

Justin F. Marquez, Esq. (SBN 262417)
justin@wilshirelawfirm.com
 Christina M. Le, Esq. (SBN 237697)
cle@wilshirelawfirm.com
 Nicol E. Hajjar, Esq. (SBN 303102)
nicol@wilshirelawfirm.com
 Arsiné Grigoryan, Esq. (SBN 319517)
agrigoryan@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
 Los Angeles, California 90010
 Telephone: (213) 381-9988
 Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
 FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**


TONG XIONG, individually, and on behalf of
 all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

REX MOORE GROUP, INC., a California
 corporation, CONSTRUCTION
 INNOVATIONS GROUP, LLC, a California
 Limited Liability Company, REX MOORE
 ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS &
 ENGINEERING, INC., a California corporation,
 REX SIGNATURE SERVICES, LLC, a
 California Limited Liability Company, and
 DOES 4 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.



Case No. 34-2019-00270480-CU-OE-GDS

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to Honorable
 Lauri A. Damrell, Dept. 28]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
 AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
 APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
 SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed with Memorandum of Points and
 Authorities, the Declarations of Tong Xiong
 and Justin F. Marquez, and Proposed Order]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: August 12, 2022

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept: 28

RESERVATION NO. 2654387

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 12, 2022 at 9:00 a.m., in Department 28 of
3 the Sacramento Superior Court, 813 6th Street, Sacramento, California 95814, pursuant to Code
4 of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Tong Xiong will
5 move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action
6 settlement between Plaintiff and Defendants Rex Moore Group, Inc., Construction Innovations
7 Group, LLC, Rex Moore Electrical Contractors & Engineering, Inc., Rex Signature Services,
8 LLC. Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation for Class Action Settlement;
- 10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
- 11 3. Approving the Notice and Settlement Information Form (collectively, “Notice
12 Packet”) and the plan for distribution of the Notice Packet to Settlement Class
13 Members;
- 14 4. Appointing Plaintiff Tong Xiong as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
- 15 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for
16 settlement purposes;
- 17 6. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Settlement
18 Administrator; and
- 19 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

20 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
21 authorities, the Declarations of Tong Xiong and Justin F. Marquez, filed concurrently herewith,
22 the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may
23 properly receive at or before the hearing.

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
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1
2 Dated: June 21, 2022
3

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

4 By: _____

Justin F. Marquez, Esq.

Christina M. Le

Nicol E. Hajjar, Esq.

Arsiné Grigoryan, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A.	Plaintiff’s Claims	1
B.	Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C.	Settlement Negotiations	2
D.	Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III.	DISCUSSION	8
A.	The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	9
1.	The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	9
2.	The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	10
3.	Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	12
B.	The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	12
C.	The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	9
1.	Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	9
2.	The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	10
3.	This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	14
4.	The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	12
D.	The Service Award To Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable	15
E.	There is Good Cause for Selecting Los Angeles Trial Lawyers' Charities As the Cy Pres Recipient.....	14
IV.	CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	15
A.	Legal Standard	15

1	B.	Plaintiff Maintains That The Criteria For Class Certification Are Satisfied	15
2	1.	The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous	15
3	2.	There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate.....	19
4	3.	Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class.....	17
5	4.	Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement	20
6	5.	A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	18
7	V.	THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	21
8	A.	The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	21
9	B.	The Notice is Accurate and Informative	21
10	VI.	CONCLUSION	19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	16
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	18
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	11
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	10
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	17
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	16
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	16
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	10
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695.....	15
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	6
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.....	13, 18
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	6
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	10
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	15
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434	6
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	17
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	17
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	7, 12
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	10
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	15
<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	12
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	16
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	10
<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	7
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	8
<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.</i> (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952	16

FEDERAL CASES

<i>Dennis v. Kellogg Co.</i> (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 858.....	14
<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	13
<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	18
<i>Priddy v. Edelman</i> (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438	7
<i>Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers</i> (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 1301.....	14
<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	11

STATE STATUTES

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 384.....	14
Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	15
Code of Civil Procedure § 384(a)	4
Labor Code § 1194	11
Labor Code § 90.5	12

