

JAMES HAWKINS APLC  
James R. Hawkins (#192925)  
Gregory Mauro (#222239)  
Michael Calvo (#314986)  
Lauren Falk (#316893)  
Ava Issary (#342252)  
9880 Research Drive, Suite 200  
Irvine, CA 92618  
Tel.: (949) 387-7200  
Fax: (949) 387-6676  
Email: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com  
Email: Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com  
Email: Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com  
Email: Lauren@jameshawkinsaplc.com  
Email: Ava@jameshawkinsaplc.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff NHYELA WASHINGTON  
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA**

NHYELA WASHINGTON, individually and on  
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PREDICINE, INC., A Delaware Corporation;  
and does 1-50, inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No. 21CV003730

Assigned for all Purposes to:  
Hon. Michael Markman  
Dept. 23

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION  
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS  
ACTION SETTLEMENT;  
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS,  
ENHANCEMENT AWARD AND  
ADMINISTRATION COSTS;  
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF  
CLASS COUNSEL; DECLARATION  
OF PLAINTIFF WASHINGTON**

Date: September 19, 2024  
Time: 10:00 a.m.  
Dept.: 23

Reservation #A-03730-001

1           **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:**  
2 **NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN** that on September 19, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as  
3 the matter may be heard in Department 23 before the Honorable Michael Markman of the Alameda  
4 County Superior Court, Plaintiff NHYELA WASHINGTON (“Plaintiff”), by and through  
5 Plaintiff’s counsels of record, will and hereby moves the Court for Final Approval of the Amended  
6 Stipulation of Class and PAGA Representative Action Settlement, awarding attorneys’ fees,  
7 litigation costs, Class Representative Enhancement Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and  
8 entering final approval and judgment.

9           This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court and Labor  
10 Code section 2699(l). This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached  
11 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying Declarations of James R. Hawkins  
12 (“Hawkins”), the declaration of Madely Nava of Apex Class Action, LLC, the declaration of  
13 Plaintiff NHYELA WASHINGTON, the Amended Stipulation of Class and PAGA Representative  
14 Action Settlement (the “Settlement Agreement”), attached to the Hawkins, argument of counsel,  
15 all papers and pleadings filed in the action, and upon any further information or evidence requested  
16 by the Court at the time of hearing on this Motion.  
17

18  
19 Dated: August 26, 2024

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

20  
21 BY:



James Hawkins  
Gregory Mauro  
Michael Calvo  
Lauren Falk  
Ava Issary

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed  
Class

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

|      |                                                                                                              |    |
|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| I.   | INTRODUCTION.....                                                                                            | 1  |
| II.  | BACKGROUND, INVESTIGATION, DISCOVERY.....                                                                    | 2  |
|      | 1. The Settlement Provides Reasonable Compensation to Class Members.....                                     | 3  |
| III. | THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND THE CLASS MEMBERS' RESPONSE....                                                  | 5  |
|      | A. Terms of the Settlement.....                                                                              | 5  |
|      | B. Released Claims.....                                                                                      | 5  |
|      | C. The Class Members Support the Settlement- Zero (0) Objections and One (1)<br>Opt-Out.....                 | 5  |
| IV.  | THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE.....                                                        | 6  |
|      | A. The Settlement Satisfies the Standard for Final Approval.....                                             | 6  |
| V.   | THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS.....                                                   | 7  |
|      | A. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable, and Calculated as a Percentage<br>of a Common Fund.....   | 7  |
|      | 1. The Requested Attorneys' Fee is Within the Range of Fees Approved<br>in Comparable Common Fund Cases..... | 9  |
|      | 2. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the<br>Requested Fee.....                           | 9  |
|      | 3. Class Counsel's Hourly Rates are Reasonable.....                                                          | 10 |
|      | 4. Class Counsel's Total Hours are Reasonable.....                                                           | 11 |
|      | 5. Costs of Litigation are Reasonable.....                                                                   | 11 |
|      | B. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE ENHANCEMENT AWARD IS<br>REASONABLE.....                                          | 11 |
|      | C. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE.....                                                   | 12 |
|      | D. THE SETTLEMENT PENALTIES UNDER PAGA ARE REASONABLE.....                                                   | 12 |
| VI.  | CONCLUSION.....                                                                                              | 13 |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                          |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------|
| <i>Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLP,</i>        |      |
| 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014).....    | 4    |
| <i>Bell v Farmers Ins. Exchange,</i>                     |      |
| (2004) 115 Cal App 4th 715.....                          | 12   |
| <i>Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.,</i>                      |      |
| USDC Southern District, Case No. 06cv1690 DMS (WMC)..... | 9    |
| <i>Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i>                   |      |
| (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4 <sup>th</sup> 1380.....           | 12   |
| <i>Children’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bonta</i>           |      |
| 97 Cal.App.4th 740 (2002).....                           | 6,10 |
| <i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i>         |      |
| (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....                               | 8    |
| <i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Company</i>                        |      |
| (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....                          | 6,7  |
| <i>Flannery v. California Highway Patrol</i>             |      |
| (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629.....                         | 10   |
| <i>In Re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.,</i>               |      |
| 472 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979).....                   | 4    |
| <i>In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i>             |      |
| (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380.....                       | 12   |
| <i>In Re Four Seasons Secs. Laws Litig.,</i>             |      |
| 58 F.R.D. 19 (W.D. Okla.1972).....                       | 4    |
| <i>In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation,</i>       |      |
| 396 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).....                         | 8    |
| <i>In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.,</i>           |      |
| 212 F.R.D. 231 (D. Del. 2002).....                       | 4    |

