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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF MERCED**

AMALIA NAVARRO CANTON,
CONCEPCION MORALES AZEVEDO, and
SONIA IMELDA NAVARRO CASTILLO,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the State of
California and other aggrieved persons;
JOSEFINA MERCADO GONZALEZ, and
JESUS TORRES RODRIGUEZ, individually,
on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN B. SANFILIPPO & SONS, INC., a
corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 22CV-01145

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Brian L.
McCabe, Courtroom 8]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: March 15, 2024
Time: 8:15 a.m.
Dept.: 8

Complaint filed: April 27, 2022
FAC filed: October 27, 2022
SAC filed: August 25, 2023
Trial date: Not set

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on March 15, 2024 at 8:15 a.m., in Courtroom 8 of the
4 Merced County Superior Court, located at 627 W 21st Street Merced, CA 95340, Plaintiffs Amalia
5 Navarro Canton, Concepcion Morales Azevedo, Sonia Imelda Navarro Castillo, Josefina Mercado
6 Gonzalez, and Jesus Torres Rodriguez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will, and hereby do, move for an
7 order as follows:

- 8 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 9 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
10 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
11 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 12 3. Appointing Plaintiffs Amalia Navarro Canton, Concepcion Morales Azevedo, Sonia Imelda
13 Navarro Castillo, Josefina Mercado Gonzalez, and Jesus Torres Rodriguez as Class
14 Representatives for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service
15 Award of \$7,500 to each Plaintiff;
- 16 4. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
17 purposes, and approving payment of \$162,500.00 in attorney’s fees, which is 33 1/3% of
18 the Total Settlement Amount;
- 19 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$16,510.53 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 20 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement
21 Administrator in the amount of \$7,625.00; and
- 22 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 23 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over
24 the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement
25 or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

26 This motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
27 the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez, Madely Nava, Amalia Navarro Canton, Concepcion
28 Morales Azevedo, Sonia Imelda Navarro Castillo, Josefina Mercado Gonzalez, and Jesus Torres

Rodriguez, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action, including but not limited to the Declarations of Plaintiffs previously submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Dated: February 22, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: _____

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Putative Class

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Amalia Navarro Canton, Concepcion Morales Azevedo, Sonia Imelda Navarro Castillo, Josefina Mercado Gonzalez, and Jesus Torres Rodriguez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek final approval of a proposed \$487,500.00 non-reversionary, class and representative action settlement with Defendant John B. Sanfilippo & Sons, Inc. (“Defendant”, and collectively with the Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 140 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage-and-hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$1,784.82*. (Declaration of Madely Nava of Apex Class Action, LLC [“Nava Decl.”], ¶ 15.) As of filing this motion, there are **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-13.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the motion for preliminary approval the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiffs and putative Class Members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the Class Period. Defendant operates in the food and beverage manufacturing industry with over 1,300 employees spread out over five locations throughout the United States. (Declaration of Justin

1 F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
2 [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

3 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted
4 in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay all hours worked. Plaintiffs
5 further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest
6 periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse all business expenses. Based on these allegations,
7 Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final
8 wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

9 On April 27, 2022, Plaintiffs Canton, Azevedo, and Castillo commenced this action entitled
10 *Amalia Navarro Canton, et al. v. John B. Sanfilippo & Sons, Inc.* in the Superior Court of the State
11 of California for the County of Merced, Case No. 22CV-01145 against Defendant, alleging causes
12 of action for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2,
13 and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide
14 meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor
15 Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203);
16 (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify
17 employees for expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and
18 Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*). (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

19 On July 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Canton, Azevedo, and Castillo filed an action in Merced County
20 Superior Court, Case No. 22CV-20407, alleging a single cause of action for civil penalties pursuant
21 to the Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.*) (the “PAGA Action”).
22 (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) On October 27, 2022, Plaintiffs Canton, Azevedo, and Castillo filed a First Amended
23 Complaint in the Class Action against Defendant adding claims for civil penalties under PAGA and
24 dismissing the PAGA Action without prejudice. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) On May 9, 2022, Plaintiffs sent a notice
25 to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging
26 similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) On August 25, 2023, Plaintiffs
27 Canton, Azevedo, and Castillo filed a Second Amended Complaint adding Josefina Mercado
28 Gonzalez and Jesus Torres Rodriguez as additional Plaintiffs. (*Id.*)

1 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

2 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
3 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for Class
4 Members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during
5 the Class Period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its
6 informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

7 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
8 analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
9 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
10 Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also
11 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
12 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

13 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

14 On January 11, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
15 action mediator Brandon McKelvey, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The
16 settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were
17 adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of
18 the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a
19 settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the
20 strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a
21 settlement the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Class
22 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement].)

