


AUG 21 2023

BY: 
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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

PENNY LYNN JACKSON, individually, on
behalf of all others similarly situated, and on
behalf of the State of California and other
aggrieved persons; and STEVEN THOMAS
SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

APPLE VALLEY COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
a California corporation; AVCOM SERVICES
INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2124721

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Joseph T.
Ortiz, Dept. S17]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed with the Declaration of Justin F.
Marquez, Declarations of Plaintiffs, and
Proposed Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: September 13, 2023

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept: S-17

Complaint filed: August 25, 2021

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 13, 2023 at 1:30 p.m., in Department S-17 of
3 the San Bernardino Justice Center, located at 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415,
4 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiffs
5 Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for
6 an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs
7 and Apple Valley Communications, Inc. and AVCOM Services Inc. (collectively, “Defendants” or
8 “AVC”). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
10 and Class Notice;
11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
13 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith as Class
14 Representatives for settlement purposes;
15 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, Arrash T.
16 Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
17 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
18 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

19 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
20 authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez and Plaintiffs Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven
21 Thomas Smith, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other
22 further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: August 21, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

25 By: _____

26 Justin F. Marquez
27 Benjamin H. Haber
28 Maxim Gorbunov

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	iv
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims	1
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C. Settlement Negotiations	3
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III. DISCUSSION	8
A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	9
1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	9
2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	10
3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	11
B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	11
C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	11
1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	11
2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	12
3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	13
4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	13
D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable	14
IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	15

1	A. Legal Standard	15
2	B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
3	Settlement Purposes.	16
4	1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous	16
5	2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate.....	17
6	3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class.....	18
7	4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement.....	18
8	5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	18
9	V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	19
10	A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	19
11	B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative	19
12	VI. CONCLUSION	20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	17
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	19
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	13
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	12
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	18
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	17
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	17
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	12
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695.....	16
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	8
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.....	14
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	8
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	12
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	16
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	8
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	18
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	18
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	8, 14
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	12
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	16
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	17
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	12
<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	9
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	10
<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.</i> (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952	17

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FEDERAL CASES

<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	15
<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	19
<i>Priddy v. Edelman</i> (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438	9
<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	14
<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	13
<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.</i> , 557 F.2d 759 (9 th Cir. 1977).....	12

STATE STATUTES

Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	16, 17
Labor Code § 1194	13
Labor Code § 90.5	14

RULES

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	19
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	11

TREATISES

Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 11.51	9
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03	13
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 8.39	19

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)	15
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Penny Lynn Jackson and Steven Thomas Smith (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$475,000 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants Apple Valley Communications, Inc. and AVCOM Services Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 166 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Michael E. Dickstein, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class period. Defendants provide emergency communication services to a wide array of industries, including, without limitation, school districts, doctor’s offices, mortuaries, as well as local and federal government agencies. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for

1 failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair
2 business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

3 On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff Penny Lynn Jackson filed a putative wage-and-hour class
4 action complaint against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages
5 (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code
6 §§ 1194, and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4)
7 failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to provide
8 accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (6) failure to timely pay final wages at
9 termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); and (7) unfair business practices (Business and
10 Professions Code 17200 et seq.). On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff Jackson filed a First Amended
11 Complaint against Defendants, adding Steven Thomas Smith as a class representative and
12 adding claims for civil penalties under Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code §
13 2698 et seq.) (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) On April 12, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint,
14 adding a claim for failure to indemnify for business expenses (Labor Code § 2802).

15 Plaintiff Jackson sent a notice to Defendants and the California Labor & Workforce
16 Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the
17 PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on August 25, 2020. (*Id.*) Plaintiff Smith provided
18 notice to Defendants and the LWDA by sending an amended PAGA notice alleging similar wage
19 and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on December 12,
20 2022. (*Id.*)

21 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

22 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
23 before mediating this action. Defendants produced certain data points related to the number of
24 putative class members, workweeks worked during the proposed class period, pay periods
25 worked during the proposed PAGA period, average rates of pay Defendants also produced
26 timekeeping and payroll records for a statistically significant portion of the proposed class, and
27 documents that describe Defendants’ policies or practices regarding the legal claims and factual
28 allegations in the complaint. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

1 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices,
2 and analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
3 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary
4 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
5 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
6 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

7 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

8 On December 12, 2022, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced
9 class action mediator Michael E. Dickstein, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via
10 Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
11 professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore
12 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
13 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
14 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and
15 Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are
16 encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 [Class Action and PAGA Settlement
17 Agreement and Class Notice].)

