

Justin F. Marquez (SBN 262417)
justin@wilshirelawfirm.com
Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin@wilshirelawfirm.com
Maxim Gorbunov (SBN 343128)
mgorbunov@wilshirelawfirm.com
Bradford Smith (SBN 345879)
bsmith@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

PENNY LYNN JACKSON, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated and on
behalf of the State of California and other
aggrieved persons; and STEVEN THOMAS
SMITH, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

APPLE VALLEY COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
a California corporation; AVCOM SERVICES
INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CIVSB2124721

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Joseph T.
Ortiz, Dept. S17]*

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Justin F. Marquez; Declaration of Laura
Singh; and [Proposed] Order]*

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: February 1, 2024

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept: S17

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on February 1, 2024 at 1:30 p.m., in Department S17 of the
3 San Bernardino County Superior Court, 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415, pursuant
4 to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Penny Lynn
5 Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will and hereby does move the Court
6 for an Order granting final approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and
7 Defendants Apple Valley Communications, Inc. and AVCOM Services Inc. (collectively,
8 “Defendants”). Plaintiff further move the Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
- 10 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
11 notice of the settlement, and advised of their right to participate in the settlement, object
12 to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 13 3. Appointing Plaintiffs Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith as Class
14 Representatives for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$10,000.00 to each
15 Plaintiff for their services as a Class Representative;
- 16 4. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
17 purposes;
- 18 5. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement
19 Administrator in the amount of \$15,000.00;
- 20 6. Approving payment of \$158,333.33 in attorney’s fees, which is 33 1/3% of the Maximum
21 Settlement Amount, and costs in the amount of \$23,478.27 for litigating this action to Class
22 Counsel;
- 23 7. Approving the payment to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency in the
24 amount of \$15,000.00;
- 25 8. Directing that the clerk of the Court enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 26 9. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over
27 the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the
28 Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez and Laura Singh filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 9, 2024

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By:

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov
Bradford Smith

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	v
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	1
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT	2
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims	2
B. Discovery and Investigation	3
C. Settlement Negotiations, Preliminary Approval, and Class Size.....	3
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement	4
E. Class Notice and Settlement Administration.	8
III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL.....	8
A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise.	8
B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Informal Discovery.....	9
C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience.....	10
D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement.....	10
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND AN ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT.....	11
A. Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method.....	12
1. The Standard Fee Award in Class Actions Has Resolved Itself As One-Third Of The Recovery In Common Fund Cases.	13
2. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code.	14
3. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Fee Award.....	15
B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.	16
1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.....	16

1	2. The Lawsuit Provided a Public Benefit.	17
2	3. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.	17
3	C. Costs Are Reasonable.	19
4	D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff Is Reasonable.	19
5	E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.	20
6	V. CONCLUSION.....	20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008)

162 Cal.App.4th 43.....14, 18

City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet (1995)

12 Cal.4th 10512

D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974)

11 Cal.3d 112

Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996)

48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....8

Gentry v. Super. Ct. (2007)

42 Cal.4th 44319

Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004)

34 Cal.4th 55314

In re Consumer Privacy Cases (2009)

175 Cal.App.4th 545.....16

Ketchum v. Moses (2001)

24 Cal.4th 112217, 18

Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008)

168 Cal.App.4th 116.....8, 10, 11

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l (2014)

231 Cal. App. 4th 860.....18

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (2016)

1 Cal.5th 48012, 13

Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc (2000)

82 Cal.App.4th 19.....16

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007)

40 Cal.4th 109414

1	<i>Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California</i> (1992)	
2	3 Cal.4 th 272	8
3	<i>Press v. Lucky Stores</i> (1983)	
4	34 Cal.3d 311	14
5	<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995)	
6	15 Cal. 3d 162	12
7	<i>Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation</i> (2001)	
8	94 Cal.App.4th 1033.....	15
9	<i>Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.</i> (2004)	
10	34 Cal.4th 319	17
11	<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977)	
12	20 Cal.3d 25	12, 16
13	<i>Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases</i> (2009)	
14	171 Cal. App. 4th 495.....	18
15	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001)	
16	91 Cal.App.4 th 224.....	8, 12, 16, 17
17	<u>FEDERAL CASES</u>	
18	<i>Been v. O.K. Industries, Inc.,</i>	
19	(E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766.....	18
20	<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.,</i>	
21	(W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174.....	20
22	<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,</i>	
23	(9 th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011	11
24	<i>Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.,</i>	
25	(W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697	11
26	<i>In re Activision Securities Litigation</i>	
27	(N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373	13
28	///	

