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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE**

DANIEL HAYES, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, AUDREY
MIGLIACCIO, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, COURTNEY
MELVIN, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GONZALES PARK, a California corporation,
PROJECT FUSION, LLC, a Delaware
corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

COURTNEY MELVIN, on behalf of the State of
California and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiff,

v.

GONZALES PARK, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company; PROJECT FUSION, LLC, a
Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants

Case No.: 21CV02456
Consolidated With Case No.: 22CV01119

**CONSOLIDATED CLASS AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION**

[Assigned to: Hon. Tamara L. Mosbarger,
Department 1]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Justin F. Marquez; [Proposed] Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: November 8, 2023
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 1

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 8, 2023 at 9:00 a.m., in Department 1 of the
3 Butte County Court, 1775 Concord Avenue, Chico, California 95928, , pursuant to California Code
4 of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Daniel Hayes,
5 Audrey Migliaccio, and Courtney Melvin (“Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move the Court for an
6 Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and
7 Defendants Gonzalez Park, LLC and Project Fusion, LLC. Plaintiffs further move the Court for
8 an Order:


- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
10 and Class Notice;
11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
13 4. Appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, and Daniel J.
15 Kramer of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
16 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc., as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities, the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez, , filed concurrently herewith, the records and
20 files in this Action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive
21 at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: October 19, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24 By: 
25 Justin F. Marquez
26 Benjamin H. Haber
27 Daniel J. Kramer

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Daniel Hayes, Audrey Migliaccio, and Courtney Melvin (“Plaintiffs”) seek
4 preliminary approval of a proposed \$637,500 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action
5 settlement with Defendants Gonzalez Park, LLC and Projection Fusion, LLC (collectively,
6 “Gonzales Park” or “Defendants,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). The proposed
7 Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 657 class members and, as
8 set forth more fully below, satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The
9 Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations
10 were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Brandon
11 McKelvey, Esq., over the course of a full-day mediation. After extensive negotiations and
12 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses,
13 Mr. McKelvey issued a mediator’s proposal, which the Parties ultimately accepted. Accordingly,
14 Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed
15 settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

16 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

17 **A. Plaintiffs’ Claims**

18 This is a consolidated wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”)
19 (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and the putative class members
20 worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class
21 period. Defendants own and manage a clothing company in Butte County that produces, *inter*
22 *alia*, private label apparel for companies throughout the United States. (Declaration of Justin
23 F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
24 Settlement (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

25 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
26 resulted in numerous Labor Code violations. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
27 failed to, *inter alia*, pay for all hours worked, provide employees with legally compliant meal
28 and rest periods, indemnify employees for all necessary business expenses, and provide timely

wages. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

On September 30, 2021, Plaintiff Hayes filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses; and (8) unfair business practices. (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff Hayes then amended his complaint on January 12, 2022 to add additional class representatives, Plaintiff Melvin and Plaintiff Migliaccio. (*Id.*)

On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff Hayes sent a notice to Defendants and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 5, **Ex. 1** [Plaintiff Hayes’ First Notice of Labor Code Violations and PAGA Penalties].) On March 15, 2022, Plaintiffs sent a subsequent joint notice to Defendants and the California LWDA alleging similar violations pursuant to the PAGA. Plaintiffs also paid the \$75.00 filing fee on the same day. (*Id.* at ¶ 6, **Ex. 2** [Plaintiffs’ Second Notice of Labor Code Violations and PAGA Penalties].) On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff Melvin filed a separate action pursuant to the PAGA for civil penalties. (*Id.*)

On February 22, 2023, the two actions described above were consolidated, with Case Number 21CV02456 being designated as the lead case. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs provided conformed copies of both actions to the LWDA. (*Id.*)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) Defendants produced a sample of

1 timekeeping and pay records for the class members. (*Id.*) Defendants also provided documents
2 of their wage and hour policies and practices during the class period and information regarding
3 the total number of current and former employees in their informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)
4 In total, Defendants produced policy documents and corresponding time/wage records for
5 approximately 160,000 shifts worked by employees during the class period. (*Id.*)

