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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

BERNADINE SMALLEY, as a private attorney
general,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, a California
employer; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 21STCV43898

[Hon. Holly J. Fujie, Department 56]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT**

*[Filed concurrently with Declaration of Larry W.
Lee; Declaration of Simon L. Yang; Declaration
of Bernadine Smalley; [Proposed] Order]*

Date: October 24, 2024
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Courtroom: 56

Reservation ID: 447233439289

Complaint Filed: December 2, 2021
FAC Filed: January 28, 2022

1 **TO THE COURT, DEFENDANT, AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD:**


2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on October 24, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard in Courtroom 56 of the above-entitled court located at 111 North Hill Street, Los
4 Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff, Bernadine Smalley, will and hereby does move for an Order
5 approving the Joint Stipulation of PAGA Settlement (the “Agreement”) entered into between Plaintiff
6 and Defendant, Brighton Collectibles.¹

7 The motion is made pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(1)(2), which requires a court to “review
8 and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to [the Labor Code Private Attorneys
9 General Act of 2004, Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”)].” Lab. Code § 2699(1)(2). The motion is
10 made on the grounds that the Agreement and the Parties’ settlement are fundamentally fair, adequate,
11 and reasonable in light of PAGA’s policies and in furtherance of PAGA’s purposes. As set forth in the
12 concurrently filed declaration of Simon L. Yang, a copy of the Agreement and the motion have been
13 electronically submitted to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency in accordance with Labor
14 Code sections 2699(1)(2) and 2699(1)(4).

15 The motion is based on this notice, the memorandum of points and authorities, the Agreement,
16 the supporting Declarations of Larry W. Lee, Simon L. Yang, and Bernadine Smalley, all pleadings and
17 papers on file herein, and any further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented before or at
18 the hearing of this matter.

19 DATED: August 12, 2024

DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.

20 By: 
21 Larry W. Lee
22 Simon L. Yang
23 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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28 ¹ The Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 to the concurrently filed Declaration of Simon L. Yang.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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SUMMARY OF MOTION

As a proxy for the State of California pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”), Plaintiff, Bernadine Smalley, sues Defendant, Brighton Collectibles, for alleged failures to pay or timely pay all overtime wages at the regular rate of pay, to provide lawful meal periods, and to provide accurate itemized wage statements.

Through the litigation, Plaintiff discovered that the alleged Labor Code violations affected approximately 407 employees in about 12,141 relevant pay periods from November 22, 2020, through April 6, 2024. Plaintiff then negotiated and obtained an excellent result for the State that requires Defendant to pay \$180,000.00 for the resolution of the alleged PAGA claims—or approximately \$14.83 for each of the relevant pay periods at issue. Significantly, the entire settlement amount is non-reversionary; none of the settlement amount will revert back to Defendant. The terms of the settlement are memorialized in the Joint Stipulation of PAGA Settlement (“Agreement”), which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the concurrently filed Declaration of Simon L. Yang.

Under PAGA, the Court must review and approve the proposed settlement. Lab. Code § 2699(1)(2). Plaintiff thus moves for approval of the Agreement:

- The Agreement provides for an award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in the amount of 33⅓% of the \$180,000.00 Settlement Amount, or \$60,000.00, in fees, plus up to \$15,000.00 in costs (though Plaintiff now seeks reimbursement of \$11,617.16 in costs only).
- It also provides for a \$10,000.00 General Release Payment to Plaintiff (i) as consideration for her additional general release of claims and waiver of Civil Code section 1542 and (ii) in recognition of her efforts and work in prosecuting the lawsuit on behalf of the State.
- It also provides for \$5,000.00 in Administration Costs to a settlement administrator for effectuating the payments contemplated by the Agreement.
- Finally, it provides for all remaining funds to constitute a PAGA Penalty Fund, 75% of which would be distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and 25% of which would be distributed to allegedly aggrieved employees.

