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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF KINGS

VAUGHN HENRY, individually, on behalf of
all others similarly situated; PEDRO TORRES
ZERMENO, individually, and on behalf of all
other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TESSENDERLO KERLEY, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive

Defendant.

Case No. 22C-0027

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Robert
Shane Burns, Dept. 2]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: November 19, 2025
Time: 8:15 a.m.
Dept.: 2

Complaint filed: January 28, 2022
FAC filed: June 12, 2022
SAC filed: May 1, 2025
Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 19, 2025 at 8:15 a.m., in Department 2 of the Kings County Superior Court, located at 1640 Kings County Drive, Hanford, CA 93230, Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, and Alan Wilcox of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$136,666.67 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$17,647.76 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to Phoenix Settlement Administration as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$7,250.00;
7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber, Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno, Kevin Lee and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

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
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1 Dated: October 27, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3
4 By: _____


Benjamin H. Haber
Daniel J. Kramer
Alan Wilcox

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno (“Plaintiff”) seek final approval of a proposed \$410,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Tessengerlo Kerley, Inc. (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 108 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$1,587.09* with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$2,919.15*. (Declaration of Kevin Lee Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Lee Decl.”], ¶ 14.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement** and **no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 8-9.) The administrator will provide a supplemental declaration once the responsive deadline passes. Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff request that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California and classified as non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant produces and markets specialty chemical solutions, including fertilizers, crop protection chemicals and process chemicals and services to diverse markets around the world. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under the PAGA. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 3.)

4. On January 28, 2022, Vaughn Henry filed this action as a putative class action against Defendant alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business practices, Case No. 22C-0027. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 4.) On June 13, 2022, Henry filed a First Amended Complaint to add a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA. On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff Henry sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff Zermeno sent notice to Defendant and the LWDA alleged wage and hour violations and intent to pursue a PAGA claim. On May 6, 2025, Henry filed a Second Amended Complaint

1 adding named Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno to the action. The Second Amended Complaint
2 is the Operative Complaint (“Operative Complaint”). (*Id.*)

3 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

4 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
5 information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendant produced a sample of time
6 and pay records for the class members. Defendant also provided employee handbooks outlining its
7 wage and hour policies and practices during the class period and information regarding the total
8 number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

9 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
10 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
11 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
12 exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
13 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
14 records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant’s potential liability prior to
15 mediation. (*Id.*)

16 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

17 On February 1, 2023, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
18 action mediator, Jeffrey Krivis, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at
19 arm’s length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients.
20 However, the Parties continued to negotiate in good faith following mediation. During the
21 negotiation process, Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno was added to replace Plaintiff Vaughn
22 Henry as the class and PAGA representative. (*Id.*) The Parties subsequently finalized a
23 settlement agreement, which was fully executed on May 27, 2025. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Joint Stipulation
24 of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Class Notice].)

25 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
26 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
27 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
28 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk

of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on June 26, 2025. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was September 8, 2025. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$410,000.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "All individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant in the State of California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time during the Class Period." (Settlement, ¶ I.E.)

2. Class Period: "The time period from August 3, 2017 to Preliminary Approval." (Settlement, ¶ I.I.)

3. Participating Class Members: "All Class Members who do not submit a valid and timely request to exclude themselves from this Settlement. Participating Class Members will release all of the Released Claims and will be bound by all terms of the Settlement and any final judgment entered in this Action." (Settlement, ¶ I.FF.)

4. Eligible Aggrieved Employees: "All individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant in the State of California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, ¶ I.R.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount or GSA: "The total value of the Settlement is a non-reversionary Four Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$410,000.00). This is the gross amount Defendant shall be required to pay under this Settlement Agreement, which

1 includes without limitation: (1) the Net Settlement Amount to be paid to Participating Class
2 Members; (2) the Attorney Fee Award and Cost Award to Class Counsel for attorneys' fees and
3 costs, as approved by the Court; (3) the Class Representative Enhancement Payment paid to the
4 Class Representative, as approved by the Court; (4) Administration Costs paid to the Settlement
5 Administrator, as approved by the Court; and (5) the PAGA Payment paid to the LWDA and
6 to Eligible Aggrieved Employees, as approved by the Court. Defendant's portion of payroll
7 taxes as the Class Members' current or former employer is not included in the GSA and will be
8 a separate obligation of Defendant. No portion of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to
9 Defendant for any reason." (Settlement, ¶ I.U.)

