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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

MARTIN ORTIZ, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

TARA MATERIALS, INC., a Georgia
corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2021-0001473-CU-OE-CTL

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Eddie
Sturgeon, Dept. C-67]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement; and [Proposed] Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: January 30, 2023

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: C-67

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**


2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 30, 2023, at 8:30 a.m., in Department C-67 of
3 the San Diego County Superior Court, 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California 92101, pursuant
4 to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Martin
5 Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed
6 class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Tara Materials, Inc. Plaintiff further
7 moves the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation for Class Action Settlement;
- 9 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes only;
- 10 3. Affording Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Class and Representative Action
11 Complaint;
- 12 4. Approving the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and the plan for distribution
13 of the Notice to Settlement Class Members;
- 14 5. Appointing Plaintiff Martin Ortiz as Class Representative for settlement purposes only;
- 15 6. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for
16 settlement purposes only;
- 17 7. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator; and
- 18 8. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

19 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
20 Authorities, the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files
21 in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at
22 or before the hearing.

23 Dated: January 6, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24
25 By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

26
27 Attorneys for Plaintiff
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Martin Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$140,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Tara Materials, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 59 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Gig Kyriacou, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes only, afford Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint, approve the proposed notice, and set a Final Approval Hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant specializes in the manufacturing of printable canvas materials on which artists paint. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked by not recording the actual start and end times of shifts for each workday. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant engaged in an unlawful rounding scheme which led to the underpayment of wages. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse employees for all necessary business-related expenditures. Based on these

1 allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and straight
2 time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize
3 and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide
4 accurate itemized wage statements, failure to indemnify employees for expenditures, unfair
5 business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.) Defendant denies all
6 allegations.

7 On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
8 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§
9 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and
10 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to
11 authorize and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages
12 at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
13 statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); and (7) unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
14 17200, *et seq.*). (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On March 3, 2021, Defendant removed this action to the United
15 States District Court, Southern District of California based on the assumption that the District
16 Court maintained federal diversity jurisdiction over this matter. (*Id.*) The case was
17 subsequently remanded back to state court because federal subject matter jurisdiction did not
18 exist. (*Id.*) The Parties have stipulated to Plaintiff being afforded leave to file a First Amended
19 Class and Representative Action Complaint, which will add causes of action for Defendant's
20 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802) and civil penalties
21 under PAGA. (*Id.*; Ex. 1 [Plaintiff's First Amended Class and Representative Action
22 Complaint].)

23 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

24 Following the remand back to state court, the Parties exchanged documents and
25 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced timekeeping and payroll records
26 for a sampling of the putative class members. Defendant also provided documents of their wage
27 and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total
28 number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

1 After reviewing the documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and
2 practices and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able
3 to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s
4 maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the
5 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel
6 reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation.
7 (*Id.*)

8 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

9 On January 31, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
10 action mediator, Gig Kyriacou, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The
11 settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
12 were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
13 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial
14 and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

15 After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
16 Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the
17 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8; Ex. 2
18 [Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement of Class Action and PAGA Representative Claims
19 (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”)].)

20 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
21 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
22 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
23 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
24 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
25 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 15.)

26 Indeed, the \$140,000.00 Settlement represents **92.2% of the realistic maximum**
27 **recovery of \$151,786.52.** (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s
28 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.1 million, when the risk of

prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$151,786.52, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-24.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement, Defendant will pay \$140,000.00 to resolve this Litigation. This amount is all-inclusive. The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Settlement Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant within the State of California during the Settlement Period. (Settlement, Section 1.5.)

2. Settlement Period: The Settlement Period means the period from January 13, 2017 through March 15, 2022. (Settlement, Section 1.9.)

3. PAGA Period: The PAGA Period means the period from January 19, 2020 through March 15, 2022. (Settlement, Section 1.10.)

4. Participating Settlement Class Member(s): Participating Settlement Class Member means any Class Member who does not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion. (Settlement, Section 1.29.)

5. PAGA Group Members: PAGA Group Members means all current and/or former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period. A PAGA Group Member may not request exclusion from the PAGA Payment. (Settlement, Section 1.7.)

6. Total Settlement Amount: This amount is \$140,000.00, which is the total amount that Defendant will pay to: Participating Settlement Class Members (which includes the employee payroll taxes withheld from the Wage Component of each Participating Settlement Class Member's Settlement Award); the Class Representative; Class Counsel; the Settlement Administrator; and the LWDA (i.e., the PAGA Payment). (Settlement, Section 1.43.)

