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and all others Similarly situated*

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN

CYNTHIA WOOD, an individual; on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAXIM HEALTHCARE STAFFING, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: STK-CV-UOE-2022-0006312

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. Barbara
A. Kronlund, Dept. 10D]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PRIVATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT
SETTLEMENT AND FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS**

*[Filed concurrently with the Declaration of
Joshua H. Haffner; Declaration of Cynthia
Wood; [Proposed] Order]*

Hearing Dates:

February 5, 6, 10, 11 or 12 of 2026

Hearing Time:

09:00 a.m.

Complaint Filed On: July 22, 2022

**TO THE HONORABLE COURT, TO ALL PARTIES, AND TO THEIR COUNSEL
OF RECORD: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN** that at 9:00 A.M. on either February 5, 6, 10, 11 or
12 of 2026, as selected by the Clerk of the Court, or any other dates thereafter as the matter can be
heard in Department 10D of the above-referenced Court, located at 180 E. Weber Avenue, Stockton,

1 California 95202, Plaintiff Cynthia Wood ("Plaintiff") will move for an order granting approval of
2 the proposed settlement on the terms and conditions set forth in the Private Attorneys General Act
3 (Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.*) ("PAGA") Settlement Agreement and Release of PAGA claims (the
4 "Settlement Agreement") between Plaintiff and Defendant Maxim Healthcare Staffing Services, Inc.
5 ("Defendant," n/k/a Amergis Healthcare Staffing, Inc.). A copy of the PAGA Settlement Agreement
6 is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Joshua H. Haffner in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
7 Approval of PAGA Settlement Agreement And Release Of PAGA Claims (hereinafter "Settlement
8 Agreement" or "Settlement") ("Haffner Dec.") at ¶3.

9 **Notice to the LWDA:** On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff's Counsel filed the Settlement
10 Agreement with the California Labor and Workforce Development ("LWDA"). (Haffner Dec.
11 **Exhibit 5** at ¶ 63.)

12 The motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and
13 Authorities in Support, Declaration of Joshua H. Haffner in Support, Declaration of Cynthia Wood
14 in Support, exhibits, all other pleadings and papers on file in this action, and any oral argument or
15 other matter that may be considered by the Court.

16 DATE: January 8, 2026

17 Respectfully submitted,
18 **HAFFNER LAW PC**

19 By: /s/ Vahan Mikayelyan
20 Joshua H. Haffner
21 Alfredo Torrijos
22 Vahan Mikayelyan

23 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Cynthia Wood*
24 *And all others similarly situated*
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Cynthia Wood ("Plaintiff"), as representatives of the LWDA and behalf of herself and
4 other aggrieved employees, respectfully submits this memorandum in support of her motion for
5 approval of the settlement of this action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor
6 Code section 2698, et seq. (hereinafter "PAGA") with Defendant Maxim Healthcare Staffing
7 Services, Inc. ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs seek entry of a proposed order and judgment granting
8 approval of the PAGA settlement.

9 As consideration for this settlement, Defendant will fund a non-reversionary, common fund
10 settlement of \$1,500,000.00 (the "Gross Settlement Amount") which includes: the Attorney Fee
11 Award, the Cost Award, Service Awards, the Administration Costs, Individual Payments, and the
12 LWDA Payment. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §3.1.) If all requested amounts are approved, after deduction
13 from the Gross Settlement Amount of the Attorney Fee Award, the Cost Award, Service Awards, and
14 the Administration Costs, the amount to be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce
15 Development ("LWDA") and Aggrieved Employees is equal to approximately \$962,600.00.

16 The remaining amount of approximately \$962,600.00 is for the payment of civil penalties under
17 PAGA to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees. This amount shall be distributed 75% to the LWDA
18 and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §3.2.; Lab. Code §2699(i) [civil penalties
19 recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the [LWDA] ...; and
20 25 percent to the aggrieved employees]. Plaintiffs estimate the LWDA will receive approximately
21 \$721,950.00 (\$962,600.00 X .75 to LWDA = \$721,950.00). Plaintiffs estimate \$240,650.00 will be
22 distributed pro rata to the Aggrieved Employees based on the number of pay periods worked during
23 the PAGA Period¹ (\$962,600.00 X .25 = \$240,650.00). (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §3.2-3.7.) As set forth
24 below, Plaintiffs believe this is a fair result for the PAGA litigation.

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¹ "PAGA Period" shall refer to the time period from May 9, 2022, through June 29, 2025. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §1.18.)

II. SUMMARY OF LITIGATION

A. The Parties

Defendant is authorized to do business within the State of California and do business in the State of California, including but not limited to San Joaquin County. Plaintiff was employed by Maxim Healthcare Staffing Services, Inc. as a nurse, and assigned to work at San Joaquin General Hospital as a nonexempt hourly employee, performing services in California at the San Joaquin General Hospital. Based on information from Defendant, there were approximately 3,406 hourly, non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 4.)

B. The Complaint and Allegations

On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff Cynthia Wood submitted a Notice of Labor Code Violations Pursuant to Labor Code Section 2699.3 to Defendant and to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) to notify the LWDA pursuant to PAGA of Plaintiff’s intent to seek civil penalties under PAGA for violations of the Labor Code. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 5.)

