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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

CAPRICE JUSTICE WILLIAMS, on behalf of
the State of California and other aggrieved
persons,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOTAL LONGTERM CARE, INC., a
corporation; INNOVAGE CALIFORNIA
PACE-INLAND EMPIRE, LLC, a limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2213347

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Jessica
Morgan, Dept. S-26]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed concurrently with: the Declaration of
Justin F. Marquez, the Declaration of
Plaintiff, and [Proposed] Order Granting
Motion]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: December 6, 2023

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: S-26

Complaint filed: June 23, 2022

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 6, 2023 at 8:30 a.m., in Department S-26 of
3 the San Bernardino Justice Center, located at 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415,
4 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiff
5 Caprice Justice Williams (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary
6 approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Total Longterm
7 Care, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation Re: Class Action and
9 Representative Action Settlement;
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Caprice Justice Williams as Class Representative for settlement
13 purposes;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Benjamin H. Haber, Arrash T.
15 Fattahi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
16 6. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

18 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
19 authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez and Plaintiff Caprice Justice Williams, filed
20 concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or
21 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: November 9, 2023

24 WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

25 By: 

26 Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
27 Benjamin H. Haber, Esq.
28 Maxim Gorbunov, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Caprice Justice Williams (“Plaintiff”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$1,300,000 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Total Longterm Care, Inc. (collectively, “Defendant”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 433 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Honorable Daniel Buckley (Ret.), over the course of a full-day, in-person mediation and subsequent settlement discussions. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a tentative settlement in early February 2023 following a mediator’s proposal that culminated with a signed long-form settlement agreement in November 2023. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant offers all-inclusive healthcare services to seniors throughout the United States, including California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage

statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff Caprice Justice Williams filed a separate putative wage-and-hour class action in San Bernardino Superior Court, Case No. CIVSB2206499 (removed on July 8, 2022 to the District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. 5:22-cv-01180-SSS-SP) against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code §§17200, et seq. On June 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant alleging claims for civil penalties under Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Labor Code § 2698 et seq.) based on similar claims. Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, et seq.) on April 11, 2022. (*Id.* ¶ 4.)

On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a stipulation for leave to file a First Amended Class and Representative Complaint adding her class claims to this action for purposes of settlement approval. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and

1 Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also
2 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
3 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

4 C. Settlement Negotiations

5 On January 26, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
6 action mediator Honorable Daniel Buckley (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The mediation was conducted
7 in-person in Los Angeles, California. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and,
8 although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the
9 mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
10 prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached.
11 (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
12 Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a tentative settlement following
13 a mediator's proposal that was then further negotiated, with the material terms encompassed
14 within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9, Ex. 2 [Joint Stipulation Re: Class Action and Representative
15 Action Settlement].)

16 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
17 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
18 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
19 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
20 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
21 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

22 Indeed, the \$1,300,000.00 Settlement represents **71% of the realistic maximum**
23 **recovery of \$1,842,335.61.** (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's
24 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$10.9 million, when the risk of
25 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that
26 Defendant's realistic exposure was \$1,842,335.61, meaning the Settlement achieves a
27 significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at
28 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed,

because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all current and former non-exempt employees who worked in California for Defendant at any time during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1(NN).)

2. Class Period: "means the period from March 30, 2018 through October 31, 2023, unless Defendant elects to shorten the Class Period pursuant to Paragraph 17 of th[e] Agreement." (Settlement, § 1(F).)

3. Participating Class Members: "all Settlement Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion and will therefore receive his or her share of the Net Settlement Amount automatically without the need to return a claim form." (Settlement, § 1(CC).)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or nonexempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period June 23, 2021 through the end of the Class Period which is currently October 31, 2023. (Settlement, §§ 1(C), 1(BB), 1(F).)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$1,300,000.00, for all claims, including wages, interest, the Class Counsel Award, Litigation costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the Class Representative Service Award. (Settlement, § 1(P).)

6. Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 11(A).)

7. Class Release: "Upon the date Defendant transfers the Gross Settlement Amount and Employer Taxes necessary to effectuate the Settlement, entry of an Order granting Final

1 Approval of the Settlement, and entry of Judgment, Plaintiff and Participating Class Members
2 release the Released Parties from any and Operative Complaint based on the facts alleged therein,
3 which arose during the Class Period, including but not limited to (1) all claims for failure to pay
4 minimum and straight time wages, pursuant to Labor Code sections 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 and
5 1197.1; (2) all claims for failure to pay overtime wages, including the first 8 hours of work on the
6 seventh day worked of any one workweek, pursuant to Labor Code sections 510, 551, 552, 1194
7 and 1198; (3) all claims for failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof,
8 pursuant to Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; (4) all claims for failure to provide rest periods or
9 compensation in lieu thereof, pursuant to Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; (5) all claims for
10 failure to pay all wages due upon separation from employment, pursuant to Labor Code sections
11 201, 202 and 203; (6) all claims for failure to issue accurate and compliant wage statements,
12 pursuant to Labor Code section 226; (7) all claims for failure to indemnify necessary expenditures
13 or losses, pursuant to Labor Code 2800 and 2802; and (8) all claims asserted through California
14 Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. arising out of the Labor Code violations
15 referenced in the Complaint (the “Class Released Claims”). (Settlement, § 7(A).)

16 8. PAGA Release: Upon the date Defendant transfers the Gross Settlement Amount
17 and Employer Taxes necessary to effectuate the Settlement, entry of an Order granting Final
18 Approval of the Settlement, and entry of Judgment, the State of California and Aggrieved
19 Employees release the Released parties from all claims exhausted in Plaintiff’s notice(s) sent to
20 the LWDA and alleged in the Operative Complaint and/or based on the Released Claims, which
21 arose during the PAGA Period, regardless of whether Aggrieved Employees opt out of the
22 Settlement Class (“PAGA Released Claims”). (Settlement, § 7(B).)

23 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$50,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
24 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$37,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
25 (\$12,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 15.) Class Counsel submitted
26 the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval.
27 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

28 10. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains

1 and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1)
2 attorneys' fees and Litigation costs, (2) Administrative Costs, (3) enhancement to the Named
3 Plaintiff, and (4) the penalties recoverable pursuant to the PAGA. (Settlement, § 1 (X).)

4 11. Distribution Formula: Each Participating Individual Settlement Payment will be
5 calculated by (a) dividing the Settlement Class Member's workweek amount by the total number
6 of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b)
7 multiplying the result by each Net Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 10(C).) As to PAGA: The
8 Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing total number of
9 workweeks worked by the Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period by the total number of
10 workweeks worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the
11 result by PAGA Payment (\$12,500). (Settlement, § 10(E))

12 12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
13 allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 14.)

14 13. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
15 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$12,500.00. (Settlement, § 1(KK).) This amount is for
16 Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
17 release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, §
18 7(D).) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall
19 revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class
20 Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 13.)

21 14. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
22 a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$433,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-
23 pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 12.)

24 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
25 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys'
26 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
27 are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class
28 mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 9(A).) Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the proposed

1 Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the
2 current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and
3 re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3 [Settlement
4 Administrator Bid].)

5 **III. DISCUSSION**

6 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
7 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
8 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
10 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
12 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

13 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
14 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
15 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
16 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
17 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
18 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
19 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
20 that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
21 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
22 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
23 require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
24 prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy
25 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

26 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
27 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
28 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
4 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
6 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
7 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
8 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
10 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
11 to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
13 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Hon. Daniel Buckley (Ret.). (Marquez Decl.
14 ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
15 manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
16 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position
17 through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations
18 and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s
19 defenses, the Parties reached an agreement following a mediator’s proposal and further settlement
20 discussions. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 9.)