1	<i>In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation,</i>	
2	(D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138.....	11
3	<i>In re Pacific Enterprises Securities City and County of San Francisco Litigation,</i>	
4	(9th Cir. 1994) 47 F.3d 373	13
5	<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.,</i>	
6	(9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	19
7	<i>United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (1990)</i>	
8	896 F.2d 403.....	17
9	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company,</i>	
10	(N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294	13, 16
11	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,</i>	
12	(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759	12
13	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,</i>	
14	(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759	12
15	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,</i>	
16	(9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043	18
17	<u>STATE STATUTES</u>	
18	Code of Civ. Proc. § 1021.5	14
19	Labor Code § 1194.....	14
20	<u>TREATISES</u>	
21	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i>	
22	(3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)	13
23	<u>OTHER AUTHORITIES</u>	
24	Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “ <i>Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical</i>	
25	<i>Study</i> ”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).....	20

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I. INTRODUCTION

3 Plaintiffs Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek final
4 approval of a proposed \$475,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class and representative action
5 settlement with Defendants Apple Valley Communications, Inc. and AVCOM Services, Inc.
6 (collectively, “Defendants”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to
7 approximately 200¹ class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement
8 satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

9 The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California
10 law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated
11 arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act
12 intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage-and-hour litigation. Upon the
13 Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an **average net benefit**
14 **of approximately \$1,213.33, and *highest net benefit of \$3,251.85.*** (Declaration of Laura Singh
15 Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Singh Decl.”], ¶ 10.) As of filing this Motion,
16 *there are zero requests for exclusion, zero workweek disputes, and zero objections to the*
17 *settlement.*² (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in
18 the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

19 Plaintiffs request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$158,333.33, reimbursement of
20 attorney costs and expenses in the amount of \$25,000.00, an incentive award for each Plaintiff in
21 the amount of \$10,000.00 each (\$20,000.00 total), Settlement Administration Costs of \$15,000.00;
22 and payment to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) in the amount
23

24 ¹ In Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, Plaintiffs indicated that
25 there were approximately 166 class members at that time based on the initial information provided by
26 Defendants for the class period. In the final class mailing list provided to the Settlement Administrator
by Defendants, the list states that there are 200 class members in the class period. (Singh Decl., ¶ 4.)

27 ² The deadline to opt-out or object to the settlement is set for January 16, 2024. Plaintiffs will
28 file a supplemental declaration from the settlement administrator no later than one week before the
February 1, 2024 hearing affirming the final class size, including whether any individuals opted-out
or objected to the settlement.

of \$15,000.00 are also reasonable and thus should be approved by the Court.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval of the Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class period. Defendants provide emergency communication services to a wide array of industries, including, without limitation, school districts, doctor's offices, mortuaries, as well as local and federal government agencies. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Marquez Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to indemnify employees for expenditures, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.) Defendants denies all allegations.

On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff Jackson filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); and (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200, *et seq.*). (*Id.* at ¶

1 4.) On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff Jackson filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants,
2 adding Steven Thomas Smith as a class representative and adding claims for civil penalties under
3 Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698 et seq.) (*Id.*) On April 12, 2023,
4 Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, adding a claim for failure to indemnify for
5 business expenses (Labor Code § 2802). (*Id.*)

6 Plaintiff Jackson sent a notice to Defendants and the California Labor & Workforce
7 Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA
8 (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on August 25, 2020. (*Id.*) Plaintiff Smith provided notice to
9 Defendants and the LWDA by sending an amended PAGA notice alleging similar wage and hour
10 violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on December 12, 2022. (*Id.*)

11 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

12 Following the filing of the initial Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
13 information before mediating this action. Defendants produced certain data points related to the
14 number of putative class members, workweeks worked during the proposed class period, pay
15 periods worked during the proposed PAGA period, average rate of pay, timekeeping and payroll
16 records for a statistically significant portion of the proposed class, and documents that describe
17 Defendants’ policies or practices regarding the legal claims and factual allegations in the
18 complaint. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

