

Kane Moon (SBN 249834)
kmoon@moonlawgroup.com
Allen Feghali (SBN 301080)
afeghali@moonlawgroup.com
S. Phillip Song (SBN 326572)
psong@moonlawgroup.com
Stanley J. Park (SBN 334747)
spark@moonlawgroup.com
MOON LAW GROUP, P.C.
725 S. Figueroa Street, 31st Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 232-3128
Facsimile: (213) 232-3125

Attorneys for Plaintiff Sebastian Howard

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

SEBASTIAN HOWARD, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIFE'S FOOD, LLC, a limited liability
company; BLUE RIDGE5, LLC, a limited
liability company; STEIN5, LLC, a limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants

Case No.: 34-2022-00314592

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT**

[Filed with the Declaration of Kane Moon, the
Declaration of Jodey Lawrence, [Proposed] Order,
and [Proposed] Judgment]

PAGA APPROVAL HEARING:

Date: July 24, 2026

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: 8B

Judge: Hon. Lauri A. Damrell

Complaint filed: January 26, 2022

FAC filed: October 6, 2022

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, TO ALL PARTIES, AND TO COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 24, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 8B of the
3 Sacramento County Superior Court, Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse, 500 G Street, Sacramento,
4 California 95814, Plaintiff Sebastian Howard (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby doe, move the Court for
5 an Order and Judgment, pursuant to California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.*, as follows:

- 6 1. Approving the Private Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release of
7 Claims (“Settlement”) between Plaintiff and Defendant Encore Restaurants, LLC;
- 8 2. Approving the requested PAGA Counsel Fees Payment of \$146,666.67;
- 9 3. Approving the requested PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of \$25,991.93;
- 10 4. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Administrator and
11 approving a \$11,000.00 as the Administration Expenses Payment;
- 12 5. Approving the scope of the Released PAGA Claims and Released Parties;
- 13 6. Approving a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$440,000.00;
- 14 7. Approving \$256,341.40 for PAGA Penalties as settlement of the Released PAGA Claims,
15 subject to potential increase pursuant to the escalator clause, to be distributed as 75%
16 (approximately \$192,256.05 to the LWDA) and 25% (approximately \$64,085.35 to
17 Aggrieved Employees);
- 18 8. Directing consummation of the Settlement pursuant to its terms and provisions;
- 19 9. Entering Judgment; and
- 20 10. Retaining jurisdiction over the Parties, Action, and the Settlement solely for purposes of
21 (i) enforcing the Settlement and/or Judgment, (ii) addressing settlement administration
22 matters, and (iii) addressing such post-Judgment matters as are permitted by law.

23 This Motion is based upon this notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
24 declarations and exhibits filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other
25 further records or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

26 As this Motion is unopposed, the Parties respectfully request relief from the page limit
27 requirement set by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d)

28 Pursuant to Local Rule 1.06 (A), the court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this

1 matter by 2:00 p.m., the court day before the hearing. The complete text of the tentative ruling may
2 be downloaded off the court's website. If the party does not have online access, they may call the
3 dedicated phone number for the department as referenced in the local telephone directory between
4 the hours of 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing and receive the tentative
5 ruling. If you do not call the court and the opposing party by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the
6 hearing, no hearing will be held.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 DATED: June 23, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

9 By: _____

10 Kane Moon
11 Allen Feghali
12 S. Phillip Song
13 Stanley J. Park

14 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Sebastian Howard*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iv
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT	2
A. Plaintiff’s Claims and Procedural Background	2
B. Discovery and Investigation	5
C. Settlement Negotiations and Notice to the LWDA	5
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement	7
III. DISCUSSION	9
A. Availability of Civil Penalties	9
B. The Settlement Merits Approval.....	10
1. The Relief Is Genuine, Meaningful, and Consistent with the Dual Statutory Purposes of Deterrence and Punishment under PAGA	10
2. The Settlement Amount Provides a Realistic Value for the Claims that is within the “Ballpark” of Reasonableness	11
3. The Settlement Is a Fair and Reasonable Result Following a Thorough Investigation and Accounting of Various Litigation Risks	14
C. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees/Costs Are Reasonable and Should Be Approved	16
1. Plaintiff’s Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the Common Fund Method.....	16
2. The Matter Involves a Fee and Cost Shifting Provision under PAGA.....	17
3. Counsel’s Experience, Reputation, and Ability Support the Requested Fee Award	18
4. While the Lodestar Method Is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, the Court May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees	19
5. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Costs Were Actually and Reasonably Incurred	20
IV. CONCLUSION	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013)

No. C 12–05860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032 4

In re Activision Securities Litigation (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp.1373 17

In re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373 17

Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 20

Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106 20

O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110..... 2, 10

Pedroza v. PetSmart, Inc. (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012)

No. ED CV 11–298 GHK (DTBx), 2012 WL 9506073 4

Staton v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938 20

Villalobos v. Calandri Sunrise Farm LP (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015)

No. C CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx), 2015 WL 12732709 1, 2

Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759..... 16

STATE CASES

Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 36 10

City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105..... 16

Dunlap v. Superior Court (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330..... 10

In re Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545 19

Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116..... 14

Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399 14

Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19..... 19

Quinn v. State of California (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162..... 16

Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 16

Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224 14, 20

Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 4

STATUTES

California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.* 1, 10

Labor Code § 2699(a) 9

Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) 4, 15

Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(A) 13

Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(B) 13

Labor Code § 2699(k)(1) 17, 20

Labor Code § 2699(m)..... 8

Labor Code § 2699(s)(1)..... 7

Labor Code § 2699(s)(2)..... 1, 7, 10

Labor Code § 2699(v)(1) 8

Labor Code § 2699.3..... 10

Labor Code § 2699.5..... 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Stats. 2024, ch. 44 (Assem. Bill No. 2288), § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 2024)..... 8

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Sebastian Howard (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of a non-reversionary \$440,000.00 gross
4 settlement of claims for civil penalties alleged pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act,
5 Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). After a full day of mediation with experienced and neutral
6 mediator Steven Rottman, and extended settlement negotiations, Plaintiff reached a resolution with
7 Encore Restaurants, LLC (“Defendant”) (collectively, Plaintiff and Defendant are the “Parties”). The
8 Parties have executed a Private Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (the
9 “Settlement”), a true and correct copy of which is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Kane Moon
10 in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement (“Moon Decl.”) submitted concurrently
11 herewith. Pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), Plaintiff now files this motion seeking an order
12 approving the proposed Settlement.

