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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

HAMZA KISSAM and ASIA
CRAWFORD, individuals, on behalf
of themselves and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

HAWTHORNE HYDROPONICS
LLC, a Limited Liability Company;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **CIVSB2203720**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS**

Hearing Date: November 4, 2025
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.
[Hearing scheduled by Order dated June 17, 2025]

Judge: Hon. Joseph T. Ortiz
Dept: 17

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The Parties to this Action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which
4 is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In
5 accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated June 17, 2025 (“Preliminary Approval Order”),
6 the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs Hamza Kissam and Asia Crawford (“Plaintiffs”) respectfully
9 move for final approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service award, and entry of the Final
10 Approval Order and Judgment. The settlement represents an excellent result for the Class and avoids
11 the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the notice to the members of the
12 Class, there were **no objections and no requests for exclusion**, which means that the entire Class
13 (100%) has elected to participate in the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response
14 from the Class evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully
15 submit that the class settlement should be finally approved for the same reasons that the Court
16 preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

17 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

18 As consideration for this settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
19 Hawthorne Hydroponics, LLC (“Defendant”) is One Million Four Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars
20 (\$1,480,000). (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.22 and 3.1.) Under the Agreement, the Gross Settlement Amount
21 consists of the following elements: all payments of Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class
22 Members, the Administration Expenses Payment to the Administrator, the Class Counsel Fees Payment
23 and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment to Class Counsel, the Class Representative Service
24

25 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

26 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant
27 Hawthorne Hydroponics, LLC who were classified as non-exempt in the State of California at any time
28 during the Class Period” The “Class Period” is defined as “March 3, 2018 through December 12,
2024.” (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶6.)

1 Payments to Plaintiffs, and the PAGA Penalties payment to the California Labor and Workforce
2 Development Agency (the “LWDA”) and the Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.)
3 Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(a). The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant’s share of payroll
4 taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The settlement is all-in with no reversion to Defendant and no need for
5 Class Members to submit claim forms. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following
6 is a table of the key financial terms of the Agreement and the proposed deductions:

7 **\$1,480,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)
8 - \$30,000 (Plaintiffs’ proposed service awards not to exceed \$15,000 each)
9 - \$100,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses - not to exceed amount)
10 - \$493,333 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed one-third of settlement)
11 - \$50,000 (PAGA Penalties - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
12 - \$12,450 (Administration Expenses Payment)
13 **\$794,217** (Net Settlement Amount)

14 The specific details of the settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
15 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

16 The settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
17 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
18 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable”. (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 3.) In sum, the settlement valued
19 at \$1,480,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact
20 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted
21 by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class
22 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,
23 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

24 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
25 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

26 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259,
27 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
28 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1151 (2000) (“[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are
the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.”)

 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable

1 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
2 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
4 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
5 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
6 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

7 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
8 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
9 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
10 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
12 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
13 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
14 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

15 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

16 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v.*
17 *Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service*
18 *Com'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
19 the settlement is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The
20 well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class
21 action settlement agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and
22 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
23 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
24 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the
25 class members to the proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116,
26 128 (2008) (internal citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186
27 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

28 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.

1 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
2 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
3 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
4 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
5 “Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing,
6 gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

7 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
8 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

9 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

10 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
11 and the Court to Act Intelligently

12 Over the course of more than three years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation
13 of the claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for
14 the full and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural
15 history and investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary
16 approval. The Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations,
17 both during and after mediation, presided over by mediator Jonathan Andrews. The details of the
18 litigation are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

19 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

20 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations
21 before an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to
22 deny any wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and
23 Class Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released
24 Class Claims of the Class in accordance with the Agreement, based upon the experience of Class
25 Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

26 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Jonathan Andrews, a respected and
27 experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, to reach the Settlement. In preparation for the
28 mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with necessary information, including Class payroll and

1 timekeeping data. Plaintiffs analyzed the data with the assistance of a damages expert, Berger
2 Consulting, and prepared and submitted a mediation brief and damage valuation to the Mediator.
3 Following the all-day mediation, the Parties agreed to the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

4 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
5 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
6 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
7 2007) (“The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the
8 litigation, with the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment
9 litigation[, and] this factor supports approval of the settlement”).

