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13 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
14 **FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO**

15 ROGER HERNANDEZ, individually and on
16 behalf of all others similarly situated,

17 Plaintiffs,

18 vs.

19 WESTERN POWER SPORTS, INC.; and
20 DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

21 Defendants.

Case No. 22CECG02123

Assigned for All Purposes to:

Hon. Jonathan Skiles

Dept. 503

22 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
23 **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF**
24 **PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR**
25 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF**
26 **CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

27 Date: August 19, 2025

28 Time: 3:30 p.m.

Dept: 503

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769 (d) and (e), Plaintiff Roger Hernandez (“Plaintiff”)
3 requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims,
4 including a claim under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, codified at Lab. Code §
5 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), against Defendant Western Power Sports, Inc. (“Defendant”) (collectively,
6 Plaintiff and Defendant referred to as the “Parties”). The putative class consists of approximately 239
7 non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California (individually, “Class Member”;
8 collectively, the “Class”) from July 12, 2018, to February 3, 2024 (the “Class Period”). The basic terms
9 of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement Agreement” or
10 “Settlement”)¹ provide for the following:

- 11 (1) A non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$705,000.00 allocated to
12 approximately 239 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the number of
13 weeks each Class Member worked during the Class Period;
14 (2) An award of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently
15 \$235,000.00) and up to \$25,000.00 in reimbursement of costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel
16 for services rendered as counsel on this matter;
17 (3) Enhancement Award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff;
18 (4) Settlement Administration fees and costs of up to \$6,900.00; and
19 (5) Allocations of \$30,000 for resolution of civil penalties under PAGA. Seventy-five
20 percent (75%) of this payment will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce
21 Development Agency (“LWDA Payment”), and twenty-five percent (25%) will be
22 paid to Class Members who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period.

23 With each Class Member allocated an average recovery of approximately \$1,665.00 from the Net
24 Settlement Amount, the Settlement satisfies the criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within

25 _____
26 ¹ A true and correct copy of the fully-executed “Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
27 Class Notice” is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Jamie Loos in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion
28 for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Loos Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith. Unless
otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms in this Motion will be used as such terms are defined and
used in the Settlement.

1 the range of reasonableness given the risks and costs of continued litigation. The Settlement was reached
2 through informed, arms-length bargaining at and after mediation between experienced attorneys. As
3 such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify
4 the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's
5 Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Phoenix Settlement Administrator as the Settlement Administrator,
6 authorize the Settlement Administrator to send notice of the Settlement, and set a final approval hearing
7 date.

8 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

9 On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff Hernandez filed a putative class action on behalf of Defendant's non-
10 exempt employees alleging the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure
11 to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks; (5) failure to
12 provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of
13 employment; (7) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment; and (8) violation of
14 Business and Professions Code § 17200, *et seq.*; for the preceding claims. Loos Decl., ¶ 3. On July 12,
15 2022, Plaintiff's counsel provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant regarding Defendant's
16 alleged Labor Code violations, as required by Lab. Code § 2699.3(a). *Id.* The LWDA did not respond to
17 this notice, indicating it did not intend to investigate, thus allowing Plaintiff to bring a PAGA claim against
18 Defendant. *Id.* On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging an additional
19 cause of action against Defendant for Enforcement of Labor Code § 2698 *et seq.* ("PAGA"). *Id.* at ¶ 4.