RULES

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	18
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	9

TREATISES

Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 11.51	7
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03	11
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 8.39	19

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)	13
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tong Xiong (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$300,000 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants Rex Moore Group, Inc., Construction Innovations Group, LLC, Rex Moore Electrical Contractors & Engineering, Inc., Rex Signature Services, LLC. (“Defendants”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 1,145 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Hon. Ronald M. Sabraw (Ret.), over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties were unable to reach an agreement during the October 21, 2020 mediation. The parties continued to engage in settlement discussions. On July 29, 2021, Defendants’ counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that a related case *Rudy Garcia v. Construction Innovations Group, LLC, et al.* Case No.:34-2020-00285239, settled on May 27, 2021. On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff sent a formal settlement demand to resolve the remaining UCL claim for the unreleased class period. On November 11, 2021, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class period. Defendants specialize in electrical contracting, with a location in Sacramento, California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Declaration of

1 Justin F. Marquez [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
3 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay for all
4 hours worked by not recording the actual start and end times of shifts and only paying for 8
5 hours of work for each workday, regardless of whether an employee worked overtime.
6 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant
7 meal and rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants
8 for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, failure
9 to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to reimburse
10 business expenses, inaccurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination,
11 unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

12 On December 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
13 against Defendants Rex Moore Group, Inc. for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time
14 wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages
15 (Labor Code §§ 1194, and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7
16 and 512); (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (5)
17 failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); and (6) unfair
18 business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.). On October 28, 2020,
19 Plaintiff filed Amendments to the Complaint inserting the true name of DOES 1-3 as
20 Construction Innovations Group, LLC, Rex Moore Electrical Contractors & Engineering,
21 Inc., and Rex Signature Services, LLC. On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First
22 Amended Complaint against Defendants adding claims for failure to authorize and permit
23 rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7), failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor
24 Code § 2802), and civil penalties under Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code
25 § 2698 et seq.). (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

26 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

27 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and
28 information before mediating this action. Defendants produced a sample of time and pay

1 records for class members. Defendants also provided documents of its wage and hour
2 policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of
3 current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. Furthermore, Defendants
4 also provided substantive responses to form and special interrogatories, requests for
5 admissions, and requests for production served by Plaintiff. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

6 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants' wage and hour policies and
7 practices, analyzing Defendants' timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class
8 Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success
9 on the merits, and Defendants' maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)
10 Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
11 asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage
12 analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

13 C. Settlement Negotiations

14 On October 21, 2020, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced
15 class action mediator Hon. Ronald M. Sabraw (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was
16 conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although
17 conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation
18 willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
19 prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been
20 reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
21 weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties were unable to reach
22 an agreement during the October 21, 2020 mediation. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) On July 29, 2021,
23 Defendants' counsel informed Plaintiff's counsel that a related case *Rudy Garcia v.*
24 *Construction Innovations Group, LLC, et al.* Case No.:34-2020-00285239, settled on May
25 27, 2021. On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff sent a formal settlement demand to resolve the
26 remaining UCL claim for the unreleased class period. On November 11, 2021, the Parties
27 reached a settlement the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement.
28 (*Id.* at ¶ 9, Ex. 1 [Joint Stipulation for Class Action Settlement].)

1 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case.
2 Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation,
3 Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is
4 in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and
5 circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by
6 Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

7 Specifically, because Plaintiff was a member of the *Garcia* settlement, Defendants
8 assert that Plaintiff has no remaining claims that are viable, and he cannot assert claims on
9 behalf of a class or serve as a representative in a PAGA action. Plaintiff disputes Defendants'
10 argument in this regard. See additional information in Section III.A.2 below.

11 Indeed, the \$300,000.00 Settlement represents **44% of the realistic maximum**
12 **recovery of \$675,703.40.** (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants'
13 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3.3 million, when the risk of
14 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes
15 that Defendants' realistic exposure was \$675,703.40, meaning the Settlement achieves a
16 significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at
17 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed,
18 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
19 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

20 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

21 Under the Settlement, Defendants will pay \$300,000.00 to resolve this litigation.
22 This amount is all-inclusive. The Settlement's key terms include:

23 1. Class Members or Settlement Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties
24 agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined
25 as: "all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants
26 within the State of California at any time during the Settlement Period (collectively referred to
27 as the "Class"). (Settlement, § I(D).)

