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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

THOMAS BROWN and ANTHONY DOSS,
individually, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the State of
California and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FIDELITY SECURITY SERVICES, INC., a
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 21STCV31617

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Stuart M.
Rice, Dept. 1]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: January 21, 2025
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Dept.: 1

Complaint filed: August 26, 2021
FAC filed: May 29, 2024
Trial date: Not set

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Anthony Doss

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on January 21, 2025 at 10:30 a.m., in Department 1 of the
4 Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012,
5 Plaintiffs Thomas Brown and Anthony Doss (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will, and hereby do, move
6 for an order as follows:

- 7 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 8 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
9 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
10 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 11 3. Appointing Plaintiffs Thomas Brown and Anthony Doss as Class Representatives for
12 settlement purposes, and approving Class Representative Service Awards of \$10,000.00 to
13 Plaintiff Brown and \$5,000.00 for Plaintiff Doss;
- 14 4. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Arrash T. Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC and Harout
15 Messrelian of Messrelian Law Inc. as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving
16 payment of \$74,166.67 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33.333333% of the Gross Settlement
17 Amount;
- 18 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$18,113.89 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 19 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement
20 Administrator in the amount of \$9,500.00;
- 21 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 22 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the
23 Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or
24 enforcing the terms of the judgment.


25 This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
26 the Declarations of Arrash T. Fattahi, Harout Messrelian, and Katherine Rovertoni, and such
27 oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action, including,
28 but not limited to, the Declarations of Plaintiffs, which were previously submitted in support of

1 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

2
3 Dated: December 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

4 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

5
6 By: 

Arrash T. Fattahi

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff Thomas Brown

8
9 Dated: December 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

10 **MESSRELIAN LAW INC.**

11
12 By: /s/ Harout Messrelian

Harout Messrelian

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff Anthony Doss
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Thomas Brown and Anthony Doss (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek final approval of a proposed \$222,500.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Fidelity Security Services, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 270 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$329.01*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$1,683.56*. (Declaration of Katherine Rovertoni on Behalf of Apex Class Action, LLC in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Rovertoni Decl.”], ¶ 16.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there are **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") representative action. Plaintiffs and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is a professional security guard company based in Los Angeles that provides armed and unarmed security guards for shopping malls, schools, and parking lots. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Fattahi Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff Brown filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business practices. (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff Brown sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (*Id.*) On May 29, 2024, Plaintiff Brown filed a First Amended Class & Representative Action Complaint against Defendant adding a claim for civil penalties under the PAGA, including a claim for Defendant's failure to pay wages every pay period, adding Plaintiff Doss as an additional class representative, and adding Harout Messrelian as counsel for Plaintiff Doss. (*Id.*)

1 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

2 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
3 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records
4 for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and
5 practices during the class period, financial documents, and information regarding the total number
6 of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

7 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
8 financial records, and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was
9 able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s
10 maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the
11 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel
12 reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant’s potential liability
13 prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

14 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

15 On July 14, 2023, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
16 action mediator, Hon. Mitchell R. Goldberg (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted
17 via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
18 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore
19 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
20 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
21 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and
22 Defendant’s defenses, and Defendant’s financial condition, the Parties reached a settlement, the
23 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, Ex. 1 [Class
24 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

25 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
26 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
27 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
28 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk

of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on August 16, 2025 [sic].¹ (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was December 8, 2024. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$222,500.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as non-exempt who worked for Defendant during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “means the period from March 1, 2017 to July 14, 2023.” (Settlement, § 1.11.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employee: “means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period (December 29, 2019 to July 14, 2023). (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.12.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$222,500.00, for all claims, including: Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, the Class Representatives Service Payments and the

¹ Preliminary approval was granted on August 16, 2024.

1 Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

2 6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement
3 Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain
4 a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified,
5 shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed
6 after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to Legal Aid at Work2 ("Cy Pres
7 Recipient"), thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code
8 of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

9 7. Release by Participating Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on
10 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
11 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that
12 were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in
13 the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action including. Except as set
14 forth in Section 6.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other
15 claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair
16 Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers'
17 compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 6.2.)
18 This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds all employer
19 payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, § 6.)