23 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on
24 the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of
25 the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the
26 Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay,
27 the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk,
28 and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

1 **D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement**

2 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement on
3 November 17, 2023. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the
4 Settlement was February 20, 2024. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement has been
5 overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Members have opted out
6 of the settlement, and no Class Members have objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

7 **E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

8 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$487,500 to resolve this litigation. The
9 key terms include:

10 1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, Class is defined
11 as “all current or former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of Defendant in California employed
12 between April 27, 2018 and March 19, 2023.” (Settlement, ¶11(e).)

13 2. Class Period: “means the period from April 27, 2018 to March 19, 2023.”
14 (Settlement, ¶ 11(g).)

15 3. Settlement Class Member: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and
16 timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 11(n).)

17 4. PAGA Member: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified
18 as an hourly-paid or nonexempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period from
19 May 9, 2021 to March 19, 2023. (Settlement, ¶¶11(y), 11(aa).)

20 5. Total Settlement Amount: This amount is \$487,500, for all claims, including the
21 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Settlement Administration Costs, payment to the Labor and Workforce
22 Development Agency (“LWDA”) for the alleged PAGA penalties, all other penalties, and the
23 Enhancement Payments. (Settlement, ¶ 11(oo).)

24 6. Uncashed Checks: Each Settlement check will be valid and negotiable for ninety (90)
25 calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, shall be cancelled. All funds
26 associated with such cancelled checks will be transmitted to the California Unclaimed Property Fund,
27 State Controller’s Office, in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 284.
28 (Settlement, ¶ 24.)

1 7. Release: “Upon the Effective Date and full funding of the Total Settlement Amount,
2 Plaintiffs and all Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion (i.e.,
3 Settlement Class Members) will be deemed to have fully, finally and forever released, settled,
4 compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released Class Claims that
5 he or she may have or had. In addition, all PAGA Members will be deemed to have fully, finally,
6 and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all
7 Released PAGA Claims irrespective of whether they have submitted a Request for Exclusion.”
8 (Settlement, ¶ 35.)

9 (a) Released Parties: means “(1) Defendant; (2) Defendant’s respective past, present, and
10 future parent corporations, affiliates, affiliates’ companies, subsidiaries, divisions,
11 d/b/a/’s, predecessors, insurers, successors, fiduciaries, franchisees, franchisors,
12 assigns, principals, heirs, their current and former employees, accountants, auditors,
13 attorneys, consultants, officers, managers, members, partners, directors, shareholders,
14 trustees, agents, both individually and in their business capacities of any of the
15 following: and (3) any individual or entity which could be jointly liable with any of
16 the foregoing for any of the Released Claims.” (Settlement, ¶ 11(hh).)

17 (b) Released Class Claims: means “claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations,
18 guarantees, costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees or costs, damages, actions or causes of
19 action which are reasonably related to the allegations and claims asserted in the
20 Action and the Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period, including but
21 not limited to claims under the California Labor Code, California Industrial Welfare
22 Commission Wage Orders, regulations, claims for restitution and other equitable
23 relief and/or other provisions of law, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay
24 minimum wages, failure to pay straight time wages, failure to provide compliant meal
25 periods and associated premium pay, failure to authorize and permit compliant rest
26 periods and associated premium pay, failure to provide compliant wage statements,
27 failure to timely pay wages upon termination of employment, failure to timely pay
28 wages during employment, failure to maintain requisite payroll records, failure to

reimburse necessary business expenses, unfair or unlawful business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., conversion or theft of labor, declaratory relief, accounting, injunctive relief, claims for penalties of any nature whatsoever, or any other benefit claimed, on account of allegations and claims which are reasonably related to the allegations and claims asserted in the Operative Complaint. The release shall not apply to claims for workers' compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, or any other claim or right that as a matter of law cannot be waived or released." (Settlement, ¶ 11(ff).)