1 7. Uncashed Checks: Each Participating Settlement Class Member will have one
2 hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date of the mailing of the individual Settlement Award
3 check to cash the check sent to the Participating Settlement Class Member. Upon the 180-day
4 deadline, the checks will automatically be cancelled by the Settlement Administrator if not
5 deposited, cashed, or otherwise negotiated beforehand. Funds associated with such cancelled
6 checks will be remitted to the Controller of the State of California pursuant to the Unclaimed
7 Property Law, California Civil Code § 1500, *et seq.*, to be held in trust for those who did not timely
8 cash their checks, until such time as they claim their property. (Settlement, Section 3.3.4.)

9 8. Release as to All Participating Settlement Class Members: As of the Effective Date
10 (as that term is defined in Section 1.19 of the Settlement Agreement), all Participating Settlement
11 Class Members, including each of their respective attorneys, agents, spouses, executors,
12 representatives, guardians ad litem, heirs, successors, and assigns, release Tara Materials and each
13 of its former or present parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, investors, partners, owners, related
14 organizations, predecessors or successors, and all agents, employees, officers, directors,
15 shareholders, partners, members, managers, holding companies, insurers, and attorneys thereof
16 (the “Released Parties”) from all claims asserted under any applicable laws and/or regulations
17 relating to any and all facts and claims asserted in the Action or any other claims, with the exception
18 of all claims under the PAGA, that could have been asserted in the Action based on the facts
19 alleged, including without limitation claims related to minimum wages, overtime and double time
20 wages (including, but not limited to, any claims for additional wages owed due to “rounding” or
21 “off the clock” work); meal and rest breaks; failure to maintain accurate employment records; wage
22 statement violations; separation pay violations; failure to reimburse business expenses; and unfair
23 business practices arising during the Settlement Period. (Settlement, Sections 1.34, 1.37, and 4.1.)

24 9. PAGA Payment: The settlement includes \$5,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s claims
25 under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$3,750.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$1,250.00) being
26 paid to the PAGA Group Members. (Settlement, Section 1.27.) Class Counsel submitted the
27 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez
28 Decl., ¶ 9.)

1 10. Net Settlement Fund: The “Net Settlement Fund” means the funds available to pay
2 the Settlement Awards to all Participating Settlement Class Members. The Net Settlement Fund
3 shall constitute the Total Settlement Amount minus the sum of the: (1) Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;
4 (2) Service Award; (3) Settlement Administration Costs; and (4) PAGA Payment made to the
5 LWDA. (Settlement, Section 1.24.)

6 11. Distribution Formula: Members of the Settlement Class not opting out will receive
7 a lump sum payment as good and valuable consideration for the waiver and release of claims as
8 set forth in Section D (8), above, in an amount determined by the Settlement Administrator in
9 accordance with Section 3.3.2 of the Settlement Agreement.

10 12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Participating Settlement Class
11 Members will be allocated as 20% wages and 80% penalties and interest. (Settlement, Section
12 3.3.6.)

13 13. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
14 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$2,500.00. (Settlement, Sections 1.40 & 3.4.) This
15 amount is for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for
16 a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to California Civil Code, § 1542. (*Id.*)
17 If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert
18 into the Net Settlement Fund to be distributed between the Participating Settlement Class Members
19 on a pro-rata basis. (*Id.*)

20 14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
21 a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$46,666.67) of the Total Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket
22 costs not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, Section 3.5.) At this time, Class Counsel’s costs are
23 less than \$10,000.00. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 39.)

24 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
25 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’
26 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
27 are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the
28 settlement. (Settlement, Section 6.1.2.) Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the proposed

1 Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the
2 current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and
3 re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.* at Section 6.1.3.) Notice will be provided in
4 English and Spanish. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11; Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

5 **III. DISCUSSION**

6 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
7 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
8 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
10 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
12 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

13 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
14 factors, which may include the strength of Plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
15 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
16 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
17 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
18 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
19 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
20 that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
21 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
22 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
23 require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
24 prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy
25 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

26 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
27 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
28 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and**
4 **Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
6 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
7 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
8 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
10 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
11 to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a full day of
13 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Gig Kyriacou, Esq. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)
14 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
15 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
16 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through
17 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

18 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
19 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as class member timekeeping and payroll records,
20 Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and
21 rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as
22 information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former
23 employees, and the wage rates in effect. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual
24 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
25 asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and
26 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

27 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
28 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-50.) Again, this supports the position that the

1 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
2 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
3 action.

4 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
5 **Respective Legal Positions**

6 A settlement is not judged against what might Plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
7 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
8 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
9 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
10 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
11 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
12 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

13 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
14 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
15 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
16 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
17 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

18 The proposed settlement of \$140,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
19 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 17-28.) Because of the proposed
20 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
21 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
22 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
23 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$140,000.00 is within
24 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
25 ***each class member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately \$1,090.40.*** (*Id.*
26 at ¶ 27.)