|    |                                                                               |     |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1  | <i>Ketchum v. Moses</i>                                                       |     |
| 2  | (2001) 24 Cal. 4 <sup>th</sup> 1122.....                                      | 10  |
| 3  | <i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc</i>                                     |     |
| 4  | 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), .....                                              | 7,8 |
| 5  | <i>Martin v. Ameripride Servs.,</i>                                           |     |
| 6  | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, *22-23 (S.D. Cal. 2011).....                     | 9   |
| 7  | <i>New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey</i>                                  |     |
| 8  | (1980) 447 U.S. 54.....                                                       | 11  |
| 9  | <i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City &amp; Cnty. of S.F.</i> |     |
| 10 | (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615.....                                             | 6   |
| 11 | <i>PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler</i>                                             |     |
| 12 | (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084.....                                                  | 10  |
| 13 | <i>Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal.</i>                             |     |
| 14 | (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 592.....                                                    | 6   |
| 15 | <i>Quinn v. State of California</i>                                           |     |
| 16 | (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....                                                     | 8   |
| 17 | <i>Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.,</i>                         |     |
| 18 | 9 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 1993).....                                               | 8   |
| 19 | <i>Rippee v. Boston Mkt. Corp.,</i>                                           |     |
| 20 | USDC Southern District, Case No. 05cv1359 BTM (JMA).....                      | 9   |
| 21 | <i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>                                                     |     |
| 22 | 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977).....                                                  | 7   |
| 23 | <i>Serrano v. Priest</i>                                                      |     |
| 24 | (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621.....                                                     | 11  |
| 25 | <i>Serrano v. Unruh,</i>                                                      |     |
| 26 | 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (1982).....                                                | 10  |
| 27 |                                                                               |     |
| 28 |                                                                               |     |

|    |                                          |       |
|----|------------------------------------------|-------|
| 1  | <i>Stambaugh v. Superior Court</i>       |       |
| 2  | (1976) 62 Cal. App. 3d 231.....          | 6     |
| 3  | <i>Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin,</i> |       |
| 4  | 226 Cal.App.4th 691 (2014).....          | 11    |
| 5  | <i>Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank</i>        |       |
| 6  | 92 Cal. App. 4 <sup>th</sup> 839.....    | 10    |
| 7  | <i>Vincent, supra,</i>                   |       |
| 8  | 557 F.2d at 769.....                     | 8     |
| 9  | <i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i>   |       |
| 10 | (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224.....         | 6,7,9 |

#### **Statutes, Rules and Regulations**

|    |                                          |   |
|----|------------------------------------------|---|
| 13 | California Rules of Court 3.769.....     | 6 |
| 14 | California Rules of Court 3.769 (g)..... | 6 |

