

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

Norman B. Blumenthal (State Bar #068687)
Kyle R. Nordrehaug (State Bar #205975)
Aparajit Bhowmik (State Bar #248066)
2255 Calle Clara
La Jolla, CA 92037
Telephone: (858)551-1223
Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
Email: Kyle@bamlawca.com
Website: www.bamlawca.com

LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC

Edwin Aiwazian (SBN 232943)
410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
Glendale, California 91203
Tel: (818) 265-1020 / Fax: (818) 265-1021

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

ERIN JONES and MATTHEW
SHACHNO, individuals, and on behalf of
other members of the general public
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
as unknown business entity; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2021-01183306-CU-OE-CXC

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS**

Hearing Date: November 6, 2025
Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m.
[Hearing scheduled by Order dated June 4,
2025]

Judge: Hon. Melissa McCormick
Dept.: CX105

Action Filed: February 8, 2021
Trial Date: Not set

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and amendments thereto (collectively the
4 “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman
5 Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated June 4,
6 2025 (“Preliminary Approval Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs Erin Jones and Matthew Shachno (“Plaintiffs”) respectfully move
9 for final approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service awards, and the proposed entry of
10 the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent
11 result for the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the
12 Class Notice to the 2,234 members of the Class, **to date there have been no objections and no**
13 **requests for exclusion** from the Class, which means that currently the entire Class (100%) has elected
14 to participate in the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class
15 evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that
16 the settlement should be finally approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved
17 the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

18 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

19 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
20 Marriott International, Inc. (“Defendant”) is Two Million Four Hundred Seventy Thousand Dollars
21 (\$2,470,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.21.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of
22 the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class
23 Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3)

25 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

26 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or have been employed by Defendant Marriott
27 International, Inc. at either the JW Marriott Anaheim or the Marriott Marquis San Diego hotels in
28 California as hourly, non-exempt employees during any portion of the Class Period.” The Class Period
 is February 9, 2017 through November 3, 2023.(Preliminary Approval Order, at ¶7).

1 Administration Expenses Payment; (4) Class Representative Service Payments to the Plaintiffs; (5) the
2 Individual PAGA Payments; and (6) the LWDA PAGA Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.21.) The Gross
3 Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The
4 Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.)
5 Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the
6 proposed deductions:

7 **\$2,470,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)
8 - \$10,000 (Plaintiffs' proposed service award not to exceed \$5,000 each)
9 - \$85,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
10 - \$822,510 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
 - \$50,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
 - \$29,950 (Administration Expenses Payment)
11 **\$1,472,540** (Net Settlement Amount)

12 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
13 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

14 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
15 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
16 is "fair, adequate and reasonable" (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶1.) In sum, the Settlement valued
17 at \$2,470,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact
18 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted
19 by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class
20 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

21 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
22 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

23 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
24 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
25 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
26 *v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are
27 the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

28 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable

1 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
2 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
4 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
5 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
6 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

7 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
8 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
9 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
10 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
12 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
13 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
14 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

15 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

16 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v.*
17 *Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service*
18 *Com'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the
19 settlement is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The
20 well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class
21 action settlement agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and
22 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
23 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
24 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the
25 class members to the proposed settlement.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116,
26 128 (2008) (internal citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186
27 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

28 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.

1 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
2 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
3 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
4 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
5 “Ultimately, the [trial] court’s determination is nothing more than ‘an amalgam of delicate balancing,
6 gross approximations and rough justice.’ [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

7 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
8 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

9 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

10 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
11 and the Court to Act Intelligently

12 Over the course of almost five years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of the
13 claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full
14 and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. Extensive formal
15 discovery was performed, including multiple rounds of written discovery, depositions, and the
16 production of 33,000 pages of relevant documents, and the Parties engaged in several discovery
17 motions, conferrals, and informal discovery conferences. The procedural history and investigation
18 performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval. The Settlement
19 was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations through an all-day
20 mediation presided over by Jeffrey Krivis, Esq. The details of the litigation are set forth in the
21 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

