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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

MARISELA MEZA, individually, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and on behalf of
the State of California and other aggrieved
persons,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARGUS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC,
a California Limited Liability Company;
PROHEALTH PARTNERS, A MEDICAL
GROUP, INC., a California corporation; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

Case No. 21STCV31612

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Yvette M.
Palazuelos, Dept. 9]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: May 2, 2024
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: 9

Complaint filed: August 26, 2021
FAC filed: October 4, 2023
Trial date: Not set

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May 2, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 9 of the Los
4 Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff
5 Marisela Meza (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

- 6 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 7 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
8 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
9 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Marisela Meza as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and
11 approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$10,000 to Plaintiff;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
13 purposes, and approving payment of \$583,333.33 in attorney’s fees, which is 33 1/3% of
14 the Gross Settlement Amount;
- 15 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$20,893.64 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 16 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to Apex Class Action, LLC as the Settlement
17 Administrator in the amount of \$20,000.00; and
- 18 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 19 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over
20 the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement
21 or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

22 This motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
23 the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Marisela Meza, and Madely Nava, and such oral
24 argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action, including but
25 not limited to the Declaration of Plaintiff previously submitted in support of Plaintiff’s Motion
26 for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.


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1 Dated: April 2, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3
4 By: 
Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

6 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marisela Meza (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$1,750,000.00 non-reversionary, class and representative action settlement with Defendants Argus Management Company, LLC and ProHealth Partners, a Medical Group, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”, and collectively with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 1,467 class members.¹ And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage-and-hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$723.70*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$2,778.16*. (Declaration of Madely Nava on Behalf of Apex Class Action. [“Nava Decl.”], ¶ 17.) As of filing this Motion, there **no objections to the settlement and no request for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 13-14.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the motion for preliminary approval the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and

¹ In Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, Plaintiff indicated that there were approximately 1,956 class members at that time based on the initial information provided by Defendants at mediation. However, this number was based on an initial overestimation by Defendants due to an extrapolation that initially did not account for Defendants’ turnover rates. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 9.) In the final class mailing lists provided to the Settlement Administrator by Defendants, the total class member size includes 1,467 employees. (Nava Decl., ¶ 13.)

1 risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the
2 proposed Settlement.

3 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

4 **A. Plaintiff's Claims**

5 This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and
6 putative Class Members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for
7 Defendants during the Class Period. Defendant Argus Management Company LLC is based in
8 Long Beach, California and provides physician practice management solutions to solo
9 practitioners, groups, and hospitals. Defendant ProHealth Partners, a Medical Group, Inc. is a
10 medical group consisting of physicians practicing in Los Angeles County and Orange County.
11 (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class
12 Action Settlement ["Marquez Decl."], ¶ 2.)

13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
14 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay for all hours
15 worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally
16 compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses. Based
17 on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage
18 statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
19 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

20 On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
21 against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§
22 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and
23 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to
24 authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to provide accurate itemized
25 wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (6) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Cal.
26 Lab. Code § 2802); and (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code § 17200
27 *et seq.*). On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Private Attorneys General Act "PAGA" action
28 against Defendants for civil penalties under PAGA (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) Plaintiff sent

1 a notice to Defendants and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”)
2 alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Labor Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*)
3 on August 26, 2021. On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against
4 Defendants consolidating the Class Action and PAGA Action. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

5 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

6 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
7 before mediating this action. Defendants produced a sample of time and pay records for Class
8 Members. Defendants also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during
9 the Class Period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in
10 its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

11 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices,
12 analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
13 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
14 Defendants’ maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also
15 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
16 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)
17 The damages model was based on a sample size of 130,802 shifts out of an estimated 902,881 total
18 shifts worked by class members, which represents a 0.25% margin of error based on a 95%
19 confidence interval. (*Id.*)

20 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

21 On March 23, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
22 action mediator Lisa Klerman, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The
23 settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
24 were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
25 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial
26 and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
27 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’
28 defenses, the Parties reached a settlement the material terms of which are encompassed within

the Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”). (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on November 21, 2023, on the condition that counsel provide a revised Notice to the class. (*Id.* at ¶ 11.) The Parties revised the notice and Plaintiff filed supplemental papers in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on December 5, 2023, and the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on December 12, 2023. (*Id.*) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was February 26, 2024, and April 1, 2024 for the 18 class members who were inadvertently omitted from the Class Data originally given to the Settlement Administrator. (Nava Decl., ¶13-14.) The reaction of the Class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement, and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$1,750,000.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. **Settlement Class**: For purposes of the Settlement Agreement only, Class “means all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt or hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the Class Period.” (Marquez Decl., Exhibit 1, Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice [the “Settlement”], § 1.5.)
2. **Class Period**: “means the period from August 26, 2017 to March 23, 2023.”

(Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt or hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period from August 26, 2021 to March 23, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.31.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$1,750,000.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, Defendants’ share of employer payroll taxes on the portion of Individual Class Member payments allocated to wages, and the Class Representative Service Award. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified, shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7. Release: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, including any and all claims involving any recovery of unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198), failure to provide meal and rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512), failure to provide accurate wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226), failure to pay all wages due at separation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203),

1 failure to reimburse business expenses (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802), and violation of Unfair
2 Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release
3 will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement
4 Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class
5 Payments. (Settlement, § 5.)

6 8. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
7 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

8 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$50,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
9 claims under PAGA, with 75% (\$37,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$12,500.00)
10 being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the
11 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

12 10. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains
13 and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted:
14 (1) attorneys’ fees and Litigation costs, (2) Administrative Costs, (3) enhancement to the Named
15 Plaintiff, and (4) the penalties recoverable pursuant to the PAGA. (Settlement, § 1.28.)

16 11. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
17 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
18 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
19 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
20 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
21 share of PAGA Penalties (\$12,500.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked
22 by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each
23 Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

24 12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
25 allocated as 25% wages, 75% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

26 13. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
27 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is
28 for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the Action, and in exchange for a

1 general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542.
2 (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion
3 or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the
4 participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

5 14. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendants will not
6 oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount (\$583,333.33), plus
7 out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

8 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
9 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
10 attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
11 allocations are calculated. (Nava Decl., Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class
12 mail of the Settlement. (*Id.*, at ¶ 7.) The Settlement Administrator also undertook its best efforts
13 to ensure that the Notice was provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including
14 conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing notices to updated addresses
15 when needed. (*Id.*, at ¶¶ 9-12.)

16 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

17 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
18 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
19 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the
20 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
21 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
22 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar*
23 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
24 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement
25 is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
26 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
27 the percentage of objectors is small." (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
28 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise

A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$1,750,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit***

1 *of approximately \$723.70, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately*
2 *\$2,778.16. (Nava Decl., ¶ 17.)*

3 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
4 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

5 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
6 employment mediator, Lisa Klerman, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
7 at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
8 parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
9 each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement
10 had not been reached. (*Id.*)

11 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted formal and informal discovery
12 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping
13 and payroll records, Defendants' policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the
14 provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at
15 separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of
16 current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period
17 premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual
18 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
19 asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and
20 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

21 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

22 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
23 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶¶ 27-42.) Class Counsel has substantial
24 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
25 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
26 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
27 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

28 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class

Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of Defendants' defenses against certification, the strength of Defendants' defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

D. No Class Members Objected or Requested Exclusion from the Settlement

No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Nava Decl., ¶ 12-13.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the "class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement" where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, "only nine objections were submitted", and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, "these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23"], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the "fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness," and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

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IV. **THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNT OF FEES, COSTS AND THE ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT.**

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants have agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$583,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$25,000.00 for litigating this Action, and enhancement awards of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. Defendants have also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for calculating attorney’s fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage-and-hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. **A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard.**

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to***

1 *forty percent* commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*See Id.*; *see*
2 *also, Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that
3 most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

4 The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions.
5 Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a
6 fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies
7 show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
8 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line
9 with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is
10 consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, Plaintiff request that the Court approve the
11 attorneys’ fees requested herein.

12 **1. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code.**

13 Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in part:

14 [A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
15 compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action
16 the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime
compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit.

17 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.)

18 As this litigation culminated in a settlement that provided for a recovery of unpaid wages,
19 including unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, Plaintiff is entitled to recover
20 reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

21 Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee award under California’s private attorney general
22 statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorneys’ fees is proper under Section
23 1021.5 if ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
24 public interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred
25 on the general public or a large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of
26 private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.’” (*Press v. Lucky Stores* (1983)
27 34 Cal.3d 311, 317-318.) The fundamental objective of the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing
28 public policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to successful litigants in such cases.”

(*Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)

This action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as Plaintiff sought to enforce Settlement Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from Defendants’ failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (*See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1113 [noting that “health and safety concerns” are what motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest periods].)

This action also conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons. Notice was sent to 1,467 Settlement Class Members, and no Settlement Class Member requested exclusion. (Nava Decl., ¶ 13, 15.) The Settlement provides a significant monetary benefit, in that it permits all persons who worked for Defendants during the applicable class period to obtain compensation for unpaid wages and missed meal and rest periods.

Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate. Without the incentive of an attorneys’ fee award, Plaintiff could not have afforded to hire counsel to pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiff’s potential recovery. (*See Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044 [“As to the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory transcends the claimants’ personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiff’s individual stake in the matter.”].)

2. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class action matters. Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in dozens of class actions resulting in a multitude of beneficial results to class members in California. Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, a fee award of 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, a percentage considered within the norm in class action

practice, is certainly justified here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards amounting to 33 1/3% of the recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. "It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to "cross-check" or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation." (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. "The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services." (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) "Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis." (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Class Counsel's lodestar is at least \$286,150 based on at least 366 hours of work performed thus far. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$583,333.33 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 2.0. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial*

1 *California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.)
2 In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See*
3 *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298
4 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action
5 litigation.”] Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g.,*
6 *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL
7 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent
8 nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

9 **1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.**

10 Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of
11 the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate
12 determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are
13 satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps*
14 *Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of
15 their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

16 For example, Mr. Marquez’ hourly rates were recently approved in *Suarez v. Bank of*
17 *America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721. There, the court
18 held that “[a]s for the lodestar cross-check, the billing rates are normal and customary for
19 timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the relevant market.” (*Id.* at p. *3.)

20 These rates are not opposed or challenged.

21 **2. The Lawsuit Provided a Public Benefit.**

22 Class Counsel’s choice to litigate this matter provided a public benefit to approximately 1,467
23 California employees. Moreover, the California Supreme Court stated that “Labor Code section
24 1194 confirms “a clear public policy ... that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s
25 minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of workers.” [citation omitted].” (*Sav-on Drug*
26 *Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.) Given the financial risks and numerous
27 attorney hours attendant to the litigation of Plaintiff’s claims, this factor supports Class Counsel’s
28 fee request and encourages the private enforcement of legal rights for the general good.

1 **3. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.**

2 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
3 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a modest multiplier
4 of 2.0 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a
5 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

6 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
7 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
8 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
9 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
10 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
11 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
12 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a
13 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
14 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
15 or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

16 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
17 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512
18 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
19 Cal. App. 4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
20 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
21 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a
22 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
23 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable”].) The intermediate court in
24 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
25 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881-82.)
26 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
27 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

28 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally

1 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
2 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
3 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
4 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
5 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal. 3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
6 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

7 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
8 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
9 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
10 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
11 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
12 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
13 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's
14 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

15 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
16 had success in wage-and-hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
17 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendants' contentions underscore the
18 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
19 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
20 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
21 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
22 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
23 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
24 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
25 achieve favorable results. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 24.) Considered against the risks of continued
26 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
27 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

28 ///

1 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

2 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$20,593.64 in costs,
3 and they anticipate incurring at least \$300 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court
4 enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 26.)
5 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$20,893.64 in costs.
6 Notably, Defendant has agreed that it will not oppose any cost award request up to \$25,000.00.
7 The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Justin Marquez, and these
8 costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

9 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee
10 paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial
11 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
12 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
13 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
14 (See *Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
15 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL
16 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
17 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
18 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

19 **D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.**

20 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
21 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
22 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
23 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
24 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
25 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (See *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
26 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against
27 employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-
28 retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443,

1 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of
2 class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
4 a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
5 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendants. Plaintiff has submitted multiple
6 declarations demonstrating her devotion to this case, including her efforts assisting counsel in the
7 case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing
8 case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Marisela Meza in Support of Plaintiff’s
9 Motion for Final Approval; *see also* Plaintiff’s declaration previously submitted in support of
10 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval.)

11 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
12 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
13 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
14 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
15 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
16 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).)

17 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
18 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
19 (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
20 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
21 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Id. at 806.) “An incentive
22 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
23 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1394, quoting *Clark, supra*, 175
24 Cal. App. 4th at 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
25 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
26 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
27 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
28 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class

representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.)

Here, Plaintiff has the right to move the Court for incentive awards of up to \$10,000.00 in light of her risk in pursuing this case, time and effort devoted to this case, and the benefit received for the other class members.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.

Apex Class Action, LLC, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$20,000.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Nava Decl., ¶ 16.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

Dated: April 2, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 
Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

Attorneys for Plaintiff

PROOF OF SERVICE

Meza v. Argus Management Company, et al.
21STCV31612

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Jorge Grimaldy, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is jgrimaldy@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On April 2, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:


Ian Chuang
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Seal Beach, California 90740
Telephone: (949) 441-4495
Facsimile: (949) 783-5181
Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 2, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.



Jorge Grimaldy