On July 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint in this Action alleging a single cause of action for Civil Penalties Pursuant to PAGA for the following claims against Defendant: (1) failure to pay Plaintiff and class members for overtime at their regular rate of pay, (2) failure to provide meal and rest breaks and associated labor violations. As set forth herein, Defendant operates a national healthcare professional staffing company, and has a policy of failing to pay overtime based on all nondiscretionary income Plaintiff and class members received. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in California as a nurse, and did not receive overtime pay at the legal rate, and did not receive lawful meal and rest breaks (the “Action”). (Haffner Decl. ¶ 6.)

Pursuant Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint Plaintiff and other employees are not being paid their regular rate of pay for overtime by Defendant. Plaintiff and the other employees receive nondiscretionary compensation for: (1) working more shifts than they are contracted for; and (2) for housing. Defendant fails to account for this nondiscretionary compensation in Plaintiff and the representative group of employees’ regular rate of pay. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 7.)

1 Representative group of employees contract with Defendant to work a certain number of shifts
2 per week. Plaintiff contracted with Defendant to work three (3) shifts per week. Plaintiff and the
3 aggrieved employees receive nondiscretionary bonuses, in addition to their regular pay, for, among
4 other things, working extra shifts. Plaintiff's extra shift bonus was \$400 for each additional shift, in
5 addition to regular pay. Defendant's other employees also had similar per extra shift bonuses. They
6 also receive a housing benefit as part of their nondiscretionary employment compensation with
7 Defendant. Defendant's pay policy, as stated in Defendant's Travel Assignment Agreement, with
8 respect to the housing benefit, is that it paid for a "minimum number of weekly work hours." The
9 housing stipend was contingent upon class members working their minimum required number of
10 hours each week, and if Defendant's employees failed to work their minimum number of weekly
11 required hours, the housing benefit is clawed back through a "housing charge back." (Haffner Decl.
12 ¶ 8.)

13 Defendant fails to calculate Plaintiff's and aggrieved employees' nondiscretionary
14 compensation, including for working extra shifts and/or for housing, in Plaintiff's and aggrieved
15 employees' regular rate of pay when calculating overtime. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 9.)

16 At all times, Defendant denied the allegations and contended that: they properly paid overtime
17 wages, they properly provided all necessary meal and rest breaks and/or paid appropriate meal and
18 rest period premiums, they provided employees with itemized statements in compliance with the
19 Labor Code, and that they promptly paid all wages due and owing upon separation of employment.
20 (Haffner Decl. ¶ 10.)

21 C. Relevant Procedural Background

22 On June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v.*
23 *Moriana* (2022) 596 U.S. __ [142 S.Ct. 1906] (Viking River), holding that the employer "was entitled
24 to enforce the [arbitration agreement at issue] insofar as it mandated arbitration of [plaintiff's]
25 individual PAGA claim," and that the trial court should have compelled individual arbitration and
26 dismissed the employee's non-individual PAGA claims for lack of statutory standing. *Id.* at 1925.
27 On August 1, 2022, after *Viking River*, the California Supreme Court granted review in *Adolph*, and
28 on August 1, 2022, the Court issued an order identifying the issue to be briefed and argued. (Haffner

Decl. ¶ 11.)

Given the issue identified above, the Parties agreed that the California Supreme Court’s decision in *Adolph* would materially impact the disposition of Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims. On September 15, 2022, the Parties stipulated to a stay of this action until after *Adolph* was decided. On September 15, 2022, the Court stayed this action pursuant to the Parties’ stipulation pending the California Supreme Court’s decision in *Adolph*. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 12.)

On July 17, 2023, the California Supreme Court published its opinion in *Adolph* wherein the Court held that a PAGA plaintiff does not lose standing to pursue a non-individual claim when his or her individual claim is compelled to arbitration. On August 17, 2023 the California Supreme Court issued the remittitur in *Adolph*, after which, on October 10, 2023 the Parties stipulated and request that the Court enter an Order. The stipulation was granted on October 30, 2023, setting a case management conference for November 28, 2023. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 13.)

After the stay was lifted, the Parties organized early mediation with Kevin T. Barnes for May 23, 2024 in an attempt to resolve the Action but the session was not successful. The Parties engaged in extensive discussions in an attempt to reach a settlement of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims at issue in this Action. Following mediation on May 23, 2024 with Kevin T. Barnes, a well-respected mediator of wage and hour class actions, the Parties were able to reach a settlement in principle after accepting the mediator offer of settlement from April 30, 2024. In preparation for these negotiations, the Parties exchanged various documents and information that allowed both sides to evaluate the potential exposure and potential risk, as well as information about the number of pay periods and the number of individuals in the PAGA group. The Parties were able to subsequently execute a long-form settlement agreement and finalize it on December 5, 2025. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 14.)

The subsequent settlement efforts followed after substantial briefing on different motions and extensive written discovery. Specifically, Plaintiff successfully opposed Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Bifurcation and two motions *in limine*. The Court denied Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Bifurcation on January 28, 2025. The motions *in limine* were decided on February 18, 2025. On top of this, the Parties have participated in several case management conferences during the Action. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 15.)

1 **D. Production Of Directly Relevant Formal and Informal Discovery and Legal**
2 **Analysis By Parties' Counsel**

3 After the unsuccessful mediation on May 23, 2024, the Parties engaged in significant formal
4 written discovery, specifically form interrogatories, employment form interrogatories, special
5 interrogatories, requests for production of documents. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 16.)

6 The Parties have undertaken reasonable investigation of the facts and law during the pendency
7 of this action. Plaintiff's Counsel diligently conducted and pursued an investigation of the PAGA
8 claims against Defendant, including research of the applicable law and the potential defenses and
9 review of relevant documents. Plaintiffs obtained directly relevant data including Defendant's written
10 policies related to the claims at issue in the Operative Complaint and Plaintiff's personnel files.
11 (Haffner Decl. ¶ 17.)

