

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

Norman B. Blumenthal (State Bar #068687)
Kyle R. Nordrehaug (State Bar #205975)
Aparajit Bhowmik (State Bar #248066)
Christine T. LeVu (State Bar #288271)
Brooke Wilkinson Waldrop (State Bar #314486)
Adolfo Sanchez Contreras (State Bar #354371)

2255 Calle Clara
La Jolla, CA 92037

Telephone: (858)551-1223

Facsimile: (858) 551-1232

Email: norm@bamlawca.com

Website: www.bamlawca.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

MARIA SEGISMUNDO and DAVID
GRAY, individuals, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, and on
behalf of the State of California, as a
private attorney general,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

RANCHO MURIETA COUNTRY
CLUB, a California Corporation; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **34-2021-00308730-CU-OE-GDS**
[consolidated with case no. 34-2021-00308737]

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS**

Hearing Date: August 22, 2025

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

[Hearing scheduled by Order dated April 28, 2025]

Judge: Hon. Jill H. Talley

Dept: 23

Date Filed: September 23, 2021

Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	-1-
II.	THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT	-1-
III.	GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS.....	-2-
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE.	-3-
A.	The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness.	-4-
1.	The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel and the Court to Act Intelligently	-4-
2.	The Settlement was Reached Through Arm's Length Bargaining.	-4-
3.	Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation	-5-
4.	There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion	-5-
5.	The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case	-6-
6.	The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation	-8-
7.	The Amount Offered in Settlement.	-9-
V.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED	-11-
A.	The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method	-11-
B.	The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.	-14-
C.	The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved.	-14-
VI.	CONCLUSION.....	-15-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page:

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135 (2000)	-2-, -3-
<i>Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.</i> , 252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008)	-5-
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183 (C.D. Cal. 2022)	-15-
<i>Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</i> , 297 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	-12-
<i>Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118 (S.D. Cal. 2009)	-8-
<i>Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert</i> , 444 U.S. 472 (1980)	-11-
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	-7-
<i>Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266 (N.D. Cal. 2007)	-7-
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2009)	-3-
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 162 Cal.App.4th 43 (2008)	-13-
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 (1996)	-3-
<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)</i> , 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000)	-11-
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	-8-
<i>Gaskill v. Gordon</i> , 160 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1998)	-12-
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Cal. 2007). .	-5-, -9-, -11-, -15-
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)	-6-

1	<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> ,	
2	2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009)	-7-
3	<i>Huens v. Tatum</i> ,	
4	52 Cal. App. 4th 259 (1997)	-2-
5	<i>In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation</i> ,	
6	80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).....	-6-
7	<i>In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases</i> ,	
8	171 Cal.App.4th 495 (2009)	-13-
9	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> ,	
10	168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008)	-3-
11	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l</i> ,	
12	1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)	-12-, -13-
13	<i>Laskey v. Int'l Union</i> ,	
14	638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)	-6-
15	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.</i> ,	
16	2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314 (S.D. Cal. 2008).....	-8-, -15-
17	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.</i> ,	
18	2014 WL 2472316 (C.D. Cal. 2014)	-11-
19	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.</i> ,	
20	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018)	-15-
21	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.</i> ,	
22	186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010).....	-3-
23	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.</i> ,	
24	15 Cal. 5th 1056 (May 6, 2024)	-7-, -11-
25	<i>Nordstrom Commission Cases</i> ,	
26	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010)	-10-
27	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n</i> ,	
28	688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982)	-3-
	<i>Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.</i> ,	
	182 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010)	-13-
	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.</i> ,	
	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865 (N.D. Cal. 2019)	-15-
	<i>Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.</i> ,	
	2012 WL 3151077 (C.D. Cal. 2012).....	-14-
	<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> ,	
	20 Cal.3d 25 (1977)	-11-

1	<i>Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.</i> ,	
2	812 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2016)	-13-
3	<i>Stetson v. Grissom</i> ,	
4	821 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2016)	-13-, -14-
5	<i>Stoetznier v. U.S. Steel Corp.</i> ,	
6	897 F.2d 115 (3d. Cir. 1990)	-6-
7	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.</i> ,	
8	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015)	-11-
9	<i>Swedish Hospital v. Shalala</i> ,	
10	1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993)	-12-
11	<i>Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.</i> ,	
12	2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016)	-14-
13	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.</i> ,	
14	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	-11-
15	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.</i> ,	
16	557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1997)	-11-
17	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.</i> ,	
18	290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)	-13-
19	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer</i> ,	
20	91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001)	-3-, -11-, -13-
21	Secondary Sources:	
22	Fitzpatrick, <i>An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award</i> ,	
23	7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811 (2010)	-12-