20 Plaintiff Hernandez then continued to proceed with formal discovery. Loos Decl., ¶ 5. He
21 propounded Requests for Production of Documents and Special Interrogatories regarding Defendant's
22 wage and hour policies, Plaintiff's personnel file, Class Members' time and pay records, and data
23 pertaining to the Class. *Id.* Through the documents and information obtained, including hundreds of pages
24 produced by Defendant, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to adequately prepare for a private mediation.
25 *Id.*

26 On December 5, 2023, the Parties attended a mediation session with Gig Kyriacou, a respected
27 mediator, and reached a settlement. Loos Decl., ¶ 6. After a full day of negotiating, the Parties agreed to
28 a settlement amount and executed a Memorandum of Understanding with the material terms the parties

1 had agreed to. *Id.* The Parties spent the following months negotiating the terms of the Settlement, which
2 was finalized in September of 2024. *Id.* As a condition of settlement, the Parties agreed to stipulate to the
3 filing of a Second Amended Complaint in order to encompass all claims discussed at mediation. *Id.* at ¶
4 7. The Second Amended Complaint was filed on September 30, 2024. *Id.*

5 Plaintiff submitted the Settlement to the LWDA pursuant to Lab. Code § 2699(1)(2). Loos Decl.,
6 ¶ 8 (Confirmation of Submission of Settlement to LWDA).

7 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT**

8 **A. Terms of Settlement**

9 Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to settle the class claims in exchange for a Gross Settlement
10 Amount of \$705,000.00. Settlement Agreement, § 3.1. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to
11 make payments for the following: (1) Individual Class Payments to Participating Class Members; (2)
12 attorneys' fees to Class Counsel of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount; (3) reimbursement
13 of Class Counsel's litigation costs of up to \$25,000.00; (4) an Enhancement Award to Plaintiff of up to
14 \$10,000.00; (5) Settlement Administration fees and costs of \$6,900.00; and (6) a payment to the LWDA
15 of \$22,500.00 pursuant to PAGA. *Id.* at § 3.2.1 – 3.2.5. Class Members' Individual Class Payments will
16 be distributed after final approval of the Settlement and Defendant funds the Gross Settlement Amount.
17 *Id.* at § 4.3. Individual Class Payments will be calculated by comparing the total Qualifying Workweeks
18 for the Class to each individual Class Member's Qualifying Workweeks. *Id.* at § 3.2.4. The Settlement
19 Administrator will calculate the actual estimated recovery to include in the Class Notice and provide
20 the estimated low and high range of possible recovery at final approval. *Id.* at § 7.4.2; Settlement
21 Agreement, Ex. A (Notice of Class Action Settlement). The class notice will only be provided in English
22 and Spanish. *See* Settlement Agreement, § 1.11.

23 The Individual Class Payments to Class Members will be allocated for tax purposes as follows:
24 20% to wages; 80% to penalties and interest. Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.4.1. The employer-side
25 payroll taxes on the portion allocated to wages will be paid by Defendant separately from, and in
26 addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 4.3. No portion of the Gross Settlement Amount will
27 revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1. Funds from uncashed or undeliverable checks will be tendered by the
28

1 Settlement Administrator to the State Controller Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class
2 Member for whom the funds are designated. *Id.* at § 4.4.3.

3 **B. Proposed Opt-Out and Objection Process**

4 Once the Court grants preliminary approval, Defendant will have fifteen days to deliver the Class
5 Data to the Settlement Administrator. Settlement Agreement, § 4.2. The Settlement Administrator will
6 then have fourteen days to send Class Members the Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”)
7 by first-class mail after checking for updated addresses through the National Change of Address database.
8 *Id.* at § 7.4.2. The Class Notice provides information regarding the nature of the lawsuit, a summary of
9 the substance of the settlement terms, the formula for calculating Individual Class Payments, the
10 individual’s estimated payout, a statement that Class Members who take no action will release their
11 claims and receive settlement checks, instructions regarding how to dispute the calculations, instructions
12 regarding how to request exclusion or object to the Settlement, the date for the final approval hearing,
13 the amounts sought for attorneys’ fees and costs, the Settlement Administration Costs, the Enhancement
14 Award to Plaintiff, and the PAGA allocation. *See* Settlement Agreement, Ex. A (Class Notice).