#### **Secondary Authorities**

|    |                           |    |
|----|---------------------------|----|
| 17 | Manual § 21.62 n.971..... | 12 |
|----|---------------------------|----|

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This Court preliminary approved the settlement on or about April 22, 2024. (James  
4 Hawkins Decl. “Hawkins”, **Exhibit A** - Preliminary Approval Order). Plaintiff Washington  
5 (“Plaintiff”), now respectfully request that this Court grant final approval of the settlement  
6 agreement attached to the Hawkins Declaration as **Exhibit B**, which seeks to resolve claims  
7 against PREDICINE, INC., A Delaware Corporation (“Defendant”) in exchange for a non-  
8 reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of (“GSA”) of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand Six  
9 hundred and Eighty Three Dollars and Seventy Seven Cents (\$144,683.77).<sup>1</sup>

10 The Class Members overwhelmingly supported the Settlement, as there is a 98.48%  
11 participation rate, with zero objections and only one opt out resulting in 65 out of 66  
12 Participating Class Members. The *highest* Individual Settlement Amount to a Participating Class  
13 Member is currently estimated to be approximately \$3,525.66, the *average* Individual Settlement  
14 Amount is currently estimated to be approximately \$1,022.40, and the *lowest* Individual  
15 Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be approximately \$31.91. These amounts are subject  
16 to employee-side tax and withholdings. (Administrator Decl. of Madely Nava-hereinafter  
17 “Nava”, ¶ 16).

18 Plaintiff also moves for final approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$48,227.92  
19 which is one third of GSA. As will be demonstrated herein, Class Counsel’s attorney fee request  
20 is supported using the percentage fee method and the lodestar method. Second, Plaintiff moves  
21 for final approval of payment of the litigation costs in the amount of \$15,654.64, all of which  
22 was incurred in litigating this matter. Third, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the Class  
23 Representative Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in the sum of \$5,000.00, to compensate the  
24 Class Representative for their service as the Class Representative and providing a general release  
25 of his claims against Defendant – a release significantly greater than the Class Members  
26 provided – and for the risks absorbed and time spent litigating the case. Plaintiff played a vital  
27

28 <sup>1</sup> The total number of workweeks worked by Participating Class Members during the Class Period is 1,785.29,  
which exceeded the escalator clause threshold and thus the Gross Settlement Amount was increased by \$49,683.77.  
As a result, the Gross Settlement Amount is \$144,683.77. (Nava Decl., ¶ 14).

1 role in representing Class Members in this case and spearheading the lawsuit to seek monetary  
2 relief on behalf of all Class Members. Fourth, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the payment  
3 of \$4,000.00 in administrative costs to Apex Class Action, LLC. Fifth, Plaintiff moves for final  
4 approval of the \$4,000.00 PAGA Payment and the payment to the Labor and Work Development  
5 Agency (“LWDA”) for its share of the PAGA Payment (\$3,000.00, which is 75% of \$4,000.00;  
6 with the remaining \$1,000.00 payable to Aggrieved Employees).

7 This case required many hours of attorney and Plaintiff time who sought relief on behalf  
8 of 66 potential class members within the State of California defined all current and former non-  
9 exempt employees who were employed by Defendant PREDICINE, INC. at any time between  
10 December 7, 2017, through June 1, 2023. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.4).

11 This litigation involved the review and analysis of documents, policies, and practices, as  
12 well as a full day of mediation. Most importantly, the Settlement and all its terms received  
13 overwhelming support from Class Members, as there were no objections and only one request  
14 for exclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request the Court grant final approval of the  
15 Settlement, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Class Representative Enhancement Award,  
16 Settlement Administration Costs, and payment to the LWDA in the amounts preliminarily  
17 approved by the Court and as fully disclosed to Class Members.

## 18 **II. BACKGROUND, INVESTIGATION, DISCOVERY**

19 On December 7, 2021 Plaintiff files a putative class action complaint entitled *Nhyela*  
20 *Washington v. Predicine, Inc.*, Alameda County Superior Court No. 22STCV05538 seeking  
21 damages for Defendant’s alleged failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime  
22 compensation, failure to authorize and provide meal periods or premium pay in lieu thereof,  
23 failure to authorize and permit rest breaks of premium pay in lieu thereof, failure to indemnify  
24 necessary business expenses, failure to timely pay final wages at termination, and unfair business  
25 practices. (Hawkins Decl. ¶¶ 3-6).

