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individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN**

MICHAEL GEORGE MCCANN, individually and
on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; DELTA CONTAINER
CORPORATION, a California Corporation; and
DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-8294

ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO:
Honorable Blanca A. Banuelos, Dept. 10B

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF PAGA
AND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF
CLASS COUNSEL; DECLARATION
OF PLAINTIFF MCCANN**

Date: September 11, 2025

Time: 9:00 a.m.

1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:**
2 **NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN** that on September 11, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as
3 the matter may be heard in Department 10B before the Honorable Blanca A. Banuelos of the San
4 Joaquin County Superior Court, Plaintiff MICHAEL GEORGE MCCANN (“Plaintiff”), by and
5 through Plaintiff’s counsels of record, will and hereby moves the Court for Final Approval of the
6 Class Action And Paga Settlement Agreement And Release Of Claims, awarding attorneys’ fees,
7 litigation costs, Service Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and entering final approval and
8 judgment.

9 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court and Labor
10 Code section 2699(1). This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached
11 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying Declarations of James R. Hawkins
12 (“Hawkins”), the declaration of Stacey Shim of APEX Class Action Administration, the
13 declaration of Plaintiff MICHAEL GEORGE MCCANN, the Class Action and PAGA Settlement
14 Agreement and Release of Claims (the “Settlement Agreement”), attached to the Hawkins
15 Declaration, argument of counsel, all papers and pleadings filed in the action, and upon any further
16 information or evidence requested by the Court at the time of hearing on this Motion.
17

18
19 Dated: August 12, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

20
21 BY:



James Hawkins
Gregory Mauro
Michael Calvo
Lauren Falk
Ava Issary

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23
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25 Attorneys for Plaintiff MICHAEL GEORGE
26 MCCANN and the Proposed Class
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This Court preliminary approved the settlement on or about March 12, 2025. (James
4 Hawkins Decl. “Hawkins”, **Exhibit A** - Preliminary Approval Order). Plaintiff McCann
5 (“Plaintiff”), now respectfully requests that this Court grant final approval of the settlement
6 agreement attached to the Hawkins Declaration as **Exhibit B**, which seeks to resolve claims
7 against REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC. and DELTA CONTAINER CORPORATION.
8 (“Defendants”) in exchange for a Gross Settlement Amount of (“GSA”) of Three Hundred Fifty
9 Two Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$352,820.00)¹.
10

11 The Class Members overwhelmingly supported the Settlement, as there is a 100%
12 participation rate, with zero objections and zero opt outs resulting in a full participation from all
13 Class Members (93). To determine a Participating Class Member’s individual settlement award
14 payment, the Net Settlement Fund will be divided by the total number of workweeks worked by
15 all Settlement Class Members during the Class Period, multiplied by the number of workweeks
16 worked by that Participating Class Member.

17 The *highest* Individual Settlement Amount to a Participating Class Member is currently
18 estimated to be approximately \$3,942.69 the *average* Individual Settlement Amount is currently
19 estimated to be approximately \$1,886.83, and the *lowest* Individual Settlement Amount is
20 currently estimated to be approximately \$12.80. These amounts are subject to employee-side tax
21 and withholdings. The *highest* individual PAGA payment to an Aggrieved Employee is
22 approximately \$165.07, the *average* individual PAGA payment to an Aggrieved Employee is
23 approximately \$128.19, and the *lowest* individual PAGA payment to an Aggrieved Employee is
24 approximately \$0.70. There are 84 Aggrieved Employees who worked a total of 10,768.00 pay
25

26
27 ¹ 13. The total number of workweeks worked by Participating Class Members during the Class Period is
28 13,708.00. The Agreement’s escalator clause had been triggered due to an increase in workweeks during the Class
Period beyond the threshold provided for in Paragraph 49(a) of the Agreement. The 34.60% increase in workweeks
beyond the threshold identified in Paragraph 49(a) led to a 19.60% increase (34.60% - 15% grace margin) to the
Gross Settlement Amount, equaling \$57,820.00. The new Gross Settlement Amount is \$352,820.00. See Shim
Decl. at ¶ 13. The original Gross Settlement Amount was \$295,000.00.