(c) Released PAGA Claims: means "any and all claims or causes of action for civil penalties under California Labor Code § 2698, et seq ("PAGA"), arising out of the facts alleged in the LWDA Letter, arising during the PAGA Period, and that were alleged or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts asserted in the Operative Complaint in the Action for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and associated premium pay, failure to provide compliant rest periods and associated premium pay, failure to provide compliant wage statements, failure to timely pay wages upon termination of employment, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to maintain requisite payroll records, and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses." (Settlement, ¶ 11(gg).)

9. No Reversion: "[n]o portion of the Total Settlement Amount shall revert to Defendant." (Settlement, ¶ 19.)

10. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$10,000 allocated to Plaintiff's claims under PAGA, with 75% (\$7,500) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$2,500) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, ¶ 18.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

11. Net Settlement Amount: The "Net Settlement Amount" is the amount that remains and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) attorneys' fees and costs, (2) Settlement Administration Costs, (3) Enhancement Payments to the

1 Named Plaintiffs, and (4) the PAGA Penalty Amount. (Settlement, ¶ 11(v).)

2 12. Distribution Formula: “Individual Settlement Shares and Individual PAGA Payments
3 will be calculated and apportioned based on the Workweeks, as follows:

4 (a) The Settlement Administrator will divide the final Net Settlement Amount by
5 the Workweeks of all Settlement Class Members during the Class Period to
6 yield the “Class Workweek Value”, and multiply each Settlement Class
7 Member’s individual Workweeks during the Class Period by the Class
8 Workweek Value to yield his or her Individual Settlement Share. If any Class
9 Member submits a timely and valid Request for Exclusion, his or her
10 Individual Settlement Share will remain part of the Net Settlement Amount
11 and will proportionally increase each Settlement Class Member’s Individual
12 Settlement Share.” (Settlement, ¶ 19(a).)

13 (b) To determine the Individual PAGA Payment for each PAGA Member, the
14 Settlement Administrator will divide the 25% portion of the PAGA Penalty
15 Amount attributed to PAGA Members, i.e., \$2,500.00, by the total number of
16 Workweeks worked by all PAGA Members during the PAGA Period (“Total
17 PAGA Workweeks”) resulting in the PAGA Workweek Value and then
18 multiplying the PAGA Workweek Value by the number of Workweeks
19 worked by each individual PAGA Member during the PAGA Period.
20 (Settlement, ¶ 19(b).)

21 13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
22 allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, ¶ 30.)

23 14. Enhancement Award: Subject to Court approval, each Plaintiff shall be paid an
24 enhancement award not to exceed \$7,500 each. (Settlement, ¶¶ 11(n), 16.) This amount is for
25 Plaintiffs’ time and effort in bringing and presenting the Action, and in exchange for a general release
26 of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, ¶ 36.) If the
27 Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the
28 Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a

pro-rata basis. (Settlement, ¶ 16.)

14. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$162,500) of the Total Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000. (Settlement, ¶ 15.)

15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Nava Decl., Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the Settlement. (*Id.*, at ¶ 7.) Apex Class Action LLC, the Settlement Administrator also undertook its best efforts to ensure that the Notice was provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing notices to updated addresses when needed. (*Id.*, at ¶¶ 6-10.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court's broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give "[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties." (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) "The inquiry 'must be limited to the extent necessary

1 to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or
2 collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair,
3 reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

4 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

5 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had she prevailed at trial,
6 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
7 (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the
8 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower
9 than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement
10 because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives
11 ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

12 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
13 some of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 9.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their
14 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs also recognize that
15 proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming,
16 and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs obtained certification of all or some
17 of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and
18 would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

19 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
20 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
21 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
22 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
23 \$487,500 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is
24 appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit
25 of approximately \$1,784.84, with a highest estimated benefit of \$2,875.53.*** (Nava Decl., ¶ 15.)