20 8. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are Aggrieved Employees:
21 "All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release,
22 on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents,
23 attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims
24 for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the
25 PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and Plaintiffs' PAGA Notices, and
26 ascertained in the course of the Action." (Settlement, § 6.3.)

27 9. No Reversion: "None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant."
28 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

10. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$15,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs' claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$11,250.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$3,750.00) being paid to Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 11.)

11. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representatives Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.28.)

12. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$3,750,00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 25% wages and 75% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs shall be paid enhancement awards not to exceed \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Brown and \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Doss. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiffs' time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 6.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata

1 basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

2 15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not
3 oppose a fee application of up to 33.333333% (\$86,666.67) of the Gross Settlement Amount,
4 plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) Plaintiffs' counsel
5 has a fee sharing agreement. Under the Agreement, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC will receive 75%
6 of the fees collected in this matter and Messrelian Law Inc. will receive 25% of the fees collected
7 in this matter. Both Plaintiffs have consented to this fee split in a separate joint prosecution
8 agreement between the law firms and have signed the agreement. Upon request from the Court,
9 Plaintiffs' counsel can provide a copy of the Joint Prosecution Agreement. (Fattahi Decl., ¶
10 38.)

11 16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
12 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
13 attorneys' fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
14 allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members were notified by
15 first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 8.4.) Apex Class Action, LLC, the Settlement
16 Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current
17 addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-
18 mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

19 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

20 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
21 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
22 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the
23 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
24 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
25 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar*
26 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
27 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement
28 is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow

counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise

A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish

liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$222,500.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate. *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately \$329.01, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$1,683.56.* (Rovertoni Decl., ¶ 16.)

B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery

The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced employment mediator, Hon. Mitchell Goldberg (Ret.). (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 17-38; *see generally*, Declaration of Harout Messrelian in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Messrelian Decl.”].) Class Counsel has substantial experience in all facets of litigation in state

1 and federal court, including discovery, law and motion, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class
2 Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or
3 otherwise exercised significant case handling responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in
4 millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

5 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
6 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiffs' claims, the strength of
7 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
8 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
9 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
10 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
11 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
12 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction
13 entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

14 **D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement**

15 No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested
16 exclusion from the Settlement. (Rovertoni Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive
17 response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock,*
18 *Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively
19 few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

20 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the
21 class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The
22 reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in
23 lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist.
24 LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the "class members overwhelmingly
25 support[ed] the settlement" where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members
26 participated in the settlement, "only nine objections were submitted." and there were 86 timely
27 opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, "these indicia of the approval of
28 the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23"], *citing Hanlon*

1 v. *Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by
2 objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and
3 stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the
4 court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

5 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF**
6 **FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.**

7 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
8 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$74,166.67, which is 33.333333% of the Gross
9 Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this Action, and enhancement awards of
10 \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Brown and \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Doss (\$15,000.00 total). Defendant has
11 also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no
12 class member has objected to these amounts.

13 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
14 calculating attorneys’ fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
15 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California
16 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action
17 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court
18 explained:

19 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
20 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override***
21 ***the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common***
22 ***fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the***
23 ***potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-
24 check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the
25 percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a
26 justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an
27 adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time
28 counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable
percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017
WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

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1 **A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard**

2 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
3 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
4 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
5 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
6 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
7 Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to***
8 ***forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
9 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
10 cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

11 The settled-for 33.333333% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class
12 actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a
13 fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical
14 studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee
15 awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiffs’ fee request
16 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature
17 and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’
18 fees requested herein.

19 **B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts**
20 **May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.**

21 Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used
22 to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can
23 be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in
24 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and
25 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In*
26 *re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

27 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
28 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a

multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.” (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.*, *supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s lodestar is at least \$118,875 based on over 138 hours of work performed thus far and Messrelian Law Inc.’s lodestar is at least \$21,175 based on over 38 hours of work performed thus far. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 18-19; Messrelian Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$74,166.67 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of **0.52**. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also*

Van Vranken, supra, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”] Much higher multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

For example, Mr. Marquez’ \$1,500 hourly rate was recently approved in *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721. There, the court held that “[a]s for the lodestar cross-check, the billing rates are normal and customary for timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the relevant market.” (*Id.* at p. *3.)