1 periods during the PAGA Period. (Administrator Decl. of Stacey Shim-hereinafter “Shim”, ¶¶
2 14-18).

3 Plaintiff also moves for final approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$117,606.67
4 which is one third of GSA. As will be demonstrated herein, Class Counsel’s attorney fee request
5 is supported using the percentage fee method and the lodestar method. Second, Plaintiff moves
6 for final approval of payment of the litigation costs in the amount of \$21,288.08, all of which
7 was incurred in litigating this matter. Third, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the Service
8 Award to Plaintiff in the sum of \$5,000.00, to compensate the Class Representative for their
9 service as the Class Representative and providing a general release of his claims against
10 Defendants – a release significantly greater than the Class Members provided – and for the risks
11 absorbed and time spent litigating the case. Plaintiff played a vital role in representing Class
12 Members in this case and spearheading the lawsuit to seek monetary relief on behalf of all Class
13 Members. Fourth, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the payment of \$3,450.00 in
14 administrative costs to Apex Class Action Administrators. Fifth, Plaintiff moves for final
15 approval of the \$22,500.00 PAGA Payment and the payment to the Labor and Work
16 Development Agency (“LWDA”) for its share of the PAGA Payment (\$22,500.00, which is 75%
17 of \$30,000.00; with the remaining \$7,500.00 payable to Aggrieved Employees).

18 This case required many hours of attorney and Plaintiff time who sought relief on behalf
19 of 93 potential class members within the State of California defined all current and former non-
20 exempt employees who were employed by Defendants REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC. and
21 DELTA CONTAINER CORPORATION for the Class Period is April 10, 2019 through March
22 12, 2025.

23 This litigation involved the review and analysis of documents, policies, and practices, as
24 well as a full day of mediation. Most importantly, the Settlement and all its terms received
25 overwhelming support from Class Members, as there were no objections and only one request
26 for exclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request the Court grant final approval of the
27 Settlement, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Service Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and
28

1 payment to the LWDA in the amounts preliminarily approved by the Court and as fully disclosed
2 to Class Members.

3 **II. BACKGROUND, INVESTIGATION, DISCOVERY**

4 Plaintiff filed a class complaint with the Court on September 2, 2021. Then, on March
5 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint (which included an amendment to the
6 Complaint) against Defendants, alleging class and representative PAGA claims. Plaintiff's
7 Complaint alleged the following class claims: 1) failure to pay wages including overtime; 2)
8 failure to provide meal periods; 3) failure to provide rest periods; 4) failure to pay timely wages;
9 5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; 6) unfair business practices; 7) Civil
10 Penalties under the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA") based on the above alleged
11 violations. (Hawkins Decl. ¶¶ 3-6).

12 Plaintiff gave written notice to Defendants and the LWDA by sending his LWDA notice
13 letter on September 7, 2021 ("PAGA Notice") alleging Defendants violated Labor Code §§
14 sections 200-203, 510, 512, 558, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 1174, 1174.5, 1175, 1194, 1197, 1197.1,
15 1198, and the IWC Wage Orders. (*Id.*)

16 On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants participated in mediation before Lisa
17 Klerman, Esq. Though the case did not settle at mediation, the parties accepted a mediator's proposal on
18 September 27, 2023. In preparation for the mediation Defendants provided Class Counsel with hire and
19 term dates for all employees, time and payroll records for approximately 75 Class Members and relevant
20 policies for Class Members during the Class Period. (*Id.*)

21 Defendants deny Plaintiff's claims and allegations and contend that the Action is not suitable for
22 class certification or manageable as a class or representative action. (Settlement Agreement ¶43).

