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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

JAVIER SANTIAGO, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAL TECH PRECISION, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2021-01195725-CU-OE-CXC

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned to: Hon. David A. Hoffer, Dept.
CX103]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: January 26, 2026
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: CX103

Complaint filed: April 15, 2021
FAC filed: August 15, 2023
Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 24, 2025 at 1:30 p.m., in Department CX103 of the Orange County Superior Court, located at 751 West Santa Ana Blvd., Santa Ana, CA 92701, Plaintiff Javier Santiago (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Javier Santiago as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Javier Santiago;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, and Alan Wilcox of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$116,666.67 in attorneys’ fees, which is one-third (33 1/3%) of the Gross Settlement Amount based on this Court’s prior guidance regarding attorneys’ fees;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$13,635.31 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$8,500.00;
7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supporting declarations, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

Dated: December 31, 2025


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Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: _____



Benjamin H. Haber
Daniel J. Kramer
Alan Wilcox

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Javier Santiago (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$350,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Cal Tech Precision, Inc. (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 219 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$806.74*, with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$1,995.21*. (Declaration of William Argueta on Behalf of CPT Group, Inc. with Respect to Notification, Proof of Processing and Request for Exclusion [“Argueta Decl.”], ¶ 15.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) The administrator will provide a supplemental declaration once the responsive deadline passes. Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a consolidated wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, et seq.) representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant Cal Tech Precision, Inc ("Defendant") during the class period. Defendant is based in Anaheim, California and specializes in the manufacturing of complex structural aerospace parts. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Haber Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked and failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and straight wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to indemnify employees for business expenditures, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 2.)

On April 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194, and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (6) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.). Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, et seq.) on April 15, 2021. On August 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for

civil penalties under Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698 et seq.). (Haber Decl., at ¶ 3.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. Following mediation, Defendant also provided financial-related documents evidencing Defendant’s ability to fund a settlement. (*Id.*)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, reviewing financial-related documents with the assistance of a financial forensic accountant, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims, and Defendant’s ability to fund a settlement. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 5.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement

On January 20, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator, Kelly A. Knight, Esq. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 6.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. The Parties did not resolve the action at mediation. (*Id.*) However, the Parties engaged in additional informal discovery, including Defendant’s production of financial-related documents. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Exs. 1-2** [Joint Stipulation Re: Class and PAGA Settlement].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 7.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed his initial Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“MPA”). (Haber Decl., ¶ 8.) On October 25, 2024, this Court issued a tentative ruling regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and ordered that the Parties review and revise issues that it had with the Settlement Agreement, Class Notice, and attaching both the notification and copy of the letter sent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), a class member exclusion form, and a workweek dispute form. The Parties met and conferred and agreed to amend the Settlement with respect to all of the requested changes from the October 25, 2024 tentative ruling, except for the allocation of the settlement payment between wages and non-wages for tax purposes, which the Parties prefer to maintain at 75% allocated to non-wages and 25% allocated to wages. The Parties agreed upon and executed an Addendum to the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Addendum”) through their counsel to confirm the changes made to the Settlement Agreement and Class Notice pursuant to the Court’s tentative ruling. On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a revised Proposed Order. On October 2, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval. (*Id.*) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was January 26, 2026. The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, **no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement.** (*Id.*; see also Argueta Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$350,000.00 to resolve this

litigation. The key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed by Cal Tech Precision in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “means the period that starts on April 15, 2017 and shall end on August 22, 2022.” (Settlement, § 1.13.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Class Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.38.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or nonexempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period from April 15, 2017 to August 22, 2022. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.13.)

5. PAGA Period: means the period that starts on April 15, 2020 and shall end on August 22, 2022. (Settlement, § 1.34.)

6. Settlement Amount: This amount is \$350,000.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Class Representative Service Award. (Settlement, § 1.24.)

7. Uncashed Checks: “If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a Class Member Address Search and, if another address is identified, shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the Orange County Public Law Center, 601 W. Civic Center Dr., Santa Ana, CA 92701, consistent with Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b) (“Cy Pres Recipient”). (Settlement, §§ 4.4.2, 4.4.3.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,

heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2 and 1997); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and (8) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Except as set forth in Section 6.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period. ” (Settlement, § 6.2.)

9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “All Aggrieved Employees, whether they are Participating Class Members or Non- Participating Class Members, are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint or the PAGA Notice, including any and all claims for: (1) violations of Labor Code § 2802 and applicable Wage Orders for failing to indemnify employees for expenditures; (2) violations of Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1198 by failing to pay for all hours worked, including minimum wages, straight time wages, and overtime wages; (3) violations of Labor Code § 226.7 and applicable Wage Orders by failing to provide meal periods; 4) Labor Code § 226.7 and applicable Wage Orders by failing to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) violations of Labor Code § 204 by failing to pay all earned wages two times per month; (6) violations of California Labor Code § 1174.5 and applicable Wage Orders by failing to maintain accurate records of hours worked and meal periods taken or missed; (7)

violations of Labor Code §§ 201 to 203 by willfully failing to pay all wages owed at termination; and (8) violations of Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements (the “PAGA Released Claims”).” (Settlement, § 6.3.)