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which
4 is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In
5 accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated November 14, 2024 (“Preliminary Approval
6 Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs Maria Segismundo and David Gray (“Plaintiffs”) respectfully
9 move for final approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service awards, and the proposed entry
10 of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent
11 result for the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the
12 notice to the members of the Class, there were **no objections and no requests for exclusion**, which
13 means that the entire Class (100%) has elected to participate in the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.
14 This is a positive response from the Class evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a
15 result, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the class settlement should be finally approved for the same
16 reasons that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

17 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

18 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
19 Rancho Murieta Country Club ("Defendant") is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$400,000) (the
20 "Gross Settlement Amount") (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.22 and 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount will settle
21 all issues pending in the Action between the Parties and will be made in full and final settlement of the
22 Released Class Claims in exchange for the payments to Participating Class Members from the Net
23 Settlement Amount, and includes (a) the costs of administration of the settlement, (b) all attorneys' fees
24

25 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

26 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant
27 Rancho Murieta Country Club in the State of California on a non-exempt basis.” The “Class Period”
28 is “September 23, 2017 through January 11, 2023.” Preliminary Approval Order, ¶6, as modified by
Stipulation and Order dated December 20, 2024.

1 and costs, (c) Class Representative Service Payments, and (d) the PAGA Penalties payment allocated
2 75% to the LWDA and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) The Gross
3 Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The
4 Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.)
5 Blumenthal Decl. ¶4(b). The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the
6 proposed deductions:

7 **\$400,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)
 - \$25,000 (Plaintiffs' proposed service award not to exceed \$12,500 each)
8 - \$18,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
 - \$133,333 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
9 - \$10,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
 - \$17,490 (Administration Expenses Payment)
10 **\$196,177** (Net Settlement Amount)

11 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
12 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 4(c)-4(i).

13 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
14 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
15 is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (Preliminary Approval Order at 3:15-19.) In sum, the Settlement
16 valued at \$400,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of
17 the fact that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses
18 asserted by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of
19 class certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is
20 fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4(j).

21 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
22 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

23 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259,
24 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
25 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
26 *v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are
27 the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

28 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable

1 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
2 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
4 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
5 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
6 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

7 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
8 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
9 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
10 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
12 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
13 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
14 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

15 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

16 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v.*
17 *Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service*
18 *Com'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
19 the settlement is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The
20 well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class
21 action settlement agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and
22 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
23 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
24 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the
25 class members to the proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116,
26 128 (2008) (internal citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186
27 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

28 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.

1 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
2 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
3 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
4 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
5 “Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing,
6 gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

7 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
8 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

9 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

10 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
11 and the Court to Act Intelligently

12 Over the course of more than two years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation
13 of the claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for
14 the full and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural
15 history and investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary
16 approval. The Parties participated in mediation on November 17, 2022 with Tim Del Castillo, which
17 after arms’ length negotiations both during and after the mediation, resulted in this Settlement. The
18 details of the litigation are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 7(a)-7(g).

19 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

20 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations
21 before an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continue to
22 deny any wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and
23 Class Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released
24 Class Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class
25 Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

26 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Tim Del Castillo, a respected and
27 experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement. In preparation
28 for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with payroll and employment data and other

1 information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and other compensation and
2 employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the assistance of damages expert
3 Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the mediator. The final settlement
4 terms were negotiated and set forth in the Agreement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

5 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
6 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
7 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
8 2007) (“The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the
9 litigation, with the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment
10 litigation[, and] this factor supports approval of the settlement”). Following mediation, in February
11 2024 the Agreement was finalized and executed. On November 14, 2024 the Court issued its
12 Preliminary Approval Order granting preliminary approved of the settlement as fair, adequate, and
13 reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

14 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

15 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
16 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
17 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
18 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
19 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
20 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the
21 Blumenthal Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement
22 discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and in the best interests
23 of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 4(j).

24 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

25 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On April 30, 2024,
26 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each
27 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial
28 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being sought,

1 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to
2 that individual. See Declaration of Madely Nava (“Nava Decl.”) ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the
3 notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary
4 Approval Order. Significantly, there have been no objections and no requests to opt-out. Nava Decl.
5 ¶¶ 11-12. As such, the entire Class (100%) will participate in the Settlement and will be sent a
6 settlement check. See Nava Decl. at ¶¶ 13 and 18; Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

7 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
8 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
9 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
10 adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
11 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
12 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
13 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
14 approval of the class is evident.

