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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF TULARE**

JOSHUA TAYLOR AND FRANK LOMONACO,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. DAIRY SYSTEMS, INC. DBA
AUTOMATED DAIRY SYSTEMS, a
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. VCU286113

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Nathan
D. Ide, Dept. 2]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement; Declaration of LATLC
President Steven Vartazarian; and
[Proposed] Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: August 22, 2022
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: 2

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**


2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 22, 2022, at 1:30 p.m., in Department 2 of the
3 Tulare County Superior Court, 221 South Mooney Boulevard, Visalia, California 93291, pursuant
4 to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Joshua
5 Taylor and Frank Lomonaco (“Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary
6 approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant U.S. Dairy
7 Systems, Inc. dba Automated Dairy Systems. Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation for Class Action Settlement;
9 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
10 3. Approving the Notice and Workweek Dispute Form (collectively, the “Notice Packet”)
11 and the plan for distribution of the Notice Packet to Settlement Class Members;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Joshua Taylor and Frank Lomonaco as Class Representatives for
13 settlement purposes;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for
15 settlement purposes;
16 6. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities, the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, the Declaration of LATLC President Steven
20 Vartazarian, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further
21 evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Dated: July 29, 2022

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

23
24 By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

25
26 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
27
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A.	Plaintiffs’ Claims	1
B.	Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C.	Settlement Negotiations	3
D.	Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III.	DISCUSSION	7
A.	The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	8
1.	The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	8
2.	The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	9
3.	Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	10
B.	The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	10
C.	The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	11
1.	Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	11
2.	The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	12
3.	This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	12
4.	The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	13
D.	The Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable	13
E.	There is Good Cause for Selecting Los Angeles Trial Lawyers’ Charities As the Cy Pres Recipient.....	15
IV.	CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	16
A.	Legal Standard	16

1	B.	Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
2		Settlement Purposes.....	17
3	1.	The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous for Settlement Purposes.	17
4	2.	There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate for	
5		Settlement Purposes.....	17
6	3.	Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class for Settlement	
7		Purposes.	18
8	4.	Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement for Settlement	
9		Purposes.	18
10	5.	A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	19
11	V.	THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	19
12	A.	The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	19
13	B.	The Notice is Accurate and Informative	20
14	VI.	CONCLUSION.....	20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	17
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	19
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	12
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	11
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	18
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	17
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	17
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	11
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695.....	16
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	7
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.....	14
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	8
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	11, 12
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	16
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	7
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	18
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	19
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	8, 13
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	11
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	16
<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	14
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	17
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	11
<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	8
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	9
<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.</i> (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952	17

FEDERAL CASES

<i>Dennis v. Kellogg Co.</i> (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 858.....	15
<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	14
<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	19
<i>Priddy v. Edelman</i> (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438	8
<i>Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers</i> (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 1301.....	15
<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	12

STATE STATUTES

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 384.....	15
Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	16, 17
Labor Code § 1194	12
Labor Code § 90.5	14

RULES

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	19
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	10

TREATISES

Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 11.51	8
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03	12
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 8.39	20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)	15
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Joshua Taylor (“Plaintiff Taylor”) and Frank Lomonaco (“Plaintiff Lomonaco,” and together with Plaintiff Taylor, the “Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$187,500.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc. dba Automated Dairy Systems (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 59 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Justice Steven M. Vartabedian (Ret.), over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a Final Approval Hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant operates in the agricultural and dairy industry and is headquartered in Jerome, Idaho with a sizable presence in California with service centers in Escalon, Modesto, and Tulare. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked by not recording the actual start and end times of shifts for each workday. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to include all remuneration in the employees’ overtime rate. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal

1 and rest periods. Plaintiffs additionally allege that Defendant failed to indemnify its employees
2 for all necessary business expenditures. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims
3 against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, failure to pay overtime
4 wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to
5 timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
6 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures, unfair business practices, and civil penalties
7 under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

8 On February 26, 2021, Plaintiff Taylor filed a putative wage-and-hour class action
9 complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab.
10 Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§
11 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4)
12 failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay
13 final wages at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
14 wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); and (7) unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof.
15 Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff Taylor filed a First
16 Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint adding claims for Defendant's failure to
17 indemnify for necessary business expenses and for civil penalties under PAGA, as well as
18 adding Plaintiff Lomonaco as an additional class representative. (*Id.*)

19 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

20 Following the filing of the initial Complaint on February 26, 2021, the Parties exchanged
21 documents and information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sampling of
22 timekeeping and payroll records for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of
23 its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the
24 total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

25 After reviewing the documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and
26 practices and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able
27 to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's
28 maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the

1 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel
2 reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation.
3 (*Id.*)

4 C. Settlement Negotiations

5 On October 20, 2021, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
6 action mediator, Justice Steven M. Vartabedian (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was
7 conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted
8 in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to
9 explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate
10 their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

11 After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
12 Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the
13 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8; Ex. 1
14 [Joint Stipulation Re: Class Settlement ("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement")].)