15 The Class Notice provides instructions for Class Members who choose to exclude themselves
16 from the Settlement. *See* Settlement Agreement § 7.5.1. To opt out, Class Members are instructed to
17 submit a Request for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator by a specified date (60 days after the date
18 of mailing of the Class Notice). *See* Settlement Agreement, Ex. A (Class Notice). Class Members do not
19 need to submit a claim form to participate in the Settlement. *Id.* at p. 2. Class Members are informed of
20 how they can object to the Settlement, and the Class Notice informs Class Members of the date, time, and
21 location of the final fairness and approval hearing so that they can appear in person. *Id.* at pp. 2, 8. The
22 Class Notice also informs Class Members to check the Administrator’s website or contact Class Counsel
23 to verify the date and time of the Final Approval Hearing. *Id.* at p. 8. Accordingly, the content of the Class
24 Notice complies with the requirements of Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(d).

25 If Class Notice packets are returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will perform a
26 skip-trace or other search, and re-mail the Class Notice with an extended deadline, to opt out or object, of
27 14 days from the date of mailing or the original deadline, whichever is later. Settlement Agreement, §§
28 1.43, 7.4.4. The initial 60-day notice period and extension process ensures the notice program provides

1 due process by giving Class Members enough time to determine whether they want to participate in the
2 Settlement. This means of notice is reasonably calculated to apprise Class Members of the pendency of
3 the action. *See* Cal. R. Ct. 3.766 (d)-(f).

4 **C. Proposed Release**

5 The release to be given by Class Members is limited to Defendant, its affiliated companies, parent
6 companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, owners, members, representatives, agents (including,
7 without limitation, any investment bankers, accountants, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers, auditors,
8 consultants, and any past, present or future officers, directors, managers, principals, and employees),
9 predecessors, successors, and assigns (the “Released Parties”). Settlement Agreement, § 1.41. Under
10 the proposed release, Class Members who do not exclude themselves from the Settlement will be
11 deemed to have released the following:

12 All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
13 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released
14 Parties from all claims and/or causes of action that were alleged or that could have been alleged
15 based on the Class Period facts in the Operative Complaint, including but not limited to the failure
16 to pay minimum wages, the failure to pay overtime wages, the failure to pay double time wages,
17 the failure to pay sick pay, the failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof, the
18 failure to permit rest periods or provide compensation in lieu thereof, the failure to provide accurate,
19 itemized wage statements, the failure to pay wages during employment, the failure to pay all wages
20 due upon separation of employment, the failure to reimburse business expenses, and any other
21 claims that were alleged in the Action, including without limitation, all related claims for restitution
22 and other equitable relief under Business and Professions Code section 17200 *et seq.*, liquidated
23 damages, and penalties. This release shall apply to claims arising during the Class Period.

24 .PAGA Group Members release the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that
25 were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the
26 Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice. This release shall apply to claims arising during the Class
27 Period. Settlement, § 5.3.

1 Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release of any and all claims, whether known or unknown,
2 which exist or may exist on Plaintiff's behalf as of the date of the Settlement, and a waiver of Civ. Code
3 § 1542. Settlement Agreement, § 5.1.1.

4 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

5 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

6 Class certification is appropriate when there exists (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous
7 class, (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members, and (3) when certification would
8 be a fair and efficient means of adjudicating the action, rendering class litigation superior to alternative
9 means. *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012).

10 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

11 Whether a class is "ascertainable" is "determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the
12 size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members." *Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors*,
13 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1271 (1987). Here, the Class consists of all current and former non-exempt
14 employees employed by Defendant in California at any time from July 12, 2018, to February 3, 2024.
15 Settlement Agreement, §§ 1.5, 1.12. Defendant's records show the Class consists of approximately 239
16 individuals, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Loos Decl., ¶ 9. Further, the Class is
17 readily ascertainable from Defendant's business records because all Class Members are current or
18 former employees of Defendant. *Id.*

19 **2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists Among Class Members**

20 "[T]he 'community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
21 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3)
22 class representatives who can adequately represent the class.'" *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal.
23 4th 1069, 1089 (2007) (quoting *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981)).