26 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
27 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

28 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced

1 employment mediator, Brandon McKelvey, Esq. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations
2 were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
3 parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
4 each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not
5 been reached. (*Id.*)

6 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the
7 claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records,
8 Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and
9 rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as
10 information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former
11 employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to
12 class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class
13 Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation.
14 (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating
15 the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

16 **C. Plaintiffs' Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

17 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
18 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Marquez Decl. at ¶¶ 27-41.) Class Counsel has substantial
19 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
20 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf
21 of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
22 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

23 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
24 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiffs' claims, the strength of
25 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
26 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
27 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight.
28 (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight

to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

D. There Were No Objections to the Settlement

No class members have objected to the Settlement, and no class members have requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Nava Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (See, e.g., *In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (See, e.g., *Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the "class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement" where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, "only nine objections were submitted", and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, "these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23"], citing *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the "fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness," and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of \$162,500, which is 33 1/3% of the Total Settlement Amount, costs up to \$25,000 for litigating this Action, and enhancement awards of \$7,500 to each named Plaintiff. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these

1 payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

2 “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether certification of
3 the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial
4 court’s broad discretion.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 234-235.) “Courts recognize two
5 methods for calculating attorney fees in civil class actions: the lodestar/multiplier method and the
6 percentage of recovery method.” (*Id.* at p. 254; *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*
7 (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.)

8 **A. Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method**

9 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created by
10 counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. The California Supreme Court held that “when a
11 number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or
12 plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or
13 plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25,
14 34 [*quoting D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 1.]

15 Class Counsel intends to seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/
16 common fund” theory. The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to “spread litigation
17 costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
18 burden alone.” (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v.*
19 *State of California* (1995) 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who
20 expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may
21 require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” Similarly, in *City and*
22 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court
23 recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an
24 action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.”

25 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016), 1 Cal.5th
26 480, that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
27 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
28 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it

provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.” (*Id.*)

Several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative “lodestar” approach for deciding fee awards, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable time records. Commenting on the lodestar approach, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel wrote: “This court is compelled to ask, ‘Is this process necessary?’ Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer would be a resounding, ‘No!’” (*In re Activision Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375.) The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial resources. (*Id.* at pp. 1378-79.) The Ninth Circuit now routinely uses the percentage of the common fund approach to determine the award of attorney’s fees. (*See, e.g. In re Pacific Enterprises Securities City and County of San Francisco Litigation* (9th Cir. 1994) 47 F.3d 373, 378-79 [approving attorney’s fee of 33 1/3%.])

1. The Standard Fee Award in Class Actions has Resolved Itself as One-Third of the Recovery in Common Fund Cases

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with **thirty to forty percent** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*See Id.; see also, Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiffs’ fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees

requested herein.

2. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code.

Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in part:

[A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

(Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.)

As this litigation culminated in a settlement that provided for a recovery of unpaid wages, including unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee award under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorneys’ fees is proper under Section 1021.5 if ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.’” (*Press v. Lucky Stores* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317-318.) The fundamental objective of the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing public policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (*Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)

This action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as Plaintiffs sought to enforce Settlement Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from Defendant’s failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (*See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1113 [noting that “health and safety concerns” are what motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest periods].)

This action also conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons. Notice was sent to 140 Settlement Class Members, and no Settlement Class Member requested exclusion. (Nava Decl., ¶¶ 6, 11-13.) The Settlement provides a significant monetary benefit, in that it permits all persons who worked for Defendant during the applicable class period to obtain compensation for unpaid wages and missed meal and rest periods.

Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate. Without the incentive of an attorneys’ fee award, Plaintiffs could not have afforded to

1 hire counsel to pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiffs' potential
2 recovery. (*See Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044
3 ["As to the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the
4 cost of the legal victory transcends the claimants' personal interest; in other words, where the burden
of pursuing the litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiff's individual stake in the matter."].)

5 **3. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the**
6 **Requested Fee Award.**

7 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
8 and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class action matters.
9 Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in dozens of class actions resulting
10 in a multitude of beneficial results to class members in California. Because it is reasonable to
11 compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, a fee award of
12 33 1/3% of the Total Settlement Amount, a percentage considered within the norm in class action
practice, is certainly justified here.