10 6. Uncashed Checks: If any checks remain uncashed or not deposited by the
11 expiration of the 90-day period after mailing the reminder notice, the Settlement Administrator
12 will, within two hundred (200) calendar days after the checks are initially mailed, cancel the
13 check(s) and pay the amount of the Individual Settlement Share(s) or Individual PAGA
14 Payment(s) (as applicable), plus any accrued interest, to the California State Controller's Office
15 in the name of the Participating Class Member(s) or Eligible Aggrieved Employee(s), in
16 accordance with California Unclaimed Property Law so that the Participating Class Member(s)
17 or Eligible Aggrieved Employee(s) will have their Individual Settlement Share(s) or Individual
18 PAGA Payment(s) available to them per the applicable claim procedure to request that money
19 from the State of California, Defendant will not be required to pay any interest on said amounts.
20 (Settlement, ¶ III.J.15.)

21 7. Released Claims: All claims based on the factual or legal theories that were
22 alleged in the Complaints and/or Plaintiff's letters to the LWDA, or that reasonably could have
23 been alleged based on the facts, legal theories, Labor Code sections, and primary rights at issue
24 in the Complaints and/or Plaintiff's letters to the LWDA, including the: failure to pay minimum
25 and straight time wages; failure to pay overtime; failure to provide meal periods and provide
26 meal period premium payments; failure to provide rest periods and provide rest period premium
27 payments; failure to timely pay wages upon termination; failure to provide and maintain
28 compliant wage statements; failure to reimburse necessary business expenses; violations of the

1 unfair competition law; and any other claims or penalties under the wage and hour laws pleaded
2 in the Action. The Released Claims include all claims for compensatory, consequential,
3 incidental, liquidated, punitive, and exemplary damages; restitution; interest; costs and fees;
4 injunctive or equitable relief; and any other remedies available at law or equity for the time
5 period from August 3, 2017 through Preliminary Approval (the last two sentences, collectively,
6 the “Released Claims”). The period of Released Claims shall extend to the limits of the Class
7 Period. The res judicata effect of the Judgement will be the same as that of the Released Claims.

8 The Released Claims does not include claims that, as a matter of law, cannot be released
9 and does not include claims for retaliation, discrimination, wrongful termination, and individual
10 claims for the recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. (Settlement, ¶ I.JJ.)

11 8. Participating Class Members Released Claims: “Upon Defendant s fulfillment of
12 its payment obligations under Section III(J)(12) of this Agreement, Plaintiff and all Participating
13 Class Members shall release the Released Parties from the Released Claims, as defined in
14 Section I(JJ) above, occurring during the Class Period. Plaintiff and the Participating Class
15 Members agree not to sue or otherwise make any claim against any of the Released Parties for
16 any of the Released Claims.” (Settlement, ¶ II.K.)

17 9. PAGA Released Claims: “Upon Defendant’s fulfillment of its payment
18 obligations under Section III(J)(12) of this Agreement, the LWDA, and any other representative,
19 proxy, or agent thereof, including, but not limited to, any and all Eligible Aggrieved Employees,
20 including Plaintiff, shall release the Released Parties from the PAGA Released Claims, as
21 defined in Section I(EE) above, occurring during the PAGA Period. Plaintiff and the Eligible
22 Aggrieved Employees agree not to sue or otherwise make any claim against any of the Released
23 Parties for any of the PAGA Released Claims. The release of the PAGA Released Claims is
24 effective, regardless of whether the Eligible Aggrieved Employee submits a timely and valid
25 request for exclusion.” (Settlement, ¶ II.L.)