22 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

23 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations
24 before an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continue to
25 deny any wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and
26 Class Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released
27 Class Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class
28 Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

1 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Jeffrey Krivis, a respected and
2 experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement (and the Parties,
3 in their separate cases, also attended two prior full-day mediations). In advance of and in preparation
4 for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with extensive payroll, time punch, and
5 employment data and other pertinent information regarding the Class Members, various internal
6 documents, and other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the
7 data with the assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation
8 brief to the mediator. Following the mediation, the Parties agreed on the basic terms of a settlement
9 pursuant to a mediator's proposal. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

10 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
11 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
12 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (where settlement was “negotiated
13 and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the litigation, with the assistance of a
14 well-respected mediator” this factor supports approval of the settlement).

15 From August of 2023 to January of 2024, the initial settlement agreement and exhibits thereto
16 were finalized and executed. In August of 2024, the Parties finalized and executed the Amendment to
17 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement which amended certain terms in the original settlement
18 agreement, per the Court’s order. In December of 2024, the Parties finalized and executed the Second
19 Amendment to Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement which further amended certain terms
20 in the original settlement agreement, per the Court’s order. In May of 2025, the Parties finalized and
21 executed the Third Amendment to Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement which further
22 amended certain terms in the original settlement agreement, per the Court’s order. On June 4, 2025, the
23 Court granted the Motion for Preliminary Approval, and entered the Order granting preliminary
24 approval of the settlement as fair and reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

25 3. Class Counsel Is Experienced in Similar Litigation

26 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
27 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
28 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and

1 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
2 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
3 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the
4 Blumenthal Decl. at Exhibit #1 and at the Declaration of Brian St. John at ¶¶ 14-19. Class Counsel have
5 participated in every aspect of the settlement discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair,
6 adequate, and reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

7 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

8 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On August 20,
9 2025, the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided
10 each class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the
11 financial terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being
12 sought, how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment
13 amount to that individual. See Declaration of Cassandra Polites, Exh. A. In disseminating the notice,
14 the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary Approval
15 Order. The Administrator has not received any written objections and not received any requests for
16 exclusion. Currently, 100% of the Class will participate in the Settlement and will be sent a settlement
17 check. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. The final details of the notice process will be documented in the
18 forthcoming declaration of Cassandra Polites to be filed after the October 20, 2025 Response Deadline
19 and in advance of the hearing on this motion.

20 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
21 Settlement. *See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
22 2000) ("If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
23 adequacy of the settlement."); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
24 objections out of 281 member class "strongly favors settlement"); *Laskey v. Int'l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
25 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
26 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
27 approval of the class is evident.

28 5. The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

1 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid
2 all overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate, were not provided meal and rest periods,
3 were not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not
4 provided accurate itemized wage statements, were not paid all accrued and used sick pay at the correct
5 rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages,
6 penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing
7 to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

8 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
9 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
10 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
11 that its procedures and practices complied with all applicable labor and employment laws. As examples
12 only, Defendant argued that Class Members were paid for all time worked, that all work time was
13 timely, properly, and accurately recorded, and that all wages were properly paid (including, but not
14 limited to, minimum wages, overtime wages, sick pay wages, gratuities, meal/rest break premiums,
15 final pay wages, and the like). Defendant contended that its meal and rest period policies and practices
16 fully complied with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally
17 required meal and rest breaks (or otherwise paid the premium where applicable). Defendant contended
18 that there was no failure to pay for business expenses. For instance, Defendant contended that and (i)
19 any uniform maintenance, cleaning, or purchase costs were either paid or not legally required to be
20 paid; and (ii) any personal cell phone usage for business purposes was strictly against company policy,
21 and, if it occurred, such usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not
22 legally required. Finally, Defendant could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior*
23 *Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiffs' claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability
24 as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also argues that based on its lawful practices,
25 Defendant acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for
26 waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. If successful, Defendant's defenses could
27 eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. Plaintiffs believe these defenses have
28 potential merit and therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

1 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
2 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

3 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
4 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
5 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

6 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
8 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
9 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

10 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
11 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
12 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
outweigh an uncertain future result.