13 The proposed Settlement seeks to resolve all alleged claims for civil penalties pursuant to PAGA
14 for approximately 1,320 Aggrieved Employees who worked approximately 10,724 Pay Periods and are
15 defined as all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly, non-exempt employee at
16 any time during the applicable PAGA Period (the “Aggrieved Employees”). (Moon Decl., ¶ 5;
17 Settlement, ¶¶ 1(c); 6(b).) For purposes of settlement, the “PAGA Period” is August 2, 2021 to July 31,
18 2022. (Settlement, ¶ 1(v).) This Settlement is on behalf of the California Labor and Workforce
19 Development Agency (the “LWDA”), Plaintiff, and Aggrieved Employees. (Moon Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff
20 is unaware of any other pending litigation involving similar claims against Defendant that may be
21 impacted by approval of the Settlement, nor has Defendant pointed to any. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

22 Settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. Pursuant to the operative PAGA statute,
23 the “court shall review and approve any penalties sought as part of a proposed settlement agreement
24 pursuant to this part.” (Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2).) In deciding whether to grant approval of a proposed
25 settlement, the primary issue to be decided is whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
26 Specifically, the issue is whether the PAGA penalties to which the parties have agreed provide “genuine
27 and meaningful” relief that is “consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public,”
28 and whether the penalties are reasonable in light of the potential verdict value in this case. (*Villalobos v.*

1 *Calandri Sunrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx), 2015 WL 12732709,
2 at *5; *see also O'Connor v. Uber Techn., Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135.)

3 As set forth herein, the proposed Settlement embodies all the features of a settlement that is fair,
4 adequate, and reasonable, as (1) it is the product of an arm's-length negotiation, (2) negotiated by
5 attorneys experienced in wage and hour litigation, (3) following sufficient investigation necessary to
6 evaluate the relative strength and value of the PAGA claims, and (4) reflects a reasoned compromise
7 based directly on the relative strength and value of the PAGA claims, as well as the risks, expense,
8 complexity, and likely duration of further litigation.

9 The meaningful value achieved by the Settlement at issue may be gleaned from the fact that the
10 LWDA and the estimated **1,320** Aggrieved Employees will, cumulatively, receive approximately
11 **\$256,341.40** as PAGA Penalties. (Moon Decl., ¶ 24.) This is a significant recovery, not only because
12 further litigation may have resulted in a net-zero recovery based on the facts of the case and defenses
13 asserted by Defendant, but also because an investigation by experienced PAGA counsel and analysis of
14 discovery revealed minimal identifiable violations, the discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties,
15 and the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative basis at all due to the potential manageability
16 issues and current state of the law. For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, Plaintiff respectfully
17 requests the Court enter the proposed order and proposed judgment submitted concurrently herewith.

18 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

19 **A. Plaintiff's Claims and Procedural Background**

20 Defendant is a limited liability company and owned and operated approximately twenty-three
21 (23) Five Guys Burgers and Fries ("Five Guys") franchise restaurants in the State of California
22 during the relevant period and through August 1, 2022, when Defendant sold its entire Five Guys
23 portfolio back to the franchisor. (Moon Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff worked for Defendant during the
24 statutory period. (*Id.*) Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt and paid
25 on an hourly basis. (*Id.*) Plaintiff contends he and his former coworkers were subjected to the same or
26 similar unlawful labor practices during their employment by Defendant, including failure to pay all
27 wages. (*Id.*)

28 Plaintiff claims for unpaid wages stems from allegations of Defendant's failure to pay

1 employees all minimum, overtime, sick pay, and regular rate wages owed, including due to
2 Defendant's failure to compensate employees for off-the-clock work and Defendant's failure to
3 incorporate all remunerations into the regular rate of pay. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff's meal and rest period
4 claims are based on allegations that due to the nature of his work and Defendant's employment practices,
5 employees regularly experienced missed, untimely, or interrupted breaks, and that Defendant failed to
6 provide any premiums for non-compliant rest breaks or all premiums for non-compliant meals. (*Id.*)
7 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse employees for all reasonable and necessary
8 business expenses incurred, including expenses incurred for the use of employees' personal cellphone
9 and the purchase of masks. (*Id.*) Plaintiff further alleges he and other employees did not receive all wages
10 owed at the time of termination nor accurate itemized wage statements due to Defendant's failure to pay
11 all wages and premiums. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for civil penalties under
12 PAGA. (*Id.*)

13 Because of the foregoing alleged violations of the Labor Code, Plaintiff filed a Class Action
14 Complaint on January 26, 2022, alleging Defendant systematically: (1) failed to pay minimum wages,
15 (2) failed to pay overtime compensation, (3) failed to provide meal periods, (4) failed to authorize and
16 permit rest breaks, (5) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses, (6) failed to timely pay final
17 wages at termination, (7) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (8) engaged in unfair
18 business practices. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action
19 Complaint (the "Operative Complaint") to allege a ninth cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA.
20 (*Id.*)

21 On April 17, 2023, the Parties stipulated to dismiss the class action allegations and individual
22 claims due to an arbitration agreement between the Parties. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) Following Defendant's
23 presentation of an enforceable arbitration agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff which contained a
24 class action waiver, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for dismissal without prejudice of all causes of
25 action other than for Civil Penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

26 Defendant ardently opposed the merits of this case and maintained several defenses to Plaintiff's
27 theories of liability, which, if successfully argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or
28 substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) Throughout this action, Defendant maintained, and continues

