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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

TONY NUNEZ, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

GABRIEL CONTAINER, a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 21STCV09787

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned to: Hon. Lawrence P. Riff, Dept. 7]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of Tony
Nunez; Declaration of Justin F. Marquez; and
[Proposed] Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: June 27, 2023

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept: 7

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 27, 2023 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 7 of the Los
3 Angeles County Superior Court, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, pursuant
4 to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*,
5 Plaintiff TONY NUNEZ (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting
6 preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant
7 GABRIEL CONTAINER. Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:


- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
9 and Class Notice;
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiff TONY NUNEZ as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
13 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, and Arrash T.
14 Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
15 6. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator; and
16 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
18 Authorities, the Declaration of Tony Nunez, the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, filed
19 concurrently herewith, the records and files in this Action, and any other further evidence or
20 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

21 Respectfully submitted,

22 Dated: April 28, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

23
24 By: 
25 Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

26 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tony Nunez (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$390,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Gabriel Container. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 142 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, informal discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Honorable Steven R. Denton (Ret.), over the course of a full day of mediation and a mediator’s proposal that followed, which the Parties considered for approximately one week. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes only, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant operates company that manufactures cardboard containers in Santa Fe Springs, California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked and failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and

1 straight time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
2 authorize and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure
3 to provide accurate itemized wage statements, unfair business practices, and civil penalties
4 under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

5 On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
6 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§
7 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and
8 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to
9 authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages
10 at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
11 statements (Labor Code § 226); and (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions
12 Code 17200, *et seq.*). (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On the same day, Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and
13 the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage
14 and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Plaintiff’s Notice of Labor Code
15 Violations and PAGA Penalties].) Plaintiff also paid the \$75.00 filing fee on March 12, 2021.
16 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

17 On December 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class & Representative Action
18 Complaint, which added a claim for civil penalties under the PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

19 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

20 Following the Initial Status Conference, Plaintiff propounded formal written discovery.
21 However, the Parties later agreed to stay formal discovery in exchange for participating in
22 private mediation and engaging in informal discovery. In advance of mediation, Defendant
23 produced a sample of timekeeping and pay records for the class members, which included
24 time records and corresponding pay records for approximately 25% of the total shifts in the
25 class period. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices
26 during the class period and information regarding the total number of current and former
27 employees. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

28 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and

1 analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records with the assistance of a retained
2 expert, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the
3 merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class
4 Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
5 litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior
6 to mediation. (*Id.*)

7 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

8 On May 31, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
9 action mediator Honorable Steven R. Denton (Ret.) (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The mediation was
10 conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although
11 conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation
12 willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared
13 to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)
14 After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
15 Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the mediator issued a mediator's proposal that the
16 Parties ultimately accepted approximately one week later. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The Parties
17 subsequently negotiated and drafted a long-form agreement, the material terms of which are
18 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9, **Ex. 2** [Class and Representative
19 Action Settlement Agreement].)

20 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
21 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
22 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
23 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the
24 risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification
25 and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

26 Indeed, the \$390,000.00 Settlement represents **61.6% of the realistic maximum**
27 **recovery of \$632,492.74.** (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's
28 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3.7 million, when the risk of

prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was approximately \$632,492.74, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-28.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) This result is also significant considering that approximately 80% of the class members are purportedly covered by arbitration agreements and class action waivers. (*Id.*) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief that they likely would not have been to achieve on their own, and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: all individuals employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the Class Period. (Settlement, ¶ 2.)

2. Class Period: "September 15, 2016 through the earlier of (i) the date of preliminary Approval or (ii) the date Class Members workweeks equals 22,653 (i.e. 10% above the total work weeks as of May 27, 2022)" (Settlement, ¶ 4.)

3. Participating Class Members: "all Class Members who do not submit a valid request to be excluded from the settlement, consistent with the terms set forth in this Settlement Agreement." (Settlement, ¶ 18.)

4. PAGA Group: means "all non-exempt, hourly-paid California employees employed by GABRIEL CONTAINER during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § I(15).)

5. PAGA Period: means "the period from September 15, 2019 through the end of the Class Period." (Settlement, ¶ 17.) Every class member is not also an Aggrieved Employee.

6. Maximum Settlement Amount: This amount is \$390,000.00 and will be used to pay Individual Settlement Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Award, and the

1 Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, ¶ 10.) Defendant shall fully fund the Maximum
2 Settlement Amount, plus all employer-side taxes, no later than 90 days after the Effective Date as
3 described in the Settlement Agreement. (Settlement, ¶ 39.)

4 7. Uncashed Checks: For any Participating Class Member whose Individual
5 Settlement Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date (not less than 180 days
6 after the date of mailing), the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks
7 to the California State Controller's Unclaimed Property Funds in the name of the Class Members
8 thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil
9 Procedure § 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, ¶ 66.)

