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FILED

OCT 21 2024

CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
BY: K. MIRANDA, DEPUTY CLERK

NOTICE

Time and/or dept. have been changed.
Moving party shall give notice of change to all parties.

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SHASTA**

ELEXIS SNELL, individually, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
State of California and other aggrieved
persons,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHASTA COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER,
a California corporation; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CVCV22-199416

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Tamara L.
Wood, Dept. 8]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: November 12, 2024
Time: ~~9:00 a.m.~~ 8:30 AM
Dept.: 863

Complaint filed: March 29, 2022
FAC filed: November 18, 2022
Trial date: Not set

BY FAX

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on November 12, 2024 at 9:00 a.m., in Department 8 of the
4 Shasta County Superior Court, located at 3035 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Rosa, California
5 95403, Plaintiff Elexis Snell (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby do, move for an order as follows:

- 6 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 7 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
8 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
9 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Elexis Snell as Class Representatives for settlement purposes, and
11 approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
13 purposes, and approving payment of \$501,467.92 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 1/3% of
14 the Gross Settlement Amount;
- 15 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$ 22,176.08 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 16 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement
17 Administrator in the amount of \$12,500.00;
- 18 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 19 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over
20 the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement
21 or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

22 This motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
23 the Declarations of Elexis Snell, Justin F. Marquez and Tanner Nicodemus, and such oral
24 argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

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
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1 Dated: October 18, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 By: 
4 Justin F. Marquez
5 Benjamin H. Haber
6 Arrash T. Fattahi

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Putative Class

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3 Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
4 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Elexis Snell (“Plaintiff”) seek final approval of a proposed \$1,504,554.21 non-reversionary, class action settlement with Defendant Shasta Community Health Center (“Defendant”, and collectively with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 855 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage-and-hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$1,047.47*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$2,752.63*. (Declaration of Tanner Nicodemus on Behalf of CPT Group, Inc. [“Nicodemus Decl.”], ¶ 17.) As of filing this Motion, there **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 10-12.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the motion for preliminary approval the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Labor Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and putative Class Members worked in

1 California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the Class Period.
2 Defendant is based in Redding, California and provides a variety of healthcare services to
3 individuals residing in Shasta County and nearby counties. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez
4 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez
5 Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
7 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
8 worked, failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and failed to
9 reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against
10 Defendant for failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate
11 itemized wage statements, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶
12 3.) Defendant denies these allegations. (*Id.*)

13 On March 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
14 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204,
15 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3)
16 failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and
17 permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination
18 (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code
19 § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair
20 business practices (Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*). (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.) On
21 June 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a separate PAGA-only Complaint against Defendant for civil
22 penalties under PAGA. On November 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
23 adding the PAGA claims while dismissing the separately filed PAGA Action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff
24 sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
25 (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA on March 30, 2022.
26 (*Id.*)

27 ///

28 ///

1 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

2 Following the filing of the Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information
3 before mediating this action. Defendant provided documents outlining their wage and hour
4 policies during the class period and produced samplings of time and pay records for class members.
5 Defendants also provided class-wide information, including the total number of current and former
6 employees and workweeks at issue during the class period. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

7 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
8 analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
9 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
10 Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also
11 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
12 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant’s
13 potential liability prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

14 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

15 On May 22, 2023, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
16 action mediator Steven Rottman, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom.
17 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
18 manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
19 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through
20 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
21 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s
22 defenses, the Parties reached settlements, the material terms of which are encompassed within
23 each Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
24 Release of Claims and Class Notice].)

25 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
26 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
27 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
28 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk

of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement on June 3, 2024. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out of or object to the Settlement was September 23, 2024. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement, and no Class Members have objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$1,504,554.21 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed by SCHC [Defendant] in California and classified as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: means the period from March 29, 2018 to July 21, 2023. (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by SCHC in California and classified as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee who worked for SCHC during the PAGA Period from June 22, 2021 to July 21, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.31.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$1,504,554.21 for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Class Representative Service Award. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain

1 a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified,
2 shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed
3 after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller's
4 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue"
5 subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b).
6 (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7 7. Release: "All Participating Class members, on behalf of themselves and their
8 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators,
9 successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably
10 could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and
11 ascertained in the course of the Action including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay
12 minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal
13 periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at
14 termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify
15 necessary business expenses; and (8) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law,
16 California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Except as set forth in Section 5.3
17 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including
18 claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing
19 Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims
20 based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be
21 deemed effective upon the date of final approval of the Settlement by the Court. (Settlement, §
22 5.)