27 ///

28 ///

1 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

2 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
3 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
4 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-
5 50.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
6 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

7 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

8 The Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement, in the form attached to the Settlement
9 Agreement as Exhibit A, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs
10 the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And
11 if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will
12 have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.
13 Accordingly, the proposed Notice meet all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California
14 Rules of Court.

15 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

16 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
17 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$46,666.67, which is 33 1/3% of the Total
18 Settlement Amount, and up to \$15,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
19 members in the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and are reasonable.

20 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common**
21 **Fund" Method**

22 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
23 by counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held that "when
24 a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff
25 or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff
26 or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d
27 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

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1 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/common
2 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
3 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
4 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d
5 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit
6 which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to
7 bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San*
8 *Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the
9 common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one
10 party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

11 The California Supreme Court recently affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016)
12 1 Cal.5th 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
13 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that
14 fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
15 percentage of the fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages
16 of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between
17 counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the
18 encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
19 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our
20 trial courts.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

21 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

22 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
23 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
24 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
25 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
26 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
27 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
28 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also

1 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
2 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
3 million].)

4 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
5 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature
6 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
7 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
8 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
9 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
10 by the Parties and requested herein.

11 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

12 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
13 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
14 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
15 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
16 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
17 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
18 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
19 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 35-38.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
20 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
21 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
22 ahead of all other concerns.

23 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 24 **Requested Fee Award**

25 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
26 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
28 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class

1 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee
2 award is supported here.

3 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
4 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
5 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
6 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
7 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
8 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
9 is reasonable and fair.

10 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

11 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
12 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
13 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
14 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
15 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
16 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir.
17 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

18 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
19 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
20 codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
21 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
22 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
23 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
24 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
25 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
26 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
27 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

28 ///

1 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
2 a Service Award in the amount of \$2,500.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
3 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff
4 devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel
5 very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class
6 Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This amount is reasonable particularly
7 in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl*
8 *Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel
9 Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members,
10 and the court approved a \$25,000.00 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff.
11 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 33)

12 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
13 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
14 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
15 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
16 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
17 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment
18 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
19 while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121
20 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards
21 in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
22 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
23 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

24 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY IS WARRANTED**

25 **A. Legal Standard**

26 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
27 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
28 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the

1 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
2 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
3 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
4 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
5 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
6 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
7 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
8 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
9 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
10 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
11 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
12 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

13 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
14 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
15 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
16 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
17 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
18 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

19 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
20 **Settlement Purposes**

21 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

22 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
23 approximately 59 employees of Defendant.

24 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
25 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
26 records of Defendant (i.e., job position), the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
27 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
28 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

1 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
2 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
3 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
4 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
5 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
6 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
7 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
8 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
9 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

10 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

11 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
12 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
13 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
14 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
15 605.)

16 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
17 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
18 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
19 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
20 to take rest periods; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages,
21 including meal period premium and rest period premium wages; whether the wage statements were
22 consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant adequately reimbursed employees for
23 business expenditures. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of
24 the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and
25 seek redress for, the same alleged injuries. Defendant denies all allegations.

26 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

27 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
28 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the

1 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
2 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
3 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
4 situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they
5 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
6 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
7 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
8 employees.

9 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

10 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
11 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
12 a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
13 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

14 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
15 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
16 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
17 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
18 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
19 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
20 Plaintiff’s willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing
21 about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

22 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

23 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
24 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
25 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
26 class action device enables it to manage this Litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
27 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
28 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a

practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 462; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members ...” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first-class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality

1 required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

2 **VI. CONCLUSION**

3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
4 approval of the proposed Settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in May 2023, or the first
5 available date thereafter.

6
7 Dated: January 6, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

8
9 By: _____

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

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11 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Ortiz v. Tara Materials, Inc., et al.

37-2021-00001473-CU-OE-CTL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Ashley Narinyans, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is anarinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On **January 6, 2023**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Danielle Hultenius Moore (SBN 232480)

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Bret Martin (SBN 304658)

bmartin@fisherphillips.com

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Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

(X) **BY MAIL:** I enclosed the above documents in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid and placed for collection and mailing on the above date in accordance with ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice of collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service, and that the correspondence shall be deposited with the United States Postal Service the same day in the ordinary course of business pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a).

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on **January 6, 2023** at Los Angeles, California.

Ashley Narinyans

Type or Print Name


Signature