10 From December 2024 to May 2025, the initial settlement agreement and exhibits thereto were
11 finalized and executed. On June 17, 2025, the Court issued its Order granting preliminary approval of
12 the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

13 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

14 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
15 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
16 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
17 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
18 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
19 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the
20 Blumenthal Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement
21 discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and in the best interests
22 of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

23 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

24 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On July 28, 2025,
25 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each
26 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial
27 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being sought,
28 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to

1 that individual. See Declaration of Nick Castro (“Castro Decl.”) ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the
2 notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary
3 Approval Order. Significantly, there have been no objections and no requests to opt-out. Castro Decl.
4 ¶¶ 11-12. As such, the entire Class (100%) will participate in the settlement and will be sent a
5 settlement check. See Castro Decl. at ¶¶ 13-15; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

6 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
7 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
8 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
9 adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznier v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
10 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
11 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
12 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
13 approval of the class is evident.

14 5. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

15 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid
16 all overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate of pay, were not provided meal and rest
17 periods or paid premiums at the correct rate of pay in lieu thereof, were not timely paid earned wages,
18 were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not provided accurate itemized wage
19 statements, were not pay all sick wages and the correct rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the
20 time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any
21 other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by
22 virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

23 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
24 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
25 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant maintains
26 that its practices complied with all applicable wage and hour laws. Defendant maintains that all Class
27 Members’ work time was properly recorded and compensated. Defendant contended that its meal and
28 rest period policies and practices provide Class Members with meal and rest periods. Defendant could

1 argue that its payment of significant meal period premiums was evidence of their compliant practices.
2 As to expense reimbursement, Defendant maintains that it did not fail to provide reimbursement for
3 necessary business expenses because, among other things, the alleged expenses were convenient and
4 voluntary, and therefore not were required expenses giving rise to reimbursement. Defendant could
5 argue that the decisions in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), *Lockheed Martin Corp.*
6 *v. Superior Ct.*, 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1108 (2003), and *Salazar v. See's Candy Shops Inc.*, 64 Cal.App.5th
7 85 (2021), weakened Plaintiffs' claims in terms of liability and value, and preclude claims from
8 proceeding on a class or representative basis. Defendant also maintains that a good faith dispute and
9 absence of willfulness would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or failure to provide
10 accurate itemized wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056,
11 1065 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and
12 accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly
13 and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.") If successful, Defendant's defenses
14 could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiffs believe that these
15 defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present a
16 serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

17 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

19 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
20 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
21 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

22 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
24 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
25 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

26 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
27 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
28 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today

1 outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
2 the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

3 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
4 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

5 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiffs would be unable
6 to obtain class certification and thereby not recover on behalf of any employees other than themselves
7 Defendant argued that the individual experience of each putative class member varied with respect to
8 the claims, which would preclude the claims from proceeding on a class basis. For instance, Plaintiffs'
9 meal and rest period claims would require individualized inquiries into whether each employee took
10 a compliant meal or rest period on a given shift and, if not, why. Plaintiffs are aware of other cases
11 where class certification of similar claims was denied. *See e.g. Cacho v. Eurostar, Inc.*, 43 Cal. App.
12 5th 885 (2019) (denying certification of rest break claims). Defendant also argued that the existence
13 of arbitration agreements would bar and/or limit class certification. Finally, even if class certification
14 was successful, as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank*
15 *National Association*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide
16 recovery even where a class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification of
17 wage and hour claims, class certification in this Action would have been hotly disputed and was by no
18 means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

19 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
20 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
21 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. The maximum and average class
22 member allocations (in addition to their Individual PAGA Payment) are \$4,176.26 and \$1,107.69,
23 respectively. *See* Castro Decl. ¶13. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the
24 uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should
25 be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

26 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

27 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
28 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event

1 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years
2 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the
3 case could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
4 outweigh an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

5 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant
6 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have
7 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
8 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
9 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
10 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
11 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
12 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have determined that the
13 Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

14 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
15 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
16 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
17 to those in this litigation:

18 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
19 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of
20 how this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
21 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
22 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
23 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

24 *Id.* at *12.

