

Justin F. Marquez (SBN 262417)
justin@wilshirelawfirm.com

Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin@wilshirelawfirm.com

Maxim Gorbunov (SBN 343128)
mgorbunov@wilshirelawfirm.com

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor

Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (213) 381-9988

Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff Brian Gillogly

[Additional counsel on following page]

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

GUADALUPE ESTRADA, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC., a California
corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

Defendants.

BRIAN GILLOGLY, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated

Plaintiff,

v.

MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.

Defendants.

Lead Case No.: 21CV386229
[Consolidated with Case No. 21CV391403]

**CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION**

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Charles F.
Adams, Department 7]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed with the Declaration of Justin F.
Marquez, Declaration of Mehrdad Bokhour,
Declarations of Plaintiffs, and Proposed
Order]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: April 25, 2024
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Department: 7

*Gillogly Complaint filed: December 3, 2021
Estrada Complaint filed: August 26, 2021
Trial date: Not set*

1 Mehrdad Bokhour (SBN 285256)
2 mehrdad@bokhourlaw.com
3 **BOKHOUR LAW GROUP, P.C.**
4 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 450
5 Los Angeles, California 90067
6 Telephone: (310) 975-1493
7 Facsimile: (310) 675-0861

8 Jake D. Finkel (SBN 293954)
9 jake@lawfinkel.com
10 **LAW OFFICES OF JAKE D. FINKEL**
11 3470 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 830
12 Los Angeles, California 90010
13 Telephone: (213) 787-7411
14 Facsimile: (323) 916-0521

15 Attorneys for Plaintiff Guadalupe Estrada
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 25, 2024 at 1:30 p.m., in Department 7 of the
3 Santa Clara Superior Court, located at 191 North First Street San Jose, CA 95113, pursuant to
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Brian
5 Gillogly and Guadalupe Estrada (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for an Order
6 granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and
7 Defendants Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. and Monterey Mushrooms, LLC (collectively,
8 “Defendants”). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement of
10 Class Action and PAGA Claims;
- 11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
- 12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
- 13 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Brian Gillogly and Guadalupe Estrada as Class Representatives
14 for settlement purposes;
- 15 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Justin F. Marquez and Benjamin H. Haber of Wilshire
16 Law Firm, PLC, Jake D. Finkel of the Finkel Firm, and Mehrdad Bokhour of the
17 Bokhour law Group, P.C. as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
- 18 6. Appointing CPT Group LLC as the Settlement Administrator; and
- 19 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

20 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
21 authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Mehrdad Bokhour, Brian Gillogly and
22 Guadalupe Estrada, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other
23 further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 26, 2024

By:


Justin J. Marquez, Esq.
Benjamin H. Haber, Esq.
Maxim Gorbunov, Esq.
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

Attorneys for Plaintiff Gillogly

Mehrdad Bokhour, Esq.
BOKHOUR LAW GROUP, P.C.

Jake D. Finkel, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF JAKE D. FINKEL

Attorneys for Plaintiff Estrada

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	vi
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims	1
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	3
C. Settlement Negotiations	3
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III. DISCUSSION	9
A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	10
1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	10
2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	11
3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	12
B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	12
C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	13
1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	13
2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	14
3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	14
4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	15
D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable	15
IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	17

1	A. Legal Standard	17
2	B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
3	Settlement Purposes.	18
4	1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous	18
5	2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate.....	18
6	3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class.....	19
7	4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement.....	19
8	5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	20
9	V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	20
10	A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	20
11	B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative	21
12	VI. CONCLUSION	22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	18
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	20, 21
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	14
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	13
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	19
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	19
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	18
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	13
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695.....	17
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	9
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.....	16
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	10
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	13, 14
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	18
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	9
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	20
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	20
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	10, 15
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	13
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	17, 18
<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	16
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	18
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	13
<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	10
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	11
<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.</i> (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952	18

FEDERAL CASES

<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	16
<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	20
<i>Priddy v. Edelman</i> (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438	10
<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	14

STATE STATUTES

Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	17, 18
Labor Code § 1194	14
Labor Code § 90.5	16

RULES

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	20
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	13

TREATISES

Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 11.51	10
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03	14
Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 8.39	21