19 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices and
20 analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the
21 probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary
22 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
23 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and
24 prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

25 **C. Settlement Negotiations, Preliminary Approval, and Class Size.**

26 On December 12, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
27 action mediator, Michael E. Dickstein, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom.
28 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,

1 were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
2 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and
3 appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

4 After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
5 Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of
6 which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8; Ex. 1 [Class Action and PAGA
7 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement")].) The Court
8 ultimately granted preliminary approval on September 13, 2023. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

9 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on
10 the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is
11 of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of
12 the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant
13 delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits,
14 trial risk, and appellate risk. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement,
15 class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable
16 judgment.

17 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

18 Under the Settlement, Defendants will pay \$475,000.00 to resolve this Litigation. This
19 amount is all-inclusive. The Settlement's key terms include:

20 1. Settlement Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of
21 a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all persons employed by
22 Defendants in California and classified as a nonexempt employee who worked for Defendants during
23 the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

24 2. Class Period: "means the period from August 26, 2017 to the date preliminary approval
25 is granted, or March 12, 2023, whichever is sooner." (Settlement, § 1.13.)

26 3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and
27 timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § 1.37.)

28 4. Aggrieved Employees: means individuals employed by Defendant in California on an

hourly non-exempt basis during the PAGA Period of August 25, 2020, to the date of preliminary approval. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.30, and 1.31.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$475,000.00 and will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representatives' Service Payments, and the Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.23.)

6. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds to the State of California's State Controller Unclaimed Property Fund, in the name of the Class Members whose checks are cancelled, in the appropriate amounts for each such individual. (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7. Release by Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims during the Class Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint and Amended PAGA Notice and ascertained in the course of the Action, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay earned wages (including minimum, straight time, overtime, and prevailing wages); (2) failure to provide meal periods; (3) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses; and (7) California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. and all damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees, costs, and other amounts recoverable under said causes of action under California law, to the extent permissible, including, but not limited to, the California Labor Code and the applicable Wage Orders. Participating Class members will not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount. (*Id.* at § 5.)

1 8. Release by Aggrieved Employees: All Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on
2 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
3 administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties and
4 attendant interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all other amounts recoverable under PAGA, if any,
5 during the PAGA Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts
6 stated in the Operative Complaint, and the Amended PAGA Notice and ascertained in the course of
7 the Action, including any and all claims based on: (1) failure to pay earned wages (including
8 minimum, straight time, overtime, and prevailing wages); (2) failure to provide meal periods; (3)
9 failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (5)
10 failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (6) failure to indemnify for necessary
11 business expenses. (*Id.* at § 5.3.)

12 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs' claims
13 under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$5,000.00) being
14 paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.36.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed
15 settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 9.)

16 10. Net Settlement Fund/Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the
17 following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA
18 PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
19 Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid
20 to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.29.)

21 11. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment [will be] calculated by (a)
22 dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating
23 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
24 Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each
25 Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of
26 PAGA Penalties (\$5,000.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all
27 Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved
28 Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

1 12. Tax Allocation: “33% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment
2 will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage Portions are subject
3 to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The remaining 67% of each
4 Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for
5 e.g., interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”).” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

6 13. Class Representative Service Award: “A Class Representative Service Payments to
7 each of the Class Representatives of not more than \$10,000.00 each (in addition to any Individual
8 Class Payments and any Individual PAGA Payment each Class Representative is entitled to receive
9 as a Participating Class Member.” (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiffs’ time and effort
10 in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or
11 unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser
12 enhancement for any Plaintiff, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net
13 Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis.
14 (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15 14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a
16 fee application of up to 33.33% (\$158,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket
17 costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) At this time, Class Counsel’s costs are
18 approximately \$23,178.27. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 27.)

