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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

MARIA JAIMES and VIRGINIA ORDAZ,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the State of California
and other aggrieved persons; and SADIE
DIAZBARRIGA, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INFINITI HEALTH LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 22STCV07261

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. David S. Cunningham III, Dept. 11]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; Declaration of Maria Jaimes; Declaration of Virginia Ordaz; Declaration of Sadie Diazbarriga; Declaration of Alecia Winfield; Declaration of Steven Donnell; and [Proposed] Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: January 18, 2023

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept: 11

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 18, 2023 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 11 of the
3 Los Angeles County Superior Court (Spring Street Courthouse), 312 North Spring Street, Los
4 Angeles, California 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of
5 Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Maria Jaimes, Virginia Ordaz, and Sadie Diazbarriga will move the
6 Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between
7 Plaintiffs and Defendant Infiniti Health LLC. Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
9 and Class Notice;
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes, only;
11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Maria Jaimes, Virginia Ordaz, and Sadie Diazbarriga as Class
13 Representatives for settlement purposes, only;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, Arrash T.
15 Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, only;
16 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Motion will be based upon this Notice; the attached Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities; the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Maria Jaimes, Virginia Ordaz, Sadie
20 Diazbarriga, Alecia Winfield, and Steve Donell, filed concurrently herewith; the records and files
21 in this action; and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at
22 or before the hearing.

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: January 6, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

25 By: _____

26 Justin F. Marquez,
27 Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

28 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Maria Jaimes, Virginia Ordaz, and Sadie Diazbarriga (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$1,100,000 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Infiniti Health LLC (“Defendant”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 2,678 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Steven Serratore, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class for the purpose of settlement only, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant provided mobile COVID-19 testing centers for schools, businesses, and communities and had partnerships with various organizations and governmental entities. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods and failed to reimburse necessary business-related expenditures. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant failed to properly provide employees with

1 sick leave pay and COVID-19 paid sick pay among other alleged violations. Based on these
2 allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and straight
3 time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize
4 and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide
5 accurate itemized wage statements, failure to indemnify employees for expenditures, failure to
6 produce requested employment records, failure to provide paid sick leave, unfair business
7 practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.) Defendant denies all allegations.

8 On February 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Jaimes and Ordaz filed a putative wage and hour class
9 action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages
10 (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code
11 §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4)
12 failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely
13 pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
14 wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures
15 (Labor Code § 2802); (8) failure to produce requested employment records (Labor Code §§ 226
16 and 1198.5); and (9) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200, *et seq.*).
17 (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs Jaimes and Ordaz also sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor
18 & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations
19 pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.*) On November 30, 2022, Plaintiffs Jaimes and Ordaz filed a First
20 Amended Class & Representative Action Complaint, which: (1) added an additional class
21 representative (Plaintiff Diazbarriga); (2) added a claim for civil penalties under the PAGA; and
22 (3) included a claim for an alleged violation of Labor Code Section 248, *et seq.*, for failure to
23 pay and provide California paid sick leave, COVID-19 paid sick leave, and COVID-19
24 supplemental paid sick leave. (*Id.*)

25 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

26 Following the filing of the initial Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
27 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of timekeeping and
28 payroll records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour

1 policies and practices during the class period and information regarding the total number of
2 current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

3 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices
4 and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
5 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary
6 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
7 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
8 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

9 C. Settlement Negotiations

10 On July 12, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
11 action mediator, Steven Serratore, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom.
12 The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional
13 manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
14 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through
15 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
16 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's
17 defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within
18 the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class
19 Notice].)

20 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
21 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
22 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
23 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
24 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
25 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 15.)