6 After reviewing the documents regarding Defendants' wage and hour policies and
7 practices, analyzing Defendants' timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class
8 Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on
9 the merits, and Defendants' maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) Class
10 Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
11 litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to
12 mediation. (*Id.*)

13 C. Settlement Negotiations

14 On December 7, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced
15 class action litigator and mediator Brandon McKelvey, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) The mediation was
16 conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted
17 in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing
18 to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate
19 their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
20 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and
21 Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached a settlement following the issuance of a mediator's
22 proposal, the material terms of which were subsequently incorporated in the Parties' proposed
23 Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 11, **Ex. 3** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
24 Class Notice].)

25 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
26 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
27 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
28 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk

of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 17.)

Indeed, the \$637,500 Settlement represents **58% of the realistic maximum recovery** of \$1,108,267.24. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants’ maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$7.5 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants’ realistic exposure was \$1,108,267.24, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-30.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties used the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12.) The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: all individuals employed by Defendants in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the Class Period. (Settlement, §§ 1.5, 1.12.)

2. Class Period: “means the period from September 30, 2017 to February 14, 2023.” (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Non-Participating Class Members: “means any Class Member who opts out of the Settlement by sending the Administrator a valid and timely Request for Exclusion.” (Settlement, § 1.29.)

5. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by any of the Defendants in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendants

1 during the PAGA Period of October 1, 2020 to February 14, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.30, and
2 1.31.) Every class member is not also an Aggrieved Employee.

3 6. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$637,500 and will be used to pay
4 Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class
5 Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Award, and the
6 Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.) Defendants shall fully fund the Gross Settlement
7 Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Defendants' share of payroll taxes by
8 transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later than 30 days after the Effective Date. (*Id.* at
9 § 4.3.)

10 7. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check
11 or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date (not less than
12 180 days after the date of mailing), the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such
13 checks to the Parties' designated *cy pres* recipient, Koinonia Family Services, subject to the
14 requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure § 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, §§ 4.4.1, 4.4.3.)

15 8. Release by Participating Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on
16 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
17 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were
18 alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative
19 Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action during the Class Period, including but not
20 limited to any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure
21 to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
22 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
23 wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses; and (8) violation of
24 California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*
25 Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release
26 any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair
27 Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers'
28 compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.)

1 This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendants fully fund the entire Gross
2 Settlement Amount and fund all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the
3 Individual Class Payments. (*Id.* at § 5.)

4 9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “All Non-Participating Class Members who are
5 Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former
6 and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the
7 Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have
8 been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Consolidated Action, and the PAGA
9 Notice and ascertained in the course of the Action, including any and all claims for: (1) failure to
10 pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide
11 meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages
12 at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (7) failure to
13 indemnify necessary business expenses.” (Settlement, § 5.3.)

14 10. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Gonzales
15 Park.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

16 11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000 allocated to Plaintiffs’ claims
17 under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$15,000) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$5,000) being paid
18 to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed
19 settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶
20 13.)

21 12. Net Settlement Fund/Amount: “Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
22 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
23 Payment, the Class Representatives’ Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class
24 Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder
25 is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.28.)

26 13. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment [will be] calculated by (a)
27 dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating
28 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class

Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$5,000) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods. Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

14. Tax Allocation: "25% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the 'Wage Portion'). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The 75% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for all other forms of recovery [e.g., interest and penalties] (the 'Non-Wage Portion')." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.) Defendants will pay their employer-side payroll taxes in addition to and separate from the Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement, §§ 3.1, 5.)

15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs shall each be paid a service award not to exceed \$10,000.00, for a combined total of \$30,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiffs' time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1542. (*Id.* at § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendants will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$212,500) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval: The Notice sets forth, in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) ILYM

Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 14, **Ex. 4** [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
4 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
6 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
7 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
8 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
10 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
11 to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
13 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Brandan McKelvey, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶
14 10.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
15 manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
16 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position
17 through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations
18 and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’
19 defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 11.)

