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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

DARIUS YOUNG, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. ARTHUR GENSLER JR. & ASSOCIATES,
INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCV07284

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Lawrence
P. Riff, Dept. 07]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed concurrently with: Declarations of
Justin F. Marquez, Darius Young, and Julie
Green in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement and [Proposed] Order Granting
Motion.]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: May 2, 2023

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept: 7

Complaint filed: February 28, 2022

FAC filed: July 25, 2022

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 2, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 7 of the Los
3 Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, pursuant
4 to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Darius
5 Young (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the
6 proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant M. Arthur Gensler Jr. &
7 Associates, Inc. (“Defendant”) Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:


- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation of Class and PAGA Action Settlement
9 and Release;
- 10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes only;
- 11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for the distribution of the Notice;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Darius Young as Class Representative for settlement purposes
13 only;
- 14 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for
15 settlement purposes only;
- 16 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
- 17 7. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Darius Young, and Julie Green, filed
20 concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or
21 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: January 26, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24
25 By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Christina M. Lee
Zachary D. Greenberg

27 Attorneys for Plaintiff
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Darius Young (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$400,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant M. Arthur Gensler Jr. & Associates, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement, as defined below, will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 509 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Mr. David Phillips, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes only, approve the proposed notice, and set a Final Approval Hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly paid, non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant specializes in architecture, design, and planning, with multiple locations internationally, in the United States, and in California. Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s location in Downtown Los Angeles. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked off the clock by putative class members and that Defendant had a systematic practice of underpayment due to rounding. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to include all remunerations in the employees’ overtime rate and meal period

1 premiums. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for failure to
2 pay minimum and straight-time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal
3 periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, and failure to timely pay all final wages at
4 termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices,
5 and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

6 Defendant denies the allegations in the Operative Complaint, denies any failure to
7 comply with the laws identified in in the Operative Complaint, and denies any and all liability
8 for the causes of action that are or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts in the
9 Operative Complaint. (Settlement, § 2.1.)

10 On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
11 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
12 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods and/or timely pay meal period premium
13 pay; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods and/or timely pay rest period premium pay;
14 (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
15 wage statements; and (7) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business
16 and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) On July 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First
17 Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint, which added a cause of action for civil
18 penalties under PAGA (“Operative Complaint”). (*Id.*)

19 Prior to Plaintiff’s action, Defendant settled a prior class action entitled *James Hardin*
20 *v. M. Arthur Gensler Jr., & Associates, Inc.*, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No.
21 BC646526, whose class definition had a slight overlap with the class period in this case.
22 Therefore, the relevant class period at issue here is from April 5, 2018 (the day after the defined
23 class period in the *Hardin* Action ended) through the present (“Class Period”). (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

24 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

25 Following the filing of the Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information
26 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a 25% sampling of timekeeping and pay
27 records for class members. Defendant also provided its wage and hour policies and practices
28 during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former

employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

After reviewing the documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations

On September 21, 2022, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator, David Phillips, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9; **Ex. 1** [Stipulation of Class and PAGA Action Settlement and Release (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”)].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 16.)

Indeed, the \$400,000.00 Settlement represents **43% of the realistic maximum recovery of \$931,340.60.** (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s maximum

1 potential liability for all claims was approximately \$9.1 million, when the risk of prevailing at
2 certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's
3 realistic exposure was \$931,340.60, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery.
4 (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at
5 trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class
6 members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable
7 judgment. Although Defendant denies all of Plaintiff's claims and contends Plaintiff would not
8 succeed on the merits of his claims or in certifying those claims for class treatment, Defendant
9 nonetheless agreed to resolve this action through settlement to avoid the expense, distraction,
10 and uncertainty of protracted litigation.

11 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

12 The Parties used the Los Angeles County Superior Court's Form Class Action and
13 PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the Parties made to
14 the template in redline is attached to the Declaration of Justin F. Marquez as Exhibit 2. The
15 Settlement's key terms include:

16 1. Settlement Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
17 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all current and former
18 non-exempt hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class
19 Period and did not previously sign a general release of claims." (Settlement, § 1.42.)

20 2. Class Period: The Class Period means the period from April 5, 2018 through the
21 date of Preliminary Approval. (Settlement, § 1.8.)

22 3. Class Member: means a member of the Settlement Class, as either a Participating
23 Class Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non-Participating Class Member
24 who qualifies as a PAGA Group Member. (Settlement, § 1.6.)

25 4. Participating Class Member: means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
26 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement. (Settlement, §1.31.)
27
28

1 5. Non-Participating Class Member: means any Class Member who opts out of the
2 Settlement by sending the Settlement Administrator a valid and timely Request for Exclusion.
3 (Settlement, §1.23.)

4 6. PAGA Group: means all current and former non-exempt hourly-paid employees
5 who worked for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period. Members of the PAGA Group
6 are “PAGA Group Members.” (Settlement, §1.26.) The “PAGA Period” means the period from
7 March 2, 2021, through the date of Preliminary Approval of the Settlement.