24 **a. Common Questions Predominate**

25 To assess whether common questions predominate, courts focus on whether the theories of
26 recovery advanced are likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*
27 *Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 327 (2004). In other words, courts determine whether the elements
28

1 necessary to establish liability are susceptible of common proof, even if the class members must
2 individually prove their damages. *Brinker, supra*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022, 1024.

3 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant maintained uniform employment policies and/or practices that
4 illegally deprived Class Members of lawful wages, meal periods, rest breaks, accurate wage statements,
5 and waiting time pay. Loos Decl., ¶ 9. Plaintiff's allegations present common legal and factual questions
6 of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, minimum and overtime pay,
7 meal period, and rest break policies to all Class Members; whether these policies and practices resulted in
8 Labor Code violations; whether Defendant's conduct was intentional; and whether Class Members are
9 entitled to penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members' schedules,
10 time punches, and payroll records, Defendant's corporate representative's testimony, written
11 communications between Defendant and Class Members, and Class Member declarations. *Id.* Thus, the
12 Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

13 *b. Plaintiff's Claims are Typical of the Class Claims*

14 The typicality requirement is satisfied when the legal theories and facts supporting Plaintiff's
15 claims are substantially similar to other class members. *See Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46
16 (1983). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he and other Class Members were employed by Defendant and
17 injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's
18 scheduling, timekeeping, minimum wage pay, overtime pay, meal period, and rest break practices and
19 policies. Loos Decl., ¶ 11. Through documents and information exchanged in formal and informal
20 discovery, including production of hundreds of pages of documents by Defendant, Plaintiff confirmed
21 that these common policies and practices similarly affected Plaintiff and the Class. *Id.*

22 Plaintiff suffered similar violations as the rest of the Class. For example, Plaintiff often received
23 missed, late, or interrupted meal periods, as well as missed rest breaks. *See* Declaration of Roger
24 Hernandez in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
25 ("Hernandez Decl.") ¶¶ 5-6. He was also informed that employees are not permitted to leave the
26 premises for rest breaks due to the fact it is still paid time and their assistance may be needed. *Id.* at ¶
27 6. Defendant also issued bonuses during the class period, which Plaintiff received based on pre-
28

1 established criteria. *Id.* at ¶ 7. After conversations with his counsel, Plaintiff understood that when he
2 worked overtime in the same period that a bonus was paid, his overtime was not paid correctly. *Id.*

3 Thus, Plaintiff's claims arise from the same employment practices and are based on the same
4 legal theories as those applicable to other Class Members, as further explained in Plaintiff's exposure
5 analysis below.

6 c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Interests of
7 the Proposed Class

8 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative(s) and proposed class
9 counsel. With respect to the class representative, a plaintiff must adequately represent and protect the
10 interests of other members of the class and demonstrate that his or her claim is not inconsistent with the
11 claims of other members of the class. *See Capitol People First v. State Dept of Developmental Servs.*,
12 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 696-697 (2007). Here, Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with the interests of
13 the Class. Plaintiff demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of the Class by litigating this
14 action, gathering documents and information, being available on the day of mediation to answer
15 questions, meeting with his attorneys on several occasions to understand the claims and theories of
16 liability at issue, assisting attorneys in preparing for mediation, reviewing the proposed settlement
17 agreement to understand its legal effect, and obtaining a fair settlement on behalf of Class Members
18 who stand to recover a substantial amount under the Settlement. *See generally*, Hernandez Decl.

19 Likewise, Aegis Law Firm, PC has expended considerable time and effort on this case and will
20 continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Loos Decl. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be
21 appointed Class Representative, and Plaintiff's Counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

22 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

23 Class treatment is superior to other methods of adjudication when the probability is small that
24 each class member will come forward to prove his or her claim and when the class approach would deter
25 and redress the alleged wrongdoing. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435, 446 (2000);
26 *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1537-1538 (2008). Here, none of the other
27 239 Class Members had shown any interest in bearing the expense and burden of litigating their own
28 claims. Loos Decl. ¶ 20. Thus, a class action is the superior method for seeking relief.