12 Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel have concluded—after considering the sharply disputed factual
13 and legal issues involved on the PAGA claims, the risks attending further prosecution, and the benefits
14 to be received pursuant to the compromise and settlement of the action as set forth in the agreement—
15 that settlement was in the best interest of the representative Plaintiffs, the LWDA, and the aggrieved
16 employees and is fair and reasonable and furthers the purpose of the PAGA to enforce the Labor
17 Code. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 18.)

18 **III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT**

19 **A. Terms Of Settlement**

20 The Parties have agreed to settle the Lawsuit by agreement upon the terms and conditions
21 and for the consideration set forth in the Settlement Agreement a copy of which is attached to the
22 concurrently filed Declaration of Joshua H. Haffner as **Exhibit "1"**.

23 A summary of the key terms of the Settlement is as follows:

- 24 1. **PAGA Members**: Any current or former non-exempt employee who worked for
25 Defendant in the State of California as “travelers” – i.e., those nurses who have
traveled out-of-town to work for Defendant's clients in California – at any time during
the PAGA Period. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §1.16.)
- 26 2. **Gross Settlement Amount or GSA**: one million five hundred thousand dollars
27 (\$1,500,000.00), which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the
Settlement. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual PAGA
28 Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, PAGA Counsel Fees, PAGA Counsel Costs,
the PAGA Representative Payment, and the Administrator's Expenses Payment.
(Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §1.8.)

- 1 3. Net Settlement Amount: Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the
2 amounts approved by the Court: PAGA Counsel Fees (four hundred ninety five
3 thousand dollars \$499,950), PAGA Counsel Costs (not to exceed eight thousand
4 dollars \$8,000.00), PAGA Representative Payment (not to exceed fifteen thousand
5 dollars \$15,000.00), and the Administration Expenses Payment (fourteen thousand
6 four hundred and fifty dollars \$14,450.00). (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §1.13.)
- 7 4. Individual PAGA Payment: The PAGA Member's pro rata share of 25% of the PAGA
8 Penalties calculated according to the number of Pay Periods the PAGA Member
9 worked during the PAGA Period. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §1.9.)
- 10 The Individual PAGA Payments to the PAGA Members will be calculated based on
11 the respective number of Pay Periods each PAGA Member worked during the PAGA
12 Period. The Administrator shall calculate the respective number of Pay Periods for
13 each PAGA Member. The Administrator will report the Individual PAGA Payments
14 on IRS 1099 Forms, if applicable. The payments to PAGA Members constitute civil
15 penalties. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §3.8.)
- 16 5. Attorney Fee Award and Cost Award: Plaintiffs' Counsel will apply to the Court for,
17 and Defendant will not oppose PAGA Counsel's request for attorneys' fees of one-
18 third (33.33%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, or \$499,950.00. Any reduction by the
19 Court of this request will revert to the NSA. Defendant will not oppose PAGA
20 Counsel's requests for reimbursement of litigation costs in the amount not to exceed
21 \$8,000.00. Any reduction by the Court of this request will revert to the NSA. (Haffner
22 Decl. Ex. 1 §3.4-3.5.)
- 23 6. PAGA Representative Payment: Defendant will not oppose Plaintiff's request for a
24 payment not to exceed \$15,000.00, as consideration for Plaintiff's General Release
25 (defined and discussed below) and her services as a PAGA representative. Any
26 reduction by the Court of this request will revert to the NSA. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1
27 §3.6.)
- 28 7. Administration Costs: The Administrator's costs for administering the Settlement shall
be \$14,450.00, which shall be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount. Any reduction
by the Court of this amount will revert to the NSA. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §3.3.)
8. LWDA Payment: The LWDA PAGA Payment shall be 75% of the NSA. (Haffner
Decl. Ex. 1 §3.7.)
9. Release by Plaintiff, the PAGA Members, and the State of California: Upon deposit
of the Gross Settlement Amount in the Qualified Settlement Fund, Plaintiff, the PAGA
Members, and the State of California release the Released Parties from any and all
claims for civil penalties arising from the claims alleged that were alleged or
reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts asserted in the PAGA Notice
dated May 9, 2022 and/or the operative complaint during the PAGA Period, including
any claims for civil penalties arising from Defendant's alleged violations of California
Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 1194,
1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, and 1198 and the corresponding provision under the applicable
Industrial Welfare Commission wage order(s) including but not limited to claims for:
(1) failing to pay minimum, regular, and overtime wages purportedly due; (2) failing
to provide legally compliant meal periods and meal period premiums purportedly due;
(3) failing to provide legally compliant rest periods and rest period premiums
purportedly due; (4) failing to timely pay all wages purportedly due during
employment; (5) failing to timely pay all wages purportedly due upon separation from
employment; and (6) failing to provide accurate wage statements (the "Released
PAGA Claims"). (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §5.1.)
10. Plaintiff's General Release: Plaintiff and her former and present spouses,
representatives, agents, attorneys (including PAGA Counsel), heirs, administrators,
successors and assigns generally, release and discharge Released Parties from all
claims, transactions or occurrences arising out of her employment with Maxim

1 Healthcare Staffing Services, Inc. (n/k/a Amergis Healthcare Staffing, Inc.) through
2 the date of executing this Agreement (“Plaintiff’s General Release”). Plaintiff’s
3 General Release does not extend to any claims or actions to enforce this Agreement,
4 or to any claims for vested benefits, unemployment benefits, disability benefits, social
5 security benefits, or workers’ compensation benefits that arose at any time. Plaintiff
6 acknowledges that she may discover facts or law different from, or in addition to, the
7 facts or law that Plaintiff now knows or believes to be true but agrees, nonetheless,
8 that Plaintiff’s General Release shall be and remain effective in all respects,
9 notwithstanding such different or additional facts or Plaintiff’s discovery of them.
10 Plaintiff represents and warrants that she has not experienced any job-related illness
11 or injury for which she has not already filed a claim. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §5.2.)