8 7. Total Maximum Settlement Amount: means \$400,000.00 which is the total
9 amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement. The Total Maximum Settlement Amount
10 will be used to pay Individual Settlement Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA
11 PAGA Payment, the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Payment, the Named Plaintiff Award, and the
12 Administrator Payment, as those terms are defined in the Settlement¹. (Settlement, § 1.45.)

13 8. Uncashed Checks: For any Settlement Group Member whose Individual
14 Settlement Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after
15 the void date, the Settlement Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to
16 the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby
17 leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure
18 Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

19 9. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not PAGA Group Members:
20 All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
21 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released
22 Parties from all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, and causes of action, whether known or
23 unknown, that were or could have been asserted (whether in tort, contract, or otherwise) for
24 violation of federal, state or local law arising out of or reasonably relating to any facts,
25 transactions, events, policies, occurrences, acts, disclosures, statements, omissions, or failures to
26 act pleaded in the Operative Complaint, including that Defendant failed to pay all wages due

27
28 ¹ Capitalized terms herein have the same meaning as those terms in the Settlement attached as Exhibit 1.

(including minimum, straight, and overtime wages), failed to provide legally compliant meal and rest breaks, failed to pay premium pay for meal and rest break violations, failed to provide timely pay including final pay, failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failed to reimburse for business expenses, engaged in unfair business practices, and for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act at any time during the Class Period. Except as set forth in Paragraph 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period. (Settlement, § 5.2.)

10. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are PAGA Group Members:

All Non-Participating Class Members who are PAGA Group Members are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, arising out of or reasonably relating to any facts, transactions, events, policies, occurrences, acts, disclosures, statements, omissions, or failures to act pleaded in the Operative Complaint, including that Defendant failed to pay all wages due (including minimum, straight, and overtime wages), failed to provide legally compliant meal and rest breaks, failed to pay premium pay for meal and rest break violations, failed to provide timely pay including final pay, failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failed to reimburse for business expenses. (Settlement, § 5.3.)

11. No Reversion: "None of the Total Maximum Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

12. PAGA Payment and Allocation: means the \$60,000.00 from the Total Maximum Settlement Amount allocated to civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq. ("PAGA"). 25% of the PAGA Payment (\$15,000.00) will be allocated to the PAGA Group and the 75% to LWDA (\$45,000.00) in settlement of PAGA claims. (Settlement, § 1.30.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

1 13. Net Settlement Fund: means the Total Maximum Settlement Amount, less the
2 following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: the LWDA PAGA Payment,
3 Attorneys' Fees and Costs Payment, Named Plaintiff Award, and the Administrator Payment, as
4 those terms are defined in the Settlement. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class
5 Members as Individual Settlement Payments. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6 14. Distribution Formula: Participating Class Members will receive a lump sum
7 payment as good and valuable consideration for the waiver and release of claims as set forth in
8 Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above, in an amount determined by the Settlement Administrator in
9 accordance with the provisions as outlined in Section 3.2.4 of the Settlement Agreement.
10 (Settlement, § 3.2.4.)

11 15. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Participating Class Members will be
12 allocated as 50% wages and 50% penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

13 16. Class Representative Named Plaintiff Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff
14 shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$5,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount
15 is for Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
16 release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.)
17 If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert
18 into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class
19 Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

20 17. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
21 a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$133,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-
22 pocket costs not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) At this time, Class Counsel's costs
23 are approximately \$12,001.00. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 40.)

24 18. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
25 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys'
26 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
27 are calculated. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 9; **Ex. A to Ex. 1**.) The Notice also includes information how
28 class members can opt-out in the event they decide to not participate in the settlement. (*Id.*) Class

Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (*Id.*) The notice will be provided only in English because that is the primary language of Class Members. CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*) (Marquez Decl., ¶ 12; Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of Plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the Plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a Plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a full day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, David Phillips, Esq. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the

1 Litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
2 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

3 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
4 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 41-50.) Again, this supports the position that the
5 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
6 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
7 action.

8 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
9 **Respective Legal Positions**

10 A settlement is not judged against what Plaintiff might recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
11 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
12 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
13 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
14 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
15 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
16 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

17 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
18 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
19 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
20 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
21 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

22 The proposed settlement of \$400,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
23 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed
24 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
25 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
26 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
27 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$400,000.00 is within
28 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) **Indeed,**

1 *each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately*
2 *\$348.16. (Id. at ¶ 26.)*

3 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

4 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
5 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
6 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-
7 50.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
8 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

9 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

10 The Proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement, in the form attached to the Settlement
11 Agreement as **Exhibit A**, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs
12 the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. The
13 Notice also provides instructions in the event a Class Member wishes to object to this proposed
14 class action settlement, either in writing or at the hearing, and explains the Class Member will have
15 the opportunity to file an objection and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the
16 proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

17 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

18 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, the Settlement Administrator will
19 allocate from the Total Maximum Settlement Amount reasonable attorneys' fees to Class Counsel
20 in the amount of \$133,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the gross Settlement Amount, and up to
21 \$15,000.00 in actual costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the Notice of
22 Proposed Class Action Settlement and are reasonable.