The terms of the Agreement are fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. In light of PAGA’s policies and in furtherance of PAGA’s purposes, the Court should approve the settlement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed the original putative class action complaint in this matter. Declaration of Simon L. Yang (“Yang Decl.”) ¶ 2. On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint to also allege a representative action under PAGA. *Id.* The operative complaint alleges Defendant fails to pay overtime at the regular rate of pay, fails to provide meal periods, fails to pay meal period premiums at the regular rate of pay, fails to timely pay wages, and fails to provide accurate itemized wage statements. *Id.*

On April 25, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims and individual PAGA claims and to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims and non-individual PAGA claims. Yang Decl. ¶ 3. On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to compel arbitration that voluntarily agreed to dismiss Plaintiff’s individual claims and class claims but opposed arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims and dismissal of Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims. *Id.* On May 17, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, and on May 20, 2023, the Court issued a ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s individual and class claims and denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. *Id.*

On June 1, 2022, Defendant filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s orders (i) denying the motion to compel arbitration of individual PAGA claims and (ii) not dismissing nonindividual PAGA claims. Yang Decl. ¶ 4. On October 11, 2023, the Parties filed a stipulated request for dismissal in the Court of Appeal, and also stipulated to arbitrate Plaintiff’s individual claims. *Id.*

The Parties met and conferred about Plaintiff’s allegations and claims as well as Defendant’s defenses. Yang Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff also requested (and Defendant provided) additional informal discovery to enable the Parties to explore the possibility of an informal resolution. *Id.* Defendant’s willingness to produce this information enabled Plaintiff to evaluate the full scope of Defendant’s potential liability. *Id.*

On May 17, 2024, the Parties attended a mediation with Steven G. Pearl, an experienced mediator knowledgeable of both the wage and hour laws and PAGA claims at issue in the Action. Yang Decl. ¶ 6. With the mediator’s assistance and based on a mediator’s proposal, the Parties were able to agree to settlement terms, which were negotiated in light of all known facts and circumstances including

1 the uncertainty associated with litigation, the risks of significant delay, and numerous potential appellate
2 issues. *Id.* The settlement terms are memorialized in the Joint Stipulation of PAGA Settlement. *Id.* Ex. 1
3 (the “Agreement”).

4 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

5 I. Settlement Payments

6 The Agreement requires Defendant to pay a non-reversionary Settlement Amount of
7 \$180,000.00. Agreement § 3.1. From the Settlement Amount, the Parties will request that the Court
8 approve a PAGA Penalty Fund, Administration Costs, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Award, and General
9 Release Payment. *Id.* § 3.1.1-4. It is expected that the LWDA will receive \$70,037.13 as its share of
10 PAGA Penalties and that employees will receive \$23,345.71 as their share of PAGA Penalties. Yang
11 Decl. ¶ 12.

12 II. Settlement Releases

13 Plaintiff is subject to a general release. Agreement § 5.2. The State releases “any and all claims
14 for civil penalties under [PAGA] predicated on the California Labor Code violations that are asserted in
15 the LWDA Notice and operative complaint (or PAGA claims that could have been asserted based on the
16 alleged Labor Code violations as well as the facts alleged in the operative LWDA Notice and complaint)
17 which are for civil penalties pursuant to [PAGA] for violations of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203,
18 204, 210, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 1194, and 1198 during the PAGA Period [i.e., from November 22,
19 2020, through April 6, 2024].” *Id.* § 5.1.

20 LEGAL STANDARD

21 PAGA requires courts to “review and approve” the settlement of any action filed under PAGA.
22 Lab. Code §2699(l)(2). The California Supreme Court has explained that a court’s review of a PAGA
23 settlement is to ensure “that any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected.” *Williams v. Superior*
24 *Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 549 (2017). But “PAGA does not establish a standard for evaluating PAGA
25 settlements.” *Griffin v. Consolidated Commc’ns*, 2023 WL 3853643, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2023)
26 (quoting *Smith v. H.F.D. No. 55, Inc.*, 2018 WL 1899912, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2018)). Indeed, the
27 Legislature, California Supreme Court, California Courts of Appeal, and LWDA have not definitively
28 established the standards for review. *E.g., Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp.*, 383 F. Supp. 3d 959,

1 971 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting the absence of a “definitive” guidance for approval of a PAGA settlement).
2 The LWDA acknowledges the lack of a “specific benchmark” and has stated only that the relief
3 provided under PAGA must be “genuine and meaningful,” “consistent with the underlying purpose of
4 the statute to benefit the public” and, in the context of a class action, “meet[] the standards of being
5 ‘fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate’ with reference to the public policies underlying the
6 PAGA.” See *O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting
7 California Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s Comments on Proposed PAGA Settlement).