10 8. Release by Participating Class Members: "means any and all claims, damages, or
11 causes of action alleged in, or arising out of, the allegations in the Complaint and First Amended
12 Complaint, filed in the Action and the PAGA Notice, which were alleged or that could have been
13 alleged by NUNEZ and/or any Participating Class Member in such complaints and/or the PAGA
14 Notice based on any of the factual allegations contained in such complaints and/or the PAGA
15 Notice, including, but not limited to, claims under state, federal (i.e., Fair Labor Standards Act
16 (FLSA)) or local law, including, but not limited to claims for unpaid wages, claims for the failure
17 to pay minimum wages, claims for the failure to pay overtime wages, claims related to missed
18 meal and rest breaks or periods and nonpayment of premium pay for such, failure to comply with
19 itemized employee wage statement provisions, failure to pay wages due at separation, failure to
20 timely pay wages during employment, failure to keep requisite payroll records, unfair
21 competition, the payment of any penalties (including PAGA). The Released Claims specifically
22 include, but are not limited to, all claims arising under California Labor Code sections 201, 202,
23 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2,
24 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2698 *et seq.*, 2800, the Wage Orders of the California Industrial
25 Welfare Commission, California Business and Profession Code sections 17200, *et seq.*,
26 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and California common law of contract,
27 interest and claims for attorney's fees relating in any way to those claims alleged and mentioned
28 in the complaint(s) and/or PAGA Notice." (Settlement, ¶ 23.) This release only becomes

effective upon the funding of the Maximum Settlement Amount. (Settlement, ¶ 68.)

9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “means any and all claims for civil penalties under PAGA based on the labor code violations alleged in the PAGA Notice sent by Plaintiff to the LWDA, including California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, 2698, et seq., the IWC Wage Orders as well as all facts, theories, or claims for civil penalties that would be considered administratively exhausted under applicable law by the PAGA Notice Plaintiff sent to the LWDA.” (Settlement, ¶ 24.) This release only becomes effective upon the funding of the Maximum Settlement Amount (Settlement, ¶ 69.)

10. No Reversion: “This settlement is made on a non-reversionary basis.” (Settlement, ¶ 38.)

11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$25,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$18,750.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$6,250.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, ¶ 44.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

12. Net Settlement Fund/Amount: “means the portion of the Maximum Settlement Amount, less the amounts approved and awarded by the Court for: (1) the attorneys’ fees of Class Counsel; (2) the litigation costs and expenses of Class Counsel; (3) the Service Award to the Class Representative; (4) the payment to the LWDA pursuant to PAGA; (5) all costs of administration, including, without limitation, the Settlement Administrator’s fees and expenses. (Settlement, ¶ 11.)

13. Distribution Formula: The Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated based on a prorated basis using the number of workweeks that Participating Class Members and PAGA Group Members worked for Defendant during the Class Period and PAGA Period, as further detailed in Paragraph 61 of the Settlement Agreement.

14. Tax Allocation: “20% of the Individual Settlement Payment (excluding any portion of the share of the PAGA Payment) to Participating Class Members as wages; 73.5% of

1 the Individual Settlement Payment (excluding any portion of the share of the PAGA Payment) to
2 Participating Class Members as non-wage statutory damages and interest; and 6.5% (i.e. PAGA
3 civil penalties) as penalties.” (Settlement, ¶ 62.)

4 15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
5 paid a service award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 43.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s
6 time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all
7 claims, known or unknown, pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, ¶ 70.)
8 If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion shall revert into the Net
9 Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members. (Settlement, ¶
10 43)

11 16. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not
12 oppose a fee application of up to 33.33% of the Gross Settlement Amount or \$130,000.00, plus
13 out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 42.)

14 17. Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final
15 Court Approval: The Notice sets forth, in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the
16 Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being
17 sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1,
18 Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement,
19 ¶ 43.) Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will
20 undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is provided to the current addresses of class
21 members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to
22 updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 11, **Ex. 3** [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

23 **III. DISCUSSION**

24 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
25 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
26 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v.*
27 *Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is
28 reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the

1 court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of
2 objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

3 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
4 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and
5 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the
6 amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings,
7 the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction
8 of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
9 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
10 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
11 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI*
12 *Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar*
13 does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover
14 if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in
15 controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

16 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
17 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
18 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

19 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
20 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

21 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and**
22 **Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

23 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
24 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
25 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
26 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
27 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
28 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not

1 to approve the settlement.”].)

2 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
3 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Honorable Steven R. Denton (Ret.).
4 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted
5 in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to
6 explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate
7 their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After
8 extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s
9 claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached an agreement pursuant to a mediator’s
10 proposal. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

11 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted extensive informal discovery
12 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping
13 and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the
14 provision of meal and rest breaks, providing all wages at separation, and the issuance of wage
15 statements, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix
16 of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest
17 period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their factual
18 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
19 asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and
20 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

21 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
22 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-48.) Again, this supports the position that
23 the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and
24 weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued
25 litigation of this action.