2. Class Counsel’s Requested Fees are Derived Using a Negative Multiplier.

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiffs seek a multiplier of **0.52** here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Multiplying the total hours billed by Class Counsel to the litigation by their reasonable hourly rates yields a lodestar of \$140,050, which is more than the \$74,166.67 in attorneys’ fees Class Counsel are requesting. This disparity is important to note because when plaintiffs seek an amount in fees that is less than what they actually billed, the requested fee amount is generally considered reasonable. (*Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 716

1 F.Supp.2d 848, 854 [finding that, if the court is asked to apply a negative multiplier, it “suggests
2 the negotiated fee award is a reasonable and fair valuation of the services rendered to the class
3 by Plaintiff’s Counsel.”].) Indeed, there is no reason for the Court to reduce Class Counsel’s
4 lodestar with a negative multiplier. (*Roos v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1472,
5 1495 [“a trial court acts appropriately . . . when it accepts in a common-fund case a cap on fees
6 . . . when the application of the cap results in a lower award than would be authorized under the
7 lodestar method.”].)

8 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
9 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
10 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
11 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
12 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
13 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
14 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a
15 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
16 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
17 or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

18 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
19 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
20 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
21 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
22 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
23 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
24 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
25 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in
26 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
27 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
28 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new

1 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

2 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
3 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
4 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
5 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
6 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
7 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
8 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

9 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
10 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
11 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
12 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
13 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
14 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
15 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's
16 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

17 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
18 had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
19 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the
20 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
21 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
22 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
23 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
24 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
25 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
26 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
27 achieve favorable results. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
28 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief

provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

C. Costs Are Reasonable.

As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$17,613.89 in costs, and they anticipate incurring at least \$500 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 26; Messrelian Decl., ¶ 12.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$18,113.89 in costs. Notably, Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declarations of Arrash T. Fattahi and Harout Messrelian, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiffs are Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The

1 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
2 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
3 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiffs should therefore be
4 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
5 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

6 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
7 Service Awards in the amounts of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Brown and \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Doss.
8 This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs’ general releases of all claims against Defendant.
9 Plaintiffs have submitted declarations demonstrating their devotion to this case, including their
10 efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation,
11 preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declarations of
12 Plaintiffs, previously submitted with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
13 Settlement.)

14 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
15 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
16 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
17 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
18 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
19 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award
20 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3
21 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
22 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

23 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
24 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
25 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
26 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
27 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
28 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”

(*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, quoting *Clark*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiffs’ declarations describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.

Apex Class Action, LLC, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$9,500.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Rovertoni Decl., ¶ 19.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

Dated: December 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 

Arrash T. Fattahi

Attorneys for Plaintiff Thomas Brown

Dated: December 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

MESSRELIAN LAW INC.

By: /s/ Harout Messrelian

Harout Messrelian

Attorneys for Plaintiff Anthony Doss

PROOF OF SERVICE

Brown, et al. v. Fidelity Security Services, Inc., et al.
21STCV31617

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Ashley Narinyans, am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Fl., Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is ashley.narinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On December 26, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Howard M. Knee (SBN 55048)
howard.knee@blankrome.com
Taylor C. Morosco (SBN 316401)
taylor.morosco@blankrome.com
BLANK ROME LLP
2029 Century Park East, 6th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: (424) 239-3400
Facsimile: (424) 389-7048

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE**.

Harout Messrelian (SBN 272020)
hm@messrelianlaw.com
MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
Glendale, California 91203
Telephone: (818) 484-6531
Facsimile: (818) 956-1983

Attorneys for Plaintiff Anthony Doss

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known e-mail address or e-mail of record in this action.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

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1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
2 is true and correct.

3 Executed this December 26, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.

4 
5 _____
6 Ashley Narinyans
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