13 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
14 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
15 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the
16 rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action
17 litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards
18 amounting to 33 1/3% of the recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable
and fair.

19 **B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts**
20 **May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.**

21 Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to
22 cross-check fee awards. "It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be
23 monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to "cross-check" or adjust the lodestar in
24 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and
25 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation." (*In re*
Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

26 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
27 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a
28 multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. "The purpose of such adjustment is to

fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$124,425 based on at least 184 hours of work performed thus far. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$162,500 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.3. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

For example, Mr. Marquez’ hourly rates were recently approved in *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721. There, the court held that “[a]s for the lodestar cross-check, the billing rates are normal and customary for timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the relevant market.” (*Id.* at p. *3.)

2. The Lawsuit Provided a Public Benefit.

Class Counsel’s choice to litigate this matter provided a public benefit to approximately 140 California employees. Moreover, the California Supreme Court stated that “Labor Code section 1194 confirms “a clear public policy ... that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s

1 minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of workers.” [citation omitted].” (*Sav-on Drug*
2 *Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340.) Given the financial risks and numerous
3 attorney hours attendant to the litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims, this factor supports Class Counsel’s
4 fee request and encourages the private enforcement of legal rights for the general good.

3. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.

5 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
6 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiffs seek a modest multiplier of 1.3
7 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ request is underscored by the fact that a significantly
8 higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

9 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
10 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer
11 who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market
12 value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent
13 counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is
14 particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons.
15 (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor
16 fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which
17 typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at
18 p. 1138.)

19 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p.
20 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 [applying a
21 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at p.
22 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002)
23 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K.*
24 *Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a study “reporting [an] average
25 multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would
26 be “per se reasonable”].) The intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable
27 range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014)
28 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California
Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

1 the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature of
2 the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
3 and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.
4 3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the lines of those approved
5 in the cases above.

6 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
7 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
8 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the amount
9 that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and uncertainty about
10 how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133, 1138.) Here, Class
11 Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter and have borne the
12 entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's outlay of time and
13 money in this case has been significant.

14 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had
15 success in wage-and-hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers and
16 expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the risk of prevailing
17 at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery completely.
18 Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this case because of the
19 difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. Despite these risks, Class
20 Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so many cases that Class Counsel
21 can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to Class
22 Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this
23 action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 24.)
24 Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights
25 and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for
26 the Class.

27 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

28 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$16,210.53 in costs,
and they anticipate incurring at least \$300 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court
enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 26.)
Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$16,510.53 in costs.
Notably, Defendant has agreed that it will not oppose any cost award request up to \$25,000. The

categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Justin Marquez, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiffs Are Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiffs should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Service Award in the amount of \$7,500 to each named Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiffs have submitted declarations demonstrating their devotion to this case, including their efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Amalia Navarro Canton; Declaration of Concepcion Morales Azevedo; Declaration of Sonia Imelda Navarro Castillo; Declaration of Josefina Mercado Gonzalez; Declaration of Jesus Torres Rodriguez.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study*, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).)

“Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at 806.) “An incentive award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’” (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1394, quoting *Clark, supra*, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.)

Here, Plaintiffs have the right to move the Court for incentive awards of up to \$7,500 each in light of their risk in pursuing this case, time and effort devoted to this case, and the benefit received for the other class members.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.

Apex Class Action LLC., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$7,625 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Nava Decl., ¶ 18.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

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
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Dated: February 22, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 

Justin F. Marquez
Benjamin H. Haber
Maxim Gorbunov

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Amalia Navarro Canton, et al. v. John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc., et al.
22CV-01145

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES) ss

On February 22, 2024, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Jeffrey A. Risch (*pro hac vice*)
jrisch@smithamundsen.com
SMITHAMUNDSEN LLC
 3815 E. Main Street, Suite A-1
 St. Charles, IL 60174
 Telephone: (630) 587-7922
 Facsimile: (630) 587-7960

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **February 22, 2024**, at Los Angeles, California.

Min Jee Kim