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)	17
--	----

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Brian Gillogly and Guadalupe Estrada (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of
4 a proposed \$2,150,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants
5 Monterey Mushrooms, Inc and Monterey Mushrooms LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). The
6 Settlement will provide monetary payments to approximately 2,200 class members. As set forth
7 more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under
8 California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and
9 negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated initially by an experienced
10 class action mediator, Hon. Howard Broadman (Ret.), over the course of a full day of Zoom
11 mediation. Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive negotiations and discussions
12 regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, and
13 ultimately reached a proposed settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court
14 preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the
15 proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

16 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

17 **A. Plaintiffs’ Claims**

18 This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiffs and
19 putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for
20 Defendants during the class period. Defendants specialize in the production, packaging, and
21 distribution of mushrooms throughout North America with multiple large-scale farms located
22 in California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
23 Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

24 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
25 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay for all hours
26 worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally
27 compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendants failed to reimburse all business expenses.
28 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage

1 statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
2 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

3 On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff Guadalupe Estrada (“Plaintiff Estrada”) filed a Private
4 Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) representative action complaint in Santa Clara County Superior
5 Court entitled *Estrada et al. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.*, Case No. 21CV386229 (the “*Estrada*
6 *Action.*”) (*Id.* at ¶ 4.)

7 On December 3, 2021, Plaintiff Brian Gillogly filed an action entitled *Gillogly, et al. v.*
8 *Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.*, Case No. 21CV39140 in the Santa Clara County Superior Court,
9 alleging causes of action for violation of (1) California Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2 and
10 1197 (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage and Straight Time Wages), (2) California Labor Code §§
11 1194 and 1198 (Failure to Pay Overtime Wages), (3) California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512
12 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods), (4) California Labor Code § 226.7 (Failure to Authorize and
13 Permit Rest Periods), (5) California Labor Code §§ 201-203 (Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages
14 at Termination), (6) California Labor Code § 226 (Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage
15 Statements), (7) California Labor Code §§ 2802 (Failure to Indemnify Employees for
16 Expenditures) and (8) California Labor Code and California Business & Professions Code §§
17 17200, et seq. (Unfair Business Practices) (the “*Gillogly Action.*”). (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs Estrada
18 and Gillogly gave notice to Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. and the California Labor & Workforce
19 Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the
20 PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on June 25, 2021 and December 3, 2021, respectively.
21 (Marquez Decl. at ¶ 5; Declaration of Mehrdad Bokhour in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
22 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [Bokhour Decl.] ¶ 4).

23 On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff Gillogly filed a First Amended Class and Representative
24 Action Complaint, which added a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA. On July 31,
25 2023, the Court consolidated the *Estrada* and *Gillogly* Action. Plaintiffs Gillogly and Estrada
26 sent an amended notice to both Defendants and the LWDA on December 21, 2023 and January
27 2, 2024, respectively, adding Monterey Mushrooms LLC as a named defendant. (Marquez Decl.
28 at ¶ 6; Bokhour Decl. ¶ 5.) On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Doe Amendment naming

Monterey Mushrooms LLC as Doe 1 in both the Gillogly and Estrada Actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶ 6.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendants produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendants also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations

On August 15, 2022, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator Hon. Howard Broadman (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement that was fully executed in August 2023, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 10, Ex. 1 [Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement of Class Action and PAGA Claims].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best

interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 17.)

Indeed, the \$2,150,000 Settlement represents **58% of the realistic maximum recovery of \$3,732,749.02.** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants’ maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$40 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants’ realistic exposure was \$3,732,749.02, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 19-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all current and former non-exempt hourly paid/hourly employees and all current and former non-exempt salaried employees of Defendant who work or worked for Defendant at any of its facilities in California at any time during the Class Period; and all current and former non-exempt hourly-paid / hourly workers who work or worked for Defendant at any of its facilities in California at any time during the Class Period via, through or under the employment of a farm labor contractor, temporary services employer or other third party that furnished workers to Defendant.” (Settlement, ¶ 3.)

2. Class Period: means the time period from June 8, 2017 to June 24, 2023, or if later, the date on which the workweek count reached 295,625. (Settlement, ¶ 3, ¶ 40.)

3. Settlement Class Member: “shall mean the individual Class Members who did not opt out of the Settlement by submitting a valid request for exclusion as described in Paragraph 57.” (Settlement, ¶ 27.)

4. PAGA Employees: means all persons who are Class Members who were employed

at any time during the PAGA Period. (Settlement, ¶ 18.)