1 to maintain, that Defendant had legally compliant employment policies and practices during the statutory
2 period. Defendant denies Plaintiff's factual allegations that it ever violated any provision of the California
3 Labor Code, including, but not limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA.
4 (*Id.*) Rather, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, all employees were properly paid for all
5 hours worked and that it did not require or permit employees to work off-the-clock. (*Id.*) As for the
6 regular rate claim, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, there was no issue with paying
7 employees the proper regular rate of pay because any additional remuneration was discretionary and thus,
8 not required to be incorporated into the regular rate of pay. (*Id.*) Defendant maintained, and continues to
9 maintain, all employees were provided with the opportunity to take all their code-compliant meal and
10 rest breaks and that missed breaks, if any, were solely the result of employees' voluntary choice. (*Id.*) As
11 for the unreimbursed business expenses, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, it did not
12 require employees to incur any business-related expenses. (*Id.*) To the extent employees received wage
13 statements that were allegedly inaccurate, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, penalties
14 are not warranted because employees suffered no actual damage or harm as a result. (*Id.*; *see, e.g.,*
15 *Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) No. C 12-05860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032, at *10
16 ["A plaintiff must adequately plead an injury arising from an employer's failure to provide full and
17 accurate wage statements, and the omission of the required information alone is not sufficient."].)

18 Defendant further denied, and continues to deny, that the action is appropriate for representative
19 treatment for any purpose other than the settlement because of the individualized and varying nature of
20 each employee's experience, making this matter unmanageable. (Moon Decl. at ¶ 10.)

21 Additionally, Defendant argued its good-faith belief that it paid all wages precludes the
22 imposition of waiting time penalties because Plaintiff would be unable to show Defendant's alleged
23 conduct was done willfully or knowingly. (Moon Decl., ¶ 10; *see, e.g., Pedroza v. PetSmart, Inc.* (C.D.
24 Cal. June 14, 2012) No. ED CV 11-298 GHK (DTBx), 2012 WL 9506073, *5.)

25 Defendant also argued that the Court retains discretion to lower the penalties if, based on the facts
26 and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is "unjust, arbitrary
27 and oppressive, or confiscatory." (*Id.* at 10; *see* Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v.*
28 *Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136 [holding that a court may reduce

1 the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based upon discretionary factors].)

2 Finally, Defendant contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely
3 to assess cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor
4 Code violations, because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially
5 where certain conduct may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that
6 are interrelated and work in tandem. (Moon Decl., ¶ 10.) As such, Defendant contended that
7 cumulative penalties and heightened penalties would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and
8 confiscatory. (*Id.*)

9 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

10 The Parties agreed to mediate the representative PAGA claims and engaged in informal
11 discovery exchange prior to mediation. (*Id.* at ¶ 11.) Defendant provided information and documents,
12 which enabled Plaintiff's Counsel to meaningfully investigate Plaintiff's allegations and assess the
13 value of the PAGA claims. (*Id.*) Defendant produced Plaintiff's personnel file and his time and
14 payroll records, and time and corresponding payroll data of all Aggrieved Employees from August 2,
15 2021 to July 31, 2022. (*Id.*)

16 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel reviewed and analyzed all the information that Defendant
17 produced, including the time/pay records, in conjunction with information provided by Plaintiff. (*Id.* at
18 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff's Counsel retained an expert to analyze the time/pay records and prepare a damage
19 analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) The time/pay records contained 8,915 Pay Periods actually worked
20 (roughly 83.13% of all Pay Periods), which allowed the expert to prepare an analysis with a high degree
21 of certainty. (*Id.*) Further, Plaintiff's Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and
22 defenses asserted in this action. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel was able to evaluate the probability
23 of success on the merits and Defendant's monetary exposure. (*Id.*) In sum, Plaintiff's and his Counsel's
24 familiarity with the facts of the case and the legal issues involved allowed them to act intelligently in
25 negotiating the Settlement. (*Id.*)

26 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Notice to the LWDA**

27 On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff submitted his demand for arbitration with JAMS. (*Id.* at ¶ 13.)
28 The Parties engaged in formal and informal discovery regarding Defendant's policies, practices,

1 operations, payroll information, and other topics. (*Id.*) To effectuate meaningful settlement
2 discussions and a productive mediation, Defendant informally produced, pursuant to the
3 settlement/mediation privilege, a headcount of all Aggrieved Employees, the number of pay periods
4 worked, and the payroll and timekeeping data of all Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.*) The Parties reached
5 this Settlement only after informal discovery and investigation were performed. (*Id.*)

6 On September 8, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day of private mediation facilitated
7 by Steven Rottman, an experienced PAGA action mediator. (*Id.* at ¶ 14.) The negotiations were at
8 arm's length and although conducted in a professional matter, were adversarial. (*Id.*) Both sides went
9 into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but they were also
10 prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)
11 Negotiations were protracted, with extended discussions and instances in which it appeared the
12 Parties would not reach a resolution. (*Id.*) Following a full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses
13 of the claims and defenses, the Parties ultimately reached a resolution, the material terms of which
14 are encompassed within the Settlement at issue. (*Id.*)

15 In reaching a resolution, the Parties recognized that the issues presented in this action are
16 likely only to be resolved with extensive and costly pretrial and trial proceedings, and that further
17 litigation will lead to inconvenience, distraction, disruption, delay, and expense disproportionate to
18 the potential benefits of litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff and his Counsel also considered the risk and
19 uncertainty of the outcome inherent in any litigation when determining whether this Settlement was
20 the correct option. (*Id.*) In sum, Plaintiff and his Counsel believe the proposed Settlement is in the
21 best interests of Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA. (*Id.*)

22 Pursuant to PAGA, on January 22, 2022, Plaintiff submitted notice of the alleged Labor
23 Code violations to the LWDA, and paid the required filing fee (*Id.* at ¶ 16, Ex. 2.). On August
24 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended PAGA notice with the LWDA, and, for the first time throughout
25 the pendency of this action, provided notice of the same to Defendant, and paid the required filing
26 fee (*Id.* at ¶ 17, Ex. 3.). The administrative exhaustion period under PAGA expired without the
27 LWDA indicating any intent to investigate the allegations. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff is duly
28

