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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE**

RAQUEL ESPINOZA, individually, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
State of California and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELALLO'S ITALIAN FOODS, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 21CV02640

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned to: Hon. Stephen E. Benson, Dept. 6]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: the Declarations of
Justin F. Marquez, Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza,
and Jeremy Talavera; and [Proposed] Order
Granting Motion]

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: April 24, 2024
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 6

Complaint filed: October 26, 2021
Trial date: Not set

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on April 24, 2024 at 9:00 a.m., in Department 6 of Butte
4 County Superior Court, located at 1775 Concord Ave., Chico, CA 95928, Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza
5 (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

- 6 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 7 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
8 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
9 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and
11 approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$7,500 to Plaintiff;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
13 purposes, and approving payment of \$91,666.67 in attorney’s fees, which is 33 1/3% of the
14 Gross Settlement Amount;
- 15 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$15,538.10 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 16 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement
17 Administrator in the amount of \$8,250; and
- 18 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 19 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the
20 parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or
21 enforcing the terms of the judgment.

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
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1 This motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
2 Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza, and Jeremy Talavera, and such oral
3 argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

4
5 Dated: April 2, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

6 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

7
8 By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov

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10 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Putative Class
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$275,000 non-reversionary, class and representative action settlement with Defendant DeLallo’s Italian Foods, Inc. (“Defendant”, and collectively with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 43 class members.¹ And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage-and-hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$2,810.08*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$4,158.58*. (Declaration of Jeremy Talavera on Behalf of CPT Group, Inc. [“Talavera Decl.”], ¶ 14.) As of filing this Motion, there are **no objections to the settlement** and **no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-13.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the motion for preliminary approval the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and putative

¹ In Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, Plaintiff indicated that there were approximately 47 class members at that time based on the initial information provided by Defendant at mediation. In the final class mailing list provided to the Settlement Administrator by Defendant, however, the list states that there are 43 class members in the class period. (Talavera Decl., ¶ 5.)

1 class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during
2 the class period. Defendant specializes in the import, production and distribution of Italian and
3 Mediterranean specialty foods with production facilities and distribution centers across the county.
4 (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
5 Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted
7 in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff
8 further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest
9 periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate
10 wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
11 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

12 On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff Raquel Espinoza filed a putative wage-and-hour class action
13 complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code
14 §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194, and 1198);
15 (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit
16 rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
17 (Labor Code § 226); (6) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203);
18 and (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.) (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On
19 December 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a separate action alleging a claim for civil penalties under Private
20 Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698 et seq.). (*Id.*) On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff
21 filed her First Amended Complaint in this Action adding her PAGA claim and dismissed the separate
22 PAGA action. (*Id.*).

23 Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development
24 Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code
25 §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on October 26, 2021. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

26 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

27 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
28 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class

members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement

On November 16, 2022, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator Mark LeHocky, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”). (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on January 10, 2024. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the

Settlement was March 29, 2024. (Talavera Decl., ¶10.) The reaction of the Class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement, and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-13.)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$275,000.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed by DeLallo’s Italian Foods in California and classified as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “means the period from October 26, 2017 to November 21, 2022.” (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: person employed by DeLallo’s Italian Foods in California and classified as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee who worked for DeLallo’s Italian Foods during the PAGA Period from October 26, 2020 to November 21, 2022. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.31.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$275,000.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, the Class Representative Service Award, and employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portions of the Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, §§ 1.22, 3.1.)

6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified, shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the

1 name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of
2 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, §§ 4.4.1, 4.4.3.)

3 7. Class Release: "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their
4 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors,
5 and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have
6 been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in
7 the course of the Action, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight
8 time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to
9 authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to
10 provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (7) violation of California's Unfair Competition
11 Law, California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Except as set forth in Section 6.3
12 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims
13 for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,
14 unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts
15 occurring outside the Class Period. (Settlement, § 6.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the
16 date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 6.)

17 8. PAGA Release: "All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved
18 Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
19 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties
20 from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based
21 on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the PAGA Notice and ascertained
22 in the course of the Action, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight
23 time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to
24 authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to pay all earned wages twice per month; (6) failure to
25 maintain accurate records of hours worked and meal periods; (7) failure to timely pay final wages at
26 termination; and (8) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements." (Settlement, § 6.2.)