12 **B. Notice and Distribution of PAGA Funds**

13 No later than ten (10) calendar days after the Effective Date, Defendant will deliver the PAGA
14 Member Data to the Administrator in the form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. To protect PAGA
15 Members’ privacy rights, the Administrator must maintain the PAGA Member Data in confidence,
16 use the PAGA Member Data only for purposes of this Settlement and for no other purpose, and restrict
17 access to the PAGA Member Data to Administrator employees only those who need access to the
18 PAGA Member Data to effect and perform under this Agreement. Defendant has a continuing duty
19 to immediately notify PAGA Counsel if it discovers that the PAGA Member Data omitted employee
20 identifying information and to provide corrected or updated PAGA Member Data as soon as
21 reasonably feasible. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §4.4.)

22 Defendant shall fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to the
23 Administrator no later than ten (10) calendar days after the Effective Date. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §4.5.)

24 Within ten (10) calendar days after Defendant funds the Gross Settlement Amount, the
25 Administrator will distribute the Administration Expenses Payment, PAGA Counsel Fees, PAGA
26 Counsel Costs, and PAGA Representative Payment. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §4.6.)

27 Mailing of Individual PAGA Payments. Within ten (10) calendar days after Defendant funds
28 the Gross Settlement Amount, the Administrator shall mail the Individual PAGA Payments to all
PAGA Members by first-class U.S. mail. Prior to mailing, the Administrator shall perform a National
Change of Address (NCOA) search to obtain the best possible address for the PAGA Member.
(Haffner Decl. Ex. 1 §4.7.)

The face of each Individual PAGA Payment check shall prominently state the date (not less
than 180 days after the date of mailing) when the check will be voided. The Administrator will cancel
all checks not cashed by the void date. Thereafter, any settlement check to a PAGA Member that is
not collected within one hundred eighty (180) days of mailing to the PAGA Members shall be

1 cancelled, and the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California
2 Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the PAGA Member. (Haffner Decl. Ex. 1
3 §4.7.1.)

4 **IV. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF APPROVAL**

5 **A. The Proposed PAGA Settlement Should Be Approved**

6 It is well established that PAGA serves to augment the limited enforcement capability of the
7 LWDA by empowering employees to bring actions to enforce California's labor standards. (*Iskanian*
8 *v. CLS Transportation L.A., LLC* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383; accord *Arias v. Sup. Ct.* (2009) 46
9 Cal.4th 969, 986 ["The act's declared purpose is to supplement enforcement actions by public
10 agencies, which lack adequate resources to bring such actions themselves."].) In the similar context
11 of wage and hour class actions, the Courts review settlements to determine whether the proposed
12 settlement is within the range of reasonableness considering the strength of the claims against the
13 proposed settlement, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the extent
14 of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, and the experience and views of counsel.
15 (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) Furthermore, courts must give "proper
16 deference to the private consensual decision of the parties" because "the court's intrusion upon what
17 is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be
18 limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of
19 fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken
20 as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.
21 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027.)

22 In this case, the settlement was reached through arms' length bargaining, and sufficient
23 investigation was performed to allow counsel to act intelligently. (Haffner Decl. ¶¶17-30.) As described
24 above, the parties thoroughly investigated and evaluated the factual strengths and weaknesses of this case
25 before reaching the proposed settlement and engaged in sufficient investigation and discovery, to support
26 the settlement. Accordingly, the settlement came only after the case was fully investigated by counsel.
27 This litigation, therefore, had reached the stage where "the Parties certainly have a clear view of the
28 strengths and weaknesses of their cases" sufficient to support the settlement. (*Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.*
(N.D. Cal. 1979) 485 F. Supp. 610, 617.)

1 The settlement negotiations have been at all times adversarial and non-collusive in nature.
2 Indeed, continued good faith but occasionally contentious negotiations were required over several
3 months to ultimately reach a fully-executed settlement agreement. (*Id.*) While Plaintiffs believe in the
4 merits of the case, they also recognize the inherent risks of litigation and understands the benefit of
5 settlement and providing funds immediately as opposed to delaying payment or risking an unfavorable
6 decision on summary adjudication/judgment, at trial and/or the damages awarded, and/or appeal all of
7 which have potential to eliminate any relief. *Id.*

8 Further, experienced counsel, operating at arms-length, have weighed the strengths of the case
9 and examined all of the issues and risks of litigation and endorse the proposed settlement. The view
10 of the attorneys actively conducting the litigation "is entitled to significant weight" in deciding
11 whether to approve the settlement. (*Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge Lee Industries, Inc.* (E.D. Pa. 1985)
12 630 F.Supp. 482, 488; *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility* (N.D. Cal. 1980) 87 F.R.D. 15, 18, *affd.* 661
13 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1981); *Boyd*, 485 F.Supp. at 617.) Counsel is experienced in similar litigation and
14 approves the settlement. (Haffner Decl. ¶¶ 31-54.)