20 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
21 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
22 records, Defendants’ policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
23 meal and rest breaks, and the issuance of wage statements, as well as information regarding the
24 number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees and the amount
25 of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 8-9.) In conjunction with
26 their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the
27 claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to
28 act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

1 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
2 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 41-51.) Again, this supports the position that the
3 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
4 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
5 action.

6 2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' 7 Respective Legal Positions

8 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
9 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
10 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
11 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
12 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
13 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
14 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

15 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
16 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 28.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
17 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving
18 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
19 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

20 The proposed settlement of \$637,500 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
21 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 17-30.) Because of the proposed
22 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
23 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
24 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
25 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$637,500 is within the
26 “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
27 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
28 ***\$525.11.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 29.)

1 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

2 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
3 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
4 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-
5 51.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
6 litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

7 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

8 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
9 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
10 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
11 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
12 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
13 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

14 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

15 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendants agree to pay Class
16 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$212,500, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross
17 Settlement Amount, and up to \$20,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
18 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

19 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"**
20 **Method**

21 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
22 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
23 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
24 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
25 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
26 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

27 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
28 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all

1 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent*,
2 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
3 Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
4 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
5 the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
6 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
7 has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in
8 which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

9 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
10 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
11 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
12 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
13 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
14 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
15 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
16 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
17 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
18 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

19 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

20 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
21 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
22 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
23 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
24 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
25 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
26 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
27 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
28 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10

million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys' fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature, and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-40.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Supports the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-51.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

1 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
2 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement.
3 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
4 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
5 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
6 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
7 is reasonable and fair.

8 **D. The Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

9 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
10 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
11 members of the class." (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
12 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
13 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
14 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
15 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

16 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
17 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
18 codified in California Labor Code Section 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of this state to
19 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
20 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions...."). Nonetheless, the California
21 Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
22 the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
23 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
24 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
25 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

26 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendants agreed to pay
27 service awards in the amount of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff, for a combined total of \$30,000.00.
28 This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs' general release of all claims against Defendants.

1 Class Counsel represent that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in
2 the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation,
3 and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 31-
4 35.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated
5 for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*,
6 No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million
7 class action settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class
8 representative incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 35.)

9 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
10 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
11 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
12 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
13 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
14 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment
15 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
16 while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121
17 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards
18 in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
19 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
20 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

21 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

22 **A. Legal Standard**

23 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
24 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
25 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
26 prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382
27 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
28 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more

1 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
2 Section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
3 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
4 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [internal citations omitted].) To
5 clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil
6 Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors:
7 “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical
8 of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v.*
9 *Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

10 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
11 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
12 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
13 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
14 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
15 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

16 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
17 **Settlement Purposes.**

18 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

19 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
20 approximately 657 employees of Defendants.

21 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
22 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
23 records of Defendants, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
24 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
25 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

26 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
27 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
28 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action

1 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
2 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
3 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
4 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
5 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
6 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

7 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

8 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
9 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
10 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
11 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
12 605.)

13 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant
14 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally
15 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting their employees to take rest periods;
16 whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
17 overtime wages; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages,
18 including meal and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were
19 consequently non-compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for
20 all of the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from,
21 and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
24 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
25 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
26 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
27 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
28 situated” vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they

1 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
2 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are a former employee of Defendants; as
3 such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
4 employees.

5 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

6 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
7 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
8 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

10 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
11 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
12 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-51.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
13 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
14 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
15 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
16 Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as representatives demonstrate their serious commitment to
17 bringing about the best results possible for the class and subclass. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d
18 at p. 451.)

19 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

20 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
21 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
22 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the
23 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
24 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
25 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
26 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
27 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 443, 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.*
28 (*9th Cir.* 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns

are essentially non-existent.

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendants, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

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
1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in March 2024 or the soonest
4 available date thereafter.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 Dated: October 19, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

7
8 By:  _____

9 Justin F. Marquez
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Hayes, et al. v. Gonzales Park, LLC, et al.
21CV02456

I, Min Jee Kim, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is minjee@wilshirelawfirm.com.

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(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

Executed on **October 19, 2023** at Los Angeles, California.


Min Jee Kim