23 In short, Defendants provided discovery sufficient to enable the Plaintiff and Class
24 Counsel to rigorously evaluate the strengths and risks of the case and perform an analysis of the
25 potential damages arising from the claims made in this case. The settlement discussions were
26 conducted at arm's-length, and the settlement is the result of an informed and detailed analysis of
27 Defendants' potential liability in relation to the costs and risks associated with continued
28

1 litigation. Based on the documents produced, as well as Class Counsel's own independent
2 investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel believes that the Settlement with Defendants for the
3 consideration and on the terms set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is
4 in the best interest of the Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, including
5 the risk of significant delay and uncertainty associated with litigation and various defenses
6 asserted by Defendants. (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 4-12, Ex. B.)

7 In reaching the proposed settlement, Plaintiff counsel's negotiation efforts took into
8 consideration relevant factors such as the size of the class, the information, data, and documents
9 obtained in the litigation and/or otherwise exchanged pursuant to the mediation privilege; the
10 experience of the named Plaintiff; the strengths and weaknesses of the case; the uncertain
11 outcome and risk of litigating complex actions; the time and expense in litigating a case through
12 trial; Defendants' defenses; and the non-reversionary nature of the settlement.

13 **A. THE SETTLEMENT PROVIDES REASONABLE COMPENSATION TO**
14 **CLASS MEMBERS**

15 As a result of the mediation, the parties agreed to settle this matter for a Gross Settlement
16 Amount ("GSA") of \$352,820.00 (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 9, Shim Decl., ¶ 13). Based on their own
17 respective independent investigations and evaluations, and after taking into account the sharply
18 disputed factual and legal issues involved in this matter, the risks attending further prosecution of
19 the case, and the monetary benefits received under the Settlement despite the questionable nature
20 of the claims, Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that Settlement for the consideration and on the
21 terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement remains fair, reasonable and adequate and is in the
22 best interests of the Class Members. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 5-13).

23 Even without the presumption of fairness and reasonableness, the settlement is clearly
24 within the range of reasonableness as thoroughly discussed in detail in the motion for
25 preliminary approval, and as considered by the Court in granting preliminary approval, (Hawkins
26 Decl., ¶¶ 9-18; Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary Approval).

27 Accounting for the risks of continued litigation and impediments to discovery, Plaintiff
28 determined that a settlement amounting to \$352,820.00 was fair and reasonable and the court

preliminarily agreed. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 11-23). *See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 212 F.R.D. 231, 256-58 (D. Del. 2002) (recognizing that a reasonable settlement amount can be 1.6% to 14% of the total estimated damages); *In Re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.*, 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (settlements with a value of 1% to 8% of the estimated total damages were approved); *In Re Four Seasons Secs. Laws Litig.*, 58 F.R.D. 19, 37 (W.D. Okla.1972) (approving 8% of damages); *Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLP*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (finding that settlement which amounted to 8% of maximum recovery “[fel] within the range of possible initial approval based on the strength of plaintiff’s case and the risk and expense of continued litigation.”); *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement of 6% to 8% of estimated damages).² (*Id.*)

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND THE CLASS MEMBERS’ RESPONSE

A. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT

The GSA is (\$352,820.00). This amount includes, the Settlement Administration Costs of \$3,450.00; the Service Award of up to \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff; Court-approved attorneys’ fees up to \$117,606.67, litigation costs to Class Counsel in the amount of \$21,288.08; and PAGA penalties of \$30,000.00 with 75% of that amount paid to the LWDA and the remaining 25% paid to the Aggrieved Employees. The Net Settlement fund available to the settlement class is approximately \$175,475.25. (Shim Decl., ¶ 13).

The Settlement is a common fund settlement with no reversion to Defendants. Thus, each of the participating Settlement Class Members will be paid his or her pro-rata share of the NSA.