21 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
22 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
23 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
24 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
25 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
26 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
27 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
28 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the

1 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
2 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

3 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
4 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 42-53.) Again, this supports the position that the
5 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
6 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
7 action.

8 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 9 **Respective Legal Positions**

10 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
11 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
12 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
13 and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
14 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
15 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
16 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

17 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
18 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate
19 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
20 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
21 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

22 The proposed settlement of \$1,300,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
23 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 18-31.) Because of the proposed
24 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
25 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
26 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
27 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$1,300,000.00 is within
28 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) **Indeed,**

1 *each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately*
2 *\$1,753.27. (Id. at ¶ 30.)*

3 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

4 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
5 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for her clients and are
6 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-
7 53.) Although Plaintiff and her counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
8 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

9 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

10 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
11 for dissemination to the class and sub-class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the
12 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
13 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file
14 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice
15 meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

16 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

17 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
18 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$433,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
19 Settlement Amount, and up to \$25,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
20 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

21 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"**
22 **Method**

23 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
24 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
25 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
26 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
27 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
28 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

1 Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/ common
2 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
3 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent*,
4 *supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
5 Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
6 from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of
7 the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*
8 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine
9 has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in
10 which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

11 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
12 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
13 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
14 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
15 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
16 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
17 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
18 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
19 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
20 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

21 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

22 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
23 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
24 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
25 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
26 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
27 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
28 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also

1 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
2 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
3 million].)

4 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
5 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature,
6 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
7 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
8 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
9 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
10 by the parties and requested herein.

11 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

12 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
13 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
14 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover her actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
15 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
16 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
17 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
18 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
19 Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
20 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
21 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
22 ahead of all other concerns.

23 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 24 **Requested Fee Award**

25 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
26 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez
27 Decl., ¶¶ 42-53.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
28 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class

counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions...."). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agreed to pay

1 a Service Award in the amount of \$12,500 to Plaintiff. This amount is less than 1% of the total
2 settlement amount. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general release of all claims
3 against Defendant. Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case,
4 communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was
5 frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This
6 amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class
7 members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-
8 02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action
9 settlement for 339 class members, and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive
10 award for each named plaintiff. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 36.)

11 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
12 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
13 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
14 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
15 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
16 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment
17 discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081,
18 while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121
19 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards
20 in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
21 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
22 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

23 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

24 **A. Legal Standard**

25 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
26 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
27 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
28 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when

1 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
2 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
3 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
4 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
5 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
6 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
7 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
8 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
9 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
10 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
11 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

12 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
13 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
14 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
15 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
16 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
17 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

18 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
19 **Settlement Purposes.**

20 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

21 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
22 approximately 433 employees of Defendant.

23 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
24 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
25 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
26 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
27 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

28 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a

1 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
2 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
3 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
4 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
5 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
6 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
7 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
8 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

9 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

10 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
11 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
12 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
13 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
14 Cal.App.3d 605.)

15 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
16 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
17 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
18 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
19 overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
20 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
21 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
22 compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified
23 class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for,
24 the same alleged injuries.

25 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

26 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
27 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
28 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and

activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as such, she alleges that she was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiff and Her Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 42-53.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiff’s willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to

1 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
2 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
3 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

4 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

5 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

6 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
7 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
8 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
9 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
10 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
11 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
12 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
13 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

14 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

15 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
16 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
17 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
18 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
19 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

20 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
21 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
22 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
23 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
24 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
25 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
26 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
27 combined settlement-certification class notice.

28 //

1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in March 2023.

4
5 Respectfully submitted,

6 Dated: November 13, 2023

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

7 By: 

8 Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
9 Benjamin H. Haber, Esq.
10 Maxim Gorbunov, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Caprice Justice Williams, et al. v. Total Longterm Care, Inc, et al.
CIVSB2213347

I, Sandy S. Sespene, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is sspene@wilshirelawfirm.com.

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(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

Executed this **November 13, 2023**, at Los Angeles, California.


Sandy S. Sespene