5. PAGA Period: means June 8, 2020 through the date of preliminary approval. (Settlement, ¶ 20.)

6. Settlement Fund: This amount is \$2,150,000, for all claims, including the Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Enhancement Payments. (Settlement, ¶ 28.) Defendants' share of payroll taxes is not included in this amount. (*Id.*)

7. Uncashed Settlement Checks: Each Settlement check will be valid and negotiable for six months from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, shall be cancelled. All funds associated with such cancelled checks will be transmitted to the California Unclaimed Property Fund, State Controller's Office, in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 384. (Settlement, ¶ 43(f).)

8. Class Release: "Upon the Effective Date, the claims released by the Settlement Class Members and Class/PAGA Representatives will include all claims pleaded in the Action and which could have been alleged under the facts, transactions, events, policies, occurrences, acts, disclosures, statements, omissions or failure to act allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Action (including in both the Estrada Lawsuit and Gillogly Lawsuit), against the Released Parties (as defined in Paragraph 24 above), for work performed during the Class Period including the following:

- (a) The claims set forth in the Action, specifically, (1) Violation of the Private Attorneys' General Act, Labor Code§ 2698 et seq.; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages (Cal. Lab. Code§§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code§§ 1194 and 1198); (4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Cal. Lab. Code§§ 226.7, 512); (5) Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods (Cal. Lab. Code§ 226.7); (6) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination (Cal. Lab. Code§§ 201-203); (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Cal.

1 Lab. Code § 226); (8) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Expenditures
2 (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and, (9) Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. &
3 Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.) as well as any claims which could have been
4 alleged under the facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Action
5 including any claims for unpaid wages (including minimum, regular and
6 overtime wages), untimely wage payments both during and at the end of
7 employment, non-compliant meal periods, non-compliant rest periods, non-
8 compliant wage statements, untimely final wage statements, unlawful
9 rounding, reimbursement for business expenses, failure to properly calculate
10 the regular rate of pay, claims for unpaid sick pay and personal time off (to
11 the extent it comprises sick pay), claims for nonproductive time and claims
12 for interest, penalties (including but not limited to waiting time penalties),
13 or premiums in connection therewith, as well as any claims under the
14 California Labor Code and California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
15 Orders

16 (b) that were alleged or which could have been alleged under the facts,
17 allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Action;

18 (c) Any claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, restitution or fraudulent
19 business practices alleged or which could have been alleged under the facts,
20 allegations and/or claims pleaded in the complaints filed as part of the
21 Action; and

22 (d) Any and all other claims under California common law, the California Labor
23 Code including but not limited to the Private Attorneys General Act, the Fair
24 Labor Standards Act, California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
25 Orders, and the California Business and Professions Code alleged in or that
26 could have been alleged under the facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded
27 in the Action. In addition, the cashing of the settlement check by the
28 Settlement Class Member shall be deemed to be an opt-in for purposes of

1 releasing Released Parties from any claims predicated under the FLSA that
2 could have been alleged under the facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded
3 in the Action. The Settlement Administrator shall include a legend on the
4 settlement check stating: ‘By cashing this check, I am opting into the
5 settlement in Guadalupe Estrada v. Monterey Mushrooms Inc., Santa Clara
6 County Superior Case No. 21CV386229 and Brian Gillogly v. Monterey
7 Mushrooms Inc., Santa Clara County Superior Case No. 21CV391403 under
8 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and releasing the Class Released Claims
9 described in the Stipulation of Settlement.’” (Settlement, ¶ 64.)

10 9. PAGA release: Upon the Effective Date, Class/PAGA Representatives and the
11 PAGA Employees hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released,
12 settled, compromised, relinquished and discharged any and all of the Released Parties of and from
13 any and all PAGA claims predicated on the facts and/or claims alleged in the Action and/or any
14 PAGA letter sent to the LWDA by any named plaintiff, Settlement Class Member or PAGA
15 Employee in the Action or in any way premised in whole or in part on any of the Class Claims set
16 forth above in Paragraph 64 that arose at any time during the PAGA Period (collectively, "the
17 PAGA Claims"). The PAGA Employees will be issued a check for their share of the PAGA
18 Payment, Individual PAGA Payment, and will not have the opportunity to opt out of, or object to,
19 the PAGA Payment and release of the PAGA Claims set forth in this Paragraph. The PAGA
20 Employees are bound by the release of the PAGA Claims regardless of whether they cash their
21 Individual PAGA Payment. (Settlement, ¶ 65.)