26 Indeed, the \$1,100,000.00 Settlement represents **56.2% of the realistic maximum**
27 **recovery** of \$1,957,855.20. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's
28 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$19.1 million, when the risk of

prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$1,957,855.20, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties used the Los Angeles County Superior Court's Form Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the Parties made to the template in redline is attached to the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez as Exhibit 2. The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: all individuals employed by Infiniti Health in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee during the Class Period. (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: "means the period from September 3, 2017, to the date of preliminary approval of the settlement." (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period of March 4, 2021, to the date of preliminary approval. (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.30, and 1.31.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$1,100,000.00 and will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representatives' Service Awards, and the Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check

1 or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the
2 Administrator shall transmit the uncashed checks to the State of California's State Controller
3 Unclaimed Property Fund, in the name of the individuals whose checks are cancelled, in the
4 appropriate amounts for each such individual. (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

5 7. Release by Class Members: "Each Class Member, on behalf of themselves and their
6 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors,
7 and assigns, who does not opt out of the Settlement shall be deemed to release the Released Parties
8 [Infiniti Health, LLC, and any of their present, former, and future direct or indirect parent
9 companies, present owners, former owners, future owners, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors
10 and affiliates, as well as each of its past, present and future shareholders, officers, directors,
11 members, employees, partners, members, shareholders and agents, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers,
12 and any individual or entity which could be jointly liable with Defendant or any of them] from any
13 and all claims, known or unknown that: were asserted in any and/or all of the complaints in the
14 Action and/or any of Plaintiffs' letters to the LWDA (including any subsequently amended
15 complaints or letters); and/or any and all claims, known or unknown, that were asserted based on
16 any or all the factual allegations in all of the complaints in the Action and/or any of Plaintiffs'
17 letters to the LWDA (including any subsequently amended complaints or letters). This includes
18 but is not limited to claims for or related to: pay for all hours worked/compensation due for
19 services; failure to pay minimum wages; failure to pay overtime wages; off-the-clock work;
20 calculation of the regular rate of pay for meal and rest period premium payments, meal periods;
21 rest periods; wage statements; payment of wages at termination; maintain and provide accurate and
22 complete records; failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses; sick pay; COVID-19 paid
23 sick; California paid sick; training pay; bonus pay, unfair competition related to any or all of the
24 foregoing; any unpaid wages or compensation related to any or all of the foregoing, which are
25 based on the facts alleged in the Action; restitution related to any or all of the foregoing which are
26 based on the facts alleged in the Action; and any penalties, including statutory or civil penalties,
27 related to any or all of the foregoing. This release includes any and all claims pursuant to:
28 California Labor Code sections §§ 200, et seq., 201, 202, 203, 204, 226, 226.7, 248, et. seq., 510,

512, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198, 1198.5 and 2802; the Fair Labor Standards Act; the California Business & Professions Code § 17200; and the California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders 7-01. The release shall run through the date the court grants preliminary approval of the settlement.” (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (*Id.* at § 5.)

8. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$50,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs’ claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$37,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$12,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

10. Net Settlement Fund/Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representatives’ Service [Awards], Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.28.)

11. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment [will be] calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$12,500) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

12. Tax Allocation: “Ten Percent (10%) of each Participating Class Member’s

Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The Ninety Percent (90%) of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”).” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

13. Class Representatives’ Service Awards: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs shall be paid Service Awards of not more than \$10,000.00 each to Plaintiffs Jaimes and Ordaz and \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Diazbarriga. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiffs’ time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement for any Plaintiff, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33.33% (\$366,630.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

15. Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval: The Notice sets forth, in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 15, Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This

1 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
2 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
3 through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
4 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
5 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

6 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
7 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
8 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
9 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
10 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
11 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
12 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
13 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
14 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
15 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
16 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
17 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
18 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

19 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
20 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
21 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

22 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
23 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

24 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
25 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

26 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
27 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
28 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)

1 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
2 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
3 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
4 to approve the settlement.”].)

5 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
6 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Steven Serratore, Esq. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 7.)
7 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
8 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
9 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through
10 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
11 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses,
12 the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

13 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
14 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
15 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
16 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
17 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
18 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
19 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
20 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
21 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
22 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

23 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
24 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-48.) Again, this supports the position that the
25 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
26 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
27 action.