13 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
14 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

15 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
16 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on
17 behalf of any other employees. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed the
18 propriety of class certification, arguing, among other things, that individual issues precluded class
19 certification. Class Counsel is aware of other cases where certification of similar claims was denied.
20 Further, as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National*
21 *Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even
22 where the class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and
23 hour claims, class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class
24 through trial was by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

25 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
26 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
27 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average
28 class member allocation will be set forth in the Declaration of Cassandra Polites to be filed before the

1 hearing on this motion. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties
2 of proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally
3 approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

4 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

5 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
6 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event
7 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years
8 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the
9 case could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
10 outweigh an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

11 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant
12 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have
13 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
14 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
15 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
16 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
17 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
18 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have determined that the
19 Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

20 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
21 continues to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
22 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
23 to those in this litigation:

24 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
25 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of
26 how this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
27 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
28 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

Id. at *12.

1 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

2 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
3 to Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug in support of preliminary
4 approval which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
5 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 2,234 Participating Class Members who collectively
6 worked 237,767 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides a value of \$1,105.64 per Class
7 Member and \$10.39 per Workweek and, after deductions, the Net Settlement Amount provides an
8 average recovery of \$659.82 per Class Member and \$6.20 per Workweek. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

9 As explained in detail in the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the calculations to compensate
10 for the amount due to the Class Members at the time the Settlement was negotiated were calculated by
11 Plaintiffs' expert, Berger Consulting, in advance of mediation. Class Counsel analyzed the data for
12 putative class members and determined the potential maximum damages for the class claims. For the
13 Class, the maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$5,167,678 for the alleged unpaid
14 minimum and overtime wages due to off the clock, or during break, work based upon 15 minutes per
15 shift, \$483,703 for alleged meal period damages based upon a 3.6% potential violation rate for shifts
16 worked and after deducting the amount already paid for meal period premiums, \$588,971 for alleged
17 rest period damages based upon the same potential 3.6% violation rate, \$520,025 for alleged
18 unreimbursed business expenses for uniform maintenance, cleaning, and/or purchase and personal cell
19 phone usage at \$10 per month, and \$877,827 for alleged underpayment of gratuity compensation
20 payments. Failure to properly or accurately calculate and/or pay all wages/compensation (including
21 based on the "regular rate" of pay) are derivative (including regarding sick pay wages). As a result, the
22 total damage valuation was calculated that Defendant was subject to a maximum damage claim in the
23 amount of \$7,638,204. As to potential penalties, Plaintiff calculated that potential waiting time
24 penalties were a maximum of between \$1,032,379 and \$4,129,514, depending on the predicate
25 violation, and potential wage statement penalties were \$7,397,104. The California Business &
26 Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. and failure to keep/maintain complete and accurate records claims
27 are derivative and encompassed within the above valuations. Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiffs'
28 calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 8(d).

1 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$2,470,000 represents more than 32% of the
2 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.³
3 The above maximum calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class
4 certification and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the
5 settlement as compared to the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by
6 Defendant, this settlement is fair and reasonable.⁴ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met.

7 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
8 **BE APPROVED**

9 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund**
10 **Method**

11 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
12 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
13 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a
14 percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple*
15 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co.*
16 *v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir.
17 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread

18 ³ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
19 Plaintiff has not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The
20 PAGA claim was addressed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval.

21 ⁴ See *In re Omnivision Tech., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (2007) (noting that certainty of recovery
22 in settlement of 6% of maximum potential recovery after reduction for attorney's fees was higher than
23 median percentage for recoveries in shareholder class action settlements, averaging 2.2%-3% from
24 2000 through 2022); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
25 (approving a settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated
26 overtime damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671,
27 at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount
28 represents approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial.");
Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming
approval of a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See
also *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class
action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316,
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and
18%" of maximum valuation).