1 authorized to act as a private attorney general with respect to the PAGA claims involved in this
2 action. (*Id.*)

3 In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(1), Plaintiff subsequently submitted to
4 the LWDA a file-stamped copy of the complaints containing the Court-assigned case number. (*Id.*
5 at ¶ 18.) To date, the LWDA has not sought to intervene in this action. (*Id.*)

6 In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), notice of settlement and a copy of
7 the proposed Settlement has been submitted to the LWDA along with a copy of Plaintiff's
8 motion and the hearing date. (*Id.* at ¶ 19, Ex. 4.) To date, the LWDA has not indicated any
9 objection to the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 19.)

10 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

11 The Settlement's key financial and other terms include:

12 1. Gross Settlement Amount, Funding, Disbursement, and Uncashed Checks. The Gross
13 Settlement Amount ("GSA") is \$440,000.00, subject to potential increase under an Escalator Clause and
14 entry of the Court's Approval Order, and is non-reversionary. (Settlement, ¶ 1(m).) Defendant shall fully
15 fund the Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to the Settlement Account established by
16 the Claims Administrator no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date. (*Id.* at ¶ 6(a).)
17 Disbursement will occur within sixty (60) calendar days of the Effective Date. (*Id.* at ¶ 5(c).) Any funds
18 remaining uncashed after 180 days from issuance will be transmitted to the California State Controller,
19 to be held in the name of each individual who failed to cash his or her check prior to the void date in the
20 unclaimed property fund. (*Id.* at ¶ 7(e).)

21 2. Escalator Clause: The GSA was negotiated based on an estimate that as of the date of the
22 Parties' mediation, there are 1,320 Aggrieved Employees who worked 10,724 Pay Periods during the
23 PAGA Period. (*Id.* at ¶ 6(b).) The Settlement includes an Escalator Clause whereby should the actual
24 number of PAGA Pay Periods exceed by more than 10% of the estimated count, Defendant agrees to
25 either (1) increase the GSA by the percentage that the actual number of Pay Periods exceeds 11,796
26 or (2) end the PAGA Period on the date on which the pay periods reach 11,796 in lieu of being
27 required to increase the GSA. (*Id.*)

1 3. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Settlement includes attorneys' fees in an amount up to 33
2 1/3% of the GSA (i.e., at least \$146,666.67), plus reimbursement for out-of-pocket litigation costs not to
3 exceed \$30,000.00, payable to Plaintiff's Counsel from the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 3(b), 3(c).) In the event actual
4 costs are less and/or the amount of fees and costs approved by the Court are less than the amounts
5 requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) Plaintiff's Counsel have
6 incurred \$25,991.93 in total litigation costs. (Moon Decl., ¶ 22; Ex. 5.)

7 4. Administration Costs. The Settlement provides an Administration Expenses Payment to the
8 Administrator, payable from the GSA, in an amount up to \$15,000.00, for its fees and expenses in
9 administering this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 3(d).) In the event the amount of actual administration costs is less
10 and/or the amount approved by the Court is less than requested, the difference will be allocated to the
11 Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) Following a competitive bidding process, the Parties jointly selected
12 Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix") as the neutral entity to administer this
13 Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 1(e); Moon Decl., Ex. 6; Declaration of Jodey Lawrence Regarding Qualifications
14 and Settlement Administration, ¶ 22, Ex. B.)

15 5. Net Settlement Amount. After deducting the PAGA Counsel Fees and Litigation Expenses
16 Payments, and Administration Expenses Payment from the GSA, in the amounts specifically approved
17 by the Court, any difference in the amounts requested and the amounts awarded will be allocated to the
18 Net Settlement Amount as PAGA Penalties. (Settlement, ¶ 1(r).) Accordingly, the Net Settlement
19 Amount is estimated to be **\$256,341.40**,¹ which will be distributed 75% (i.e., 75% * \$256,341.40 =
20 **\$192,256.05**) to the LWDA and 25% ((i.e., 25% * \$256,341.40 = **\$64,085.35**) to Aggrieved Employees
21 pursuant to PAGA law governing Plaintiff's claims.² (Moon Decl., ¶ 24.)

22
23 ¹ The estimated Net Settlement Amount was calculated by deducting the following amounts from
24 the GSA (\$440,000.00): \$25,991.93 for the PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses, \$146,666.67 for the
25 PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, and \$11,000.00 for the Administration Expenses Payment. The estimated
Net Settlement Amount is greater than provided in the Settlement because Plaintiff's Counsel are
requesting less than the maximum amount allocated under the Settlement. (*See* Settlement, ¶ 3(b)-3(d).)

26 ² On July 1, 2024, new legislation was enacted to amend PAGA in several respects, including as
27 to the recovery split for civil penalties. (Stats. 2024, ch. 44 (Assem. Bill No. 2288), § 1, eff. Jul. 1,
28 2024).) As amended, PAGA now provides for a 65%-LWDA/35%-aggrieved employee split. (Lab. Code
§ 2699(m).) However, this provision does not apply retroactively prior to June 19, 2024. (*Id.* at §
2699(v)(1).) In other words, because Plaintiffs' PAGA Notices were submitted prior to June 19, 2024,

1 6. Individual PAGA Payments. Each Aggrieved Employee will be entitled to his or her pro
2 rata amount from the 25% share of PAGA Penalties that is directly proportional to the number of pay
3 periods worked in the PAGA Period without having to submit any claim form. (Settlement, ¶¶ 3(f), 7(b).)
4 This results in an average Individual PAGA Payment of roughly **\$48.41** for each of the estimated 1,320
5 Aggrieved Employees (\$64,085.35 / 1,320), and a PAGA Pay Period value of **\$5.96** for each of the
6 10,724 estimated PAGA Pay Periods (\$64,085.35 / 10,724). (Moon Decl., ¶ 25.) Individual PAGA
7 Payments will be allocated to 100% penalties for tax purposes. (See Settlement, ¶ 7(c).) Aggrieved
8 Employees will receive an explanatory letter with their payment. (See *id.*, Ex A.)