1 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

2 Preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a “reasonable range.” *See North*
3 *County Contractor’s Ass’n., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1089-90 (1994);
4 *Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions*, § 11.26 (4th ed. 2002). In reviewing the fairness of a
5 class action settlement, due regard should be given to what is “‘otherwise a private consensual
6 agreement between the parties.’” *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1389
7 (2010). The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
8 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
9 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*

10 Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where (1) the settlement is reached through “arms-
11 length bargaining”; (2) investigation and discovery are “sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
12 intelligently”; (3) counsel is “experienced in similar litigation”; and (4) the percentage of objectors “is
13 small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802 (1996). The Settlement satisfies the first
14 three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at the final approval stage.

15 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

16 *a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s-Length Negotiations*

17 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
18 evidence to the contrary is offered. Thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are
19 conducted in good faith. Here, the Settlement was the product of extensive investigation and a full day
20 mediation session with a respected mediator after formal discovery. Loos Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. The negotiations
21 were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the
22 interests of their clients. *Id.* at ¶ 6. The amount of Plaintiff’s requested Enhancement Award was not
23 negotiated until after the Parties agreed to the Gross Settlement Amount and many other terms. *Id.* at ¶
24 21.

25 *b. Plaintiff’s Counsel Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Discovery*

26 Plaintiff’s Counsel thoroughly investigated the class claims, applicable law, and potential
27 defenses. *See generally*, Loos Decl. In particular, Plaintiff’s Counsel assessed the value of the class
28 claims using Defendant’s data and documents produced through formal discovery. Loos Decl., ¶ 11.

1 Plaintiff's counsel extensively reviewed policy documents and Class Members' time and pay records to
2 perform a thorough analysis. *Id.* Further, Plaintiff's Counsel engaged an expert, Berger Consulting
3 Group, LLC, to quantify the potential exposure using the time and payroll records, and then assessed
4 the risks associated with each of the claims meriting reductions in the likely recovery at trial. *Id.*; *see*
5 *also* Declaration of Sean Berger in Regard to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval ("Berger
6 Decl.). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel fully understood the strengths and weaknesses of the claims
7 before the Parties reached a settlement.

8 *c. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation*

9 Plaintiff is represented by Aegis Law Firm, PC ("Class Counsel"). Class Counsel prosecute wage
10 and hour class actions on behalf of employees and others who have had their rights violated. Loos Decl.
11 ¶¶ 24-36. The attorneys working on this case have been appointed class counsel in many cases, through
12 both contested motions and settlement approval motions. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiff's Counsel has extensive
13 experience in similar litigation and should be appointed as Class Counsel.

14 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's Claims and**
15 **the Risks and Expense of Litigation**

16 Courts have discretion to approve class settlements by assessing several factors, including the
17 "strength of plaintiffs' case, risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation and risk
18 of maintaining the class action through trial." *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.*, 186 Cal.
19 App. 4th 399, 407 (2010); *see Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129 (2008).

20 While Plaintiff and his counsel believed and continue to believe this is a strong case for
21 certification, the significant risks and expenses associated with class certification and liability
22 proceedings were taken into account. Loos Decl., ¶ 13. To determine if the amount offered at mediation
23 was reasonable, Plaintiff's Counsel weighed that figure against many risk factors. *Id.* at ¶ 14. If Plaintiff
24 continued to prosecute the claims rather than accept a settlement, Plaintiff would have faced deadlines
25 to file a motion for class certification, had to have engaged in more formal written discovery and taken
26 depositions, expended time and resources to resolve disputes, prepared and filed potential dispositive
27 motions and/or discovery motions, and engaged in extensive trial preparation. *Id.* An adverse ruling at
28 any one of these stages could have prevented the Class from obtaining any recovery. *Id.*

1 a. Exposure Analysis

2 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered a fair and
3 reasonable settlement. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Rather,
4 compromise is expected:

5 Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if “the relief afforded
6 by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be
7 successfully litigated,” this is no bar to a class settlement because “the public interest may indeed
be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding
litigation.”