8 Federal district courts have typically followed the LWDA’s limited guidance by requiring
9 settlements to be “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of PAGA’s policies and
10 purposes.” See *Haralson*, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 972 (collecting cases). When applying this test, federal
11 district courts often consider factors such as strength of a Plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity,
12 and likely duration of further litigation; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
13 completed; and the expertise and views of counsel. See *Smith*, 2018 WL 1899912, at *3. Federal district
14 courts have also been mindful of the fact that trial courts have broad discretion to award civil penalties
15 in amounts that are less than the maximum amounts authorized by PAGA. *Id.* at *3; see also Lab. Code
16 § 2699(e)(2).²

17 “Given PAGA’s purpose to protect the public interest, [authoritative California courts] also
18 agree with the LWDA and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA
19 settlement to ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA’s purposes and policies.” *Moniz v.*
20 *Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56, 77 (2021).

21
22
23 ² A party asserting a PAGA claim is not required to meet the requirements of a class action. *Arias v.*
24 *Superior Court*, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 984 (2009). Due process concerns with respect to absent class members
25 are not present in a PAGA action. *Williams*, 3 Cal. 5th at 547 n.4. Unnamed employees need not be
26 given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA
27 claim. E.g., *Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp.*, 747 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that
28 unnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim or settlement approval) (citing *Ochoa-
Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 WL 1340777, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010)). “The court does
not have to approve the named PAGA plaintiff, nor does the court inquire into the adequacy of counsel’s
ability to represent the unnamed employees.” *Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 WL 1340777, at *4. “[T]he
purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for the government that
otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state enforcement agencies.” *Id.*

DISCUSSION

I. The Settlement Complies with Statutory Requirements.

PAGA states that any “proposed settlement shall be submitted to the agency at the same time that it is submitted to the court.” Lab. Code. § 2699(1)(2). In satisfaction of that requirement, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Agreement and this motion to the LWDA through the LWDA’s online filing system in conjunction with filing this motion. Yang Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. 4.

II. The Settlement Should Be Approved as Fair in Light of PAGA’s Purposes and Policies.

A. The Settlement Is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness.

In the class action context, a trial court must determine and approve a class action settlement is fair to “prevent fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class” through settlement and dismissal of the class action.” *Consumer Advocacy Grp., Inc. v. Kintetsu Enters. Of America*, 141 Cal. App. 4th 46, 60 (2006). Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of settlement unless there is evidence to the contrary. *Priddy v. Edelman*, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989); *Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.*, 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1987); *In re Chicken Antitrust Litig.*, 560 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

While the recommendations of counsel proposing the settlement are not conclusive, the Court can properly take them into account, particularly where, as here, they have been involved in thorough investigation, are experienced with this type of litigation, and agreed to a resolution through arm’s length negotiation. *See* 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* § 11.47 (4th ed. 2002); *National Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. at 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“So long as the integrity of the arm’s length negotiation process is preserved, however, a strong initial presumption of fairness attaches to the proposed settlement ... and ‘great weight’ is accorded to the recommendations of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”) (citations omitted). In such circumstances, as here, courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the proponents. *National Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 528; *accord Hammon v. Barry*, 752 F. Supp. 1087 (D.D.C. 1990); *Steinberg v. Carey*, 470 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); *In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.*, 472 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979); *Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 79 F.R.D. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