26 On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff provided written notice by certified mail to the Labor and  
27 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and Defendant of the specific provisions of the  
28



1 California Labor Code that Plaintiff alleged Defendant had violated with respect to non-exempt  
2 and/or hourly paid employees in California. *Id.*

3 As a result of the investigations, and subsequent settlement discussions and the resultant  
4 settlement and scope of claims, on August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action  
5 Complaint against Defendant, adding a cause of action for civil penalties under the PAGA,  
6 combining the class and PAGA actions. (Hawkins Decl. ¶6).

7 On March 29, 2023, the Parties engaged in private mediation with a well-respected wage  
8 and hour class action mediator, Jeffrey Krivis, a respected mediator of complex wage and hour actions,  
9 and, with Mr. Krivis's assistance, the Parties agreed to a mediator proposal. (Hawkins Decl. ¶5). The  
10 settlement discussions were conducted at arm's-length, and the settlement is the result of an informed and  
11 detailed analysis of Defendant's potential liability in relation to the costs and risks associated with  
12 continued litigation. Based on the documents produced, as well as Class Counsel's own independent  
13 investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel believes that the Settlement with Defendant for the  
14 consideration and on the terms set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the  
15 best interest of the Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of  
16 significant delay and uncertainty associated with litigation and various defenses asserted by Defendant.  
17 (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 4-12, Ex. 1.)

18 In reaching the proposed settlement, Plaintiff counsel's negotiation efforts took into  
19 consideration relevant factors such as the size of the class, the information, data, and documents  
20 obtained in the litigation and/or otherwise exchanged pursuant to the mediation privilege; the  
21 experience of the named Plaintiff; the strengths and weaknesses of the case; the uncertain  
22 outcome and risk of litigating complex actions; the time and expense in litigating a case through  
23 trial; Defendants' defenses; and the non-reversionary nature of the settlement.

24  
25 **1. The Settlement Provides Reasonable Compensation to Class Members**

26 As a result of the mediation, the parties agreed to settle this matter for a Gross Settlement  
27 Amount ("GSA") of \$144,683.77 (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 5, Nava Decl., ¶ 14). Based on their own  
28 respective independent investigations and evaluations, and after taking into account the sharply

1 disputed factual and legal issues involved in this matter, the risks attending further prosecution of  
2 the case, and the monetary benefits received under the Settlement despite the questionable nature  
3 of the claims, Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that Settlement for the consideration and on the  
4 terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement remains fair, reasonable and adequate and is in the  
5 best interests of the Class Members. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 5-13).

6 Even without the presumption of fairness and reasonableness, the settlement is clearly  
7 within the range of reasonableness as thoroughly discussed in detail in the motion for  
8 preliminary approval, and as considered by the Court in granting preliminary approval, (Hawkins  
9 Decl., ¶¶ 9-18; Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary Approval).

10 Accounting for the risks of continued litigation and impediments to discovery, Plaintiff  
11 determined that a settlement amounting to \$144,683.77 was fair and reasonable and the court  
12 preliminarily agreed. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 11-21). *See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 212  
13 F.R.D. 231, 256-58 (D. Del. 2002) (recognizing that a reasonable settlement amount can be 1.6% to 14%  
14 of the total estimated damages); *In Re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.*, 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (N.D. Ga.  
15 1979) (settlements with a value of 1% to 8% of the estimated total damages were approved); *In Re Four*  
16 *Seasons Secs. Laws Litig.*, 58 F.R.D. 19, 37 (W.D. Okla.1972) (approving 8% of damages); *Balderas v.*  
17 *Massage Envy Franchising, LLP*, 2014 WL 3610945, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (finding that  
18 settlement which amounted to 8% of maximum recovery "[fell] within the range of possible initial  
19 approval based on the strength of plaintiff's case and the risk and expense of continued litigation."); *In re*  
20 *Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement of 6% to 8%  
21 of estimated damages).<sup>2</sup> (*Id.*)

