27 asserted by Defendant, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for
28 meal or rest periods or other wages were owed given Defendant's position that Plaintiff and Class
Members were properly compensated. See *Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584
(2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith dispute
as to whether and when the wages were due.").

1 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount represents more than 9.8% of the potential maximum
2 damages at issue for the Class in this case, assuming these amounts could all be proven in full at trial.⁴
3 The above maximum calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class
4 certification and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the
5 Settlement as compared to the potential value of the claims, the Settlement is most certainly fair and
6 reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

7 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARDS SHOULD**
8 **BE APPROVED**

9 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund**
10 **Method**

11 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
12 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
13 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage
14 of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91
15 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34 (Cal. 1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van*
16 *Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997).
17 The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation
18 costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
19 burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

20 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in
21 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common

22 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim does not provide a recovery to the Class, Plaintiffs did not included the
23 PAGA claim in this discussion of the class claim valuation. The PAGA claim was addressed in the
24 Motion for Preliminary Approval in the Declaration of Nordrehaug at ¶ 33.

25 ⁵ See *Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000)
26 approving settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery"); *Stovall-Gusman*
27 *v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval
28 where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents approximately 10% of what class might have
been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full verdict value); *Ma*
v. Covidien Holding, Inc., 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action
settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of full verdict value).

1 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
2 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) (“We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
3 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
4 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
5 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund
6 created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the market”
7 in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

8 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
9 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
10 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
11 in legal services. See Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,
12 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that
13 “[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent”). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved
14 a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

15 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund.
16 Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$4,060,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class. The
17 Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was able to convince Defendant that Plaintiffs could
18 potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability, maintain class certification, overcome
19 difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f).
20 In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed the necessary skills in both wage and
21 hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above, there were significant risks to the
22 contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*, 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
23 (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of one-third of the common fund as**
24 **attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

25 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is relevant
26 to the ... reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261, 1272 (D.C.
27 Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the market” for
28 fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that Class

1 Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

2 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney's fees
3 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. As observed in *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*:

4 No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when
5 successful, as little as he would charge a client who had agreed to pay for his services, regardless
6 of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases producing large recoveries, is it just to make
7 a fee depend solely on the reasonable amount of time expended.

8 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974). Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of \$4,060,000 has been created.
9 For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk
10 than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well
11 as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense
12 firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether in private matters or in class action
13 litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate in order to compensate for both the risks
14 and the delay in payment.** See e.g. *Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir.
15 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v. Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016)
16 (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

17 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
18 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$1,353,333 is also established by reference to Class
19 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence that
20 through March 25, 2024, Class Counsel's total lodestar is \$523,769.17, with additional fees still to be
21 incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibits
22 #3 and 4 [lodestar of \$421,694.17]; Declaration of Launa Adolph at ¶19 [lodestar of \$102,075].) The
23 requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to Class Counsel's total lodestar with a reasonable
24 multiplier of less than 2.6, and there will be additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete
25 the settlement process and manage the settlement distribution. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12.) Such a
26 multiplier is well within the range of positive multipliers approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and
27 *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁶

28 ⁶ See *Laffitte*, *supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
supra, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278

1 For such reasons, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in the amount of one-third of the
2 common fund is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

3 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

4 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a "Class Counsel
5 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$48,000." Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
6 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$46,591.32 based upon counsel's billing records
7 which evidence total expenses of \$46,591.32. The requested expense reimbursement is equal to the actual
8 expenses incurred, with the difference to be retained in the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed to
9 the Class. These litigation expenses include the expenses incurred for filing fees, mediation expenses,
10 expert fees (Berger Consulting Group and Econ One), deposition transcript charges, attorney service
11 charges (Knox, One Legal), docket document downloading charges, Lexis research charges, all of which
12 are costs normally billed to and paid by the client.⁷ The details of the litigation expenses incurred are set
13 forth the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and 4 [expenses of \$41,877.10], and Declaration of
14 Launa Adolph at ¶23 and Exhibit A [expenses of \$4,714.22]. These costs were reasonably incurred in
15 the prosecution of the Action (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13; Adolph Dec., ¶23).

16 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

17 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as the class representatives, Plaintiffs should
18 be awarded the agreed service award of \$10,000 each, in accordance with the Agreement for their time,
19 risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Defendant has agreed to this
20 payment and there have been no objections to the requested service awards. The Blumenthal Decl., at

21
22 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba v. Apple*
23 *Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In*
24 *re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of
25 2.52 as "fair and reasonable"); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming
multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved range of 2 to 4); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties' agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, "[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging,
28 photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service,
mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable." *Rutti v.*
Lojack Corp., Inc., 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Declarations of the Plaintiffs are submitted in support of this request and are attached as Exhibits #6, 7, 8 and 9 to the Blumenthal Decl.

As the representatives of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duty to the Class admirably and without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation, responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) As set forth in the Agreement, the Plaintiffs are also providing a comprehensive release as part of the Settlement, far beyond the class release. The Declaration of the Plaintiffs detail the involvement, stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also assumed the serious risk that she might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational risk of being “blacklisted” by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of fellow former employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiffs’ participation, cooperation and information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount of \$10,000 is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See e.g. Mathein v. Pier I Imps.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386, 168 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P36,620 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (approving two service awards of \$12,500 each); *Holman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173698 (approving \$10,000 service award where class member recovery was \$375); *Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245, 268 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving \$10,000 award). Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully request approval of the requested award in accordance with the Agreement.

VI. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

Dated: March 25, 2024

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

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