² *See also In re Uber FCRA Litig.*, No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101552, at *23- 24 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement where gross settlement fund, prior to deducting attorneys’ fees and services awards, was valued at 7.5% or less of total possible verdict); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, No. 15-cv-02198-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016) (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement representing “8.1% of the full verdict value” with 13 settlement amount representing approximately 5.3% of full verdict value); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, No. 13-cv-02540-HSG, 2015 WL 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final approval to settlement with net recovery to Plaintiff valued at 7.3% of potential maximum recovery); *Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-02705-DMR, 2014 WL 7247065, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (granting final approval where gross settlement amount represented 8.6% of the maximum potential recovery from the class claims and estimated amount distributable to class after accounting for attorneys’ fees and other deductions represented approximately 6.1% of maximum potential recovery); *In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig.*, No. 07-cv-05182-WHA, 2010 WL 3001384, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (granting final approving where “[t]he proposed settlement amount is [. . .] only about five percent of the estimated damages before fee and costs—even before any reduction thereof for attorney’s fees and costs.”).

1 **B. RELEASED CLAIMS**

2 Subject to approval by this Court, and in exchange for the consideration recited in the
3 Settlement Agreement, the Released Claims are all claims that have been or could have been
4 reasonably alleged or asserted in the PAGA Notices and as defined in the Settlement. (Hawkins
5 Decl., Ex. B- Settlement Agreement ¶31).

6 **C. THE CLASS MEMBERS SUPPORT THE SETTLEMENT – ZERO (0)**
7 **OBJECTIONS AND ZERO (0) OPT-OUTS**

8 On March 12, 2025, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,
9 conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes, appointed Apex Class Action
10 Administrators to act as the administrator, approved the Notice to be sent to the Class, and directed
11 that the Notice be mailed to the Class via U.S. First Class Mail. (Hawkins Decl., Ex. A- Order
12 Granting Preliminary Approval). On June 13, 2025, the Notice was sent to all 93 individuals listed
13 in the Class Data using U.S First Class Mail. (Shim Decl., ¶7). Out of the 93 Notices, none were
14 deemed undeliverable. (Shim Decl., ¶¶ 7-11). As a result of the mailing, there is a 100%
15 participation rate and 93 Class Members will be mailed a settlement check.

16 If a Participating Class Member's or Aggrieved Employee's check is returned to the
17 Settlement Administrator, the Settlement Administrator will make reasonable efforts to re-mail it
18 to the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee at the correct address. Participating
19 Class Members and Aggrieved Employees shall have one hundred eighty (180) calendar days after
20 mailing by the Settlement Administrator to cash each settlement check. If any Participating Class
21 Member's or Aggrieved Employee's check is not cashed within that period, the check will be void
22 and a stop-payment will be issued, and the Settlement Administrator shall issue the unclaimed
23 funds to the California State Controller's Office in the name of the Class Member or Aggrieved
24 Employee. The release will be binding upon all Participating Class Members and Aggrieved
25 Employees who do not cash their checks within the one hundred eighty (180) calendar days period.
26 In the event that any settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator within one
27 hundred eighty (180) calendar days of mailing, the Settlement Administrator will, within five (5)
28 business days of receipt of the returned settlement check, perform a skip trace to locate the

individual, and notify Defense Counsel and Class Counsel of the results. If a new address is located by these means, the Administrator will have ten (10) business days to re-issue the check. Neither Defendant, Defense Counsel, Class Counsel, Plaintiff, nor the Settlement Administrator will have any liability for lost or stolen settlement checks, forged signatures on settlement checks, or unauthorized negotiation of settlement checks. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 75).

IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE

A. THE SETTLEMENT SATISFIES THE STANDARD FOR FINAL APPROVAL

California Rule of Court, Rule 3.769, requires court approval for class action settlements. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(g). California courts favor settlement. *Stambaugh v. Superior Court* (1976) 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, *Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal.* (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602 (“[T]he law wisely favors settlements”). Accordingly, the Court must give “[due] regard to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245.