28 2. Settlement Period: The Settlement Period means the period from December 4,

1 2015 through September 14, 2016, and from January 22, 2021 through the date of preliminary
2 approval. (Settlement, § I(R).)

3 3. Settlement Amount: This amount is \$300,000.00, which shall be paid by
4 Defendants, and from which all Net Settlement Payments, Court-approved attorneys' fees and
5 Litigation costs pursuant to Section XIII, Administrative Costs pursuant to Section VIII,
6 enhancement to Named Plaintiff pursuant to Section XIV, statutory penalties, interest, and
7 PAGA Settlement pursuant to Section XVI shall be paid, except as provided herein.
8 (Settlement, § I(Q).)

9 4. No Reversion: This is a non-reversionary settlement. Settlement checks will be
10 valid for 180 days. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 384(a), any unpaid cash residue or
11 unclaimed or abandoned class member funds, plus any accrued interest thereon will be sent to
12 the Center for Workers' Rights, 2741 Fruitridge Rd., Suite 5, Sacramento, CA 95820 pursuant
13 to Code of Civil Procedure Section 384(a). (Settlement, § XI(C).)

14 5. Release: The class release is limited to "all claims, both potential and actual,
15 that were or may have been raised in the First Amended Complaint or that are reasonably
16 related to the allegations in the First Amended Complaint as to all Class Members, including
17 claims under Labor Code section 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 246, 246.5, 248.5,
18 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802, 2698, 2699, 2699.3, 2699.5,
19 California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 11040,
20 *et seq.*, California Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq.*, and all class claims,
21 representative claims, aggrieved employee claims, meal or rest periods, meal or rest period
22 premiums, unpaid wages, overtime, minimum wages, and complete payments of wages at
23 separation or termination, failure to provide accurate and itemized wage statements, unfair
24 competition based on the foregoing, unfair business practices based on the foregoing, unlawful
25 business practices based on the foregoing, fraudulent business practices based on the foregoing,
26 PAGA penalties based on the foregoing, waiting time penalties, civil penalties based on the
27 foregoing, interest, fees, costs, and any other claims that may have been raised in the First
28 Amended Complaint or that reasonably relate to the allegations therein during the Class Period

1 as defined above (collectively the “Released Claims”). The Release Period shall be the Class
2 Period. “Released Parties” as referenced herein and as released in the Settlement shall
3 collectively mean: (i) Defendants Construction Innovations Group, LLC, Rex Moore Group,
4 Inc., Rex Signature Services, LLC; Rex Moore Electrical Contractors & Engineering, Inc.; (ii)
5 each of Defendants’ past, present and future parents, subsidiaries and affiliates including,
6 without limitation any corporation, limited liability company, partnership, trust, foundation and
7 non-profit entity which controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with Defendants;
8 (iii) the past, present, and future shareholders, directors, officers, agents, consultants,
9 representatives, administrators, fiduciaries, benefit plans, transferees, predecessors, successors
10 and assigns of any of the foregoing; and (iv) any individual or entity which could be jointly
11 liable with any of the foregoing.” (Settlement, § VII(A).)

12 6. PAGA Settlement: The settlement includes \$25,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
13 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$18,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25%
14 (\$6,250.00) will be paid to eligible members of the PAGA Class. Class Counsel submitted the
15 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval.
16 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

17 7. Net Settlement Amount: The Net Settlement Fund is the Settlement Amount
18 minus any award of attorneys’ fees and Litigation costs, Administrative Costs, enhancement to
19 the Named Plaintiff, and penalties recoverable pursuant to California’s Private Attorney
20 General Act (“PAGA”) (the “PAGA Settlement”). (Settlement, § I(L).)