15 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
16 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
17 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
18 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
19 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
20 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 15.)

21 Indeed, the \$187,500.00 Settlement represents **72.5% of the realistic maximum**
22 **recovery of \$258,637.10.** (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's
23 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.8 million, when the risk of
24 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that
25 Defendant's realistic exposure was \$258,637.10, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant
26 recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-24.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class
27 certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. Indeed, because of the proposed
28 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an

unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement, Defendant will pay \$187,500.00 to resolve this Litigation. This amount is all-inclusive. The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Settlement Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “All persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the Settlement Period (together, collectively referred to as the “Class Members”).” (Settlement, § I (R).)

2. Settlement Period: The Settlement Period means the period from February 26, 2017 through December 20, 2021. (Settlement, § I (S).)

3. Participating PAGA Members: Participating PAGA Members means all Settlement Class Members who worked for Defendant from February 26, 2020 through December 20, 2021. (Settlement, § I (M).)

4. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$187,500.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Class Representatives’ Service Awards. (Settlement, § I (Q).)

5. No Reversion & Cy Pres: This is a non-reversionary settlement. Settlement checks will be valid for one hundred and eighty (180) days from the date of issuance. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 384(a), any unpaid cash residue or unclaimed or abandoned class member funds, *with any interest generated in the account established by the Settlement Administrator*, will be sent to the Los Angeles Trial Lawyers’ Charities (“LATLC”), 2708 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 391, Santa Monica, CA 90403. (Settlement, § XI (C)(2).) Neither Plaintiffs or Class Counsel have any interest, financial or otherwise, in the proposed *cy pres* recipient. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.)

6. Release as to All Settlement Class Members: The class release is limited to “any and all wage-related claims that were alleged in the Litigation or which could have been alleged in

1 the Litigation based on the facts asserted in the Litigation arising during the Settlement Period[,]
2 including the following claims: (1) all claims alleged in the operative complaint, under any legal
3 theory of liability, for the failure to pay all wages of any kind, including any minimum or straight
4 time wages, owed pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, the
5 California Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders, or any comparable federal
6 statute under any theory of liability; (2) all claims alleged in the operative complaint, under any
7 legal theory of liability, for the failure to pay overtime or double time wages owed pursuant to
8 California Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194, and 1198, the IWC Wage Orders, or any comparable
9 federal statute under any theory of liability; (3) all claims alleged in the operative complaint, under
10 any legal theory of liability, for the failure to provide meal periods pursuant to California Labor
11 Code §§ 226.7 and 512, and the IWC Wage Orders; (4) all claims alleged in the operative
12 complaint, under any legal theory of liability, for the failure to provide rest periods pursuant to
13 California Labor Code § 226.7, and the IWC Wage Orders; (5) all claims alleged in the operative
14 complaint, under any legal theory of liability, for any penalties of any kind arising from an alleged
15 failure to pay final wages or other amounts allegedly owed to Class Members pursuant to California
16 Labor Code §§ 201-203, as well as California Labor Code §§ 218.5, 218.6, and 1194; (6) all claims
17 alleged in the operative complaint, under any legal theory of liability, for any penalties of any kind
18 arising from an alleged wage statement violation pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 226 and
19 1174.5; (7) all claims alleged in the operative complaint, under any legal theory of liability, for
20 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures pursuant to California Labor Code § 2802; (8) all
21 claims alleged in the operative complaint, under any legal theory of liability, for violation of
22 Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*; (9) all claims alleged in the operative complaint
23 and Plaintiffs’ PAGA letters, under any legal theory of liability, for penalties pursuant to the PAGA
24 (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*); and (10) all claims alleged in the operative complaint, under any
25 legal theory of liability, for any penalties or any another amounts that could be potentially owed to
26 Class Members during the Settlement Period, including penalties owed pursuant to California Labor
27 Code §§ 210, 226.3, 558, and 1197.1.” (Settlement, § VII (A).)

28 ///

1 7. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$10,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs’
2 claims under the PAGA, with 75% of which (\$7,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
3 (\$2,500.00) being paid to the participating PAGA Members. (Settlement, § XVI.) Class Counsel
4 submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary
5 Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 9.)