19 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms, a
20 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’
21 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are
22 calculated. (Singh Decl., Ex. A.) The Notice also included an opt-out form that class members could
23 complete in the event they decide to not participate in the settlement. (*Id.*) Class Members were
24 notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.2.) CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement
25 Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current addresses
26 of class members, including conducting a skip trace when needed and re-mailing the notice to updated
27 addresses. (Singh Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

28 ///

1 **E. Class Notice and Settlement Administration.**

2 This Court granted preliminary approval on September 13, 2023. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 8.)
3 Notices explaining class member rights were mailed out to all 200 class members in the mailing
4 list provided by Defendant. (Singh Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) To date, there have been zero written requests
5 for exclusion and zero objections to the settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.)

6 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

7 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases.
8 (See e.g., *Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be
9 considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk,
10 expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status
11 through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a government participant,
12 and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*
13 (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where,
14 as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length
15 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
16 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is
17 small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

18 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
19 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue
20 regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford*
21 *Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary
22 to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or
23 collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable
24 and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

25 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise.**

26 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at trial,
27 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
28 (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the

1 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower
2 than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because
3 the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground
4 in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

5 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
6 some of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their
7 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs also recognizes that
8 proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
9 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs obtained certification of all or some of
10 the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would
11 substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

12 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
13 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
14 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
15 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
16 \$475,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is
17 appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an estimated average***
18 ***benefit of approximately \$1,213.33, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be***
19 ***approximately \$3,251.85.*** (Singh Decl., ¶ 40.)

20 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Informal**
21 **Discovery.**

22 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
23 employment mediator, Michael E. Dickstein, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations
24 were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
25 parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
26 each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had
27 not been reached. (*Id.*)

28 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the

1 claims set forth in the Litigation, such as certain data points related to the number of putative class
2 members, workweeks worked during the proposed class period, pay periods worked during the
3 proposed PAGA period, average rates of pay Defendants also produced timekeeping and payroll
4 records for a statistically significant portion of the proposed class, and documents that describe
5 Defendants’ policies or practices regarding the legal claims and factual allegations in the complaint.
6 (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated
7 the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs
8 and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.
9 (*Id.*)

10 **C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience.**

11 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
12 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 28-40.) Class Counsel has substantial experience in
13 all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion, trial, appeals,
14 arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of plaintiffs
15 and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling responsibilities in
16 numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

17 Based on Class Counsel’s experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class Counsel
18 is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff’s claims, the strength of Defendants’
19 defenses against certification, the strength of Defendants’ defenses on the merits, and the fairness of
20 the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of
21 class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar,*
22 *supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 129 [“The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the
23 competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that
24 a settlement agreement represents an arms’ length transaction entered without self-dealing or other
25 potential misconduct”].)

26 **D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement.**

27 To date, no class members have objected to the Settlement and no class members have
28 requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Singh Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) The overwhelmingly positive

1 response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc.*
2 *Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few
3 objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

4 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the
5 class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction
6 here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser
7 circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976,
8 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the
9 settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the
10 settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20
11 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of
12 the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th
13 Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that
14 the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents
15 at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its
16 discretion in approving settlement].)

17 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF**
18 **FEES, COSTS AND AN ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT.**

19 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants have agreed to pay Class
20 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$158,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the Maximum
21 Settlement Amount, and costs up to \$25,000.00 for litigating this Action. In addition, Defendants
22 will not oppose an application for the payment of Settlement Administration Costs and Class
23 Representatives Enhancement Awards. Settlement Administration Costs are \$15,000.00, and each
24 Plaintiff will apply for an Enhancement Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 each (\$20,000.00 total).
25 The proposed attorneys’ fees and expenses, as well as the requested Enhancement Awards, were
26 disclosed to the Class Members in the proposed Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement.

27 “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether certification of
28 the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial

1 court's broad discretion." (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 234-235.) "Courts recognize two
2 methods for calculating attorney fees in civil class actions: the lodestar/multiplier method and the
3 percentage of recovery method." (*Id.* at p. 254; *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557
4 F.2d 759, 769.)

5 **A. Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method.**

6 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by
7 counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held that "when a
8 number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or
9 plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or
10 plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25,
11 34 [*quoting D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 1.]

12 Class Counsel intends to seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/
13 common fund" theory. The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to "spread litigation
14 costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
15 burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v.*
16 *State of California* (1995) 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who
17 expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may
18 require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." Similarly, in *City and*
19 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court
20 recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action
21 brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share."