15 5. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

16 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid
17 all overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate of pay, were not provided meal and rest
18 periods or paid premiums at the correct rate of pay in lieu thereof, were not timely paid earned wages,
19 were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not provided accurate itemized wage
20 statements, were not pay all sick wages and the correct rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the
21 time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any
22 other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by
23 virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶6.

24 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
25 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
26 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
27 that Defendant’s practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that Class
28 Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded. Defendant

1 contends that its meal and rest period policies fully complied with California law and Defendant did
2 not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendant could argue that
3 their payment of meal period premiums is evidence of lawful practices. Defendant contends that there
4 was no failure to pay for business expenses and any cell phone usage was merely convenient and
5 voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally required. Finally, Defendant could argue that the
6 Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiffs'
7 claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also
8 argues that based on their facially lawful practices, Defendant acted in good faith and without
9 willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate
10 wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (May 6, 2024)
11 (“if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage
12 statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and
13 intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.”) Defendant’s defenses could eliminate
14 or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiffs believe that these defenses could be
15 overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present a serious risk to
16 recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶9(a).

17 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

19 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
20 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...]he gross
21 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

22 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
24 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
25 approval.”). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

26 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
27 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
28 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today

1 outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
2 the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

3 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
4 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

5 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiffs would be unable
6 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on
7 behalf of any employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully
8 opposed the propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification.
9 Further, as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National*
10 *Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even
11 where the class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and
12 hour claims, class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class
13 through trial was by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶9(b).

14 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
15 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
16 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average
17 class member allocation are \$2,726.59 and \$495.40, respectively. *See Nava Decl.* ¶ 15. Given the
18 complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed
19 Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶9(e).

20 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

21 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
22 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event
23 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years
24 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the
25 case could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
26 outweigh an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶9(c).

27 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of continuing to litigate and
28 trying this Action against Defendant through possible appeals which could take several years. Class

1 Counsel has also taken into account the uncertain outcome and risk of litigation, especially in complex
2 class actions such as this Action. Class Counsel is also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems
3 of proof under, and alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions
4 and appeals would have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been
5 delayed if not denied, thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers
6 substantial benefits upon the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have
7 determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class.
8 Blumenthal Decl. ¶9(c).

9 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
10 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
11 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
12 to those in this litigation:

13 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
14 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of
15 how this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
16 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
17 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
18 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

19 *Id.* at *12.

20 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

21 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
22 to Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
23 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
24 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 396 Class Members who collectively worked 20,002
25 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of \$1,010.10 per Class Member
26 and \$20.00 per Workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average
27 recovery of \$495.39 per Class Member and a recovery of \$9.80 per Workweek. Blumenthal Decl. at
28 ¶9(d).

The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiffs' damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at

1 issue in this Action, Plaintiffs used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
2 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$8,719 for the
3 alleged unpaid wages due to rounding, \$454,659 for the alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work
4 at 1 hour per week, \$652,158 for alleged meal period damages based upon a 46.8% potential violation
5 rate for shifts observed in the time records and after deducting the meal premiums (\$10,062) actually
6 paid by Defendant, and \$1,414,351 for alleged rest period damages based upon a 100% violation rate,
7 \$24,185 for alleged unreimbursed business expenses for personal cell phone usage at \$5 per month.
8 Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6. As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated that Defendant was
9 subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$2,554,073. As to potential penalties, Plaintiffs
10 calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum range of between \$498,938 and
11 \$923,958, depending on the predicate violation, and potential maximum wage statement penalties were
12 \$421,450.³ Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiffs' calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal
13 Decl. ¶9(d).

14 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$400,000 represents more than 9.8% of the
15 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴
16 The 100% alleged violation rate for rest breaks likely overstates the value of these claims as the Class
17 Members received some rest breaks given that the records showed meal breaks were provided for a
18 majority of shifts. Moreover, given the majority of class members were represented by unions
19 throughout their employment and had any break issue arisen, such issues could have been resolved
20 through union grievance procedures. Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of
21

22 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
23 226, at mediation Plaintiffs recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses
24 asserted by Defendant, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for
25 meal or rest periods or other wages were owed given Defendant's position that Plaintiffs and Class
26 Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584
(2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith
dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

27 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
28 Plaintiffs have not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The
PAGA claim was addressed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval in the Declaration of Nordrehaug
at ¶33.