1 The factors that would give rise to a presumption of fairness in the context of a class action
2 settlement are present in this PAGA action. Here, both Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel have
3 a great deal of experience in wage and hour and PAGA litigation. Plaintiff’s counsel have extensive
4 class action and PAGA litigation experience and have been approved as class counsel in numerous wage
5 and hour class actions. Declaration of Larry W. Lee (“Lee Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-5; Yang Decl. ¶¶ 13-16. Each
6 side has apprised the other of their respective factual contentions and legal theories, and each side has
7 considered the other’s contentions and theories. Defendant provided the relevant numbers of pay periods
8 in which alleged overtime underpayments occurred and in which meal period entitlements arose, among
9 other things—enabling Plaintiff to assess the full value of the PAGA claims and further enabling
10 negotiations to take place between the Parties. Yang Decl. ¶ 5. As the settlement is the result of
11 extensive arm’s length negotiations between the Parties and their counsel, it is entitled to a presumption
12 of fairness. *Id.* ¶ 10.

13 **B. The Settlement Obtains an Excellent Result for the State.**

14 **1. The Settlement Amount Is Reasonable.**

15 Plaintiff contended that Defendant’s alleged Labor Code violations resulted in a \$100 per pay
16 period penalty for each of approximately 12,141 relevant pay periods that Plaintiff contended had either
17 underpayments of overtime wages or meal period violations. Yang Decl. ¶ 7; Lab. Code § 2699(f).³ The
18 Agreement requires Defendant to pay \$180,000.00—or approximately \$14.83 per pay period for the
19 12,141 relevant pay periods in which Plaintiff contended Labor Code violations occurred. *Id.*

20 Defendant contested the merits and denied it was liable at all. Yang Decl. ¶ 8. For example,
21 Defendant contended that there were no underpayments of overtime and no meal period violations at all.
22 *Id.* Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevailed on the merits, Defendant contested the extent of liability. *Id.*
23 Specifically, Defendant contended that PAGA penalties would be subject to discretionary reductions. *Id.*

24 While the Parties disagree on the application of the law to the facts, each Party recognized in
25 negotiations that, if taken to trial, the other Party would at least have reasonable arguments, such that the
26 Settlement Amount to which the Parties ultimately agreed was reasonable. Yang Decl. ¶ 9. Ultimately,
27 based on a review of Defendant’s records, Plaintiff argued that the potential total recovery amounted to
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³ Except as otherwise noted, all “Section” references are to the Labor Code.

1 \$1,214,100.00—or \$100 for each of approximately 12,141 relevant pay periods that Plaintiff contended
2 had Labor Code violations. *Id.* ¶ 7. Plaintiff contends that the Settlement Amount of \$180,000.00—
3 approximately 14.83% of that potential recovery—is an excellent result. *Id.*

4 Although Plaintiff and her counsel are confident that litigation of the claims would result in a
5 judgment against Defendant, they recognize the inherent risks in litigation, including the specific risks
6 that the applicable law could change, that liability could not be established at trial, or that penalties
7 awarded after trial would be reduced. Yang Decl. ¶ 10. The settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,
8 given the inherent risks of litigation, as well as the potential for appeals and the costs of pursuing
9 litigation. *Id.*

10 **2. The Settlement Releases Are Appropriate.**

11 As discussed above, only Plaintiff is subject to a general release. Agreement § 5.2. The State
12 releases any PAGA claims from November 22, 2020, through April 6, 2024, that are based on the Labor
13 Code violations pled in the Action. *Id.* § 5.1. Plaintiff alleged targeted claims in the Action, and any
14 settlement releases also are specifically tailored to the targeted claims alleged. The settlement releases
15 are thus appropriate. *E.g., Carter v. City of Los Angeles*, 224 Cal. App. 4th 808, 820 (2014) (“A general
16 release—covering ‘all claims’ that were or could have been raised in the suit—is common in class action
17 settlements.”).