9 7. Releases of Claims. The Released PAGA Claims will be effective upon entry of the
10 Approval Order by the Court approving payment of the PAGA penalties and on the date when
11 Defendant fully funds the entire GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) The release of claims is limited to claims for PAGA
12 penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts
13 stated in the Operative Complaint and that arose during the PAGA Period. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 1(z), 12.) The
14 “Released Parties” are “Defendant and its parents, subsidiaries, officers, shareholders, members,
15 directors, agents, attorneys, employees, and insurers.” (*Id.* at ¶ 1(aa).)

16 **III. DISCUSSION**

17 **A. Availability of Civil Penalties**

18 The LWDA and its constituent departments and divisions are authorized to assess and collect
19 civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by an employer. With a stated goal
20 of improving enforcement of existing Labor Code obligations, the California Legislature adopted the
21 Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, permitting, as an alternative, an aggrieved employee to initiate a
22 private civil action on behalf of him- or herself and other current or former employees.” (Lab. Code §
23 2699(a).) Before an employee may file an action seeking to recover civil penalties for violations of any
24 of the Labor Code provisions enumerated in Labor Code section 2699.5, he or she must comply with the
25 Act’s administrative procedures as set forth in Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a), which include

26
27 _____
28 any civil penalties recovered in this action will be split according to prior PAGA law (i.e., 75% to the
LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved Employees).

1 providing notice to the LWDA and the employer of the alleged Labor Code violations, and then waiting
2 a prescribed period of time to permit the LWDA to investigate and to decide whether to cite the employer
3 for the alleged violations. (*Id.* at §§ 2699.3, 2699.5; *Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior*
4 *Court* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370; *see also Dunlap v. Superior Court* (2006) 142
5 Cal.App.4th 330.)

6 Here, in compliance with Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiff submitted notice of the
7 Labor Code violations at issue to the LWDA, and he has exhausted administrative remedies
8 without the LWDA noticing any intent to investigate the claims. (Moon Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. 3.)
9 Accordingly, Plaintiff is duly authorized to act as a private attorney general pursuant to PAGA.
10 (*Id.* at ¶ 17.)

11 **B. The Settlement Merits Approval**

12 Settlement of PAGA claims must be approved by a Court. (Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2).) Here, the
13 circumstances weigh heavily in favor of approval, as explained below.

14 **1. The Relief Is Genuine, Meaningful, and Consistent with the Dual Statutory Purposes** 15 **of Deterrence and Punishment under PAGA**

16 The \$440,000.00 GSA amounts to “genuine and meaningful” relief “consistent with the
17 underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public.” (Moon Decl., ¶ 38; *see O’Connor*, 201
18 F.Supp.3d at 1133–35 [denying settlement approval where allocation for PAGA claims was 0.1% of
19 the estimated full worth].) This is an excellent result, particularly because, under the Settlement,
20 Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of
21 not being able to recover anything at all. (Moon Decl., ¶ 38.)

22 The Settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution that satisfies PAGA’s dual statutory
23 purposes of deterrence and punishment, on the one hand, and providing Aggrieved Employees
24 with genuine and meaningful relief, on the other. (Lab. Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) As a result of this
25 litigation, Defendant has had to hire legal counsel, engage in employee-wide discovery, and
26 participate in mediation. (Moon Decl., ¶ 39.) Assuming approval is granted, Defendant will also have
27 to pay civil penalties pursuant to PAGA. (*Id.*) Not including its own attorneys’ fees and costs,
28 Defendant will pay at least \$440,000 to resolve this matter—of which approximately \$256,341.40

1 is allocated toward PAGA Penalties and will be distributed as 75% to the LWDA and 25% to
2 Aggrieved Employees, in compliance with PAGA law governing the claims in this Action. (*Id.*; *see*
3 Settlement, ¶ 7.) This amount represents roughly 47% of the realistic exposure for the claims
4 (\$256,341.40 / \$536,200.00), as discussed below. (Moon Decl., ¶ 39.) Additionally, the release
5 obtained under the Settlement does not preclude Aggrieved Employees from pursuing any individual
6 (non-PAGA) claims they may have against Defendant or the other Released Parties. (*Id.*; *see*
7 Settlement, ¶ 12.)

8 **2. The Settlement Amount Provides a Realistic Value for the Claims that is within the**
9 **“Ballpark” of Reasonableness**

10 There can be no doubt that this Settlement is the result of vigorous, adversarial, non-collusive,
11 and arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties. (Moon Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s Counsel performed an
12 extensive investigation into the facts, claims, and defenses at issue and Defendant’s potential liability,
13 including a review of governing law and analysis of informal discovery, including Defendant’s written
14 policies and time/pay data for a majority of Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff’s Counsel
15 used the foregoing discovery and investigation to prepare for mediation and, with the assistance of a
16 statistics expert, assessed the probability of success on the merits and Defendant’s monetary exposure,
17 discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses in depth at mediation and months of
18 continued negotiations, and ultimately negotiated the resulting Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11–15.)