15 There are legal uncertainties associated with cases such as this as they can be factually
16 complex and require protracted litigation to resolve. A settlement is not judged solely against what
17 might have been recovered had plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide
18 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership* (9th
19 Cir. 1998) 151 F. 3d 1234, 1242; *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246
20 & 250; *Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank* (1990) 220 Cal.App. 3d 1117, 1139.) Instead, "[c]ompromise is
21 inherent and necessary in the settlement process ... even if the relief afforded by the proposed
22 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this
23 is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary
24 settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation" (*Wershba*, 91
Cal.App.4th at 250.)

25 **B. The Proposed Settlement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims**

26 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive "basic information about the nature
27 and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being
28 paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise." (See *Kullar v. Foot Locker*

1 *Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.) To assist the Court with determining if the proposed
2 settlement is within a range that is fair, reasonable, and adequate, Plaintiffs’ counsel analyzed the
3 value of pleaded allegations. As stated above, the settlement was reached only after exchanging
4 discovery prior and conducting legal analyses of both Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s theories.

5 Based on the informal discovery produced by Defendant, during the period from May 9,
6 2022, through June 29, 2025, Defendant employed approximately 3,406 Aggrieved Employees over
7 the course of approximately 76,321 work weeks. Based on the data, the realistic exposure for the
8 PAGA claims amounted to approximately **\$3,816,050**, assuming that the Court assessed a
9 maximum penalty of \$50 per pay period with a proven violation as in *Amaral* (76,321 pay periods
10 X \$50 per pay period = \$3,816,050.00). (Haffner Decl. ¶26.)

11 **Defendant’s Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Claims:**

12 With regard to Plaintiff’s wage claims, Defendant would likely contend that they properly
13 paid Aggrieved Employees for all overtime, meal period and rest periods. Defendant would argue on
14 the grounds that the Labor Code statutes upon which Plaintiff seeks relief do not apply to Plaintiff
15 because she was directly employed by a public entity – San Joaquin General Hospital. Specifically,
16 the statutes under which Plaintiff brings her PAGA claims for failure to (i) timely pay all wages
17 purportedly due during employment, (ii) pay overtime compensation purportedly due, (iii) provide
18 compliant meal periods, (iv) provide compliant rest periods, and (v) provide accurate wage statements
19 are not applicable to individuals directly employed by public entities. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 21.) Defendant
20 relies on California Supreme Court’s opinion that “***provisions of the Labor Code apply only to***
21 ***employees in the private sector*** unless they are specifically made applicable to public employees.”
22 (*Stoetzel v. Department of Human Resources* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 718, 752, quoting *Campbell v. Regents*
23 *of University of California* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 330, emphasis added; accord Cal. Code Regs., tit.
24 8, § 11050, subds. (1)(C) [except in circumstances not applicable here, “[t]he provisions of this order
25 shall not apply to any employees directly employed by the State or any political subdivision thereof,
26 including any city, county, or special district”]. Defendant would further argue that, therefore,
27 Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue PAGA action on behalf of aggrieved employees. (*Adolph v. Uber*
28 *Technologies, Inc.* (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123–1124 [“If the arbitrator determines that Adolph is
not an aggrieved employee and the court confirms that determination and reduces it to a final

1 judgment, the court would give effect to that finding, and Adolph could no longer prosecute his non-
2 individual claims due to lack of standing.”].)

3 Regarding Plaintiffs’ wage statement claims, because they were wholly derivative of the
4 Plaintiffs’ primary claims, as explained above, they would fail for the same reasons. (Haffner Decl. ¶
5 22.)

6 Importantly however, a number of courts have found that the “subsequent” penalty under
7 PAGA applies only after a court or the Labor Commissioner determines that the employer has violated
8 the Labor Code. *See Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1209; *accord*
9 *Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Service, Inc.* (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009)
10 2009 WL 2448430, at *9 (“[u]nder California law, courts have held that employers are not subject
11 to heightened penalties for subsequent violations unless and until a court or commissioner notifies
12 the employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code”); *Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 990 F.3d 1157,
13 1173 (9th Cir. 2021) (reversing judgment as to “heightened civil penalties” because the defendant
14 was not given notice by the Labor Commissioner when the “subsequent” violations occurred); *Chen*
15 *v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC*, 2014 WL 4961182 (C.D. Cal., October 2, 2014) (“Under the
16 Labor Code, if an employer does not have notice that they are committing a violation, they are not
17 subject to the heightened penalties.”); *Trang v. Turbine Engine Components Technologies Corp.*,
18 2012 WL 6618854 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (“courts have held that employers are not subject to
19 heightened penalties for subsequent violations unless and until a court or commissioner notifies the
20 employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code”), citing *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.
21 App. 4th 1157 (2008). When evaluating Defendant’s exposure here, Plaintiff’s counsel was forced to
22 consider this line of cases.

23 Applying further significant discounts for the risks associated with the action (including but
24 not limited to, the risk that the Court exercises its discretion to lower the penalties awarded and the
25 risk of losing at trial), this settlement for \$1,500,000.00 is well within a reasonable range. (Haffner
26 Decl. ¶ 23.)