27 9. No Reversion: "None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant."
28 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

10. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$25,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff's claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$18,750.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$6,250.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Final Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

11. Net Settlement Amount: The "Net Settlement Amount" is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) attorneys' fees and Litigation costs, (2) Administrative Costs, (3) enhancement to the Named Plaintiff, and (4) the penalties recoverable pursuant to the PAGA. (Settlement, § 1.27.)

12. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$6,250) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 33% wages, 67% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$7,500.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$91,666.67) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys'

fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Talavera Decl., Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the Settlement. (*Id.*, at ¶ 7.) The Settlement Administrator also undertook its best efforts to ensure that the Notice was provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing notices to updated addresses when needed. (*Id.*, at ¶¶ 8-9.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise

A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the

1 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower
2 than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement
3 because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives
4 ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

5 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
6 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her
7 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that
8 proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming,
9 and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some
10 of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and
11 would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

12 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
13 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
14 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
15 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
16 \$275,000 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is
17 appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit***
18 ***of approximately \$2,810.08, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately***
19 ***\$4,158.58.*** (Talavera Decl., ¶ 14.)

20 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal**
21 **and Informal Discovery**

22 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
23 employment mediator, Mark LeHocky, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
24 at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner. (*Id.*) The parties went into the
25 mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
26 prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached.
27 (*Id.*)

28 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the

claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶¶ 27-41.) Class Counsel has substantial experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion, trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

D. There Were No Objections to the Settlement.

No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Talavera Decl., ¶ 11-13.) The overwhelmingly positive response of

1 the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing*
2 *and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and
3 requests for exclusion support approval].)

4 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the
5 class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction
6 here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser
7 circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed]
9 the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in
10 the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over
11 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms
12 of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th
13 Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that
14 the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents
15 at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its
16 discretion in approving settlement].)

17 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNT OF**
18 **FEES, COSTS AND THE ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT.**

19 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
20 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$91,666.67, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross
21 Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this Action, and enhancement awards of
22 \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these
23 payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

24 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
25 calculating attorney’s fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
26 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480, the California
27 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage-and-hour class action
28 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court

1 explained:

2 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
3 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override***
4 ***the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the***
5 ***common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on***
6 ***the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar
7 cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider
whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed
multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to
make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally
weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a
reasonable percentage to apply.

8 (*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also* *Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017
9 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

10 **A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard**

11 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
12 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
13 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
14 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
15 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
16 Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to***
17 ***forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*See Id.*; *see also*,
18 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
19 cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

20 The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions.
21 Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a
22 fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show
23 that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class
24 actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the
25 prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with
26 awards in California. Accordingly, Plaintiff request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees
27 requested herein.

28 ///

B. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code.

Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in part:

[A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

(Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.)

As this litigation culminated in a settlement that provided for a recovery of unpaid wages, including unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee award under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorneys’ fees is proper under Section 1021.5 if ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.’” (*Press v. Lucky Stores* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317-318.) The fundamental objective of the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing public policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (*Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)

This action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as Plaintiff sought to enforce Settlement Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from Defendant’s failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (*See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1113 [noting that “health and safety concerns” are what motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest periods].)

This action also conferred a significant benefit on the class. Notice was sent to 43 Settlement Class Members, and no Settlement Class Member requested exclusion. (Talavera Decl., ¶ 13, 15.) The Settlement provides a significant monetary benefit, in that it permits all persons who worked for Defendant during the applicable class period to obtain compensation for unpaid wages and missed

meal and rest periods.

Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate. Without the incentive of an attorneys' fee award, Plaintiff could not have afforded to hire counsel to pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiff's potential recovery. (*See Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044 ["As to the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory transcends the claimants' personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiff's individual stake in the matter."].)

C. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award.

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class action matters. Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in dozens of class actions resulting in a multitude of beneficial results to class members in California. Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, a fee award of 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, a percentage considered within the norm in class action practice, is certainly justified here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards amounting to 33 1/3% of the recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. "It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be

monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$114,175 based on at least 176 hours of work performed thus far. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$91,666.67 is based on a **negative multiplier** of 0.8 and therefore is below typical multipliers that trial courts typically consider reasonable and fair. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate." (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

For example, Mr. Marquez' hourly rates were recently approved in *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721. There, the court held that "[a]s for the lodestar cross-check, the billing rates are normal and customary for timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the relevant market." (*Id.* at p. *3.)