21 8. Distribution Formula: Members of the Settlement Class not opting out will
22 receive a lump sum payment as good and valuable consideration for the waiver and release of
23 claims set forth in Section VII(A), above, in an amount determined by the Settlement
24 Administrator in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The lump sum payment to
25 each member of the Settlement Class not excluding him/ herself will be determined in
26 accordance with the procedure set forth in Section X. (Settlement, § XI(A).)

27 9. Taxation and Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class
28 Members will be allocated as 15 % as wages, 85 % as penalties and interest. (Settlement, §

1 XV.)

2 10. Enhancement Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an
3 enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, § XIV.) This amount is for
4 Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
5 release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, §
6 VII (B).) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions
7 shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating
8 Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § XIV.)

9 11. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendants will not
10 oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$100,000.00) of the Settlement Amount, plus out-
11 of-pocket costs not to exceed \$15,000.00 (Settlement, § XIII.) At this time, Class Counsel's
12 costs are approximately \$10,366.41. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11.)

13 12. Notice of Proposed Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement
14 of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees,
15 costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
16 are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A.) The Notice also sets forth each class member's total
17 workweeks, as well as the approximate amount of money they would receive in the event all
18 class members participate in the settlement. The Notice also includes an opt-out form. (*Id.*)
19 Class Members will be notified by first class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § IX (A).)
20 Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its
21 best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members,
22 including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated
23 addresses. (Settlement, § X (B)-(D).) Notice will be provided in English and Spanish.
24 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12; Ex. 2.)

25 13. Dispute Procedure: Class Notice will include a procedure by which a Class
26 Member may dispute the number of workweeks or opt-out of the settlement. (Settlement, Ex.
27 B.)

28 ///

1 **III. DISCUSSION**

2 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
3 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
4 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v.*
5 *Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is
6 reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and
7 the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
8 percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

9 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider
10 relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense,
11 complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status
12 through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage
13 of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
14 participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot*
15 *Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action
16 settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of
17 reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the
18 maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010)
19 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the
20 maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead,
21 only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes
22 of the litigation.”].)

23 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
24 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
25 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and**
4 **Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement,
6 unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations
7 were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) §
8 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed.
9 (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989)
10 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been
11 fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
13 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Hon. Ronald M. Sabraw. (Marquez Decl.
14 ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
15 professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to
16 explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate
17 their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After
18 extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's
19 claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties were unable to reach an agreement during the
20 October 21, 2020 mediation. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 8.) The parties continued to engage in
21 settlement discussions. On July 29, 2021, Defendants' counsel informed Plaintiff's counsel that
22 a related case *Rudy Garcia v. Construction Innovations Group, LLC, et al.* Case No.:34-2020-
23 00285239, settled on May 27, 2021. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 9.) On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff
24 sent a formal settlement demand to resolve the remaining UCL claim for the unreleased class
25 period. On November 11, 2021, the Parties reached a settlement. (*Id.*)

26 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery
27 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping
28 and payroll records, Defendants' policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages,

1 the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at
2 separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix
3 of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest
4 period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their
5 extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the
6 claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able
7 to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

8 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
9 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-50.) Again, this supports the position that
10 the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and
11 weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued
12 litigation of this action.

13 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 14 **Respective Legal Positions**

15 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial,
16 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
17 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is
18 inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed
19 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully
20 litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served
21 by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding
22 litigation.”].)

23 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
24 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 25.) Specifically, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff was a member of
25 the settlement reached in *Rudy Garcia v. Construction Innovations Group, LLC, et al.* Case
26 No.:34-2020-00285239, Plaintiff has no remaining claims that are viable, other than a short
27 period covered under the Unfair Competition Law’s limitations period, which is not included
28 in the *Garcia* settlement, and cannot serve as a representative plaintiff in a class or PAGA