22 10. Released Parties: means “Defendant and any of its or their past, present and future
23 direct or indirect parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors and affiliates, all farm labor
24 contractors, temporary services employers and other third party employers that furnished workers
25 to Defendant, and any individual or entity which could be jointly liable with Defendant, as well as
26 each of its or their past, present and future officers, directors, employees, partners, members,
27 shareholders and agents, attorneys, insurers and reinsurers.” (Settlement, ¶ 24.)

28 11. No Reversion: No portion of the Total Settlement Amount shall revert to Defendant.

(Settlement, ¶ 40.)

12. PAGA Payment: The settlement includes \$50,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs' claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$37,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$12,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, ¶ 44.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 11.)

13. Net Settlement Amount: The "Net Settlement Amount" is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) attorneys' fees and costs, (2) Settlement Administration Costs, (3) Enhancement Payments to the Named Plaintiffs, and (4) the PAGA Payment. (Settlement, ¶ 43.)

14. Distribution Formula: "Individual Settlement Shares and Individual PAGA Payments will be calculated and apportioned based on the Workweeks, as follows:

- (a) Each Settlement Class Member's individual Pay Period count (total number of Pay Periods the Settlement Class Member worked during the Class Period),
 - (b) Divided by the combined sum of all Settlement Class Members' Pay Period counts during the Class Period; and
 - (c) Multiplied by the value of the Net Settlement Amount. Each Settlement Class Member's respective calculation of Pay Periods worked and estimated share of the Net Settlement Amount shall be identified in the Notice."
- (Settlement, ¶ 43(a).)

15. PAGA Allocation: To arrive at the Individual PAGA Payments, the portion of the PAGA Payment allocated to the PAGA Employees shall be divided among the PAGA Employees on a pro-rata basis, based upon the following formula: each PAGA Employee's Pay Period count (the total number of Pay Periods the PAGA Employee worked during the PAGA Period) divided by the combined sum of all PAGA Employees' pay period counts, multiplied by the value of the portion of the PAGA Payment allocated to the PAGA Employees.. (Settlement, ¶ 45.)

16. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be

1 allocated as 30% wages, 70% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, ¶ 43(d).)

2 17. Enhancement Payment: Subject to Court approval, each Plaintiffs shall be paid an
3 Enhancement Payment not to exceed \$12,500.00 each. (Settlement, ¶ 49.) If the Court approves a
4 lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement
5 Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis.
6 (Settlement, ¶ 43(c).)

7 18. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
8 a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$716,595.00) of the Total Settlement Amount, plus out-of-
9 pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 48.)

10 19. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
11 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys'
12 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
13 are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class
14 mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶54.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement
15 Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current
16 addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-
17 mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator
18 Bid].)

19 **III. DISCUSSION**

20 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
21 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
22 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
23 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
24 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
25 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
26 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

27 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
28 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely

1 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
2 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
3 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
4 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
5 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
6 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
7 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
8 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
9 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
10 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
11 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

12 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
13 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
14 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

15 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
16 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

17 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
18 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

19 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
20 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
21 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
22 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
23 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
24 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
25 to approve the settlement.”].)

26 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
27 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Hon. Howard Broadman (Ret.). (Marquez
28 Decl. ¶ 9.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a

1 professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore
2 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its
3 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
4 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and
5 Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 10.)

6 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
7 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
8 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
9 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
10 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
11 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
12 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 7-8.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
13 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
14 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
15 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

16 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
17 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶¶ 42-54; Bokhour Decl. at ¶¶ 16-21.)
18 Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective
19 evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time
20 consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

21 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties'** 22 **Respective Legal Positions**

23 A settlement is not judged against what plaintiff might recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
24 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
25 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent
26 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
27 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
28 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in

1 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

2 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
3 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 29.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate
4 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving
5 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
6 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

7 The proposed settlement of \$2,150,000 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
8 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Because of the proposed
9 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
10 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
11 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
12 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$2,150,000 is within the
13 “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
14 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
15 ***\$596.32.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 30.)

16 3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

17 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
18 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
19 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-54;
20 Bokhour Decl., ¶¶ 16-21.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the
21 claims alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests
22 of the class.