22 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
23 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
24 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
25 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
26 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
27 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
28 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it

1 provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
2 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.” (*Id.*
3 [internal citations omitted].)

4 Several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative “lodestar” approach for deciding
5 fee awards, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable time
6 records. Commenting on the lodestar approach, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel wrote: “This court is
7 compelled to ask, ‘Is this process necessary?’ Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer would be a
8 resounding, ‘No!’” (*In re Activision Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375.)
9 The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of class
10 counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by providing
11 an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial resources.
12 (*Id.* at pp. 1378-79.) The Ninth Circuit now routinely uses the percentage of the common fund
13 approach to determine the award of attorney’s fees. (*See, e.g., In re Pacific Enterprises Securities*
14 *City and County of San Francisco Litigation* (9th Cir. 1994) 47 F.3d 373, 378-79 [approving
15 attorney’s fee of 33 1/3%].)

16 **1. The Standard Fee Award in Class Actions Has Resolved Itself As One-**
17 **Third Of The Recovery In Common Fund Cases.**

18 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what is
19 a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable
20 fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part
21 of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.”
22 (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty
23 percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with **thirty to forty percent commonly**
24 **awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small.** (*See Id.*; *see also, Van Vranken v. Atlantic*
25 *Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent
26 was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

27 The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions.
28 Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee

1 award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show
2 that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class
3 actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the
4 prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with
5 awards in California. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees
6 requested herein.

7 **2. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code.**

8 Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in
9 part: [A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
10 compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the
unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation,
including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

11 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.)

12 As this litigation culminated in a settlement that provided for a recovery of unpaid wages,
13 including unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
14 reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

15 Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee award under California’s private attorney general statute,
16 Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorneys’ fees is proper under Section 1021.5 if
17 ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
18 interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the
19 general public or a large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private
20 enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.’” (*Press v. Lucky Stores* (1983) 34 Cal.3d
21 311, 317-318.) The fundamental objective of the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing public
22 policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (*Graham v.*
23 *DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)

24 This action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as
25 Plaintiff sought to enforce Settlement Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from
26 Defendants’ failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (*See Murphy v.*
27 *Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.*, (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1113 [noting that “health and safety
28 concerns” are what motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest

1 periods].)

2 This action also conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons. Notice was sent to
3 200 Settlement Class Members, and, to date, no Settlement Class Members requested exclusion or
4 opted out of the Settlement. The Settlement provides a significant monetary benefit, in that it permits
5 all persons who worked for Defendants during the applicable class period to obtain compensation for
6 unpaid wages and missed meal and rest periods.

7 Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate.
8 Without the incentive of an attorneys' fee award, Plaintiffs could not have afforded to hire counsel to
9 pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiffs' potential recovery. (*See*
10 *Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044 ["As to the necessity
11 and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal
12 victory transcends the claimants' personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the
13 litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiff's individual stake in the matter."].)

14 **3. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Fee**
15 **Award.**

16 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and
17 employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class action matters. Class
18 Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in dozens of class actions resulting in a
19 multitude of beneficial results to class members in California. Because it is reasonable to compensate
20 class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, a fee award of 33 1/3% of the
21 Maximum Settlement Amount, a percentage considered within the norm in class action practice, is
22 certainly justified here.

23 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
24 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement.
25 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the
26 rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action
27 litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards
28 amounting to 33 1/3% of the recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable

1 and fair.

2 **B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May**
3 **Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.**

4 Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to
5 cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be
6 monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison
7 to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range
8 of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy*
9 *Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

10 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
11 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a
12 multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to
13 fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
14 retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill
15 justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for
16 such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be
17 enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

18 Wilshire Law Firm’s current lodestar is at least \$121,975 based on at least 177 hours of work
19 performed by Class Counsel thus far. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Accordingly, the requested fee of
20 \$158,333.33 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.3. To be sure, trial
21 courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao*
22 *v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d
23 at p. 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See*
24 *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298
25 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action
26 litigation”].)

27 **1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.**

28 Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the
plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

1 determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are
2 satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge*
3 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly
4 rates in other wage and hour class action settlements. These rates are not opposed or challenged.