---

22  
23 <sup>2</sup> *See also In re Uber FCRA Litig.*, No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101552, at \*23- 24 (N.D. Cal.  
24 June 29, 2017) (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement where gross settlement fund, prior to  
25 deducting attorneys' fees and services awards, was valued at 7.5% or less of total possible verdict); *Viceral v.*  
26 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, No. 15-cv-02198-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at \*21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016)  
27 (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement representing "8.1% of the full verdict value" with net  
28 settlement amount representing approximately 5.3% of full verdict value); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*,  
No. 13-cv-02540-HSG, 2015 WL 3776765, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final approval to settlement  
with net recovery to Plaintiff valued at 7.3% of potential maximum recovery); *Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-  
02705-DMR, 2014 WL 7247065, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (granting final approval where gross settlement  
amount represented 8.6% of the maximum potential recovery from the class claims and estimated amount  
distributable to class after accounting for attorneys' fees and other deductions represented approximately 6.1% of  
maximum potential recovery); *In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig.*, No. 07-cv-05182-WHA, 2010 WL 3001384, at \*2 (N.D.

1           **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND THE CLASS MEMBERS' RESPONSE**

2           **A. Terms of the Settlement**

3           The GSA is (\$144,683.77). This amount includes, the Settlement Administration Costs of  
4 \$4,000.00; the Class Representative Enhancement Award of up to \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff; Court-  
5 approved attorneys' fees up to \$48,227.92, litigation costs to Class Counsel in the amount of  
6 \$15,654.64; and PAGA penalties of \$4,000.00 with 75% of that amount paid to the LWDA and  
7 the remaining 25% paid to the Aggrieved Employees. The Net Settlement Amount ("NSA") is  
8 approximately \$67,801.20. (Nava Decl., ¶ 15).

9           The Settlement is a common fund settlement with no reversion to Defendant. Thus, each  
10 of the participating Settlement Class Members will be paid his or her pro-rata share of the NSA.

11           **B. Released Claims**

12           Subject to approval by this Court, and in exchange for the consideration recited in the  
13 Settlement Agreement, the Released Claims are all claims that have been or could have been  
14 reasonably alleged or asserted in the PAGA Notices and as defined in the Settlement. (Hawkins  
15 Decl., Ex. B- Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 24-30).

16           **C. The Class Members Support the Settlement – Zero (0) Objections and**  
17           **One (1) Opt-Out**

18           On April 22, 2024, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, conditionally  
19 certified the class for settlement purposes, appointed Apex Class Action, LLC to act as the  
20 administrator, approved the Notice to be sent to the Class, and directed that the Notice be mailed  
21 to the Class via U.S. First Class Mail. (Hawkins Decl., Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary  
22 Approval). On or about June 12, 2024, Apex mailed the Notices to 66 Class Members. (Nava  
23 Decl., ¶7). Out of the 66 Notices, only 1 was deemed undeliverable after attempts to ascertain the  
24 addresses. (Nava Decl., ¶¶ 7-11). As a result of the mailing, there is a 98.48% participation rate  
25 and 65 Class Members will be mailed a settlement check. (*Id.* ¶ 13).

26  
27  
28           Cal. July 29, 2010) (granting final approving where "[t]he proposed settlement amount is [. . .] only about five  
percent of the estimated damages before fee and costs—even before any reduction thereof for attorney's fees and  
costs.").

1 All settlement checks to Class Members and/or Aggrieved Employees that remain  
2 uncashed after one hundred eighty (180) days of the mailing by the Claims Administrator, or for  
3 those Class Members and/or Aggrieved Employees whose Notice Packets were deemed  
4 undeliverable, shall be distributed to a cy pres recipient Child Advocates of Silicon Valley, a tax-  
5 exempt 501(c)(3) organization that is a child advocacy program for the benefit of children,  
6 consistent with the requirements set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 384(a).  
7 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 4.10).

#### 8 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

##### 9 **D. The Settlement Satisfies the Standard for Final Approval**

10 California Rule of Court, Rule 3.769, requires court approval for class action settlements.  
11 Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(g). California courts favor settlement. *Stambaugh v. Superior Court* (1976) 62  
12 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, *Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal.* (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602  
13 (“[T]he law wisely favors settlements”). Accordingly, the Court must give “[due] regard to what  
14 is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer,*  
15 *Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 224, 245.