1 litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear
2 the entire burden alone.” *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

3 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys’ fees in
4 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys’ fees in common
5 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
6 *Robert Half Int’l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) (“We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
7 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
8 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund,
9 the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
10 fund created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the
11 market” in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

12 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
13 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
14 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
15 in legal services. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503 (2016), the California Supreme
16 Court both endorsed the award of a fee as a percentage of that fund, and expressly approved one-third
17 (1/3) as a reasonable percentage in a contingent common fund class settlement. Such similar awards
18 by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

19 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the
20 fund. Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$2,470,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class and
21 none of the Class Members elected to opt out as of the date of the filing of this Motion. Similarly, not
22 one Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was able to
23 convince Defendant that Plaintiffs could potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability,
24 maintain class certification, overcome difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial
25 if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed
26 the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above,
27 there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*,
28 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**

1 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.”)**

2 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is
3 relevant to the...reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
4 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
5 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class
6 that Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

7 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
8 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly
9 contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the
10 risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant
11 who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency**
12 **fee basis, whether in private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above**
13 **their hourly rate in order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g.*
14 *Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk
15 enhancement); *Stetson v. Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to
16 apply risk multiplier).

17 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
18 the requested attorneys’ fee of one-third equal to \$822,510 is also established by reference to Class
19 Counsel’s lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
20 **that through October 13, 2025, Class Counsel’s total lodestar is \$1,171,448.75, with significant**
21 **additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** (See
22 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibits #3 and 4 [lodestar of \$767,496.75]; Declaration of St. John at ¶¶
23 10-11 [lodestar of \$403,952.) The requested fee award is therefore less than Class Counsel’s current
24 lodestar, representing a negative multiplier of 0.70, and there will be additional lodestar incurred by
25 Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the settlement distribution and reports.
26 (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12.) Such a lodestar cross-check is well below the range of positive multipliers
27 approved in other cases such as *Laffitte and Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.
28

2002).⁵ Because the multiplier cross-check is within this accepted range it is not “extraordinarily high” so as to justify an adjustment of the percentage under *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 505. For such reasons, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of one-third of the common fund is reasonable and should be approved.

B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses

The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$85,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$61,147.98 based upon counsel’s billing records which evidence total combined expenses of \$61,147.98.⁶ The details of the litigation expenses incurred are set forth the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and 4 [expenses of \$41,007.24]; Declaration of St. John at ¶ 20 and Exhibit B [expenses of \$20,140.74]). These costs were reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the Action. Because these costs were reasonable and necessary to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request is reasonable and should be granted.

C. The Service Awards Are Reasonable and Should be Approved

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as the class representatives, Plaintiffs should be awarded the agreed service award of \$5,000 each in accordance with the Agreement for their time, risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representatives. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Defendant has agreed to these payments and there have been no objections to the requested service award. The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of larger service awards approved in

⁵ See *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino supra*, at 1051(3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 255 (“multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.”); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

⁶ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.*, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Plaintiffs' Declarations
2 in support of the request are attached as Exhibits #6 and 7 to the Blumenthal Decl.

3 As the representatives of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duties to the Class admirably and
4 without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
5 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
6 settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Plaintiffs' Declaration detail the
7 involvement, stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also assumed the
8 serious risk that they might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational
9 risk of being "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of
10 employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiffs' participation, cooperation and
11 information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

12 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount
13 is below the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews v. Plains All Am.*
14 *Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (service awards of \$15,000 each
15 are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal.
16 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S.
17 Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class member payment was
18 \$351); *Louie, supra*, 2008 WL 4473183 at *7 (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs
19 in overtime class action); *Glass, supra*, 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17 (awarding \$25,000 service award).
20 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests approval of the Class Representative Service
21 Payments in accordance with the Agreement.

22 **VI. CONCLUSION**

23 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness and
24 should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate, and request entry of Judgment.

25 Respectfully submitted,

26 Dated: October 13, 2025

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Attorneys for Plaintiffs