27 Moreover, the proposed Settlement, even with deductions, provides a substantial sum to the
28 Aggrieved Employees. The Settlement secured by Plaintiff here is greater than other PAGA penalty
awards approved by California state courts, which often range between \$7,500.00 and \$15,000.00 for

1 PAGA claims impacting hundreds or thousands of individuals, resulting in much lower PAGA
2 penalty payments on a per capita basis. *See, e.g., Penaloza v. PPG Industries Inc.*, 2013 WL 2917624
3 at *2 (Super. Ct. L.A. County, May 20, 2013) (approving PAGA penalties of \$5,000.00 to class of
4 667 members); *Cabrera v. Advantage Sale & Marketing, LLC*, 2013 WL 1182822 (Super. Ct. L.A.
5 County, March 12, 2013) (approving PAGA penalties of \$10,000.00 for class of approximately 3,000
6 members). (Haffner Decl. ¶ 24.)

7 Defendant would likely argue that PAGA penalties would be limited. Defendant could argue
8 that even if Plaintiffs prevailed, the recoverable penalties under PAGA are minimal. Indeed, as
9 assumed above, courts considering the issue have refused to “stack” PAGA penalties. *See*
10 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corporation* (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018) No. D072392 (published Dec.
11 19, 2018) (approving PAGA penalty reduction to \$5 per pay period); *accord Atempa v. Pedrazzani*
12 (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809. Moreover, Defendant would likely argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled
13 to recover PAGA penalties at the subsequent violation rate of \$100 per pay period. California’s
14 appellate courts have held that “[u]ntil the employer has been notified that it is violating a Labor
15 Code provision (whether or not the commissioner or court chooses to impose penalties), the
16 employer cannot be presumed to be aware [of the violation]” and therefore, until a Court or the
17 Commissioner issues a finding of a violation, the initial \$50 violation rate applies for each pay
18 period in which the alleged violation occurred. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163
19 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1209; *accord Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit*
20 *Service, Inc.* (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009) 2009 WL 2448430, at *9 (“[u]nder California law, courts
21 have held that employers are not subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations unless
22 and until a court or commissioner notifies the employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code”).
23 Thus, Defendant could argue that even if Plaintiffs were able to establish any violation of the Labor
24 Code, the PAGA penalties assessed for these violations will be computed at the \$50 per pay period
25 rate, as opposed to the \$100 per pay period rate at maximum, and there is a possibility that a further
26 reduction of the penalty to \$5 per pay period as approved in *Carrington* could apply given
27 Defendant’s alleged compliance with the Labor Code as discussed above. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 25).

28 Plaintiffs understood Defendant’s position to be, using the most recent court of appeal
decision on the topic of evaluating the value of a PAGA claim (*Carrington v. Starbucks, supra*)

1 (i.e. at \$5.00 per pay period X 76,321 pay periods at issue), that it is likely Defendant's maximum
2 exposure on the minimum and overtime wage claims could not exceed **\$381,605.00**. Defendant
3 could argue that this Court would use the *Carrington* valuation as a ceiling for assessing PAGA
4 penalties on the remaining primary and derivative claims as well and that this amount (i.e.,
5 \$381,605.00) was its true "worst case scenario" exposure for **all** claims. As such, the settlement
6 amount of \$1,500,000.00 is approximately 39.3% of the realistic exposure scenario of
7 \$3,816,050.00 (assuming \$50 per pay period) and exceeds the "worst case scenario" exposure by
8 approximately a factor of 4. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 26.)

9 Finally, public policy strongly favors the settlement of litigation. *Consumer Advocacy Group*
10 *v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 46, 63. Because the proposed Settlement
11 is neither unjust nor ignores the public interest, it should be approved. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 27.)

12 Practically speaking, if Plaintiffs continued litigating this matter, the Plaintiffs, LWDA, and
13 employees potentially could have received nothing if the Court had agreed with Defendant's position
14 especially in light of the volatility of this area of law and the aforementioned defenses. The settlement
15 is reasonable in light of the risks involved in this case—including the prospect of a potential adverse
16 summary adjudication ruling, defenses to the case, potential appeal, and potential costs which could
17 be forced on our client if Plaintiffs were not successful. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 28.)

18 Plaintiffs' Counsel is convinced that the proposed settlement is fair based on the negotiations
19 and a detailed knowledge of the issues present in this action. The length and risks associated with a
20 motion for summary adjudication, trial, and other normal perils of litigation have impacted the value
21 of the claims and were all weighed in reaching the proposed settlement. In light of the above, the
22 proposed Settlement is well within the range of reasonableness and should be granted approval.
23 Plaintiffs believe that in providing employees with relief and obtaining penalties for the LWDA, this
24 settlement furthers the purpose of PAGA to enforce compliance with the Labor Code and should be
25 approved. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 29.)

26 Accordingly, the gross PAGA penalty payment is highly reasonable in light of the risks and
27 uncertainties associated with the PAGA claims in this case. Additionally, the length and risks
28 associated with a motion for summary adjudication, trial, and other normal perils of litigation have
impacted the value of the claims and were all weighed in reaching the proposed settlement. The

1 Settlement commits Defendant to pay a sum large enough to punish Defendant for alleged violations
2 and to deter such alleged conduct in the future. At the same time, in light of the alleged violations and
3 defenses thereto, it is not so large as to be unjust, oppressive or confiscatory. Based upon the
4 foregoing, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the state of California
5 and the Aggrieved Employees and should be granted approval. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 30.)

6 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE APPROVED**

7 Counsel seeks \$499,950.00, one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, in fees for the time
8 spent litigating this matter and reimbursement of expenses of \$8,000.00 incurred in the prosecution
9 of this action. The request is for fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and
10 time-consuming litigation on a contingent fee basis. (Haffner Decl. Ex 2 ¶ 61).