6 8. Net Settlement Fund: The “Net Settlement Fund” or “Net Settlement Amount”
7 means the Gross Settlement Amount minus: (1) attorneys’ fees and Litigation costs, (2)
8 Administrative Costs, (3) enhancements to the Named Plaintiffs, and (4) the penalties recoverable
9 pursuant to the PAGA. (Settlement, § I (K).)

10 9. Distribution Formula: Members of the Settlement Class not opting out will receive
11 a lump sum payment as good and valuable consideration for the waiver and release of claims as
12 set forth in Section D (6), above, in an amount determined by the Settlement Administrator in
13 accordance with the provisions as outlined in Section XI(A) of the Settlement Agreement.
14 Additionally, Participating PAGA Members will receive a distribution of the PAGA penalties
15 pursuant to the formula outlined in the last paragraph of Section XI(A) of the Settlement
16 Agreement.

17 10. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
18 allocated as 33% wages and 67% penalties and interest. (Settlement, § XV.)

19 11. Class Representatives’ Service Awards: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs Taylor
20 and Lomonaco shall be paid enhancement awards in the amounts of \$7,500.00 and \$5,000.00,
21 respectively. (Settlement, § XIV.) This amount is for Plaintiffs’ time and effort in bringing and
22 presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown,
23 pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § VII (B).) If the Court approves lesser
24 enhancements, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount
25 to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis.
26 (Settlement, § XIV.)

27 ///

28 ///

12. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$62,500.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, § XIII.)

13. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A.) The Notice also includes an opt-out form that class members can complete in the event they decide to not participate in the settlement. (*Id.*) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § IX (C).) Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*) Notice will be provided in English and Spanish. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11; Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

14. Workweek Dispute Form: The Workweek Dispute Form sets forth each class member's total workweeks and permits class members to dispute their number of workweeks by following the procedures as outlined in the Workweek Dispute Form. (Settlement, Ex. B.)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of Plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount

1 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
2 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
3 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
4 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
5 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
6 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
7 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
8 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
9 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
10 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

11 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
12 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
13 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

14 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
15 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

16 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and**
17 **Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

18 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
19 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
20 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
21 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
22 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
23 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
24 to approve the settlement.”].)

25 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a full day of
26 mediation with experienced class action mediator, Justice Steven M. Vartabedian (Ret.). (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
28 professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore

1 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its
2 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

3 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
4 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
5 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
6 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
7 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
8 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
9 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
10 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
11 Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
12 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

13 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
14 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-50.) Again, this supports the position that the
15 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
16 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
17 action.

18 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
19 **Respective Legal Positions**

20 A settlement is not judged against what Plaintiffs might recover had they prevailed at trial,
21 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
22 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
23 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
24 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
25 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
26 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

27 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
28 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate

1 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving
2 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
3 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

4 The proposed settlement of \$187,500.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
5 compared to Plaintiffs' reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 17-28.) Because of the proposed
6 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
7 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
8 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
9 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$187,500.00 is within
10 the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
11 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
12 ***\$1,381.78.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

13 3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

14 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
15 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
16 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-
17 50.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
18 litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

19 B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

20 The Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and Workweek Dispute Form, in the form
21 attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibits A and B, should be approved for dissemination
22 to the class. The Notice and Workweek Dispute Form inform the class of the terms of the
23 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
24 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
25 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice
26 and Workweek Dispute Form meet all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of
27 Court.

28 ///

1 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

2 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
3 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$62,500.00, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
4 Settlement Amount, and up to \$15,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
5 members in the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and are reasonable.

6 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common**
7 **Fund” Method**

8 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
9 by counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held that “when
10 a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff
11 or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff
12 or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d
13 25, 34, quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

14 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/common
15 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
16 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent*,
17 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
18 Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
19 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
20 the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
21 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
22 has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in
23 which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

24 The California Supreme Court recently affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016)
25 1 Cal.5th 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
26 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that
27 fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
28 percentage of the fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages

1 of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between
2 counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the
3 encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
4 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our
5 trial courts.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

6 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

7 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
8 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
9 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
10 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
11 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
12 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
13 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also
14 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
15 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
16 million].)

17 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
18 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature
19 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
20 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
21 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
22 Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
23 by the Parties and requested herein.

24 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

25 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
26 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
27 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
28 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in

1 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
2 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
3 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
4 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 35-38.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
5 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this Litigation on behalf of
6 the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the
7 Class ahead of all other concerns.

8 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 9 **Requested Fee Award**

10 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
11 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
12 Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
13 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
14 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee
15 award is supported here.

16 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
17 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
18 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
19 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
20 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
21 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
22 is reasonable and fair.