19 Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s analysis of the arguments and information provided by Defendant,
20 on an expert analysis of the time and pay records, and on information from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Counsel
21 evaluated Defendant’s both maximum and risk-adjusted potential exposure in preparation for mediation.
22 (*Id.* at ¶ 29.) Although the expert’s analysis revealed that the time and pay records supported several
23 violations by Defendant, those identifiable violations were primary limited to the regular rate, meal
24 period, and rest break claims. (*Id.*) The records themselves did not provide strong support for the off-the-
25 clock work, and expense reimbursement claims, and derivative penalties for those claims, as these claims
26 are predominantly testimony based. (*Id.*) In other words, Plaintiff’s analysis revealed that certain claims
27 were not as strong as originally believed. (*Id.*)

28 Additionally, there are no records to establish the off-the-clock work claim and reimbursement

1 claim on the merits. (*Id.* at ¶ 30.) Rather, proof of these claims would need to be supported by
2 declarations from Aggrieved Employees regarding business expenses and off-the-clock work as the
3 records themselves cannot demonstrate what expenses Aggrieved Employees incurred without
4 reimbursement and they cannot demonstrate the time, if any, Aggrieved Employees spent working off
5 the clock. (*Id.*)

6 Indeed, the exposure figures that were calculated for mediation were based on assumed high
7 violation rates that would not likely be demonstrated at trial, as they assume either the participation of all
8 Aggrieved Employees (which would be difficult given the particularly large size of this group), or
9 alternatively, the use of surveys or statistical data as a surrogate (which would still require the
10 participation of a majority of Aggrieved Employees to establish a sound representation of all non-exempt
11 employees). (*Id.* at ¶ 31.) The reality is that many employees would be unavailable or unresponsive due
12 to the significant lapse in time between their employment and the investigation of the claims. (*Id.*)
13 However, even assuming those employees would be available and responsive, obtaining such
14 declarations would potentially reveal that each Aggrieved Employee had a different experience. (*Id.*)
15 The individualized nature of their employment experience and the numerosity of employees affected
16 present significant risk with manageability and proof on the merits. (*Id.*)

17 Even as to the regular rate and meal period claims, our analysis found that Defendant's exposure
18 is less than initially believed. (*Id.* at ¶ 32.) As to meal periods, a review of the time/pay records shows a
19 43.5% violation rate for Defendant. (*Id.*) However, after accounting for meal waivers, the violation rate
20 reduced to 20.6%. (*Id.*) Plaintiff's expert also found that Defendant made meal premium payments for
21 9.7% of the violations. (*Id.*) As to the regular rate issue, Plaintiff's expert identified 5,642 total payments
22 that were not factored into the regular rate of pay for purposes of paying sick pay, meal break premiums,
23 and overtime, resulting in a 12.7% violation rate for unpaid overtime, 4.9% violation rate for unpaid meal
24 break premiums, and 0.7% violation rate for unpaid sick pay. (*Id.*) However, these violation rates assume
25 Plaintiff would be able to show the bonus payments were non-discretionary payments that should have
26 been factored into the regular rate. (*Id.*)

27 The likelihood that Defendant could assert viable legal defenses would likely further reduce its
28 overall exposure. (*Id.* at ¶ 33.) For example, the individualized and testimony-intensive nature of the

1 claims could bar manageability of this representative action or otherwise significantly reduce Defendant's
2 overall liability. (*Id.*) Further, a claim-by-claim penalty calculation is overly optimistic as it presumes
3 Plaintiff would be able to stack the penalties, although penalty stacking is not expressly permitted by
4 PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 34.) Rather, without either (i) a prior finding by the LWDA or a court within the past
5 five years that the employer violated PAGA or (ii) evidence that the employer's conduct was malicious,
6 fraudulent, or oppressive, PAGA only provides for a maximum \$100 penalty for each pay period. (Lab.
7 Code § 2699(f)(2)(A)–(B).) Moreover, Plaintiff's Counsel believes it would be unrealistic to expect the
8 Court to award the full (penalty-stacked) exposure given the discretionary nature of awarding penalties
9 and given Defendant's defenses, including that any failure to pay premiums, regular rate wages, or for
10 off-the-clock work was not knowingly or willfully done, and additionally, to the extent employees
11 received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, employees suffered no actual resulting damage
12 or harm. (Moon Decl., ¶ 34.) Moreover, awarding the full penalties amount would likely raise Due
13 Process concerns. (*Id.*) For the foregoing reasons, the *realistic* exposure is thus far below the estimate
14 premised on stacking. (*Id.* at ¶ 35.)

15 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Counsel believes it is more reasonable to assess penalties on
16 a \$100 civil penalty per pay period basis pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(A) for each of the
17 estimated 10,724 pay periods at issue, as opposed to a claim-by-claim approach. (*Id.* at ¶ 36.)
18 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel estimates Defendant's maximum PAGA exposure to be
19 **\$1,072,400.00** (\$100 x 10,724). (*Id.*) However, based on the discovery, Defendant's arguments at
20 mediation and continued settlement discussions, an understanding that the claims are heavily
21 dependent on the unlikely participation by Aggrieved Employees and their varying employment
22 experience, and other important considerations discussed above, it is reasonable to assume a violation
23 occurred at most in 50% of all pay periods, which results in a realistic (*risk-adjusted*) exposure of
24 **\$546,200.00** (\$1,072,400.00 * 50%). (*Id.*) As a result, the GSA of \$440,000.00 represents roughly **82%**
25 of the realistic exposure (\$440,000.00 / \$546,200.00) and **41%** of the maximum exposure (\$440,000.00
26 / \$1,072,400.00). (*Id.*)

27 The proposed Settlement therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to the
28 reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶ 37.) When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties

involved in continued litigation, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and the probability of appeal, it is clear the GSA of \$440,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and that settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*; *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133; *see Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408–09 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims,” but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation”].)

3. The Settlement Is a Fair and Reasonable Result Following a Thorough Investigation and Accounting of Various Litigation Risks

The Parties reached this Settlement through arms-length negotiations, with the assistance of an experienced mediator, Steve Rottman, at a full day mediation, and after the exchange of discovery and Plaintiff’s Counsel’s completion of a thorough investigation into the facts of the allegations and assessment of the risks of litigation. (Moon Decl., ¶ 40.) A settlement agreement that is “the product of extensive and hard-fought adversarial negotiations between the parties” is entitled to a presumption of fairness. (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

This Settlement is presumptively fair because: (1) it was reached through arms-length negotiations that were overseen by an independent mediator knowledgeable and experienced PAGA and complex labor and employment matters; and (2) it was negotiated and reached only after the Parties and their respective counsel engaged in discovery, conducted a thorough investigation of the facts, and evaluated the strengths and value of the Plaintiff’s claims, and the risks of litigating those claims through trial, as set forth in detail below.