16 In deciding whether to approve a class settlement, a court evaluates whether the proposed  
17 settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup>  
18 1794, 1801 (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. Of S.F.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982)  
19 688 F.2d 615, 625). A court enjoys broad discretion to make its fairness determination. *Dunk*, 48  
20 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 1801. However, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is  
21 reached through arms-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow  
22 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)  
23 the percentage of objectors is small.” *Id.* at 1802; accord *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 245. In  
24 addition, a court should consider additional relevant factors, including the strength of the Plaintiff’s  
25 case compared to the settlement amount; the risk, expenses, complexity, and likely duration of  
26 further litigation; and the fair treatment of class members in relation to each other. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.  
27 App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 1802.  
28

1 At the time of preliminary approval, the Court was provided with sufficient information to  
2 satisfy three of the four *Dunk* factors, leaving the fourth factor, the number of objectors, unknown  
3 until after the Class had an opportunity to respond to the Settlement as explained in the Notice.  
4 Subject only to the Class's reaction to the Settlement, the Court preliminarily presumed the  
5 Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Following dissemination of the Notice, and  
6 adequate time provided to the Class to object to the Settlement, no class member submitted  
7 objections and only one Class Member excluded themselves from the settlement, **resulting in a**  
8 **98.48% participation rate from the Class.** (Nava Decl., ¶ 13). Thus, the proposed Settlement is  
9 entitled to the presumption that it is fair and in all other respects proper and should be finally  
10 approved.

11 **V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS**

12 **E. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable, Calculated as a Percentage**  
13 **of a Common Fund**

14 Class Counsel applies for an award of attorneys' fees in the sum of \$48,227.92 of the GSA,  
15 and litigation costs of \$15,654.64 (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 25-28, Ex. C). When a settlement results in  
16 a common fund for the benefit of a class, class counsel may be awarded fees as a percentage of the  
17 common fund. See *Wershba*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254 (recognizing the "percentage of  
18 recovery" method). The California Supreme Court confirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*  
19 that "[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases." 1 Cal.5th 480, 506  
20 (2016), in stating:

21 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of  
22 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better  
23 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement  
24 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging  
25 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not  
26 be denied our trial courts.

27 *Id.* at 503 (internal citation omitted); see also *e.g.*, *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34  
28 (1977) ("when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action  
brought by a plaintiff or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that  
fund, such plaintiff or Plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund."); *Serrano v.*  
*Unruh*, 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (1982) (in awarding a fee from the common fund obtained for the

benefit of all parties, the trial court acts within its equitable power to prevent the other parties' unjust enrichment.); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993) (the percentage of the fund method for calculating attorney's fees more accurately reflects the results achieved for the putative class than the lodestar method and "establishes reasonable expectations on the part of Plaintiff's attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages early settlement, which avoids protracted litigation."); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation*, 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund 'in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure.'").<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at 769. In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, 167, the Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." The reasons for applying the common fund doctrine include: "...fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and directly compensated should his efforts be successful." *Id.* Because

---

<sup>3</sup> *Laffitte* also held trial courts have discretion to assess reasonableness of fee awards with tools such as the lodestar cross-check, although they need not do so. *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 ("We hold further that trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee . . . they also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee").

1 there is a defined and clearly traceable benefit to the Class, the Court can base an award of  
2 attorneys' fees using a 'common fund' approach to compensate Class Counsel.

3 **1. The Requested Attorneys' Fee is Within the Range of Fees Approved in**  
4 **Comparable Common Fund Cases**

5 Assessing an appropriate fee based on a percentage of the fund involves considering "all  
6 of the circumstances of the case." Appellate cases addressing fees arise almost exclusively where  
7 awards were challenged by Defendants or objectors – the only parties with standing to appeal.  
8 *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 236.