23 B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

24 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
25 for dissemination to the class and sub-class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the
26 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
27 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
28 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice

meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendants agree to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$716,595, which is 33 1/3% of the total settlement amount, and up to \$25,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the

1 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
2 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
3 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
4 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
5 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
6 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

7 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

8 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
9 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
10 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
11 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
12 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
13 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
14 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also
15 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
16 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
17 million].)

18 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
19 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature,
20 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
21 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
22 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
23 Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as
24 negotiated by the parties and requested herein.

25 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

26 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
27 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
28 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were

larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-41.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-54; Bokhour Decl., ¶¶ 16-21.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which

1 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
2 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
3 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

4 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
5 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
6 codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
7 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
8 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
9 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
10 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
11 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
12 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
13 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

14 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agreed to pay
15 an Enhancement Payment in the amount of \$12,500 to each Plaintiff. This amount is also in
16 exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs devoted a great
17 deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently
18 for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during
19 the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 32-36; Bokhour Decl., ¶ 11; *See generally* Declaration of Brian
20 Gillogly in Support of Plaintiffs ‘Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; *See*
21 *generally* Declaration of Plaintiff Guadalupe Estrada In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
22 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light
23 of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams,*
24 *III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F.
25 Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members, and the
26 court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶ 36.)

28 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount

requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

1 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
2 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
3 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
4 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
5 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*,
6 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

7 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
8 **Settlement Purposes.**

9 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

10 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
11 approximately 2,200 employees of Defendants.

12 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
13 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
14 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
15 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
16 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

17 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
18 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
19 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
20 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
21 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
22 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
23 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
24 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
25 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

26 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

27 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
28 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any

1 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
2 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
3 Cal.App.3d 605.)

4 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant
5 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally
6 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
7 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
8 overtime wages; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
9 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
10 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
11 compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified
12 class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress
13 for, the same alleged injuries.

14 **3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

15 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
16 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
17 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
18 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
19 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
20 situated" vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
21 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
22 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendants; as
23 such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
24 employees.

25 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

26 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
27 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
28 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*

1 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

2 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
3 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
4 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-54; Bokhour Decl., ¶¶ 17-21.) Class Counsel
5 unquestionably is “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.”
6 (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and
7 Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms,
8 showing their dedication. Plaintiffs’ willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her
9 serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60
10 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

11 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

12 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
13 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
14 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
15 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
16 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
17 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
18 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
19 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
20 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
21 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

22 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

23 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

24 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
25 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
26 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
27 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
28 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he

1 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
2 Members" (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
3 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

4 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

5 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
6 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
7 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
8 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
9 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

10 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
11 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
12 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
13 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
14 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
15 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
16 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
17 combined settlement-certification class notice.

18 ///

19 ///

20 ///

21 ///

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in September 2024.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: March 26, 2024

6 By: _____

7 Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
8 Benjamin H. Haber, Esq.
9 Maxim Gorbunov, Esq.
10 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM**

11 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Gillogly*

12 Mehrdad Bokhour, Esq.
13 **BOKHOUR LAW GROUP, P.C.**

14 Jake D. Finkel, Esq.
15 **LAW OFFICES OF JAKE D. FINKEL**

16 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Estrada*

Gillogly v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., et al.
21CV391403

I, Rebecca Padilla state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is rpadilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

Mehrdad Bokhour (SBN 285256)
mehrdad@bokhourlaw.com
BOKHOUR LAW GROUP, P.C.
 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 450
 Los Angeles, California 90067
 Telephone: (310) 975-1493
 Facsimile: (310) 675-0861

Jake D. Finkel (SBN 293954)
jake@lawfinkel.com
LAW OFFICES OF JAKE D. FINKEL
 3470 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 830
 Los Angeles, California 90010
 Telephone: (213) 787-7411
 Facsimile: (323) 916-0521

James K. Gumberg (SBN 157151)
jpgumberg@pglawfirm.com
 Christina Miccoli
cmiccoli@pglawfirm.com
PATANE GUMBERG AVILA, LLP
 4 Rossi Circle, Suite 231
 Salinas, California 93907
 Mailing: P.O. Box 3770,
 Salinas, California 93912
 Telephone: (831) 755-1461
 Facsimile: (831) 755-1477

Attorneys for Defendant

Attorneys for Plaintiff Guadalupe Estrada

- (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- (X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 26, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.


Rebecca Padilla