11 **A. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fee Request of One-Third of the Gross Settlement Is**
12 **Proper Under the Common Fund Doctrine**

13 California state and federal courts have recognized that in actions creating a common fund
14 benefiting others as well as a plaintiff, an appropriate method for determining an award of attorneys' fees
15 is based on a percentage of the total value of benefits provided by the litigation. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half*
16 *Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 497-499, 503-506; *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34; *Boeing Co.*
17 *v. Van Gemert* (1980) 444 U.S. 472, 478; *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 577 F.2d 759,
18 769.) Such "fee spreading" assures that all those benefited by the litigation pay their fair share of
19 obtaining the recovery. (*Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.)

20 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, a wage and hour class action wherein
21 Counsel obtained a \$19 million non-reversionary settlement on behalf of the class, the California
22 Supreme Court approved the use of the percentage of fund or common fund method to award one-third
23 of the settlement amount or \$6,333,333.33 to Counsel for attorneys' fees. The Court stated:

24 Whatever doubts may have been created by *Serrano III, supra*, 20 Cal.3d 25,
25 [], or the Court of Appeal cases that followed, we clarify today that use of the
26 percentage method to calculate a fee in a common fund case, where the award
27 serves to spread the attorney fee among all the beneficiaries of the fund, does
28 not in itself constitute an abuse of discretion. We join the overwhelming
majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation
established a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial
court in its equitable powers awards Counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage

method - including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation [] convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.

(*Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 503.) Under the “common fund” doctrine, “a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” (*Boeing*, 444 U.S. at 478.) The Supreme Court explained: “The doctrine rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigants’ expense. Jurisdiction over the fund involved in the litigation allows a court to prevent this inequity by assessing attorney’s fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately among those benefitted by the suit.” (*Id.*) Thus, the common fund doctrine ensures that each beneficiary of the settlement contributes proportionately to the payment of the attorneys’ fees recovered from monetary payments that the prevailing party recovered in the lawsuit. (*Stanton v. Boeing* (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 967, citing *Winger v. SI Mgmt. L.P.* (9th Cir. 2002) 301 F.3d 1115.)

In common fund cases, the percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of Counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial resources. (*Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 486-487; see *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 31 n.5 citing *In re Activision Sec. Litig.* (N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375, 1378-79.)

A fee of \$499,950.00, which constitutes one-third of the gross settlement, is within the range of reasonableness. (See *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 503-504 [approving common fund method used for attorneys’ request of one-third of settlement].) Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. (See *In re Activision Sec. Litig.*, 723 F. Supp. at 1378.) Because Counsel’s requested fee is reasonable and falls well within the historical range of attorney’s fee awards under the common fund theory, the Court should approve the requested fees as reasonable pursuant to the common fund approach.

B. Plaintiffs’ Fee Request Is Reasonable Under the “Lodestar Plus Multiplier” Method

In a common fund settlement “[t]he lodestar method is merely a cross-check on the

1 reasonableness of a percentage figure.” (*Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043,
2 1050, n.5.) In this case, consideration of Counsel’s lodestar as a cross-check to the percentage figure
3 also strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested fee award. The base amount is then adjusted
4 in light of various factors. (*Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d at 48.)

5 Under California law, the Court may award attorneys’ fees based on a lodestar plus multiplier
6 approach. Under this approach, the lodestar is calculated by multiplying the reasonable hours
7 expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The court may then enhance the lodestar with a multiplier, if
8 appropriate. See, for example, *Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1347.

9 Counsel’s total lodestar in this case as of the date of this motion is approximately \$223,475.
10 (Haffner Decl. ¶ 47.) Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable, Counsel’s hours spent are reasonable,
11 and Plaintiffs would even be entitled to a multiplier to account for the successful result in this action
12 and to compensate Plaintiffs and their counsel for the contingent risk inherent in the litigation and
13 for the delay in receiving fees. The breakdown of the hours worked by counsel in this matter is set
14 forth as follows:

Attorney	Hours	Hourly Rate	Total
Joshua H. Haffner	76.7	\$900	\$69,030
Alfredo Torrijos	85.8	\$850	\$72,930
Vahan Mikayelyan	191.8	\$425	\$81,515
Total	354.3	N/A	\$223,475

18
19 (*Id.*)

20 Multipliers as high as 12 have been approved by the California appellate courts. See, for
21 example, *Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demete* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465
22 (affirming a 12-times multiplier of counsel’s hourly rate and expressly rejecting the argument that
23 the requested fee was exorbitant or unconscionable). Treatises on class actions describe multipliers
24 in the double digits in other California cases. (3 Newberg & Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions*, §
25 1403, at 14-5 n.21 (multiplier of 10 times the hourly rate awarded) (internal citations omitted).

26 Here, Class Counsel’s total attorneys’ fees to date are \$223,475.00 (Haffner Decl. ¶ 47.) This
27 represents just over a 3 years of litigation, involving technical issues and complex litigation matters.
28 When compared with the amount of the fee award sought, Class Counsel’s request is fully justified

1 under *Serrano*. Based on the quality of the result achieved here, the very substantial contingency
2 litigation risk presented by this class action, class counsel's preclusion of other work (as reflected in
3 the lodestar), and the delay in compensation, all discussed more fully below, a fee multiplier is
4 appropriate. Counsel therefore requests approval of a multiplier of approximately 2.2, which falls
5 well below multiplier amounts Courts have previously approved. *See citations supra; see also*
6 *Wershba v. Apple Computer* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255. Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (lode star may
7 range from "2 to 4 or even higher."). Thus, Class Counsel seeks a fee amount of \$499,950.00.