2. The Lawsuit Provided a Public Benefit.

Class Counsel's choice to litigate this matter provided a public benefit to approximately 43 California employees. Moreover, the California Supreme Court stated that "Labor Code section 1194 confirms "a clear public policy ... that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California's minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of workers." [citation omitted]." (*Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.) Given the financial risks and numerous attorney hours attendant to the litigation of Plaintiff's claims, this factor supports Class Counsel's fee request and encourages the private enforcement of legal rights for the general good.

3. Class Counsel's Requested Fees are Derived Using a Negative Multiplier.

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other "enhancement" factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a negative multiplier of 0.8 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff's request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Multiplying the total hours billed by Class Counsel to the litigation by their reasonable hourly rates yields a lodestar of \$114,175, which is more than the \$91,666.67 in attorney's fees Class Counsel are requesting. This disparity is important to note because when plaintiffs seek an amount in fees that is less than what they actually billed, the requested fee amount is generally considered reasonable. (*Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 [finding that, if the court is asked to apply a negative multiplier, it "suggests the negotiated fee award is a reasonable and fair valuation of the services rendered to the class

by Plaintiff’s Counsel.”].) Indeed, there is no reason for the Court to reduce Class Counsel’s lodestar with a negative multiplier. (*Roos v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1495 [“a trial court acts appropriately . . . when it accepts in a common-fund case a cap on fees . . . when the application of the cap results in a lower award than would be authorized under the lodestar method.”], disapproved on another ground in *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.)

Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

“Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable”].) The intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally

1 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
2 the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature of
3 the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
4 and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.
5 3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the lines of those approved
6 in the cases above.

7 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
8 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
9 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the amount
10 that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and uncertainty about
11 how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133, 1138.) Here, Class
12 Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter and have borne the
13 entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's outlay of time and
14 money in this case has been significant.

15 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had
16 success in wage-and-hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers and
17 expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the risk of prevailing
18 at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery completely.
19 Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this case because of the
20 difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. Despite these risks, Class
21 Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so many cases that Class Counsel
22 can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to Class
23 Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this
24 action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 24.)
25 Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights
26 and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for
27 the Class.

28 ///

1 **E. Costs Are Reasonable.**

2 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$15,238.10 in costs,
3 and they anticipate incurring at least \$300 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court
4 enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 26.)
5 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$15,538.10 in costs.
6 Notably, Defendant has agreed that it will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00. The
7 categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Justin Marquez, and these costs
8 are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

9 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying
10 client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for
11 defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger
12 service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.)
13 Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San*
14 *Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D.
15 Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as
16 reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer
17 legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual
18 equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

19 **F. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.**

20 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
21 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members
22 of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class
23 action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are
24 necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class
25 representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009)
26 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against
27 employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation
28 statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.)

1 Plaintiff should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class
2 members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a
4 Service Award in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s
5 general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating
6 her devotion to this case, including her efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with
7 counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents.
8 (*See, generally* Declaration of Raquel Espinoza in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval
9 of Class Action Settlement.)

10 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested
11 here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given
12 to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative
13 was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg &
14 Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L.
15 Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).)

16 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be
17 necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC* (2009)
18 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named
19 plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring
20 a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at 806.) “An incentive award is appropriate ‘if it is
21 necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’” (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186
22 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1394, quoting *Clark, supra*, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 804.) The “criteria courts may
23 consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class
24 representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal
25 difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the
26 class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof)
27 enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.)

28 Here, Plaintiff has the right to move the Court for incentive awards of up to \$7,500.00 in light

1 of her risk in pursuing this case, time and effort devoted to this case, and the benefit received for the
2 other class members.

3 **G. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

4 CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$8,250.00
5 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Talavera Decl., ¶ 16.) These expenses
6 are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member
7 payment processing.


8 **V. CONCLUSION**

9 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
10 of the proposed settlement.
11

12 Dated: April 2, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

13 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

14
15 By: 

16 Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov

17 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Espinoza v. Delallo's Italian Foods, Inc., et al.
21CV02640

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is rpadilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On April 2, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Julie A. Marquis
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Liam Gaarder-Feingold
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Stephanie Pinkham
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Attorneys for Defendant

- (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- (X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 2, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.



Rebecca Padilla