23 8. No Reversion: None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.
24 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

25 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$50,000 allocated to Plaintiff's claims
26 under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$37,500) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$12,500) being
27 paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed
28 settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶

10.)

10. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representative’s Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. (Settlement, § 1.28.)

11. Distribution Formula: Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$12,500) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

13. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$501,467.92) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$35,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

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1 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
2 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
3 attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
4 allocations are calculated. (Nicodemus Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A; Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.)
5 Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Nicodemus Decl., ¶ 7.)

6 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

7 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
8 cases. (See e.g., *Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
9 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the
10 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
11 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
12 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar*
13 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
14 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement
15 is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
16 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
17 the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
18 224, 245.)

19 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
20 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
21 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
22 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent
23 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
24 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
25 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

26 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

27 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at
28 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.

(*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognize that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$1,500,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately \$1,047.47, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$2,752.63.*** (Nicodemus Decl., ¶ 17.)

B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery

The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced employment mediator, Steven Rottman, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

1 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted formal and informal discovery
2 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping
3 and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the
4 provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at
5 separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of
6 current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period
7 premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual
8 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
9 asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and
10 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

11 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

12 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
13 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶¶ 27-39.) Class Counsel has substantial
14 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
15 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
16 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
17 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

18 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
19 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
20 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
21 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
22 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
23 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
24 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
25 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction
26 entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

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28 ///

1 **D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement**

2 No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class members has requested
3 exclusion from the Settlement. (Nicodemus Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive
4 response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock,*
5 *Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively
6 few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

7 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the
8 class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The
9 reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in
10 lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist.
11 LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly
12 support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members
13 participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely
14 opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of
15 the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon*
16 *v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by
17 objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and
18 stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the
19 court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

20 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF**
21 **FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.**

22 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
23 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount,
24 costs up to \$35,000.00 for litigating this Action, and an enhancement award of \$10,000.00 to
25 Plaintiff. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments
26 addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

27 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
28 calculating attorney’s fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed

by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage-and-hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also* *Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*See Id.*; *see also, Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in

class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiffs’ fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.” (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.*, *supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a

mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$269,025 based on at least 335 hours of work performed thus far. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$501,467.92 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.85. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”] Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

For example, Mr. Marquez’ hourly rate was recently approved in *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721. There, the court held that “[a]s for the lodestar cross-check, the billing rates are normal and customary for

timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the relevant market.” (*Id.* at p. *3.)

2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a modest multiplier of 1.85 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

“Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable”].) The intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

1 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
2 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
3 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
4 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
5 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
6 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal. 3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
7 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

8 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
9 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
10 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
11 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
12 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
13 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
14 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's
15 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

16 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
17 had success in wage-and-hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
18 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the
19 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
20 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
21 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
22 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
23 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
24 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
25 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
26 achieve favorable results. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
27 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
28 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

1 **C. Costs Are Reasonable**

2 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$21,876.08 in costs,
3 and they anticipate incurring at least \$300 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court
4 enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 26.)
5 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$22,176.08 in costs.
6 Notably, Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$35,000.00.
7 The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Justin Marquez, and these
8 costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

9 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee
10 paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial
11 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
12 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
13 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
14 (See *Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
15 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL
16 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
17 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
18 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

19 **D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable**

20 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
21 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
22 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
23 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
24 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
25 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (See *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
26 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against
27 employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-
28 retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443,

1 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of
2 class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to
4 pay a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
5 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration
6 demonstrating her devotion to this case, including their efforts assisting counsel in the case,
7 communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-
8 related documents. (*See, generally*, Plaintiff’s Declaration.)

9 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
10 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
11 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
12 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
13 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
14 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).)

15 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
16 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
17 (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
18 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
19 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at 806.) “An incentive
20 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
21 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1394, quoting *Clark, supra*, 175
22 Cal. App. 4th at 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
23 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
24 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
25 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
26 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
27 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.)

28 Here, Plaintiff has the right to move the Court for incentive awards of up to \$10,000.00 in

light of their risk in pursuing this case, time and effort devoted to this case, and the benefit received for the other class members.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved

CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$12,500.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Nicodemus Decl., ¶ 19.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.


V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

Dated: October 18, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PROOF OF SERVICE

Snell v. Shasta Community Health Center, et al.
CVCV22-0199416

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On October 21, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

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
Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 21, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.



Rebecca Padilla