25 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

26 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
27 to Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
28 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 717 Class Members who collectively worked 65,702
Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides a value of \$2,064 per Class Member and \$22 per

1 Workweek and, after deductions, the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of
2 \$1,107.69 per Class Member and \$12.08 per Workweek. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

3 The calculations to compensate for the amount due to the Class Members at the time the
4 Settlement was negotiated were calculated by Plaintiffs' expert, Berger Consulting, in advance of
5 mediation. Class Counsel analyzed the data for putative class members and determined the potential
6 maximum damages for the class claims. For the Class, the maximum potential damages for unpaid
7 wages due to rounding was \$42,488, the maximum potential damages for alleged off-the-clock work
8 at one hour per week was \$2,390,228, the maximum potential damages for unpaid overtime wages as
9 a result of the miscalculation of the regular rate was \$113,302, the maximum potential damages for sick
10 pay and meal premiums as a result of the miscalculation of the regular rate was \$114,921, the maximum
11 potential damages for the alleged unpaid overtime is \$258,783, the maximum potential damages for
12 alleged meal period violations were estimated to be \$834,808 based upon a 15.8% violation rate
13 observed in the time records and after deduction for meal premiums already paid by Defendant, the
14 maximum potential damages for alleged rest period violations were estimated to be \$1,067,194 based
15 upon the same 15.8% potential violation rate observed for meal breaks, and the maximum potential
16 damages for the alleged failure to reimburse business expenses were calculated to be \$89,785 based
17 upon \$5 per month. In total, the damages for the Class were calculated to have a maximum potential
18 total value of \$4,911,509. In addition, Plaintiffs calculated that the maximum value of the potential
19 waiting time penalties was between \$1,773,865 and \$3,983,731, depending on the predicate violation,
20 and the maximum value of the potential wage statement penalties was \$1,413,650.³ Defendant
21 vigorously disputed Plaintiffs' calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

22 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount represents more than 30% of Plaintiffs' calculation
23 of the potential maximum damages at issue for the Class in this case, assuming these amounts could

24
25 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
26 226, at mediation Plaintiffs recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses
27 asserted by Defendant, including but not limited to, a good-faith dispute defense as to whether any
28 premium wages for meal or rest periods or other wages were owed given Defendant's position that
Plaintiffs and Class Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal.
App. 4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have
a good faith dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

1 all be proven in full at trial.⁴ Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by
2 the employer in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely
3 negate the claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the class.
4 The maximum calculations should then be realistically risk rated in consideration for both the risk of
5 class certification and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of
6 the Settlement as compared to the potential value of the claims, the Settlement is most certainly fair and
7 reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

8 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
9 **BE APPROVED**

10 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method**

11 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
12 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
13 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a
14 percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple*
15 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing*
16 *Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th
17 Cir. 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to
18 "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does
19 not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

20 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in
21 _____

22 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim does not provide a recovery to the Class, Plaintiffs did not include the
23 PAGA claim in this discussion of the class claim valuation. The PAGA claim was addressed in the
24 Motion for Preliminary Approval in the Declaration of Nordrehaug at ¶ 33.

25 ⁵ See *Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000)
26 approving settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery"); *Stovall-Gusman*
27 *v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval
28 where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents approximately 10% of what class might have
been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full verdict value);
Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc., 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class
action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of full verdict value).