10. PAGA Penalties: The settlement includes \$10,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$7,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$2,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, §1.37.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.)

11. Net Settlement Fund: “is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) attorneys’ fees and Litigation costs, (2) Administrative Costs, (3) enhancement to the Named Plaintiff, and (4) the penalties recoverable pursuant to the PAGA. (Settlement, § 1.30.)

12. Distribution Formula: An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$2,500) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 25% wages, 75% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: “Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 6.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement

Class Members on a pro-rata basis.” (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$116,666.67) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 8.3.2.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a

whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise

A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$350,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.

Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately \$806.74, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$1,995.21.

(Argueta Decl., ¶ 15.)

B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery

The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced employment mediator, Kelly A. Knight, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) The settlement negotiations

were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. The Parties did not resolve the action at mediation. However, the Parties engaged in additional informal discovery, including Defendant's production of financial-related documents. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, including samples of pay data and timesheets for class members. Defendant also produced financial-related documents that Plaintiff analyzed with the assistance of a financial forensic accountant. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 4-5) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 26-34.) Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action. (*Id.*)

Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral

mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Argueta Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the "class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement" where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, "only nine objections were submitted", and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, "these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23"], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the "fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness," and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of \$166,666.67, which is one-third (33 1/3%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of \$10,000.00 to named Plaintiff Javier Santiago.

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for

calculating attorneys' fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys' fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in

1 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line
2 with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is
3 consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees
4 requested herein.

5 **B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts**
6 **May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.**

7 Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used
8 to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can
9 be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in
10 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and
11 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In*
12 *re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

13 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
14 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a
15 multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is
16 to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
17 retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal
18 skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate
19 for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may
20 be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

21 Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that
22 an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed
23 time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the
24 California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

25 With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts
26 conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely
27 scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on
attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award
appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

28 (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v.*

Integrated Resources, Inc., supra, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$104,155 based on over 104 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 16-17.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$166,666.67 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.6. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (See *Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; see also *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (See *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; see also *Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (See, e.g., *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a positive multiplier of

1 1.6 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff's request is underscored by the fact that a
2 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

3 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
4 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) "A
5 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
6 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
7 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
8 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
9 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is "earned compensation; unlike a
10 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
11 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
12 or delay in payment of attorney's fees." (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

13 "Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher." (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
14 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
15 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
16 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
17 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 ["most" common fund cases apply a multiplier
18 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
19 study "reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases" and
20 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be "per se reasonable.") The intermediate court in
21 *Laffitte*, after finding that "2 to 4" is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
22 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
23 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
24 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

25 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
26 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
27 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
28 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

1 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
2 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
3 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

4 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
5 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
6 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
7 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
8 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
9 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
10 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's
11 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

12 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
13 had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
14 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the
15 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
16 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
17 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
18 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
19 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
20 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
21 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
22 achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 24.) Considered against the risks of continued
23 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
24 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

25 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

26 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$13,635.31 in costs,
27 and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00.
28 (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to

1 \$13,635.31 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of
2 Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

3 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee
4 paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial
5 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
6 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
7 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
8 (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
9 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL
10 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
11 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
12 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

13 **D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.**

14 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
15 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
16 members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
17 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements
18 containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to
19 represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring
20 about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The
21 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
22 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
23 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be
24 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
25 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

26 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
27 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Javier Santiago.
28 This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant.

1 Plaintiff will submit a declaration demonstrating his devotion to this case, including his efforts
2 assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for
3 mediation, and reviewing case-related documents.

4 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
5 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
6 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
7 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
8 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
9 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award
10 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3
11 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
12 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

13 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
14 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
15 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
16 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
17 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
18 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
19 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
20 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
21 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
22 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
23 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
24 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
25 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
26 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

27 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

28 CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of

1 \$8,500.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Argueta Decl., ¶ 17.)
2 These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and
3 Class Member payment processing.


4 **V. CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
6 of the proposed settlement.

7
8 Dated: December 31, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

9 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

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11 
12 Benjamin H. Haber
13 Daniel J. Kramer
14 Alan Wilcox

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16 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Santiago v. Cal Tech Precision, Inc., et al.
30-2021-01195725-CU-OE-CXC

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 660 S. Figueroa St., Sky Lobby, Los Angeles, California 90017. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On December 31, 2025, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Damian M. Moos
dmoos@scopelitis.com
SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, LLP
2 North Lake Avenue Suite 560
Pasadena, CA 91101
Telephone: (949) 800-8601
Facsimile: (626) 795-4790

Attorney for Defendant

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 31, 2025, at Los Angeles, California.



Rebecca Padilla