1 action. (*See Cel-Tech Communications v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.* (1995) 20
2 Cal.4th 163, 168 [Plaintiff cannot circumvent an absolute bar for relief “simply by
3 recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition”]; *Rubin v. Green* (1993) 4
4 Cal.4th 1187, 1203 [Defendants’ immunity from suit by Plaintiff, “should not evaporate
5 merely because the plaintiff discovers a conveniently different label for pleading what
6 is in substance an identical grievance arising from identical conduct” and UCL cannot
7 be used to circumvent the limitations and procedures set forth in Revenue and
8 Taxation Code]; *Krantz v. Visual Images, LLC* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164, 178 [UCL claim
9 will “stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of
10 action”]; *Smith v. Smith Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718-20 [“it
11 is fairly said that section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws,” but the underlying
12 laws must still be actionable for the UCL claim to be actionable]; *Robinson v. Southern
13 Counties Oil Co.* (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476, 484 [“A change in facts or law can deprive
14 a plaintiff of standing.”].) Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ argument in this regard and
15 disputes that he lacks standing to assert class and representative PAGA claims.

16 While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists
17 as to each cause of action, and as to Plaintiff’s standing to bring class and representative PAGA
18 claims, as detailed above. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of
19 wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
20 proposition. (*Id.*)

21 The proposed settlement of \$300,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery
22 when compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 116-27.) Because of
23 the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid
24 the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties
25 involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability,
26 the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
27 \$300,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is
28 appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average***

1 *net benefit of approximately \$123.36. (Id. at ¶ 27.)*

2 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

3 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
4 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
5 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶
6 39-50.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
7 litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

8 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

9 The proposed Notice and Workweek Dispute Form, in the form attached to the
10 Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A, should be approved for dissemination to the class and sub-
11 class. The Notice and Workweek Dispute Form informs the class of the terms of the settlement
12 and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who
13 wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
14 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice
15 and Workweek Dispute Form meet all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules
16 of Court.

17 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

18 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendants agree to pay Class
19 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$100,000.00, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
20 Settlement Amount, and up to \$15,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
21 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

22 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common**
23 **Fund" Method**

24 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit
25 created by counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held
26 that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought
27 by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that
28 fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v.*

1 *Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d
2 1.)

3 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
4 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among
5 all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone."
6 (*Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the
7 California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which
8 creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear
9 a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San*
10 *Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the
11 common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by
12 one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

13 The California Supreme Court recently affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.*
14 (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the
15 benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a
16 fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an
17 appropriate percentage of the fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The
18 recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation,
19 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
20 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
21 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage
22 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts." (*Id.* [internal citations
23 omitted].)

24 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

25 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "No general rule can be articulated on
26 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit
27 on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume
28 a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger

percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature, and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of

1 consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class
2 actions. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-50.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-
3 counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is
4 reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and
5 experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

6 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating
7 the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the
8 settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and
9 knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the
10 procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has
11 frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class.
12 Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

13 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

14 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments
15 to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
16 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant
17 approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class
18 representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are
19 appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See*
20 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

21 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because
22 they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong
23 policy is codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of
24 this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not
25 required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the
26 California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
27 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
28 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class

1 representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class
2 members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agreed to
4 pay a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange
5 for Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendants. Class Counsel represent that
6 Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated
7 with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in
8 contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This amount is
9 reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class
10 members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-
11 cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class
12 action settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative
13 incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 33.)

14 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
15 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
16 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per
17 class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.”
18 (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
19 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named
20 plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850
21 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions
22 received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The
23 authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish
24 to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service
25 to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

26 **E. There is Good Cause for Selecting Center for Workers’ Rights As the Cy**
27 **Pres Recipient.**

28 A *cy pres* award allows for “aggregate calculation of damages, the use of summary

1 claim procedures, and distribution of unclaimed funds to indirectly benefit the entire class.”
2 (*Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers* (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 1301, 1305.) “To
3 ensure that the settlement retains some connection to the plaintiff class and the underlying
4 claims, however, a *cy pres* award must qualify as ‘the next best distribution’ to giving the funds
5 directly to class members.” (*Dennis v. Kellogg Co.* (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 858, 865, quoting
6 *Six Mexican Workers*, 904 F.2d at 1308.)