1 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common
2 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
3 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
4 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
5 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund,
6 the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
7 fund created"). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the
8 market" in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

9 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
10 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
11 fee awards. Attorneys' fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
12 in legal services. See Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,
13 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that
14 "[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent"). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved
15 of a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

16 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the
17 fund. Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$1,480,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class, and
18 not one Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was able to
19 convince Defendant that Plaintiffs could potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability,
20 maintain class certification, overcome difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial
21 if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed
22 the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above,
23 there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*,
24 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ("**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**
25 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**")

26 Third, "the response of the class members to attorneys' fee notice, though not decisive, is
27 relevant to the ... reasonable determination" regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
28 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court's "approximation of the

1 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class
2 that Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

3 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
4 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of
5 \$1,480,000 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and
6 the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost
7 inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained
8 a premier and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether**
9 **in private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate**
10 **in order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g. Stanger v. China Elec.*
11 *Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v.*
12 *Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

13 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
14 the requested attorneys’ fee of one-third equal to \$493,333 is also established by reference to Class
15 Counsel’s lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
16 **that through October 9, 2025, Class Counsel’s total lodestar is \$397,397.91, with significant**
17 **additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.**
18 (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibits #3 and #4.) The requested fee award is therefore currently
19 equivalent to Class Counsel’s total lodestar with a reasonable multiplier of less than 1.3, and there will
20 be additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the
21 settlement distribution and reports. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12.) Such a multiplier is well below the
22 range of multipliers approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d
23 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁶ Because the multiplier cross-check is well below this accepted range it

24
25 ⁶ See *Laffitte*, *supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
26 *supra*, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278
27 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
28 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
Cases, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez*
v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved
range of 2 to 4); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26

1 is not “extraordinarily high” so as to justify an adjustment of the percentage under *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.
2 5th at 505. For such reasons, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of less than one-
3 third of the common fund is reasonable and should be approved.

4 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

5 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel
6 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$100,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
7 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$75,874.04, which is less than the not to exceed
8 amount. Class Counsel have incurred \$75,874.04 based upon counsel’s billing records. These litigation
9 expenses include the expenses incurred for filing fees, mediation expenses, CourtCall charges, expert
10 expenses (DM&A, Berger Consulting and Employment Research), attorney service charges (Knox,
11 OneLegal), deposition expenses, Bel-Aire notice expenses (ILYM), charges for document downloads,
12 and FedEx delivery charges, all of which are costs normally billed to and paid by the client.⁷ The
13 details of the litigation expenses incurred are set forth the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibits #3 and
14 4. These costs were reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the Action. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13.)
15 Because these costs were necessary to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request should
16 be granted.

17 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

18 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as the sole class representatives, Plaintiffs
19 should be awarded the agreed service award of \$15,000 each, in accordance with the Agreement for
20 their time, risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representative. (Agreement at
21 ¶ 3.2(a).) Defendant has agreed to this payment and there have been no objections to the requested
22 service award. The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service awards
23 approved in California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Plaintiffs’
24 _____
25 multiplier).

26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging,
28 photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service,
mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v.*
Lojack Corp., Inc., 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 Declarations are submitted in support and are attached as Exhibits #6 and 7 to the Blumenthal Decl.

2 As the only representative of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duties to the Class admirably
3 and without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the
4 litigation, responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and
5 reviewing the settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Plaintiffs' Declarations
6 details the involvement, stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also
7 assumed the serious risk that they might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as
8 the reputational risk of being "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action on
9 behalf of employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiffs' participation, cooperation and
10 information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

11 The payment of a service award to a successful class representative is appropriate and the
12 amount of \$15,000 is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g.,*
13 *Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
14 (service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist.
15 LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.*
16 *(U.S.)*, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class
17 member payment was \$351); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183, *7
18 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 06, 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Fin.*
19 *Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000 service award). Class Counsel
20 respectfully request approval of the Class Representative Service Payments under the Agreement.

21 **VI. CONCLUSION**

22 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
23 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate,
24 and request entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

25 Respectfully submitted,

26 Dated: October 9, 2025

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Attorneys for Plaintiffs