8 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 250 (2001) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff
9 contends that his claims are based on Defendant’s common, class-wide policies and procedures, and
10 that liability could be determined on a class-wide basis without dependence on individual assessments
11 of liability. Loos Decl., ¶ 12. Although the amount of Defendant’s potential exposure – if proven – is
12 substantial, the legitimate and serious risks of succeeding at class certification and trial compelled a
13 serious consideration of the benefit of a settlement. *Id.* at ¶ 14.

14 Minimum Wage and Overtime Claims: Plaintiff’s minimum wage and overtime claims were
15 premised on the theory that Defendant failed to properly calculate the overtime rate and sick pay to
16 include nondiscretionary bonuses. *Id.* at ¶ 16. Plaintiff calculated that this claim was worth
17 approximately \$22,317.00. *Id.* However, Defendant argued that such bonuses were non-discretionary in
18 nature and therefore were not required to be incorporated into the regular rate of pay. *Id.* As such,
19 Plaintiff assumed there was a 70% chance of success at class certification and 60% chance of success
20 on the merits at trial, rendering the claim worth approximately \$9,373.14. *Id.*

21 Meal Period Claims: Plaintiff’s meal period claim was based on the theory that it maintained
22 facially insufficient policies which failed to inform Class Members of the timing of meal periods and
23 resulted in violations as shown in the records. *Id.* at ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s expert estimated that this claim was
24 potentially worth \$189,320.00, with interest, in light of the violations shown in the records. *Id.* However,
25 Defendant argued that despite the lack of a specific timing requirement in its policies, its practices were
26 compliant. *Id.* Defendant also argued that employees could, and routinely did, waive their meal periods.
27 *Id.* As such, Plaintiff’s counsel believed there was a 70% chance succeeding at class certification and a
28 60% chance at trial, resulting in a value of approximately \$79,514.00. *Id.*

1 Rest Break Claim: Plaintiff alleged that Defendant maintained an illegal rest break policy that
2 required Class Members to remain on the premises and failed to authorize all timely rest breaks required
3 under California law. *Id.* at ¶ 18. If Plaintiff could prove a 100% violation rate for each shift over 3.5
4 hours, then damages could reach up to \$1,354,948.00. *Id.* However, Defendant argued that it maintained
5 compliant practices and that Class Members could, and often did, voluntarily choose to waive their rest
6 breaks. *Id.* As such, this claim would have relied on Class Member testimony, making it a riskier claim
7 at class certification and liability stages. *Id.* Plaintiff’s counsel believed there was a 50% chance
8 succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance at trial, resulting in a value of \$270,990.00. *Id.*

9 Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties: Plaintiff’s Counsel also considered the arguable
10 presence of various derivative penalties, and weighed the potential recoveries against probable defenses.
11 *Id.* at ¶ 19. Specifically, Defendant could argue that Plaintiff could not prove the “willful” prong needed
12 to obtain waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203. *Id.* Additionally, Defendant could argue that
13 Plaintiff could not show that Class Members suffered an “injury” as a result of wage statement violations,
14 as required by Labor Code § 226, or that the wage statements correctly reflected the wages paid and owed.
15 *Id.* Moreover, Plaintiff would not recover any of these derivative penalties if he failed to prove the
16 underlying claims. *Id.* Although the Class arguably could have seen a payout of approximately
17 \$182,992.00 for waiting time penalties and \$484,350.00 for wage statement penalties, Plaintiff would not
18 recover any of these derivative penalties if he failed to prove the underlying claims. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiff
19 discounted these claims assuming a 70% chance of class certification and 60% chance at the merits for
20 both claims, resulting in a realistic value of \$76,857.00 for the waiting time claim and \$203,427.00 for the
21 wage statement claim. *Id.*