26 10. PAGA Payment: The PAGA Payment consists of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars
27 (\$25,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount allocated for the settlement and release of claims
28 for civil penalties under PAGA. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) of the PAGA Payment

1 (\$18,750.00) shall be paid to the LWDA, and Twenty-Five Percent (25%) (\$6,250.00) of the
2 PAGA Payment shall be distributed to Eligible Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement ¶ I.CC.)
3 Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for
4 Preliminary Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 12.)

5 11. Net Settlement Amount: “The total amount of money available for payout to
6 Participating Class Members, which is the GSA less the Attorney Fee Award, the Cost Award,
7 the Class Representative Enhancement Payment, the PAGA Payment, and Administration Costs.
8 In other words, the NSA is the portion of the GSA that will be distributed to Class Members
9 who do not request exclusion from the settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ I.Y.)

10 12. Distribution Formula: “The Settlement Administrator will pay each Participating
11 Class Member his or her proportional share of the Net Settlement Amount, which will be equal
12 to: (i) the number of workweeks he or she worked as a Class Member during the Class Period,
13 based on the Class Data provided by Defendant, divided by (ii) the total number of workweeks
14 worked by all Participating Class Members, collectively, during the Class Period, based on the
15 same Class Data, and (iii) multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount. One day worked in a given
16 week will be credited as a workweek for purposes of this calculation. Therefore, the value of
17 each Participating Class Member’s Individual Settlement Share is tied directly to the number of
18 workweeks he or she worked during the Class Period.” (Settlement ¶ G.5.a.)

19 13. Tax Allocation: Each Participating Class Member’s Individual Settlement Share
20 will be apportioned as follows: twenty percent (20%) as wages and eight percent (80%) as
21 penalties and interest. (Settlement, ¶ G.5.b.)

22 14. Class Representative Service Award: “The amount(s) the Court awards to
23 Plaintiff for his service as the Class Representative, which will not exceed Ten Thousand
24 Dollars (\$10,000.00) to Plaintiff. The payment shall be paid from the Qualified Settlement Fund.
25 Defendant takes no position as to the amount requested. The enhancement is subject to Court
26 approval. If the Court awards less than the amount(s) requested, any amount(s) not awarded will
27 become part of the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to Participating Class Members.”
28 (Settlement, ¶ I.K.)

1 15. Attorney Fee Award: The amount, not to exceed Thirty-Three and One-Third
2 Percent (33 1/3%) of the Gross Settlement Amount or One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Six
3 Hundred Sixty-Six Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents (\$136,666.67), in the event it is finally
4 approved by the Court and awarded to Class Counsel. The Attorney Fee Award shall be paid
5 from the Qualified Settlement Fund. Defendant takes no position as to the amount requested.
6 (Settlement, ¶ I.C.)

7 16. Cost Award: The amount that the Court awards Class Counsel for payment of
8 actual litigation costs, which shall not exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00). The Cost
9 Award will be paid from the Qualified Settlement Fund. Defendant takes no position as to the
10 amount requested. The Cost Award is subject to Court approval. If the Court awards less than
11 the amount requested, any amount not awarded will become part of the Net Settlement Amount
12 for distribution to Participating Class Members. (Settlement, ¶ I.M.)

13 17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
14 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
15 attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
16 allocations are calculated. (Lee Decl., ¶ 5, Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by
17 mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶ I.AA.) Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the Settlement
18 Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current
19 addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-
20 mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

21 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

22 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
23 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to
24 be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the
25 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
26 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
27 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar*
28 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is

1 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement
2 is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
3 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
4 the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
5 224, 245.)

6 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
7 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
8 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
9 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent
10 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
11 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
12 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

13 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

14 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
15 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
16 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
17 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
18 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
19 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
20 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

21 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
22 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 11.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his
23 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes
24 that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-
25 consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification
26 of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible
27 appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

28 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief

1 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
2 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
3 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
4 \$410,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.
5 *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately*
6 *\$1,587.09, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$2,919.15.* (Lee
7 Decl., ¶ 14.)