28 ///

1 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
2 **Respective Legal Positions**

3 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he or she prevailed at
4 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
5 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
6 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
7 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
8 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
9 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

10 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
11 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate
12 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving
13 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
14 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

15 The proposed settlement of \$1,100,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
16 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed
17 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
18 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
19 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
20 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$1,100,000.00 is within
21 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
22 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
23 ***\$228.11.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

24 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

25 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
26 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
27 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-
28 48.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the

litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$366,630.00, which is 33.33% of the gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$25,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San*

1 *Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the
2 common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one
3 party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

4 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
5 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
6 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
7 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
8 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
9 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
10 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
11 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
12 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
13 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

14 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

15 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
16 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
17 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
18 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
19 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
20 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
21 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
22 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
23 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
24 million].)

25 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 33.33% of the Settlement Amount, which
26 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature,
27 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
28 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the

1 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)

2 Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated

3 by the Parties and requested herein.

4 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

5 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime

6 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this

7 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were

8 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in

9 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing

10 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by

11 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class

12 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent

13 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the

14 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class

15 ahead of all other concerns.

16 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the**

17 **Requested Fee Award**

18 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers

19 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez

20 Decl., ¶¶ 40-48.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class

21 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class

22 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee

23 award is supported here.

24 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the

25 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.

26 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning

27 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class

28 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee

1 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
2 is reasonable and fair.

3 **D. The Service Awards to the Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

4 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
5 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
6 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
7 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
8 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
9 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
10 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

11 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
12 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
13 codified in California Labor Code Section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
14 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
15 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....” Nonetheless, the California
16 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
17 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
18 (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 461.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
19 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
20 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

21 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
22 Service Awards of not more than \$10,000.00 each to Plaintiffs Jaimes and Ordaz and \$7,500.00 to
23 Plaintiff Diazbarriga. These amounts are also in exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all
24 claims against Defendant. Plaintiffs have devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel
25 in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation,
26 and were frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 30-
27 34; Declarations of Maria Jaimes, Virginia Ordaz, and Sadie Diazbarriga in Support of Plaintiffs’
28 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.) These amounts are reasonable

1 particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*)
2 Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB,
3 Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339
4 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each
5 named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 34.)

6 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amounts
7 requested here are particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
8 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
9 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
10 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study,”
11 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment
12 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
13 while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121
14 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards
15 in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
16 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
17 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

18 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

19 **A. Legal Standard**

20 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
21 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
22 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
23 prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382
24 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
25 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
26 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
27 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
28 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be

represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.

1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes approximately 2,678 employees of Defendant.

Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries

1 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
2 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
3 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

4 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

5 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
6 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
7 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
8 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
9 Cal.App.3d 605.)

10 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
11 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
12 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
13 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
14 overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
15 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period
16 premium wages; whether Defendant properly paid non-exempt employees for California sick pay
17 and COVID-19 sick pay; whether bonuses were properly paid; whether non-exempt employees
18 were properly paid for training; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
19 compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified
20 class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress
21 for, the same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
24 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
25 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
26 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
27 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
28 situated” vis-à-vis the class].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they

1 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
2 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant; as
3 such, they alleged that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly
4 situated employees.

5 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

6 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
7 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
8 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

10 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
11 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
12 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 40-48.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
13 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
14 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
15 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
16 Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their serious commitment to
17 bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

18 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

19 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
20 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
21 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the
22 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
23 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
24 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
25 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
26 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 462; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir.
27 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are
28 essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
7 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
8 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
9 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
10 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

11 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

12 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
13 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
14 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
15 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
16 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
18 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
19 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
20 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
21 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
22 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
23 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
24 combined settlement-certification class notice.

25 **VI. CONCLUSION**

26 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
27 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing for a date in May 2023.


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2 Dated: January 6, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

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4 By:


Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Arrash T. Fattahi

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6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Jaimes, et al. v. Infiniti Health LLC, et al.
21STCV07261

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Ashley Narinyans, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is anarinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On **January 6, 2023**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Alecia Whitaker Winfield (SBN 209661)

awinfield@littler.com

Krystal Saleh (SBN 320932)

ksaleh@littler.com

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

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
Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE.**

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **January 6, 2023**, at Los Angeles, California.



Ashley Narinyans