18 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
19 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
20 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
21 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
22 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and
23 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

24 Indeed, the \$475,000.00 Settlement represents **77% of the realistic maximum recovery**
25 **of \$612,004.04.** (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants’ maximum
26 potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3.8 million, when the risk of prevailing at
27 certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants’
28 realistic exposure was \$612,004.04, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery.

(*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-30.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the parties made to the template in redline is attached to the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez as Exhibit 2. The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed by Defendants in California and classified as a nonexempt employee who worked for Defendants during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “means the period from August 26, 2017 to the date preliminary approval is granted, or March 12, 2023, whichever is sooner.” (Settlement, § 1.13.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.37.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendants in California and classified as a nonexempt employee who worked for Defendants during the PAGA Period from August 25, 2020 to March 12, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.32.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$475,000.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Class Representative Service Award. (Settlement, § 1.23.)

6. Uncashed Checks: The Administrator must conduct a Class Member Address Search for all other Class Members whose checks are returned undelivered without USPS forwarding address. Within 7 calendar days of receiving a returned check the Administrator must remail checks to the USPS forwarding address provided or to an address ascertained through the

1 Class Member Address Search. Any Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA
2 Payment check remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted
3 to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby
4 leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure
5 Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, §§ 4.4.2, 4.4.3.)

6 7. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not Also Aggrieved Employees:
7 "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
8 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released
9 Parties from all claims during the Class Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been
10 alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint and Amended PAGA Notice and
11 ascertained in the course of the Action, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay earned
12 wages (including minimum, straight time, overtime, and prevailing wages); (2) failure to provide
13 meal periods; (3) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4) failure to timely pay final wages
14 at termination; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to indemnify
15 for necessary business expenses; and (7) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law,
16 California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. and all damages, interest, penalties,
17 attorneys' fees, costs, and other amounts recoverable under said causes of action under California
18 law, to the extent permissible, including, but not limited to, the California Labor Code and the
19 applicable Wage Orders. Participating Class Members will not release any other claims, including
20 claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing
21 Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based
22 on facts occurring outside the Class Period. (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed
23 effective on the date when AVC fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement,
24 § 5.)

25 8. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are Aggrieved Employees: All
26 Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf
27 of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
28 administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties

1 and attendant interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all other amounts recoverable under PAGA, if
2 any, during the PAGA Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on
3 the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the Amended PAGA Notice and ascertained in the
4 course of the Action, including any and all claims based on: (1) failure to pay earned wages
5 (including minimum, straight time, overtime, and prevailing wages); (2) failure to provide meal
6 periods; (3) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4) failure to timely pay final wages at
7 termination; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (6) failure to indemnify
8 for necessary business expenses. (Settlement, § 5.3.) This Release will be deemed effective on the
9 date when AVC fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 5.)

10 9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: All Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release,
11 on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
12 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA
13 penalties and attendant interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all other amounts recoverable under
14 PAGA, if any, during the PAGA Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged,
15 based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the Amended PAGA Notice and
16 ascertained in the course of the Action, including any and all claims based on: (1) failure to pay
17 earned wages (including minimum, straight time, overtime, and prevailing wages); (2) failure to
18 provide meal periods; (3) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4) failure to timely pay final
19 wages at termination; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (6) failure to
20 indemnify for necessary business expenses. (Settlement, § 5.4.) This Release will be deemed
21 effective on the date when AVC fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement,
22 § 5.)

23 10. No Reversion: "None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to AVC."
24 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

25 11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs'
26 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
27 (\$5,000.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel
28 submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary

Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

12. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Participating Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) attorneys’ fees and Litigation costs, (2) Administration Expenses Payment, (3) enhancement to the Named Plaintiffs, (4) LWDA PAGA Payment, and (5) Individual PAGA Payments. (Settlement, § 1.29.)

13. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$5,000.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

14. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 33% wages, 67% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.) The Administrator will report the Individual PAGA Payments on IRS 1099 Forms. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.2.)

15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00 each. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiffs’ time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

16. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendants will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$158,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a

statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.2.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy

1 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

2 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
3 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
4 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

5 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
6 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

7 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
8 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

9 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
10 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
11 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
12 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
13 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
14 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
15 to approve the settlement.”].)

16 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
17 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Michael E. Dickstein, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶
18 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
19 manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
20 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position
21 through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations
22 and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’
23 defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 8.)