Based on the aforementioned discovery and on their own independent investigation and evaluation, Plaintiff’s Counsel is of the opinion that the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*) Furthermore, considering all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant on the merits, the Settlement is in the best interests of the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (*Id.*)

Although Plaintiff’s Counsel believes there is merit to Plaintiff’s allegations, they also

1 acknowledge a legitimate controversy exists as to each allegation. (*Id.* at ¶ 41.) Plaintiff’s Counsel
2 also recognizes that proving the amounts of penalties owed to each Aggrieved Employee would
3 be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Moreover, Plaintiff’s
4 Counsel is also of the opinion that because the issues here are fairly contested, there is a
5 possibility of the Court not awarding PAGA penalties even if Plaintiff prevailed on the merits
6 due to the largely discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 42.) Indeed, a Court
7 may reduce PAGA penalties “if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do
8 otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” (Lab.
9 Code § 2699(e)(2).) In other words, were this matter to go to trial, any award granted would be
10 at the discretion of the Court and subject to a substantial reduction. (Moon Decl., ¶ 42.) While
11 Plaintiff’s Counsel believes there would be no persuasive grounds to reduce penalties, they recognize
12 that the Court could determine otherwise and significantly reduce any award of penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 43.)
13 This wide range of potential recovery and additional delays and risks of trial provide justification to
14 settle for a reasonable amount of recovery at this point in the litigation. (*Id.*) In all, based on the
15 investigation and analysis of the claims in preparation for mediation, the maximum exposure did not
16 comport with the realistic exposure that Defendant faced, as discussed above. (*Id.*)

17 Plaintiff’s Counsel took into account the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative
18 basis at all due to the potential manageability issues, the risk of not prevailing at trial, and the risk that
19 even if Plaintiff prevailed at trial, the penalties would be limited due to the largely discretionary nature
20 of awarding PAGA penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 44.) The provisions of the Labor Code triggering PAGA
21 penalties in this case include Labor Code sections 203, 210, 226, 1197.1, and 2802. (*Id.*) However,
22 PAGA penalties are not mandatory, but rather, permissive. (Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2).) Accordingly,
23 it is entirely possible that even if Plaintiff would be successful at trial, assuming he first able to win
24 on the merits regarding his individual claim at arbitration and then defeat the manageability issues
25 presented at litigation by the large number of Aggrieved Employees in this action, Plaintiff may still
26 be awarded substantially less than what was obtained through the Settlement. (Moon Decl., ¶ 44.)

27 The Settlement avoids the significant risks, burdens, and the accompanying expense of further
28 litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 45.) Though the Parties have engaged in a significant amount of investigation,

informal discovery, and employee data analysis, they have not participated in extensive formal discovery procedures, including depositions and expert discovery. (*Id.*) Moreover, Plaintiff would have to proceed with arbitration of his individual claims and win on the merits before proceeding with litigation of the representative PAGA claims. (*Id.*) Preparation for trial and the prospect of appeals in the wake of any summary judgment ruling would remain for the Parties. (*Id.*) As a result, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys' fees and costs through trial, a lengthy and uncertain process that could result in recovering less than was settled for. (*Id.*)

C. The Requested Attorneys' Fees/Costs Are Reasonable and Should Be Approved

In line with the Settlement, Plaintiff's Counsel requests an award of attorneys' fees in an amount of 33 1/3% of the GSA (i.e., no less than \$146,666.67, subject to potential increase under the escalator clause), plus reimbursement for actual litigation costs in the amount of \$25,991.93. (Moon Decl., ¶ 70; *see* Settlement, ¶ 3(b); Ex. 5.)

1. Plaintiff's Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the Common Fund Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. (*See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.) The California Supreme Court has held, "when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund." (*Id.* at p. 34.)

Here, Plaintiff's Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common fund" theory. (Moon Decl., ¶ 67.) The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionately among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of Cal.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated, "one who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a

fund in which other persons[] are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at pp. 110–11 [pincite omitted].) The reasons for applying this doctrine include:

fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and directly compensated should his efforts be successful.

(*Id.* at p. 111.)

Several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative “lodestar” approach for deciding fee awards, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable time records. Commenting on the lodestar approach, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel wrote in *In re Activision Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp.1373:

This court is compelled to ask, “Is this process necessary?” Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer would be a resounding, “No!” Not only do the *Lindy* and *Kerr–Johnson* analyses consume an undue amount of court time with little resulting advantage to anyone, but, in fact, it may be to the detriment of the class members.

(*Id.* at p. 1375 [emphasis added].) The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial resources. (*Id.* at pp. 1378–79.) California Courts now routinely use the percentage of the common fund approach to determine the award of attorney’s fees. (*See, e.g., In re Pac. Enter. Sec. Litig.* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378–79 [approving attorneys’ fee award of 33%].)

2. The Matter Involves a Fee and Cost Shifting Provision under PAGA

Labor Code section 2699 provides for the recovery reasonable attorney’s fees as well as costs of suit. (Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Specifically, it states: “Any employee who prevails in any [PAGA] action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs . . .” (*Id.*) Under this provision, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total recovery for the Aggrieved Employees at the conclusion of this case. (*Id.*) This fee/cost-shifting provision reflects the understanding that Plaintiff’s Counsel must accept significant risk of substantial expenses and consumption of time, energy, and other resources in litigating a PAGA claim, and thus,

that Plaintiff's Counsel is not only permitted, but entitled, to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if successful in litigating a PAGA claim.

The Settlement at issue is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Plaintiff's Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Plaintiff's Counsel who undertook this matter on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (Moon Decl., ¶¶ 61–75.) Once Plaintiff's Counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees, they committed to pursue it to its conclusion, and were accordingly precluded from focusing on, or taking on, other cases which could have resulted in a larger, and less risky, monetary gain. (*Id.* at ¶ 73.)