1 compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024),
2 could completely negate the claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were
3 owed to the Class. The above maximum calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both
4 the risk of class certification and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the
5 amount of the settlement as compared to the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses
6 asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has
7 been met. Blumenthal Decl. ¶9(d).

8 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
9 **BE APPROVED**

10 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund**
11 **Method**

12 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
13 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
14 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a
15 percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple*
16 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing*
17 *Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th
18 Cir. 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to
19 "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does
20 not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

21
22 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
23 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
24 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
25 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents
26 approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Dunleavy*
27 *v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming approval
28 of a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See also *Viceral*
v. Mistras Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action
settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"
of maximum valuation).

1 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in
2 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common
3 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
4 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
5 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
6 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund,
7 the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
8 fund created"). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the
9 market" in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

10 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
11 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
12 fee awards. Attorneys' fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
13 in legal services. See Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,
14 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that
15 "[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent"). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved
16 of a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶12.

17 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the
18 fund. Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$400,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class, and
19 not one Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was able to
20 convince Defendant that Plaintiffs could potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability,
21 maintain class certification, overcome difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial
22 if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶11(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed
23 the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above,
24 there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*,
25 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ("**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**
26 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**")

27 Third, "the response of the class members to attorneys' fee notice, though not decisive, is
28 relevant to the ... reasonable determination" regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,

1 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
2 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class
3 that Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

4 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
5 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of \$400,000
6 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case
7 presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent in
8 class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier
9 and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether in**
10 **private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate in**
11 **order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g. Stanger v. China Elec.*
12 *Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v.*
13 *Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

14 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
15 the requested attorneys’ fee of one-third equal to \$133,333 is also established by reference to Class
16 Counsel’s lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
17 **that through July 28, 2025, Class Counsel’s lodestar is \$250,296.25, with significant additional**
18 **fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** Blumenthal Decl.
19 at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and 4. The requested fee award is therefore less than Class Counsel’s current
20 total lodestar, representing a “negative multiplier”, and there will be additional lodestar incurred by
21 Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the settlement distribution and reports.
22 (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13.) Such a negative multiplier is below the range of positive multipliers
23 approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.
24 2002).⁶ For such reasons, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of one-third of the

25
26 ⁶ See *Laffitte*, *supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
27 *supra*, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278
28 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
Cases, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez*

1 common fund is fair and reasonable, and should be approved.

2 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

3 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel
4 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$18,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
5 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$11,826.37. Class Counsel have incurred
6 \$11,826.37 based upon counsel’s billing records, and these litigation expenses include the expenses
7 incurred for filing fees, mediation expenses, Federal Express expenses, expert expenses (Berger
8 Consulting), and attorney service charges (Knox, OneLegal), all of which are costs normally billed to
9 and paid by the client.⁷ The details of the litigation expenses incurred are set forth the Blumenthal
10 Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and 4. These costs were reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the
11 Action. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13.) Because these costs were necessary to the successful prosecution
12 of these claims, the request should be granted.

13 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

14 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as class representatives, Plaintiffs should be
15 awarded the agreed service award of \$12,500, each, in accordance with the Agreement for their time,
16 risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representative. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).)
17 Defendant has agreed to this payment and there have been no objections to the requested service award.
18 The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶15, provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in California
19 in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Plaintiffs’ Declarations are
20 submitted in support of this request and are attached as Exhibit #6 and 7 to the Blumenthal Decl.

21 As the representatives of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duties to the Class admirably and
22

23
24 *v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved
25 range of 2 to 4); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26
multiplier).

26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging,
28 photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service,
mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v.*
Lojack Corp., Inc., 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
2 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
3 settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 15.) The Plaintiffs' Declarations detail the
4 involvement, stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also assumed the
5 serious risk that they might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational
6 risk of being "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of
7 employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiffs' participation, cooperation and
8 information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 16-17).

9 The payment of a service award to a successful class representative is appropriate and the
10 amount of \$10,000 is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g.,*
11 *Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
12 (service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist.
13 LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.*
14 *(U.S.)*, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class
15 member payment was \$351); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183, *7
16 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 06, 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Fin.*
17 *Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000 service award). Class Counsel
18 respectfully request approval of the Class Representative Service Payments in accordance with the
19 Agreement.

20 **VI. CONCLUSION**

21 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
22 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate
23 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

24 Respectfully submitted,

25 Dated: July 28, 2025

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

26 By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
27 Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Attorneys for Plaintiffs
28