7 Moreover, in the class action context, California Code of Civil Procedure permits
8 unpaid cash residues in a class action settlement to be distributed to a *cy pres* recipient “in a
9 manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying class action or causes of
10 action, or to promote justice for all Californians.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 384.)

11 Here, under the terms of the settlement agreement, in the event settlement checks
12 remain uncashed after 180 days, those funds shall be donated to Center for Workers’ Rights as
13 a *cy pres* beneficiary. (Settlement, § XI(C).) Center for Workers’ Rights furthers the purpose
14 of this case and promotes justice for all Californians by striving “to improve working
15 conditions, reduce barriers to securing employment, and remedy workplace injustice for low-
16 wage workers and their families in the greater Sacramento area.” (See
17 <https://www.rightscenter.org/about/>)

18 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

19 **A. Legal Standard**

20 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims
21 derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations.
22 For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies
23 the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides:
24 “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties
25 are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue
26 or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
27 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
28 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be

1 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To
2 clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil
3 Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three
4 factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or
5 defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the
6 class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

7 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action
8 device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class
9 actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the
10 rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any
11 doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification.
12 (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

13 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied**
14 **for Settlement Purposes.**

15 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

16 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
17 approximately 1,145 employees of Defendants.

18 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
19 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular
20 business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset*
21 *Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of
22 product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

23 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties
24 to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward*
25 (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons,
26 an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in
27 fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the
28 maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing

1 the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v.*
2 *Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a
3 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

4 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which** 5 **Predominate**

6 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on
7 the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over
8 any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
9 to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987)
10 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

11 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant
12 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally
13 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
14 whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked,
15 including overtime wages; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses;
16 whether Defendants paid terminated employees all vacation wages at the correct rate of pay;
17 whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal
18 period premium wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were
19 consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same
20 for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered
21 from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
24 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class,
25 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the
26 defendant’s conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 “[t]he
27 only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class
28 representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims

1 are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if
2 the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a
3 former employee of Defendants; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies
4 and practices as other similarly situated employees.

5 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

6 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first,
7 a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation;
8 second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v.*
9 *Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

10 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained
11 counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class
12 actions that previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 39-50.) Class Counsel unquestionably is
13 "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v.*
14 *Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff
15 has, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their
16 dedication. Plaintiff's willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious
17 commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class and subclass. (*McGhee,*
18 *supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

19 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

20 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
21 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
22 litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this
23 Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves
24 the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class
25 treatment, similarly-situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for
26 damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and
27 expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443,
28 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of

1 settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

2 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

3 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

4 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
5 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
6 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is
7 no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this
8 matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has
9 explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial
10 percentage of the Class Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed
11 settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

12 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

13 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S.
14 first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members
15 of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there
16 are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have
17 the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte &
19 Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to
20 date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and
21 coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an
22 admission of liability by the Defendant, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this
23 Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval
24 decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of
25 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class
26 notice.

27 ///

28 ///


1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant
3 preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing for August
4 12, 2022.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 Dated: July 21, 2022

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

7
8 By: 
Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
Christina M. Le
Nicol E. Hajjar, Esq.
Arsiné Grigoryan, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

PROOF OF SERVICE

Tong Xiong v. Rex Moore Group, Inc., et al.
34-2019-00270480-CU-OE-GDS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Fl., Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is sspene@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On July 21, 2022, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Terry A. Wills, Esq. (SBN 133962)
twills@cookbrown.com
Barbara A. Cotter, Esq. (SBN 142590)
bcotter@cookbrown.com
Alexis M. Gabrielson, Esq. (SBN 298738)
agabrielson@cookbrown.com
Kristin Bowling
kbowling@cookbrown.com
COOK BROWN, LLP
2407 J. Street, Second Floor
Sacramento, California 95816
Telephone: (916) 442-3100
Facsimile: (916) 442-4227

Attorneys for Defendant,
REX MOORE GROUP, INC., et al.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **July 21, 2022**, at Los Angeles, California.



Sandy S. Sespene