5 **2. The Lawsuit Provided a Public Benefit.**

6 Class Counsel’s choice to litigate this matter provided a public benefit to 830 California
7 employees. Moreover, the California Supreme Court stated that “Labor Code section 1194 confirms “a
8 clear public policy ... that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s minimum wage and
9 overtime laws for the benefit of workers.” [citation omitted].” (*Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.*
10 (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.) Given the financial risks and numerous attorney hours attendant to the
11 litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims, this factor supports Class Counsel’s fee request and encourages the
12 private enforcement of legal rights for the general good.

13 **3. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.**

14 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
15 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiffs seek a modest multiplier of
16 1.3 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ request is underscored by the fact that a
17 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

18 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
19 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
20 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
21 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no
22 more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application
23 of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of
24 vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is
25 neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation
26 for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment
27 of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

28 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p.

1 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 [applying
2 a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal. App. 4th
3 at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir.
4 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v.*
5 *O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a study “reporting [an]
6 average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of
7 2.43 would be “per se reasonable”].) The intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4”
8 is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert*
9 *Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in
10 full by the California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

11 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
12 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
13 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature
14 of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
15 case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano, supra*,
16 20 Cal. 3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the lines of those
17 approved in the cases above.

18 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
19 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery is
20 only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the amount
21 that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and uncertainty about
22 how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133, 1138.) Here, Class
23 Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter and have borne the
24 entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s outlay of time and
25 money in this case has been significant.

26 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had
27 success in wage-and-hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers
28 and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendants’ contentions underscore the risk of

1 prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery
2 completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this case
3 because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. Despite these
4 risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so many cases that
5 Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other meritorious cases
6 presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but were declined, during
7 the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results.
8 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of
9 the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents
10 a very strong result for the Class.

11 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

12 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$23,178.27 in costs,
13 and they anticipate incurring at least \$300.00 in additional costs up to the time the Court enters a
14 judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 10, 27.) Accordingly, Class
15 Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$23,478.27 in costs. Notably, Defendant has
16 agreed that it will not oppose any cost award request up to \$25,000.00. The categories of costs are
17 set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Justin Marquez, and these costs are easily seen to be
18 both reasonable and necessary.

19 **D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff Is Reasonable.**

20 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
21 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members
22 of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class
23 action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are
24 necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class
25 representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009)
26 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against
27 employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation
28 statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.)

1 Plaintiffs should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class
2 members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendants agreed to pay
4 Service Awards in the amount of \$10,000.00 each to Plaintiff Jackson and Plaintiff Smith.
5 (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) In its Order granting preliminary approval, this Court preliminarily approved
6 Service Awards in the amount of \$10,000 to each Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
7 Plaintiffs' general release of all claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs have submitted declarations
8 demonstrating that Plaintiffs devoted at least 40 hours of time and work assisting counsel in the case,
9 communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation. (*See,*
10 *generally*, Declarations of Plaintiff Jackson and Smith filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
11 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; *see also* Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 13-17.)

12 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested
13 here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to
14 class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the "average award per class representative was
15 \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357." (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey
16 P. Miller, "*Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study*", 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303,
17 1308 (2006).)

18 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

19 CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$9,000.00
20 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Singh Decl., ¶ 12.) These expenses
21 are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member
22 payment processing.

23 **V. CONCLUSION**

24 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval of
25 the proposed settlement.

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1
2 Dated: January 9, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

3
4 By: _____

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov
Bradford Smith

5
6 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PROOF OF SERVICE

Jackson v. Apple Valley Communications, Inc., et al.
CIVSB2124721

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Min Jee Kim, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is minjee@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On January 9, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Jared L. Bryan (SBN 220925)
jared.bryan@jacksonlewis.com
Vincent L. Chen (SBN 311883)
Vincent.chen@jacksonlewis.com
Stacy C. Boura
stacy.boura@jacksonlewis.com
Aracely Orizaba
aracely.orizaba@jacksonlewis.com
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
200 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 500
Irvine, California 92618
Telephone: (949) 885-1360
Facsimile: (949) 885-1380


Attorneys for Defendants

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on January 9, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.



Min Jee Kim