In deciding whether to approve a class settlement, a court evaluates whether the proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. Of S.F.* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625). A court enjoys broad discretion to make its fairness determination. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. However, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Id.* at 1802; accord *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. In addition, a court should consider additional relevant factors, including the strength of the Plaintiff’s case compared to the settlement amount; the risk, expenses, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; and the fair treatment of class members in relation to each other. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

At the time of preliminary approval, the Court was provided with sufficient information to satisfy three of the four *Dunk* factors, leaving the fourth factor, the number of objectors, unknown

1 until after the Class had an opportunity to respond to the Settlement as explained in the Notice.
2 Subject only to the Class's reaction to the Settlement, the Court preliminarily presumed the
3 Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Following dissemination of the Notice, and
4 adequate time provided to the Class to object to the Settlement, no class member submitted
5 objections and no Class Member excluded themselves from the settlement, **resulting in a 100%**
6 **participation rate from the Class**. Thus, the proposed Settlement is entitled to the presumption
7 that it is fair and in all other respects proper and should be finally approved.

8 **V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS**

9 **A. THE REQUESTED FEE AWARD IS FAIR AND REASONABLE,**
10 **CALCULATED AS A PERCENTAGE**
11 **OF A COMMON FUND**

12 Class Counsel applies for an award of attorneys' fees in the sum of \$117,606.67 of the
13 GSA, and litigation costs of \$21,288.08 (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 24-31, Ex. C). When a settlement
14 results in a common fund for the benefit of a class, class counsel may be awarded fees as a
15 percentage of the common fund. *See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254 (recognizing the
16 "percentage of recovery" method). The California Supreme Court confirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert*
17 *Half Int'l, Inc.* that "[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases." 1
18 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), in stating:

19 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
20 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
21 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
22 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
23 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not
24 be denied our trial courts.

25 *Id.* at 503 (internal citation omitted); *see also e.g., Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34
26 (1977) ("when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action
27 brought by a plaintiff or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that
28 fund, such plaintiff or Plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund."); *Serrano v.*
Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (1982) (in awarding a fee from the common fund obtained for the
benefit of all parties, the trial court acts within its equitable power to prevent the other parties'
unjust enrichment.); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir.

1993) (the percentage of the fund method for calculating attorney’s fees more accurately reflects the results achieved for the putative class than the lodestar method and “establishes reasonable expectations on the part of Plaintiff’s attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages early settlement, which avoids protracted litigation.”); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation*, 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure.’”).³

The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” *Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at 769. In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, 167, the Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” The reasons for applying the common fund doctrine include: “...fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and directly compensated should his efforts be successful.” *Id.* Because there is a defined and clearly traceable benefit to the Class, the Court can base an award of attorneys’ fees using a ‘common fund’ approach to compensate Class Counsel.

³ *Laffitte* also held trial courts have discretion to assess reasonableness of fee awards with tools such as the lodestar cross-check, although they need not do so. *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 (“We hold further that trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee . . . they also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee”).

1 **1. The Requested Attorneys’ Fee is Within the Range of Fees Approved in**
2 **Comparable Common Fund Cases**

3 Assessing an appropriate fee based on a percentage of the fund involves considering “all
4 of the circumstances of the case.” Appellate cases addressing fees arise almost exclusively where
5 awards were challenged by Defendant or objectors – the only parties with standing to appeal.
6 *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 236.

7 The requested fee falls in the mid-range of percentage class fee awards, which generally
8 range from 20% to 50% of a common fund, and it constitutes fair compensation for undertaking
9 complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent basis and compensates
10 Class Counsel for their efforts, as well as the result achieved for the benefit of the Class. Numerous
11 courts in California routinely approve fee requests equal to or greater than 25% of the common
12 fund. *See Martin v. Ameripride Servs.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, *22-23 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
13 (collecting cases); *Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 06cv1690 DMS
14 (WMC) (awarding 40% fee on a \$16 million wage and hour class action settlement); *Rippee v.*
15 *Boston Mkt. Corp.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 05cv1359 BTM (JMA) (awarding a 40%
16 fee on a \$3.75 million wage and hour class action settlement). In fact, the Sacramento County
17 Superior Court has awarded fees of 25% of the common fund in wage and hour class actions.
18 (*McMahon v. Airco Mechanical, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2019-00259269; *Uribe v. EcoGuard Pest*
19 *Management, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2021-00300650; *Arroyo v. Epic Home Solar*, Case No. 34-2021-
20 00310634; *Blair v. Clark Wagaman Designs*, Case No. 34-2021-00313156).