8 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
9 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

10 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
11 employment mediator, Jeffrey Krivis, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were
12 at arm’s length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients
13 The Parties did not reach an agreement to settle that day. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation
14 willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to
15 litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) The
16 Parties did not reach an agreement to settle that day. However, the Parties continued to negotiate
17 in good faith following mediation. During the negotiation process, Plaintiff Pedro Torres
18 Zermeno was added to replace Plaintiff Vaughn Henry as the class and PAGA representative.
19 (*Id.*)

20 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
21 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
22 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
23 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
24 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
25 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
26 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 9-10.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
27 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
28 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in

1 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

2 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

3 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
4 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 28-36.) Class Counsel has substantial
5 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
6 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
7 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
8 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

9 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
10 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
11 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
12 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
13 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
14 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
15 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
16 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction
17 entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

18 **D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement**

19 To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested
20 exclusion from the Settlement. (Lee Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the
21 class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing*
22 *and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections
23 and requests for exclusion support approval].)

24 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the
25 class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The
26 reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive as there were **zero** opt-outs and **zero** objections.
27 Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v.*
28 *Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court

found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$136,666.67, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of \$10,000.00 to named Plaintiff Pedro Torres Zermeno. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for calculating attorneys’ fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time

counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also* *Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also* *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See* *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and

1 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re*
2 *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

3 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
4 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a
5 multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is
6 to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
7 retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal
8 skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate
9 for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may
10 be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

11 Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that
12 an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed
13 time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the
14 California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

15 With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts
16 conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely
17 scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on
attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award
appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

18 (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v.*
19 *Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a
20 mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively
21 scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales*
22 *Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with
23 district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it
was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”];
Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451
[“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method,
it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s
hours.”].)

24 (*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

25 Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$81,900 based on over 96 hours of work performed thus
26 far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$136,666.67 is reasonable and fair
27 as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.7. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion
28 in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.*

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seek a positive multiplier of 1.67 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-

1 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
2 or delay in payment of attorney's fees." (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

3 "Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher." (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
4 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
5 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
7 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 ["most" common fund cases apply a multiplier
8 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
9 study "reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases" and
10 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be "per se reasonable.") The intermediate court in
11 *Laffitte*, after finding that "2 to 4" is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
12 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
13 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
14 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

15 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
16 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
17 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
18 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
19 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
20 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
21 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

22 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
23 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
24 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
25 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
26 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
27 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
28 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's

outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 26.) Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

C. Costs Are Reasonable.

As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$17,647.76 in costs, and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00. (Haber Decl., ¶ 27.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$20,000.00 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover "out-of-pocket expenses that 'would normally be charged to a fee paying client'" including costs for "service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction." (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (See *Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06-00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 ["Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,

1 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
2 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

3 **D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.**

4 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
5 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
6 members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
7 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements
8 containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to
9 represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring
10 about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The
11 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
12 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
13 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be
14 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
15 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

16 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
17 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Pedro Torres
18 Zermeno. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against
19 Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating his devotion to this case, including
20 his efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently, and reviewing
21 case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff submitted in support of Motion
22 for Final Approval.)

23 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
24 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
25 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
26 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
27 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
28 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award

1 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3
2 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
3 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

4 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
5 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
6 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
7 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
8 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
9 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
10 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
11 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
12 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
13 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
14 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
15 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
16 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
17 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

18 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

19 Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will
20 incur a total of \$7,250.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Lee Decl.,
21 ¶ 16.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion
22 tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

23 **V. CONCLUSION**

24 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
25 of the proposed settlement.

26 ///


27 ///

28 ///

1 Dated: October 27, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 

4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Daniel J. Kramer
6 Alan Wilcox

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Henry, et al. v. Tessengerlo Kerley, Inc.
22C-0027

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby, Los Angeles, California 90017. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On October 27, 2025, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

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Attorneys for Defendant

- (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- (X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 27, 2025, at Los Angeles, California.



Rebecca Padilla