3. Counsel's Experience, Reputation, and Ability Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their prior experience in pursuing class and representative actions on behalf of employees, Plaintiff's Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class action and representative matters. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 46–63.) Plaintiff's Counsel have been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in a multitude of class and representative actions resulting in beneficial results to class members and aggrieved employees in California. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 46–63.) Because it is reasonable to compensate Plaintiff's Counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation, and experience, the requested fee award is supported here.

Plaintiff's Counsel's experience in wage-and-hour class and representative actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 64.) Practice in the narrow field of wage-and-hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of representative action litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 61.) Based on these and other factors, Plaintiff's Counsel have frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for aggrieved employees. (*See id.* at ¶¶ 50, 55, 57, 60.) Thus, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

1 **4. While the Lodestar Method Is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, the Court May**
2 **Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees**

3 “Despite its primacy, the lodestar method is not necessarily utilized in common fund cases.”
4 (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 27.) Courts have criticized the lodestar
5 method as a drain on the judicial system and a disincentive on attorneys to take on high-risk, challenging
6 cases. (*Id.* at p. 29.) Indeed, the lodestar approach: “(1) ‘increases the workload of an already overtaxed
7 judicial system,’ (2) is ‘insufficiently objective and produce[s] results that are far from homogenous,’ (3)
8 ‘creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of the realities of the practice of
9 law,’ (4) ‘is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in terms of percentages of the
10 settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the plaintiffs or of an overall dollar amount,’ (5) ‘encourages
11 lawyers to expend excessive hours, and . . . engage in duplicative and unjustified work,’ (6) ‘creates a
12 disincentive for the early settlement of cases,’ (7) deprives trial courts of ‘flexibility to reward or deter
13 lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as early settlement, will be fostered,’ (8) ‘works to the particular
14 disadvantage of the public interest bar,’ and (9) results in ‘confusion and lack of predictability.’” (*Id.*
15 [quoting Third Circuit Task Force, *Court Awarded Attorney Fees* (1985) 108 F.R.D. 237, 246–
16 49].)

17 Although California Courts support the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used
18 to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be
19 monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to ‘cross-check’ or adjust the lodestar in comparison to
20 a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of
21 fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy*
22 *Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 [quoting *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 49–50].)
23 Applying the lodestar method is a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours
24 reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, and the second step is to apply a multiplier to the
25 lodestar to account for various factors. (*Id.* at p. 556.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at
26 the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the
27 litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the
28 unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.*) “Under certain

1 circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit
2 analysis.” (*Id.* at pp. 556–57.)

3 Further, “California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.”
4 (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The Court “should defer
5 to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend
6 on the case.” (*Moreno v. City of Sacramento* (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.) Generally,
7 hours are reasonable if they were “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved
8 in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client.”
9 (*Hensley v. Eckerhart* (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431.)

10 Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel combined lodestar is *no less than* **\$86,022.50**, which is based on *no*
11 *less than* **111.3 hours** of attorney time spent to-date at their customary hourly rates. (Moon Decl., ¶
12 68.) Thus, in comparison to this lodestar, the fee request represents a multiplier of **1.70**. (*Id.* at ¶ 71(c).)
13 Further, the foregoing lodestar does not reflect additional works that will be devoted to this litigation,
14 including to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the
15 settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and
16 communicate with Plaintiff regarding the case. (*Id.* at ¶ 69.) The amount of fees requested under
17 the Settlement is warranted based on the contingent risk that Plaintiff’s Counsel incurred, the difficulty
18 of the questions involved, the substantial benefit conferred on the Aggrieved Employees and State of
19 California as a result of the Settlement, and the skill displayed by Plaintiff’s Counsel. (*Id.* at ¶ 71.)
20 Plaintiff’s Counsel also bear the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay.
21 (*Id.* at ¶ 69.) Thus, the request for attorneys’ fees is more than reasonable under a lodestar check.

22 **5. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Costs Were Actually and Reasonably Incurred**

23 Winning counsel are entitled to recover the out-of-pocket costs and expenses they
24 reasonably incurred in investigating, prosecuting, and settling a case. (*Staton v. Boeing Co.* (9th
25 Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 974; Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks
26 reimbursement in the total amount of \$25,991.93, for expenses that were actually and
27 reasonably incurred in this litigation. (Moon Decl., ¶ 77, Ex. 5.) These expenses were reasonably
28

1 necessary to the litigation and were actually incurred by my office. (*Id.*) These to-date expenses
2 are summarized as follows:

- 3 (a) "LWDA" of \$75.00: a one-time cost for submitting Plaintiff's PAGA Notice to the
4 LWDA;
- 5 (b) "Complaint fee" of \$1,590.83.00: the initial case filing fee for initiating the Action;
- 6 (c) "Berger Consulting Group" of \$8,075.00: costs of expert review of discovery for
7 mediation;
- 8 (d) "Steve Rottman" of \$15,000.00: a one-time cost for mediation services;
- 9 (e) "Ace," "ACE – Service of Process," "Sacramento Superior Court," "Journal," "Journal
10 Sacramento," and "Journal – Joint CMS" of \$1,251.10: costs for purchasing court
11 documents, and for filing and serving various documents during this Action; and

12 Moreover, the amount is below the maximum allocation under the Settlement and thus,
13 the remainder (\$4,008.07) will revert to the PAGA Penalties. (Moon Decl., ¶ 77; Settlement, ¶
14 3(c).) Thus, costs should be reimbursed in full.

15 **IV. CONCLUSION**

16 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant approval of the
17 Settlement and enter the proposed approval order and proposed judgment submitted herewith.

18 Respectfully submitted,

19 DATED: June 23, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

20 By: _____

21 Kane Moon
22 Allen Feghali
23 S. Phillip Song
24 Stanley J. Park

Attorneys for Plaintiff Sebastian Howard