21 In short, Class Counsels’ fee request of \$117,606.67 (33.33% of the common fund) is in
22 line with awards in similar cases in California and demonstrates that Class Counsels’ fee request
23 is consistent with market rates and is reasonable.

24 **2. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee**

25 Class Counsels’ fee request is also reasonable when calculated using the lodestar method.
26 Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably
27 spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at
28 48. The court then may enhance this lodestar figure by a “multiplier” to account for a range of

1 factors, such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, its contingent nature, and the degree of
2 success achieved. *Id.* at 49; *see also Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36 (2001); *Thayer*
3 *v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834 (2001), [“[t]here is no...rule limiting the factors
4 that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to [adjust the] lodestar”].

5 As of the date of filing, Class Counsel worked approximately 191.10 documented hours on
6 this case. for a lodestar value of approximately \$143,968.00. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 27) In light of the
7 facts and circumstances of this matter, as well as the results that Class Counsel have achieved,
8 Class Counsel have spent a reasonable number of hours performing work on this matter. In
9 addition, Class Counsel will continue to perform work on this matter through the date of final
10 approval and in connection with the implementation of the Settlement. Class Counsel is not
11 requesting a multiplier since the lodestar does not exceed the requested Attorney’s fees. Attorney
12 Gregory Mauro spent 72.30 hours on this litigating this case at a rate of \$850 per hour, Attorney
13 James Hawkins spent 60.30 hours litigating this matter at a rate of \$1,050 per hour, Attorney Ava
14 Issary spent 22.60 hours litigating this matter at a rate of \$500 per hour, and Paralegal Melissa
15 Whitson spent 35.90 hours on this case at a rate of \$220 per hour. *Id.*

16 3. Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates are Reasonable

17 Class Counsels’ hourly rates are between \$200 and \$1,050 and are in line with rates
18 typically approved in wage and hour class action litigation and which rates have been approved by
19 Courts in California in the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Orange and San
20 Diego County Superior Courts. (Hawkins Decl., ¶25); *Children’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*,
21 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 (2002) (noting rates were reasonable where they were “within the range
22 of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable
23 work”).

24 A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and
25 experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.
26 When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts may consider factors such as skill and
27 experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s
28 customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632.

1 Class Counsels' skill and experience support their hourly rates. Our practices are limited
2 exclusively to litigation, focusing on the representation of employees in wage and hour and
3 consumer class action matters. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 25). As prominent attorneys in the field of wage
4 and hour class action litigation, Class Counsel continually monitors the prevailing market rates
5 charged by both defense and plaintiff law firms and set the billing rates of their attorneys and
6 paralegals to be consistent with the prevailing market rates in the private sector for attorneys and
7 staff of comparable skill, qualifications and experience. Other wage and hour attorneys working
8 as class counsel before California courts charge comparable if not higher rates. Therefore, as they
9 are in line with those of the relevant community, Class Counsels' hourly rates are reasonable.

10 **4. Class Counsel's Total Hours are Reasonable**

11 In determining a lodestar fee, reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during
12 litigation, the time spent before the action was filed, including time spent interviewing clients,
13 investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. *See New York Gaslight*
14 *Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62. The fee award should include fees incurred to establish
15 and defend the attorneys' fee claim. *Serrano v. Priest* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.

16 Class Counsel expended a combined total of approximately 191.10 hours on this case.
17 The work performed to achieve a settlement that will provide valuable consideration to the Class
18 is summarized by Class Counsel in the declaration submitted herewith. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31);
19 *Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin*, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699 (2014) ("Because time records are not
20 required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve.")
21 (internal quotations omitted). All tasks and work performed were reasonable and necessary for the
22 prosecution of this case. The work performed was justified considering the result achieved. All of
23 the work and tasks performed by Class Counsel were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution
24 of this case. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31).