9 The requested fee falls in the mid-range of percentage class fee awards, which generally  
10 range from 20% to 50% of a common fund, and it constitutes fair compensation for undertaking  
11 complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent basis and compensates  
12 Class Counsel for their efforts, as well as the result achieved for the benefit of the Class. Numerous  
13 courts in California routinely approve fee requests equal to or greater than 35% of the common  
14 fund. *See Martin v. Ameripride Servs.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, \*22-23 (S.D. Cal. 2011)  
15 (collecting cases); *Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 06cv1690 DMS  
16 (WMC) (awarding 40% fee on a \$16 million wage and hour class action settlement); *Rippee v.*  
17 *Boston Mkt. Corp.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 05cv1359 BTM (JMA) (awarding a 40%  
18 fee on a \$3.75 million wage and hour class action settlement). In fact, the Sacramento County  
19 Superior Court has awarded fees of 35% of the common fund in wage and hour class actions.  
20 (*McMahon v. Airco Mechanical, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2019-00259269; *Uribe v. EcoGuard Pest*  
21 *Management, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2021-00300650; *Arroyo v. Epic Home Solar*, Case No. 34-2021-  
22 00310634; *Blair v. Clark Wagaman Designs*, Case No. 34-2021-00313156).

23 In short, Class Counsels' fee request of \$48,227.92 (33.33% of the common fund) is in line  
24 with awards in similar cases in California and demonstrates that Class Counsels' fee request is  
25 consistent with market rates and is reasonable.

26 **2. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee**

27 Class Counsels' fee request is reasonable when calculated using the lodestar method.  
28

1 Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably  
2 spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at  
3 48. The court then may enhance this lodestar figure by a “multiplier” to account for a range of  
4 factors, such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, its contingent nature, and the degree of  
5 success achieved. *Id.* at 49; *see also Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36 (2001); *Thayer*  
6 *v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834 (2001), “[t]here is no...rule limiting the factors  
7 that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to [adjust the] lodestar”].

8 As of the date of filing, Class Counsel worked approximately 90.20 combined documented  
9 hours on this case. All of the work and tasks performed by Class Counsel were reasonable and  
10 necessary for the prosecution of this case. (*Id.*).

### 11 **3. Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates are Reasonable**

12 Class Counsels’ hourly rates are between \$200 and \$950 and are in line with rates typically  
13 approved in wage and hour class action litigation and which rates have been approved by Courts  
14 in California in the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Orange and San Diego  
15 County Superior Courts. (Hawkins Decl., ¶24); *Children’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*, 97  
16 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 (2002) (noting rates were reasonable where they were “within the range of  
17 reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work”).

18 A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and  
19 experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.  
20 When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts may consider factors such as skill and  
21 experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s  
22 customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632.  
23 Class Counsels’ skill and experience support their hourly rates. Our practices are limited  
24 exclusively to litigation, focusing on the representation of employees in wage and hour and  
25 consumer class action matters. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 24). As prominent attorneys in the field of wage  
26 and hour class action litigation, Class Counsel continually monitors the prevailing market rates  
27 charged by both defense and plaintiff law firms and set the billing rates of their attorneys and  
28 paralegals to be consistent with the prevailing market rates in the private sector for attorneys and



staff of comparable skill, qualifications and experience. Other wage and hour attorneys working as class counsel before California courts charge comparable if not higher rates. Therefore, as they are in line with those of the relevant community, Class Counsels' hourly rates are reasonable.

#### **4. Class Counsel's Total Hours are Reasonable**

In determining a lodestar fee, reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the time spent before the action was filed, including time spent interviewing clients, investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. *See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62. The fee award should include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee claim. *Serrano v. Priest* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.

Class Counsel expended a combined total of approximately 92.20 hours on this case. The work performed to achieve a settlement that will provide valuable consideration to the Class is summarized by Class Counsel in the declaration submitted herewith. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 25-28;); *Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin*, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699 (2014) ("Because time records are not required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve.") (internal quotations omitted). All tasks and work performed were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this case. The work performed was justified considering the result achieved.

#### **5. Costs of Litigation are Reasonable**

Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of the litigation costs and expenses of \$15,654.64. These costs were reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the results achieved are fair, and reasonable. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 25-28, Ex. C).