22 PAGA Claim: The PAGA claim presented even higher hurdles. *Id.* at ¶ 20. Although Plaintiff’s
23 Counsel found Defendant’s exposure could potentially reach approximately \$493,600.00 under Lab.
24 Code § 2699(f), assuming the initial penalty rate of \$100 for each pay period and based on 4,936 PAGA
25 pay periods, Plaintiff would have to prove a violation in every pay period. *Id.* Most importantly, the
26 Court would have discretion to reduce the PAGA award based on whether the amount of the award
27 would be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2). *Id.* In theory, the
28 Court could reduce the award by 99% if it so wished. *Id.* Plaintiff was doubtful he could recover any

1 PAGA penalties, especially if a large class judgment was entered for the same violations. *Id.*
2 Accordingly, Plaintiff could not place a high value on the PAGA penalties, and therefore allocated
3 \$30,000.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount to settle these claims. *Id.*

4 **C. The Requested Service Award for Plaintiff**

5 Plaintiff seeks a Service Award of up to \$10,000.00 for accepting the responsibilities of
6 representing the interests of the Class and assuming risks and potential costs that were not borne by any
7 other Class Members. Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff is eligible for payment that
8 reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent absent
9 class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, supra*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 1393; *Bell v. Farmers*
10 *Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 726 (2004).

11 Here, Plaintiff had the option to pursue his claims individually, but instead chose to pursue this
12 class action, delaying individual recovery until approval of a class action settlement. Loos Decl., ¶ 21.
13 Throughout the case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in gathering the evidence necessary to prosecute the class
14 claims, maintained regular contact with counsel, was available on the day of mediation to answer critical
15 questions, and reviewed the Settlement to make sure it was fair to the Class. *Id.*; *see also* Hernandez
16 Decl. ¶ 10. No action would likely have been taken by Class Members individually, and no
17 compensation would have been recovered for them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class.

18 By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing
19 the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., supra*, 34 Cal. 4th at 340. The requested
20 Enhancement Award for Plaintiff's service as the class representative and for a general release of all
21 employment claims is reasonable and should be preliminarily approved. At the final approval stage,
22 Plaintiff will further support the request for the Enhancement Award by declarations addressing the
23 factors for the award. Loos Decl., ¶ 23.

24 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs**

25 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who invested
26 in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the class.
27 Attorneys' fees are awarded as a matter of equity. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees
28 equaling one-third or more of the potential value of the common fund. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162

1 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008) (“Empirical studies show that, regardless of whether the percentage
2 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
3 recovery”).

4 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Aegis Law Firm, PC as Class Counsel. The attorneys performed
5 significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting the matter with no guarantee of any
6 payment. Loos Decl., ¶ 37. Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks preliminary approval of attorneys’ fees in the
7 amount of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be
8 \$235,000.00, and up to \$25,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in
9 this matter, the extensive information exchange, and substantial recovery obtained on behalf of Plaintiff
10 and the Class, Plaintiff’s Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See*
11 *generally*, Loos Decl. In support of the request for attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiff’s Counsel submits
12 its hourly detailed billing, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Loos Decl. *See* Loos Decl. at ¶ 42, Exhibit 4. At
13 final approval, Plaintiff’s Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys’
14 fees and litigation costs. *Id.* at ¶ 38.


15 **V. CONCLUSION**

16 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable Settlement of the class claims in light of the
17 risks present in this case. Plaintiff has appropriately presented the materials and information necessary
18 for preliminary approval, and therefore, respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the
19 Settlement and schedule a date to conduct the final approval hearing.

20 Dated: July 9, 2025

AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC

21
22 By:



Jamie Loos

Attorneys for Plaintiff