8 1. Counsel's Hourly Rates Are Reasonable

9 The hourly rates of the attorneys stated above are in line with rates approved for attorneys in
10 this region with similar experience. (Haffner Decl. **Exhibits 3-4**, ¶ 56 [2026 Locality Pay Tables for
11 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA and Laffey Matrix].) A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate
12 charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (*PLCM Group, Inc.*
13 *v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts may
14 consider factors such as the attorney's skill and experience, the nature of the work performed, the
15 relevant area of expertise and the attorney's customary billing rates. (*Flannery v. California Highway*
16 *Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632.) Class Counsel's skill and experience support their hourly
17 rates. (Haffner Dec. ¶¶ 57-60 [describing Mr. Haffner's, Mr. Torrijos and Mr. Mikayelyan's
18 experience in working on class action and other representative lawsuits].)

19 Plaintiffs' Counsel's rates are also in line with the respective Laffey Matrix rates. (Haffner
20 Decl. **Exhibit 3** available at <http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html>.) California Courts have applied
21 the Laffey Matrix with adjustments to the specific California locality where the Counsel's office is
22 located based on "Locality Pay Tables." (*Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
23 691, 695-696 [affirming fee award based on Laffey Matrix with upward 9 percent rate adjustment
24 from D.C. area compared to San Francisco Bay Area based on Locality Pay Tables]; *In re HPL Techs.,*
25 *Inc., Secs. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. April 22, 2005, No. C-02-3510 VRW) 365 F.Supp.2d 912, 921-922 [using
26 Laffey Matrix with upward adjustment of 9 percent for San Francisco based on difference between
27 D.C. Area 's +15.98 locality pay compared to San Francisco's +26.39 percent locality pay differential
28 from the federal courts' "Judiciary Salary Plan Pay Tables."].) Here, Plaintiff's Counsel's office is

located in Los Angeles County. For 2026, the Locality Pay Tables, state a 36.47% locality payment for the Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA area (Haffner Decl. **Exhibits 3-4** ¶ 56 [2026 Locality Pay Tables for Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA available at <https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/26Tables/html/LA.aspx> and Laffey Matrix rates]). The 2024/2025 Laffey Matrix states the following relevant rates: \$473 for attorneys 1 to 3 years out of law school, \$581 for attorneys 4 to 7 years out of school, \$839 for attorneys 8 to 10 years out of school, \$948 for attorneys 11 to 19 years out of law school and \$1,141 for attorneys 20 plus years out of law school.

2. Counsel's Total Hours Are Reasonable

In determining a lodestar, reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the time spent before the action is filed, including time spent interviewing the clients, investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. (See *New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62.) Further, the fee award should include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee claim. (*Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)

Counsel has spent approximately a combined 354.3 hours on this case. (Haffner Decl. ¶47.) In summary form, counsel's many tasks included the following: pre-filing investigation, legal research, and research of Defendant and its operations; communicating with client regarding their responsibility in bringing the action, the facts of their case, their employment, their work environment, their documents and Defendant's policies and procedures; drafting pleadings and notices; drafting communications with the LWDA; reviewing Plaintiffs' files and determining liability and evaluating claim and defense strengths and weaknesses; legal research of case law and wage orders regarding applicable claims and defenses; propounding and responding to informal discovery; meeting and conferring over directly relevant informal discovery; evaluating Defendant's policies; determining case strategy; communicating with Defendant's Counsel; evaluating data provided in informal discovery; calculating PAGA damages; negotiating settlement and settlement documents; communicating with the administrator and responding to administrator's inquiries; preparing the motion for approval of PAGA and supporting documents. Combining Plaintiffs' counsels' hours and their hourly rates in this case amounts to a total of 354.3 hours, and calculating individual hourly contributions amounts to a total lodestar of \$223,475.00. Counsel is seeking an \$499,950.00 award

1 of attorneys' fees in connection with this matter, which is in line with the calculated lodestar value,
2 assuming a reasonable multiplier of 2.2. (Haffner Decl. ¶47.)

3 **C. Counsel's Costs Request Is Reasonable**

4 Plaintiffs' Counsel requests \$8,000.00 in total costs in this matter. This amount is reasonable
5 and was incurred in the litigation of this matter. (Haffner Decl. ¶ 61, **Exhibit 2**.) All costs were
6 reasonably incurred in prosecution of the lawsuit and paid on a contingency basis. The majority of
7 the costs were associated with the initial filing fees and mediation fees, and the remainder was
8 reasonably incurred in prosecution of the lawsuit. (*Id.*)

9 **VI. CONCLUSION**

10 The PAGA settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. It will result in fair payment
11 considering the risks and defenses; it is non-collusive; and it was achieved as the result of informed,
12 extensive, and arms' length negotiations conducted by counsel for respective parties who are
13 experienced in wage and hour representative litigation. For the foregoing reasons, the parties
14 respectfully request that the Court grant approval of the proposed PAGA Settlement.

15 Date: January 8, 2026

Respectfully submitted,
HAFFNER LAW PC

17 By: /s/ Vahan Mikayelyan
18 Joshua H. Haffner
19 Alfredo Torrijos
Vahan Mikayelyan

20 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Cynthia Wood*
21 *And all others similarly situated*