### **VI. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE ENHANCEMENT AWARD IS REASONABLE**

Class Counsel seeks approval of a \$5,000.00 Class Representative Enhancement Award to the named Plaintiff/Class Representative. The requested enhancement award is reasonable in light of the general release of all claims Plaintiff agreed to, greater than the release given by Class Members, the benefits Plaintiff conferred upon the entire Class resulting in payments to all Class Members, the time spent assisting counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims and consenting to the proposed Settlement. Furthermore, in pursuing this action on behalf of the

1 Class, Plaintiff risked a judgment for attorneys' fees and costs in the event this matter had been  
2 lost. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 29-30; *See also* declaration of Plaintiff Washington filed concurrently  
3 herewith)

4 Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to compensate named  
5 Plaintiff for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class litigation. *See In re*  
6 *Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393; *see also Bell v. Farmers*  
7 *Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class  
8 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n.971 (noting that service payments are warranted). Based on the  
9 foregoing, the \$5,000.00 Class Representative Enhancement Award is fair, appropriate, and  
10 justified as part of the overall settlement.

11 **VII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

12 The Parties agreed to hire Apex Class Action, LLC as the administrator, and the Court  
13 approved this choice. The Administrator was responsible for formatting, printing and mailing the  
14 Notice. It was also responsible for updating addresses and re-mailing Notices returned as  
15 undeliverable, responding to Class Member inquiries, answering questions from Counsel for the  
16 Parties, and providing a declaration to document its duties and responsibilities under the  
17 settlement. Plaintiff now requests that the Court approve the \$4,000.00 fee to Apex Class Action,  
18 LLC for services rendered and to be rendered. (Nava Decl., ¶ 19). Following the grant of final  
19 approval, the Administrator's duties will continue in order to calculate and mail the Individual  
20 Settlement Payment checks to Class Members, perform tax reporting obligations, disburse other  
21 payments as ordered by the Court, and perform such other duties as set forth in the Settlement  
22 Agreement. The fee of \$4,000.00 for services rendered and to be rendered is fair and reasonable  
23 and should be granted.

24 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT PENALTIES UNDER PAGA ARE REASONABLE**

25 The PAGA payment of \$4,000.00 with 75% of to the LWDA and 25% to the aggrieved  
26 employees is reasonable under the circumstances. The Parties negotiated a good faith amount for  
27 PAGA penalties. The PAGA penalties allocation is not the result of self-interest at the expense of  
28 other Class Members. The LWDA was also provided notice of the Settlement with the concurrent

1 filing of the preliminary approval motion and the instant motion. Plaintiff did not receive a  
2 response or objection to the Settlement from the LWDA. Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court finally  
3 approve the PAGA allocation in the amount of \$4,000.00 with 75% being paid to the LWDA and  
4 25% being distributed to the aggrieved employees.

5 **IX. CONCLUSION**

6 Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court grant final approval  
7 of the Class Action Settlement, award (1) Class Counsels' fees in the sum of \$48,227.92 and  
8 litigation costs of \$15,654.64; (2) award the named Plaintiff an Class Representative Enhancement  
9 Award in the sum of \$5,000.00; (3) award \$4,000.00 to Apex Class Action, LLC, for settlement  
10 administration services, and (4) approve the PAGA Payment of \$4,000.00 with a \$3,000.00 of that  
11 sum paid to the LWDA and the remaining \$1,000.00 paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

12  
13 Dated: August 22, 2024

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

14  
15 BY:



16 James Hawkins  
17 Gregory Mauro  
18 Michael Calvo  
19 Lauren Falk  
20 Ava Issary

21 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed  
22 Class  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28

On August 26, 2024, I served on the interested parties in this action the following document(s) entitled:

**DECLARATION OF JAMES HAWKINS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; JUDGMENT**

**SERVICE LIST**  
(See attached service list)

Executed on August 26, 2024, at Irvine, California

  
Eddie Magana

**Via LWDA Website Only**

Labor and Workforce Development Agency

Attn: PAGA Administrator

1515 Clay Street, Ste 801

Oakland, CA 94612

*<http://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act>*

Brian D. Berry, Esq.

Sarah Zenewicz, Esq.

Camille A. Watson, Esq.

**Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP**

One Market, Spear Street Tower, 28th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105-1596

Tel: (415)442-1000

Fax: (415)442-1001

Brian.berry@morganlewis.com

Sarah.zenewicz@morganlewis.com

Camille.watson@morganlewis.com

Attorneys for Defendant

**PREDICINE INC.**