18 **C. The Requested Payments and Allocations Are Reasonable.**

19 The Agreement provides for a Settlement Amount of \$180,000.00. Agreement § 3.1. From the
20 Settlement Amount, attorneys’ fees will be no more than 33⅓% of the Settlement Amount (or
21 \$60,000.00) and litigation costs of up to \$15,000.00 are permitted—though Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks
22 reimbursement of \$11,617.16 in costs only. *Id.* § 3.1.1; Yang Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Ex. 2. The requested
23 General Release Payment is \$10,000.00. Agreement § 3.1.2. The requested Administration Costs are
24 \$5,000.00. Agreement § 3.1.3. The PAGA Penalty Fund thus will be \$93,382.84, and pursuant to statute,
25 75% of the PAGA Penalty Fund (or \$70,037.13) would constitute the LWDA Payment, and 25% of the
26 PAGA Penalty Fund (or \$23,345.71) would be payable to Aggrieved Employees based on the number of
27 relevant pay periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee. *Id.* § 3.1.4; *see also* Yang Decl. ¶ 12.⁴

28 ⁴ Plaintiff files this motion with the Court and with the LWDA via online submission. Yang Decl. ¶ 20.

1 **1. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award Is Reasonable.**

2 Plaintiff requests an attorneys' fees award of 33⅓% of the Settlement Amount. Agreement §
3 3.1.1. Further, the Parties have agreed to reimbursement of Plaintiff's Counsel's litigation costs.
4 Plaintiff's Counsel have incurred costs at their own risk, for example, for filing the lawsuit, service of
5 process, mediation fees, and payment of other litigation related costs.

6 **a. The percentage of the fund method supports the requested fees.**

7 PAGA allows a prevailing Plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. Lab. Code § 2699(g).
8 As discussed below, the requested attorneys' fees of \$60,000.00 are reasonable in light of the standards
9 established in the class action context. There, California state and federal courts have recognized that an
10 appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage of the total value
11 of benefits to settlement beneficiaries. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254
12 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478
13 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997).

14 Indeed, under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common fund wage and hour class
15 action settlements should start with the percentage method. *See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th
16 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when
17 class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial
18 court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the
19 amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created"). Under the
20 percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the market" in fixing a reasonable
21 fee. *See Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) ("When a fee is set by a court
22 rather than by contract, the object is to set it at a level that will approximate what the market will set ...
23 The judge, in other words, is trying to mimic the market in legal services.").

24 The requested attorneys' fees of \$60,000.00 should be awarded for several reasons:

25 First, the fee award representing 33⅓% of the fund clearly falls within the accepted range and is
26 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of fee awards. Attorneys' fees
27 awards of 35% of the fund are within the expected range in the "market in legal services." *See*
28 *Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*, 7 J. Empirical Leg.

Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that “[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent”); *see also Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66 n.11 (2008) (“[E]mpirical studies [that] show that ... fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”).⁵

Second, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. As observed in *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*:

No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who had agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases producing large recoveries, is it just to make a fee depend solely on the reasonable amount of time expended.

495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974). Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of \$180,000.00 has been created. For Plaintiff’s Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case—as a pending Supreme Court decision (and subsequent California Supreme Court decision) had the potential to eliminate the possibility of any recovery on the PAGA claims. Yang Decl. ¶ 4. Nonetheless, despite the possibility of recovering nothing on the PAGA claims, Plaintiff’s Counsel did not accept a too heavily discounted settlement. Instead, Plaintiff’s Counsel continued litigating the claims to obtain an excellent result for the State.

b. The lodestar cross-check supports the requested fees.

The amount requested is reasonable for an additional reason. While the primary method employed to determine fees is the percentage method, courts have discretion to use the lodestar method to “cross-check” the amount of fees calculated by way of percentage. The *Laffitte* court emphasized, however, that “the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund and thus does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award.” *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 505 (emphasis added); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Secs. Litig.*, 396 F.3d 294, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lodestar cross-check does not trump the primary reliance on the percentage of common fund method”).

⁵ Such a fee award mimics the market and “is supported by the fact that typical contingency fee agreements provide that class counsel will recover 33% if the case is resolved before trial and 40% if the case is tried.” *Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores LLC*, 2008 WL 8150856, at *16 n.59 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (citing Brickman, *Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees* (Fall 2003) 81 Wash U. L. Q. 653, 659 n. 11).

