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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

JONHATAN BARAJAS, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FINAL PHASE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2118622

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned to: Hon. Joseph T. Ortiz, Dept. S-17]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Jonhatan Barajas; Declaration of Justin F.
Marquez; and [Proposed] Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: April 27, 2023

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept: S-17

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 27, 2023 at 1:30 p.m., in Department S-17 of the
3 San Bernardino County Superior Court, San Bernardino District – Civil Division, 247 West Third
4 Street, San Bernardino, California 92415-0210, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §
5 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Jonhatan Barajas (“Plaintiff”) will
6 and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class
7 action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Final Phase Construction, Inc. Plaintiff further
8 moves the Court for an Order:


- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
10 and Class Notice;
11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
13 4. Appointing Plaintiff Jonhatan Barajas as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, and Arrash T.
15 Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
16 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities, the Declaration of Jonhatan Barajas, the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, filed
20 concurrently herewith, the records and files in this Action, and any other further evidence or
21 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: April 5, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24
25 By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

26
27 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Barajas (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$250,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Final Phase Construction, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 55 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, informal discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Honorable Jackson Lucky (Ret.), over the course of a full day of mediation and numerous discussions following mediation that extended several weeks after the mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant operates a full-service commercial finish carpentry and mill work installation company in Rancho Cucamonga, California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest

1 periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code
2 §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7)
3 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business
4 practices (Business and Professions Code 17200, *et seq.*). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's
5 payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. (*Id.* at ¶
6 3.) On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce
7 Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the
8 PAGA. (*Id.*, Ex. 1 [Plaintiff's Notice of Labor Code Violations and PAGA Penalties].) Plaintiff
9 also paid the \$75.00 filing fee on June 25, 2021. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

10 On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class & Representative Action
11 Complaint, which added a claim for civil penalties under the PAGA. (*Id.*)

12 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

13 Following the filing of the initial Complaint, the Parties engaged in an exchange of
14 informal discovery. In advance of mediation, Defendant produced a sample of timekeeping and
15 pay records for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of their wage and hour
16 policies and practices during the class period and information regarding the total number of
17 current and former employees. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

18 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices,
19 analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the
20 probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary
21 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
22 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
23 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

24 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

25 On October 25, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
26 action mediator Honorable Jackson Lucky (Ret.) (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via
27 Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
28 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore

1 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
2 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
3 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and
4 Defendant's defenses the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are
5 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 2 [Class Action and PAGA
6 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

7 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
8 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
9 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
10 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
11 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
12 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.)

13 Indeed, the \$250,000.00 Settlement represents **71.5% of the realistic maximum**
14 **recovery of \$349,610.87.** (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's
15 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.85 million, when the risk of
16 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that
17 Defendant's realistic exposure was approximately \$349,610.87, meaning the Settlement
18 achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of
19 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.)
20 Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed
21 relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

22 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

23 The Parties used the Los Angeles County Superior Court's Form Class Action and PAGA
24 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the parties made to the
25 template in redline is attached to the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez as Exhibit ___. The
26 Settlement's key terms include:

27 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
28 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: all individuals employed

1 by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the
2 Class Period. (Settlement, § 1.5.)

3 2. Class Period: “June 25, 2017 and shall end on November 3, 2022 or on a date when
4 the Court grants preliminary approval of the settlement, whichever date is earlier.” (Settlement, §
5 1.12.)

6 3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
7 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

8 4. Non-Participating Class Members: “means any Class Members who opts out of the
9 Settlement by sending the Administrator a valid and timely Request for Exclusion.” (Settlement,
10 § 1.29.)

11 5. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and
12 classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA
13 Period of April 15, 2020 to the close of the Class Period. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.30, and 1.31.)
14 Every class member is not also an Aggrieved Employee.

15 6. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$250,000.00 and will be used to pay
16 Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class
17 Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Award, and the
18 Administrator’s Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.) Defendant “shall fully fund the Gross Settlement
19 Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Final Phase Construction share of
20 payroll taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator in two installments: \$75,000 upon final
21 approval of the settlement, and the remaining balance of \$175,000, plus applicable employer-side
22 payroll taxes and any additional settlement funds owed, if applicable [...] will be due 60 days
23 thereafter.” (*Id.* at § 4.3.)

24 7. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check
25 or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date (not less than
26 180 days after the date of mailing), the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such
27 checks to the California State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Funds in the name of the Class
28 Members thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of

Civil Procedure § 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify expenditures; and (8) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* [...] Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 6.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and fund all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (*Id.* at § 6.)

9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice and ascertained in the course of the Action, including any and all claims for (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (7) failure to indemnify expenditures.” (Settlement, § 6.3.)

///

1 10. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Final Phase
2 Construction.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

3 11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$10,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
4 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$7,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$2,500.00)
5 being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the
6 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez
7 Decl., ¶ 10.)

8 12. Net Settlement Fund/Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the
9 following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the
10 LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment,
11 Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The
12 remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.”
13 (Settlement, § 1.28.)