23 **D. The Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

24 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
25 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
26 members of the class." (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
27 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
28 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the

1 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
2 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

3 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
4 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
5 codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
6 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
7 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
8 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
9 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
10 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
11 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
12 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

13 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
14 Service Awards in the amounts of \$7,500.00 and \$5,000.00 to Plaintiffs Taylor and Lomonaco,
15 respectively. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims against
16 Defendant. Class Counsel represent that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting
17 counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for Litigation and to prepare for
18 mediation, and were frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez
19 Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits
20 Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar*
21 *Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped
22 negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a
23 \$25,000.00 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 33)

24 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
25 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
26 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
27 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
28 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,

53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

E. There is Good Cause for Selecting Los Angeles Trial Lawyers’ Charities As the *Cy Pres* Recipient

A *cy pres* award allows for “aggregate calculation of damages, the use of summary claim procedures, and distribution of unclaimed funds to indirectly benefit the entire class.” (*Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers* (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 1301, 1305.) “To ensure that the settlement retains some connection to the plaintiff class and the underlying claims, however, a *cy pres* award must qualify as ‘the next best distribution’ to giving the funds directly to class members.” (*Dennis v. Kellogg Co.* (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 858, 865, quoting *Six Mexican Workers*, 904 F.2d at 1308.)

Moreover, in the class action context, California Code of Civil Procedure permits unpaid cash residues in a class action settlement to be distributed to a *cy pres* recipient “in a manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying class action or causes of action, or to promote justice for all Californians.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 384.)

Here, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, in the event settlement checks remain uncashed after 180 days, those funds shall be donated to Los Angeles Trial Lawyers’ Charities as a *cy pres* beneficiary. (Settlement, § XI (C).) In the past, LATLC has been the *cy pres* recipient in several wage and hour class action settlements. (Declaration of LATLC President Steven R. Vartazarian [“Vartazarian Decl.”], ¶ 5.) “In connection with this *cy pres* wage and hour award, LATLC will allocate the award to specific charitable efforts specifically related to employment and professional development and monitor those charitable efforts to ensure the *cy pres* funds are indeed utilized for the earmarked purposes.” (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) “Since it began in 2006, LATLC has

1 donated \$2,778,784.69 to organizations helping people seek employment and promoting
2 educational and professional opportunities.” (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

3 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

4 **A. Legal Standard**

5 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification for settlement purposes.
6 All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws
7 and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the
8 Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382
9 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
10 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
11 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
12 section 382: “(1) there must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
13 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
14 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify
15 these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1)
17 predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
18 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart*
19 *Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

20 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at
21 pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “[c]ourts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means
22 to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are
23 at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
24 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
25 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

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1 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
2 **Settlement Purposes**

3 **1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous for Settlement Purposes.**

4 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
5 approximately 59 employees of Defendant.

6 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
7 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in Defendant’s regular
8 business records (i.e., job position), the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000)
9 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject
10 of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

11 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
12 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
13 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
14 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
15 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
16 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
17 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
18 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
19 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

20 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**
21 **for Settlement Purposes**

22 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
23 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
24 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
25 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
26 Cal.App.3d 605.)

27 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
28 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had

1 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
2 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
3 to take rest periods; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages,
4 including meal period premium and rest period premium wages; whether the wage statements were
5 consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant adequately reimbursed employees for
6 business expenditures. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of
7 the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and
8 seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

9 **3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class for Settlement**
10 **Purposes.**

11 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
12 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
13 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
14 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
15 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
16 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
17 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
18 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant; as
19 such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
20 employees.

21 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement for**
22 **Settlement Purposes.**

23 The adequacy of representation requirement is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
24 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
25 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
26 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

27 Both of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
28 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that

1 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
2 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
3 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
4 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
5 Plaintiffs’ willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their serious commitment to
6 bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

7 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

8 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
9 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
10 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
11 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
12 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
13 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
14 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
15 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
16 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
17 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

18 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

19 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

20 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
21 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
22 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
23 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
24 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
25 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
26 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
27 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

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1 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

2 The Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement should be approved. It will be
3 disseminated through direct U.S. first-class mail to the last known address for each Class Member.
4 It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the
5 Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action
6 settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval
7 Hearing.

8 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
9 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
10 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
11 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
12 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
13 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made.
14 Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality
15 required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

16 **VI. CONCLUSION**

17 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
18 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in January 2023.

19
20 Dated: July 29, 2022

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

21
22 By: _____

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

23
24 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES) ss

On **July 29, 2022**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Attorneys for Defendant U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc. dba Automated Dairy Systems

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

Executed on **July 29, 2022**, at Los Angeles, California.


Signature