1 Courts find reasonable multipliers in a lodestar cross-check can “range from 2 to 4 or even
2 higher.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001).⁶ Indeed, the intermediate
3 court in *Laffitte*—after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check—
4 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. *Laffitte*, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 881-82.⁷ Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has cited
5 with approval a comprehensive study of fees awarded by the percentage method showing that the
6 majority of multipliers awarded are “in the 1.5-3.0” range. *See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d
7 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a multiplier of 3.65 in an employment class action case and
8 analyzing the multiplier awarded in over 30 cases).⁸

9 With respect to Plaintiff’s Counsel’s lodestar, at least 94.3 hours have been expended by just one
10 of Plaintiff’s Counsel litigating this case. Yang Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 3. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Counsel expects
11 to incur approximately 5.0 hours of anticipated time spent to attend the settlement approval hearing,
12 secure approval, and respond to post-approval phone calls and correspondence from the Administrator
13 and defense counsel to effectuate the terms of the settlement. *Id.* Courts are quite liberal in the evidence
14 required to prove an attorney’s hours; an attorney’s testimony alone may suffice. *Martino v. Denevi*, 182
15 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559 (1986) (“Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a
16 particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed
17 time records.”).

18 Reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the time spent before the
19 action is filed, including time spent interviewing the clients, investigating the facts and the law, and
20 preparing the initial pleadings. *New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey*, 447 U.S. 54, 62 (1980). The fee
21

22 ⁶ *Accord Chavez*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 60 (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check); *Sutter*
23 *Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a
cross-check); *City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders*, 203 Cal. App. 3d 78 (1988) (affirming a 2.34
multiplier without remand).

24 ⁷ The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full upon review by the California Supreme Court.

25 ⁸ Federal district courts applying California law have likewise routinely approved cross-check
26 multipliers between 2.0 and 3.0 in employment cases. *See, e.g., Willner v. Manpower Inc.*, 2015 WL
27 3863625, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (affirming a 2.10 multiplier on settlement of California Labor
Code violations); *Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 303 F.R.D. 326, 334 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (approving
attorneys’ fees that resulted in lodestar multiplier of 2.83); *Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp.*, 2013 WL
28 496358, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (approving a multiplier of 2.76 in settlement of Labor Code
violations). Other courts have found even higher multipliers to be reasonable by comparison to other
cases. *See Craft v. County of San Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(approving a 5.2 multiplier after surveying a large body of cases affirming a higher multiplier).

award should also include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee claim. *Serrano v. Unruh*, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 639 (1982). The hours for which Plaintiff's Counsel seeks compensation involve only these types of tasks. Thus, the number of hours for which fees are sought is reasonable.

A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler*, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). The court may consider other factors when determining a reasonable hourly rate, *e.g.*, the attorney's skill and experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney's customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol*, 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632-33 (1998).

Here, Mr. Yang's hourly rate is \$750. Yang Decl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff's Counsel's skill and experience justify the requested rate. As shown in the supporting declarations, Plaintiff's Counsel has significant experience in the area of employment and wage and hour class and representative actions. Plaintiff's Counsel's practices focus on representing employees in employment matters, particularly wage and hour cases on a contingency basis. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 2-5; Yang Decl. ¶¶ 13-16.

Based on the rates and 99.3 total hours, the lodestar for just one of Plaintiff's Counsel through the finalization of this settlement will be approximately \$74,475.00. Yang Decl. ¶ 19. The requested attorneys' fees result in a negative multiplier of approximately 0.81. Again, the requested fees are reasonable and fair, based on the factors described above. The cross-check also supports the requested fees.

c. The requested litigation costs are reasonable.

PAGA also allows a prevailing Plaintiff to recover litigation costs. Lab. Code § 2699(g). The Agreement permits Plaintiff's Counsel to request up to \$15,000.00 in litigation costs. Agreement § 3.1.1. Plaintiff's Counsel, however, seeks \$11,617.16 in costs only. Yang Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Ex. 2. As set forth in accompanying declarations of Plaintiff's counsel, these costs were all directly incurred in the prosecution of this action, including filing fees and service fees. *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's Counsel's request for costs in the amount of \$11,617.16 is fair, adequate, reasonable, and consistent with PAGA's policies. Because this amount is less than what was provided in the Agreement, the difference will be distributed to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees as part of the PAGA Penalty Fund.