25 **5. Costs of Litigation are Reasonable**

26 Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of the litigation costs and expenses of \$21,288.08.
27 These costs were reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the results achieved are fair,
28 and reasonable. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31, Ex. C).

1 **B. THE SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE**

2 Class Counsel seeks approval of a \$5,000.00 Service Award to the named Plaintiff/Class
3 Representative. The requested Service Award is reasonable in light of the general release of all
4 claims Plaintiff agreed to, greater than the release given by Class Members, the benefits Plaintiff
5 conferred upon the entire Class resulting in payments to all Class Members, the time spent assisting
6 counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims and consenting to the proposed
7 Settlement. Furthermore, in pursuing this action on behalf of the Class, Plaintiff risked a judgment
8 for attorneys' fees and costs in the event this matter had been lost. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31; *See*
9 *also* declaration of Plaintiff McCann filed concurrently herewith)

10 Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to compensate named
11 Plaintiff for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class litigation. *See In re*
12 *Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393; *see also Bell v. Farmers*
13 *Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class
14 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n.971 (noting that service payments are warranted). Based on the
15 foregoing, the \$5,000.00 Service Award is fair, appropriate, and justified as part of the overall
16 settlement.

17 **C. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

18 The Parties agreed to hire Apex Class Action Administrators as the administrator, and the
19 Court approved this choice. Apex Class Action Administrators' total fees and costs for services in
20 connection with the administration of this Settlement, which includes fees and costs incurred to-
21 date, as well as anticipated fees and costs for completion of the settlement administration, are
22 \$3,450.00. Apex Class Action Administrators' work in connection with this matter will continue
23 with the calculation of the settlement award payments, issuance and mailing of the settlement
24 award checks, the necessary tax filing and reporting on such payments, and any other tasks that
25 the Parties mutually agree to and/or the Court orders Apex Class Action Administrators to perform.
26 (Shim Decl., ¶17). Following the grant of final approval, the Administrator's duties will continue
27 in order to calculate and mail the Individual Settlement Payment checks to Class Members,
28 Aggrieved Employees, perform tax reporting obligations, disburse other payments as ordered by

the Court, and perform such other duties as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The fee of \$3,450.00 for services rendered and to be rendered is fair and reasonable and should be granted.

D. THE SETTLEMENT PENALTIES UNDER PAGA ARE REASONABLE

The PAGA payment of \$30,000.00 with 75% of to the LWDA and 25% to the aggrieved employees is reasonable under the circumstances. The Parties negotiated a good faith amount for PAGA penalties. The PAGA penalties allocation is not the result of self-interest at the expense of other Class Members. The LWDA was also provided notice of the Settlement with the concurrent filing of the preliminary approval motion and the instant motion. Plaintiff did not receive a response or objection to the Settlement from the LWDA. Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court finally approve the PAGA allocation in the amount of \$30,000.00 with 75% being paid to the LWDA and 25% being distributed to the aggrieved employees.


VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court grant final approval of the Class Action Settlement, award (1) Class Counsels' fees in the sum of \$117,606.67 and litigation costs of \$21,288.08; (2) award the named Plaintiff an Service Award in the sum of \$5,000.00; (3) award \$3,450.00 to Apex Class Action Administrators, for settlement administration services, and (4) approve the PAGA Payment of \$30,000.00 with \$22,500.00 of that sum paid to the LWDA and the remaining \$7,500.00 paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

Dated: August 11, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

BY:



James Hawkins
Gregory Mauro
Michael Calvo
Lauren Falk
Ava Issary

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed
Class

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On August 12, 2025, I served on the interested parties in this action the following document(s) entitled:

DECLARATION OF JAMES HAWKINS IN SUPPORT OF PAGA AND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; JUDGMENT

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8
9 **Via LWDA Website Only**

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12 <http://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act>