23 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common**
24 **Fund" Method**

25 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
26 by counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held that "when
27 a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a Plaintiff
28 or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such Plaintiff

1 or Plaintiff may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d
2 25, 34, quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

3 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/common
4 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
5 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent*,
6 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
7 Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
8 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
9 the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
10 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
11 has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in
12 which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

13 The California Supreme Court recently affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016)
14 1 Cal.5th 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the
15 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that
16 fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
17 percentage of the fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages
18 of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between
19 counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the
20 encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
21 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our
22 trial courts.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

23 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

24 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
25 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
26 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
27 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
28 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)

Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff request attorneys' fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 35-40.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez

Decl., ¶¶ 41-50.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The Named Plaintiff Award Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to a plaintiff in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should

1 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
2 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, the Settlement
4 Administrator will allocate from the Total Maximum Settlement Amount a Named Plaintiff Award
5 in the amount of \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general
6 release of all claims against Defendant. Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff devoted a great deal
7 of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for
8 litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during
9 the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 30-34; Declaration of Darius Young in Support of Plaintiff’s
10 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Young Decl.”], ¶¶ 4-9.) This
11 amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class
12 members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-
13 02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action
14 settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a \$10,000.00 class representative
15 incentive award for each named Plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 34.)

16 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
17 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
18 award given to class action Plaintiff from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
19 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
20 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiff: An Empirical Study”,
21 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named Plaintiff in employment
22 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
23 while named Plaintiff in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and
24 a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
25 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative Plaintiff whole by
26 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
27 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

1 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY IS WARRANTED**

2 **A. Legal Standard**

3 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
4 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
5 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
6 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
7 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
8 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
9 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
10 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
11 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
12 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
13 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
14 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
15 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
16 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
17 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

18 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
19 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
20 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
21 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
22 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
23 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

24 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
25 **Settlement Purposes**

26 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

27 Plaintiff contends that the proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily
28 ascertainable, and includes approximately 509 employees of Defendant.

1 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
2 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
3 records of Defendant (i.e., job position), the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
4 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
5 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

6 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
7 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
8 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
9 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
10 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
11 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
12 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
13 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
14 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

15 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

16 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
17 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
18 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
19 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
20 605.)

21 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
22 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
23 worked off the clock by the putative class member and that Defendant had a systematic practice of
24 underpayment due to rounding. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees
25 with legally compliant meal and rest periods. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to
26 include all remunerations in the employees’ overtime rate and meal period premiums. Based on
27 these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for failure to pay minimum and
28 straight-time wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to

1 authorize and permit rest periods, and failure to timely pay all final wages at termination, failure
2 to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices, and civil penalties
3 under PAGA. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the
4 identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members are alleged to have
5 suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries. Defendant denies all allegations.

6 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

7 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
8 of the representative Plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
9 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
10 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
11 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
12 situated" vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
13 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
14 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
15 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
16 employees.

17 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

18 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
19 named Plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
20 a named Plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
21 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

22 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
23 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
24 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 41-50.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
25 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
26 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
27 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing his dedication. Plaintiff's
28

1 willingness to serve as a representatives demonstrate his serious commitment to bringing about the
2 best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

3 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

4 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
5 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
6 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
7 class action device enables it to manage this Litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
8 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
9 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
10 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
11 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
12 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
13 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

14 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

15 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

16 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
17 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
18 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
19 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
20 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
21 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
22 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
23 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

24 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

25 The Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement attached as Exhibit A to Exhibit 1 of this
26 Motion should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first-class mail to the last
27 known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the
28 Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. The Notice also provides

1 instructions in the event a Class Member wishes to object to this proposed class action settlement,
2 either in writing or at the hearing, and explains that the Class Member will have the opportunity to
3 file an objection and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

4 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
5 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
6 terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
7 makes clear that the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
8 Defendant, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
9 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made.
10 Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality
11 required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.


12 **VI. CONCLUSION**

13 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
14 approval of the proposed Settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing on August 31, 2022
15 (approximately 120 days after the May 3, 2023 hearing date on this motion, if it is granted), or
16 the first available date thereafter.

17
18
19 Dated: January 26, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

20 By: 
21 Justin F. Marquez
22 Christina M. Lee
23 Zachary D. Greenberg
24 Attorneys for Plaintiff
25
26
27
28

PROOF OF SERVICE

Darius Young v. M. Arthur Gensler Jr. & Associates
22STCV07284

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Sandy S. Sespene, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is ssespene@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On **January 26, 2023**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

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
Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on January 26, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.



Sandy S. Sespene