1 **2. The Requested General Release Payment Is Reasonable.**

2 Plaintiff, Bernadine Smalley, requests a modest General Release Payment of \$10,000.00.
3 Agreement § 3.1.2. The request is reasonable in light of the general release that the Agreement requires
4 of Plaintiff. Independently, the request is appropriate in recognition of Plaintiff’s efforts on behalf of the
5 State. Declaration of Bernadine Smalley (“Smalley Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3.

6 With respect to the general release, Plaintiff did not proceed with litigation of all of her potential
7 claims and instead strategically pursued the targeted claims in this lawsuit to maximize her ability to
8 recover penalties for the State. Nonetheless, Plaintiff was required to agree to a general release as part of
9 this settlement, though in any other context, Plaintiff would have sought at least a \$10,000.00 payment
10 in exchange for a general release.

11 Independently, courts have held that named plaintiffs in private attorney general actions can
12 request a service award. *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining
13 that service awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the
14 class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, *to*
15 *recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general*”) (emphasis added).

16 As part of her duties as a private attorney general, Plaintiff provided all necessary information
17 and evidence that resulted in this settlement. Smalley Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff met and conferred with her
18 counsel on a number of occasions to discuss the case. *Id.* ¶ 3. She provided information and documents
19 to her counsel and made herself available to answer any other questions. *Id.* Ultimately, Plaintiff’s
20 efforts secured an exceptional result.

21 In addition to the invaluable services that Plaintiff provided, she also took a significant risk.
22 Smalley Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff risks prejudice in the future from other potential employers that may be less
23 willing to hire an individual who has filed suit against a prior employer. Plaintiff took this risk upon
24 herself and the State benefited. No other allegedly aggrieved employees had to face potential prejudice
25 in future employment. Nor did the State have to allocate its limited resources to ensure compliance with
26 the Labor Code.

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1 **3. The Administration Costs Are Reasonable.**

2 Because the Agreement requires payments not only to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's Counsel, and the
3 LWDA, but also to other current and former employees, significant time and effort will be required to
4 administer the Agreement if it is approved by this Court. Among other things, the Administrator will
5 prepare and mail each absent employee's share and prepare appropriate tax forms for all parties who
6 receive payments under the Agreement. Similarly, any uncashed checks must be voided so that the
7 unclaimed amounts can be forwarded to the State of California Controller's Office Unclaimed Property
8 Fund. Agreement § 4.4.


9 Phoenix Settlement Administrators, a well-recognized settlement administrator, has quoted
10 Administration Costs not to exceed \$5,000.00 to administer the settlement. Yang Decl. ¶ 12; *see also*
11 Agreement § 3.1.3. The Administration Costs are reasonable and should be approved.

12 **CONCLUSION**

13 The proposed settlement would result in substantial monetary benefits to the State. It was the
14 result of informed, arm's length negotiations conducted by counsel experienced in wage and hour class
15 and representative action litigation. Its terms appear to be fair, adequate, and reasonable, and there is no
16 reason to believe the proposal is outside the range of reasonableness for such a settlement. Accordingly,
17 for the benefit of the State and in furtherance of PAGA's policies, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
18 Court grant approval of the settlement.

19 DATED: August 12, 2024

DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.

20 By: 
21 Larry W. Lee
22 Simon L. Yang
23 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Court Reservation Receipt

Reservation

Reservation ID: 447233439289	Status: RESERVED
Reservation Type: Motion to Confirm Settlement	Number of Motions: 1
Case Number: 21STCV43898	Case Title: BERNADINE SMALLEY vs BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES
Filing Party: Bernadine Smalley (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 56
Date/Time: October 24th 2024, 8:30AM	Confirmation Code: CR-SKHGPZFDCJH56BYDC

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Confirm Settlement	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment

Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
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