14 13. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment [will be] calculated by (a)
15 dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating
16 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
17 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
18 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
19 share of PAGA Penalties (\$2,500) by the total number of PAGA Period Workweeks worked by all
20 Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved
21 Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

22 14. Tax Allocation: “33% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class
23 Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage Portions
24 are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The 67% of each
25 Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims
26 for interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”).” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

27 15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
28 paid a service award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s

time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1542. (*Id.* at § 6.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$83,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval: The Notice sets forth, in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.3.1.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 4 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount

1 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
2 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
3 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
4 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
5 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
6 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
7 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
8 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
9 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
10 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

11 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
12 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
13 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

14 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
15 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

16 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
17 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

18 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
19 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
20 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
21 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
22 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
23 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
24 to approve the settlement.”].)

25 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
26 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Honorable Jackson Lucky (Ret.). (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
28 professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore

1 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its
2 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
3 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and
4 Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 8.)

5 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
6 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
7 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
8 meal and rest breaks, providing all wages at separation, and the issuance of wage statements, as
9 well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
10 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
11 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
12 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
13 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
14 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

15 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
16 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-48.) Again, this supports the position that the
17 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
18 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
19 action.

20 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties'** 21 **Respective Legal Positions**

22 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
23 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
24 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent
25 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
26 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
27 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
28 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation."].)

1 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
2 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
3 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
4 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
5 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

6 The proposed settlement of \$250,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
7 compared to Plaintiff's reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-28.) Because of the proposed
8 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
9 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
10 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
11 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$250,000.00 is within
12 the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
13 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
14 ***\$2,148.48.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

15 3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

16 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
17 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
18 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-
19 47.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
20 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

21 B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

22 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
23 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
24 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
25 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
26 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
27 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

28 ///

1 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

2 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
3 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$83,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross
4 Settlement Amount, and up to \$20,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
5 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

6 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”**
7 **Method**

8 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
9 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
10 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
11 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
12 may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
13 quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

14 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/ common
15 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
16 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent*,
17 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
18 Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
19 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
20 the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
21 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
22 has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in
23 which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

24 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
25 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
26 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
27 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
28 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage

1 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
2 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
3 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
4 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
5 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

6 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

7 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
8 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
9 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
10 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
11 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
12 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
13 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
14 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
15 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
16 million].)

17 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
18 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature,
19 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
20 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
21 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
22 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
23 by the Parties and requested herein.

24 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

25 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
26 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
27 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
28 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in

1 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
2 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
3 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
4 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
5 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
6 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
7 ahead of all other concerns.

8 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 9 **Requested Fee Award**

10 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
11 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
12 Decl., ¶¶ 39-47.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
13 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
14 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee
15 award is supported here.

16 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
17 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
18 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
19 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
20 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
21 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
22 is reasonable and fair.

23 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

24 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
25 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
26 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
27 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
28 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the

1 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
2 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

3 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
4 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
5 codified in California Labor Code Section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
6 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
7 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
8 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
9 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
10 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
11 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
12 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

13 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
14 a service award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
15 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time
16 and work for this case, communicating with counsel on a frequent basis, providing documents
17 related to his employment, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See,*
18 *generally*, Declaration of Jonhatan Barajas; *see also* Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This amount is
19 reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members.
20 (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-
21 DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for
22 339 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each
23 named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 33.)

24 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
25 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
26 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
27 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
28 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,

53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. **CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

A. **Legal Standard**

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to Section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [internal citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to

the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.

1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes approximately 55 current and former employees of Defendant.

Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

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1 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
2 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
3 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting their employees to take rest periods;
4 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
5 overtime wages; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to indemnify
6 employees for all necessary business expenses; whether final payment of wages was untimely and
7 excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage
8 statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues
9 are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members
10 suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

11 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

12 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
13 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
14 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
15 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
16 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
17 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
18 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
19 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
20 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
21 employees.

22 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

23 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
24 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
25 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
26 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

27 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
28 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that

1 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-47.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
2 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
3 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
4 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
5 Plaintiff’s willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing
6 about the best results possible for the class and subclass. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p.
7 451.)

8 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

9 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
10 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
11 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
12 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
13 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
14 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
15 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
16 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 443, 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.*
17 (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns
18 are essentially non-existent.

19 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

20 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

21 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
22 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
23 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
24 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
25 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
26 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
27 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
28 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

VI. CONCLUSION

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Barajas v. Final Phase Construction
CIVSB2118622

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

$$\left. \begin{array}{l}) \\) \\) \end{array} \right\} \text{SS}$$

On **April 5, 2023**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Fred J. Knez (SBN 94038)
Andrew J. Knez (SBN 296894)
Matthew J. Knez (SBN 303070)
matthewknez@knezlaw.com
info@knezlaw.com
KNEZ LAW GROUP, LLP
6780 Indiana Ave., Suite 160
Riverside, CA 92506
Telephone: (951) 742-7681
Facsimile: (951) 742-7685

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **April 5, 2023** at Los Angeles, California.

Ashley Narinyans
Type or Print Name


Signature