26 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
27 **Respective Legal Positions**

28 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial,

nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

The proposed settlement of \$390,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$390,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately 1,505.28.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-48.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be

1 approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the
2 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
3 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
4 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice
5 meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

6 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

7 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
8 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount up to 33.33% of the Gross Settlement Amount or
9 \$130,000.00, and up to \$20,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in
10 the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

11 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common**
12 **Fund" Method**

13 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
14 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
15 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or
16 plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or
17 plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d
18 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

19 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
20 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
21 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent*,
22 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
23 Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
24 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
25 the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
26 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
27 has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund
28 in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

1 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1
2 Cal.5th 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
3 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that
4 fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
5 percentage of the fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized
6 advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of
7 incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a
8 contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and
9 avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable
10 tool that should not be denied our trial courts.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

11 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

12 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
13 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit
14 on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
15 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger
16 percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd
17 Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper
18 limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively
19 small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp.
20 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement
21 funds of under \$10 million].)

22 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
23 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic
24 literature, and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162
25 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage
26 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of
27 the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the
28 attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

1 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

2 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
3 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
4 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
5 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
6 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources
7 facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume
8 risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk
9 for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a
10 contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on
11 behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary
12 duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

13 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the**
14 **Requested Fee Award**

15 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of
16 consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class
17 actions. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-48.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-
18 counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is
19 reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience,
20 Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

21 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
22 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
23 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
24 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
25 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
26 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee
27 award is reasonable and fair.

28 ///

1 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

2 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments
3 to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
4 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant
5 approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class
6 representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are
7 appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See*
8 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

9 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because
10 they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong
11 policy is codified in California Labor Code Section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this
12 state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not
13 required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the
14 California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
15 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
16 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class
17 representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class
18 members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

19 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
20 a service award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
21 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff
22 devoted a great deal of time and work for this case, including communicating with counsel on a
23 frequent basis, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (Marquez Decl.,
24 ¶¶ 30-34.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff
25 generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar*
26 *Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped
27 negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a
28 \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 34.)

1 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
2 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
3 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
4 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.”
5 (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
6 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named
7 plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a
8 median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an
9 average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the
10 study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make
11 representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the
12 class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

13 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

14 **A. Legal Standard**

15 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims
16 derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations.
17 For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
18 prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382
19 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
20 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
21 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements
22 to Section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
23 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
24 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [internal citations omitted].)
25 To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil
26 Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors:
27 “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses
28 typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.”

1 (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

2 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
3 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
4 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
5 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
6 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*,
7 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

8 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
9 **Settlement Purposes.**

10 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

11 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
12 approximately 142 current and former employees of Defendant.

13 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
14 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular
15 business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life*
16 *Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product
17 that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

18 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
19 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
20 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an
21 action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact
22 practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the
23 maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing
24 the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v.*
25 *Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35
26 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

27 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

28 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the

1 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
2 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
3 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
4 Cal.App.3d 605.)

5 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
6 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
7 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting their employees to take rest periods;
8 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
9 overtime wages; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages,
10 including meal and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were
11 consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for
12 all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from,
13 and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

14 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

15 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
16 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but
17 rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's
18 conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only
19 requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class
20 representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are
21 typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the
22 claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former
23 employee of Defendant; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices
24 as other similarly situated employees.

25 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

26 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
27 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation;
28 second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v.*

1 *Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

2 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
3 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions
4 that previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-48.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
5 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
6 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
7 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
8 Plaintiff’s willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to
9 bringing about the best results possible for the class and subclass. (*McGhee, supra*, 60
10 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

11 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

12 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
13 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
14 litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this
15 Court’s use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves
16 the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class
17 treatment, similarly-situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for
18 damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and
19 expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 443, 457-62;
20 *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of
21 settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

22 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

23 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

24 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
25 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
26 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
27 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this
28 matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has

1 explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial
2 percentage of the Class Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed
3 settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

4 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

5 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
6 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
7 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
8 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
9 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

10 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte &
11 Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date
12 and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent
13 manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of
14 liability by the Defendant, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not
15 ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has
16 yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and
17 neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.


18 **VI. CONCLUSION**

19 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
20 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in November 2023 or as
21 soon as is practicable for the Court’s calendar.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: April 28, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24
25 By: 

26 Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

27 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
28

Nunez v. Gabriel Container, et al.
21STCV09787

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

On April 28, 2023, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Facsimile: (858) 485-9412


Signature