24 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
25 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
26 records, Defendants’ policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
27 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
28 as data points related to the number of putative class members, workweeks worked during the

1 proposed class period, pay periods worked during the proposed PAGA period, average rates of
2 pay. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel
3 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
4 Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the
5 proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

6 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
7 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 41-52.) Again, this supports the position that the
8 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
9 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
10 action.

11 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 12 **Respective Legal Positions**

13 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
14 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
15 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
16 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
17 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
18 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
19 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

20 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
21 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 28.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate
22 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs also recognizes that proving
23 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
24 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

25 The proposed settlement of \$475,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
26 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 17-30.) Because of the proposed
27 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
28 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in

1 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
2 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$475,000.00 is within
3 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
4 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
5 ***\$1,425.70.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 29.)

6 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

7 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
8 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
9 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-
10 52.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
11 litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

12 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

13 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
14 for dissemination to the class and sub-class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the
15 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
16 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
17 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice
18 meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

19 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

20 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agree to pay Class
21 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$158,333.00, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
22 Settlement Amount, and up to \$25,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
23 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

24 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”** 25 **Method**

26 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
27 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
28 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs

1 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
2 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
3 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

4 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
5 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
6 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
7 *Hughes Air W., Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977).) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15
8 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning
9 a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
10 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
11 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
12 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
13 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

14 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
15 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
16 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
17 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
18 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
19 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
20 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
21 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
22 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
23 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

24 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

25 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "No general rule can be articulated on what
26 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
27 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
28 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages

are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature, and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code Section 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-40.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers

1 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
2 Decl., ¶¶ 41-52.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
3 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
4 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee
5 award is supported here.

6 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
7 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement.
8 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
9 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
10 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
11 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
12 is reasonable and fair.

13 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable**

14 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
15 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
16 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
17 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
18 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
19 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir.
20 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

21 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
22 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
23 codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
24 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
25 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
26 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
27 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
28 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should

1 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
2 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agreed to pay
4 a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000 to each Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
5 Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time
6 and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation
7 and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the
8 mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the
9 substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et*
10 *al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F.
11 Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members, and the
12 court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez
13 Decl., ¶ 35.)

14 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
15 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
16 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
17 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
18 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
19 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment
20 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
21 while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121
22 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards
23 in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
24 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
25 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

26 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

27 **A. Legal Standard**

28 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive

1 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
2 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
3 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
4 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
5 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
6 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
7 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
8 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
9 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
10 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
11 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
12 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
13 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
14 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

15 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
16 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
17 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
18 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
19 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
20 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

21 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
22 **Settlement Purposes.**

23 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

24 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
25 approximately 166 employees of Defendants.

26 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
27 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
28 records of Defendants, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods; whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

///

1 **3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

2 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
3 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
4 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
5 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
6 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
7 situated" vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
8 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
9 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are current and former employees of
10 Defendants; as such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other
11 similarly situated employees.

12 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

13 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
14 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
15 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
16 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

17 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
18 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
19 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-52.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
20 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
21 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
22 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
23 Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her serious commitment to
24 bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

25 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

26 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
27 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
28 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the

1 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
2 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
3 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
4 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
5 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
6 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
7 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

8 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

9 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

10 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
11 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
12 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
13 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
14 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
15 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
16 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
17 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

18 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

19 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
20 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
21 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
22 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
23 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

24 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
25 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
26 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
27 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
28 Defendants, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits

1 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
2 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
3 combined settlement-certification class notice.


4 **VI. CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
6 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in February of 2024.

7
8 Dated: August 21, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

9
10 By:  _____

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov

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12 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
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1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 *Jackson v. Apple Valley Communications, Inc., et al.*
3 CIVSB2124721

4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
5) ss
6 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

7 I, Min Jee Kim, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I
8 am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is
9 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address
10 is minjee@wilshirelawfirm.com.

11 On **August 21, 2023**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND**
12 **MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;**
13 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a
14 true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as
15 follows:


16 Jared L. Bryan (SBN 220925)
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18 Vincent L. Chen (SBN 311883)
19 Vincent.chen@jacksonlewis.com
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25 200 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 500
26 Irvine, California 92618
27 Telephone: (949) 885-1360
28 Facsimile: (949) 885-1380

Attorneys for Defendant

- 20 (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State
21 of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- 22 (X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles,
23 California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known
24 email address or e-mail of record in this action.

25 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
26 foregoing is true and correct.

27 Executed on **August 21, 2023** at Los Angeles, California.

28 
Min Jee Kim