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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO

PASCUAL LUJAN, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees and aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GUSMER ENTERPRISES, INC.; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CECG00166

Honorable Kristi Culver Kapetan
Department 502

NOTICE OF RENEWED MOTION AND RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Date:	November 10, 2026
Time:	3:27 p.m.
Dept.:	502
Complaint Filed:	January 11, 2024
FAC Filed:	August 26, 2025
Trial Date:	Not Set

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on **November 10, 2026** at **3:27 p.m.** in Department 502 of the above-captioned Court located at 1130 "O" Street, Fresno, California 93724, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, Plaintiff Pascual Lujan ("Plaintiff") will and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Gusmer Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendant").

Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an Order:

1. Preliminarily approving the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement") attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Annabel F. Blanchard in Support of Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Blanchard Decl.");

2. Certifying the Class for Settlement purposes;

3. Appointing Plaintiff Pascual Lujan as the Class Representative for Settlement purposes;

4. Appointing Barbara DuVan-Clarke, Danielle L. GruppChang, P.J. Van Ert, and Annabel F. Blanchard of Blackstone Law, APC as Class Counsel for Settlement purposes;

5. Approving the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Class Notice"), attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, to be mailed to the Class;

6. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement and set forth in the Class Notice;

7. For each Class Member and PAGA Employee, directing Defendant to furnish their full name, last known mailing address, Social Security number, hire and termination dates, and number of Workweeks and Pay Periods to the Settlement Administrator within fifteen (15) business days after entry of the order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement;

8. Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process; and

9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.

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Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), on February 9, 2026, a copy of the Settlement was submitted to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") via online submission through the LWDA's website. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 52 and Exh. 7).

This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Annabel F. Blanchard, the Declaration of Plaintiff Pascual Lujan, the Declaration of Bennett Berger, the Declaration of Laura L. Barnett, the Declaration of the Settlement Administrator (Lisa Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc.), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 15, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: A. Blanchard
Annabel F. Blanchard
Attorneys for Plaintiff Pascual Lujan

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Pascual Lujan ("Plaintiff") seeks preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement") entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant Gusmer Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendant") (together, with Plaintiff, the "Parties"). (Declaration of Annabel F. Blanchard in Support of Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ["Blanchard Decl."], Exh. 3). The Settlement terms are outlined as follows:

- Class Size: One hundred and eleven (111) individuals.
- Gross Settlement Amount: Two Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($295,000.00).
- Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Attorneys' fees of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount ($98,333.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is $295,000.00) plus actual litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($20,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Enhancement Payment: Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($7,500.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Settlement Administration Costs: Not to exceed Six Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($6,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- PAGA Amount: Thirteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($13,000.00) from the Gross Settlement Amount, 65% of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") and the remaining 35% to be paid to the PAGA Employees.
- Estimated Net Settlement Amount: One Hundred Fifty Thousand Nine Hundred Seventeen Dollars and Zero Cents ($150,917.00) to be distributed to Settlement Class Members.

As set forth herein, the Settlement is the product of informed discovery and arms-length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the Class. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminarily approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the Class, approve the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Class Notice"), and set a hearing date for final settlement approval, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a supplier providing products and services to liquid processing industries. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt maintenance mechanic from approximately December 2019 to approximately May 2022. (Declaration of Plaintiff Pascual Lujan in Support of Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ["Lujan Decl."], ¶ 2).

On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the action entitled *Pascual Lujan v. Gusmer Enterprises, Inc.*, Fresno County Superior Court Case No. 24CECG00166 ("Action"), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 9).

On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA by online submission and to Defendant by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant ("PAGA Letter"). (*Id*., ¶ 10 and Exh. 2).

On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint ("Operative Complaint") in the Action. (*Id*., ¶ 11). The Operative Complaint alleges ten (10) causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and premium payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premiums payments in lieu thereof, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, for violations of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, *et seq*. based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, and for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2698 *et seq.* ("PAGA") based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations. (Ibid).

On January 30, 2025, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Bret Geckeler, Esq. ("Mediator"), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, and with the assistance of the Mediator's evaluations, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve this dispute on a class and representative basis. (*Id*., ¶ 12). The Parties then worked diligently to negotiate and memorialize the terms in a long form settlement agreement. (Ibid).

On November 14, 2025, the Parties executed the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 13).

On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Motion for Preliminary Approval") and supporting documents. (*Id.*, ¶ 14).

On March 9, 2026, the Court issued a Tentative Ruling ("March 9, 2026 Tentative Ruling"), which raised several points of inquiry with regard to the Motion for Preliminary Approval and denied the Motion for Preliminary Approval without prejudice. (*Id.*, ¶ 15)

On March 10, 2026, the Court entered a Minute Order ("March 10, 2026 Minute Order"), which adopted the March 9, 2026 Tentative Ruling. (*Id.*, ¶ 16 and Exh. 4)

III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Class Definition

For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the Class shall be defined as "all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the Class Period (excluding any employee who, before the inception of this Action, signed a severance or settlement agreement containing a full release of claims)." (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.b). The Class Period is defined as the period from January 11, 2020 through March 20, 2026[1]. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.f). Based on information provided by Defendant, there are a total of one hundred and eleven (111) Class Members who worked thirteen thousand four hundred and ninety-three (13,493) weeks for Defendant as hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees in California during the Class Period ("Workweeks"). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17, Declaration of Laura L. Barnett in support of Class and PAGA Settlement ["Barnett Decl."], ¶ 6; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.nn).

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[1] Pursuant to the Escalator Clause in the Settlement Agreement, if the number of Workweeks exceeds 13,537, Defendant may either increase the Gross Settlement Amount on a pro rata basis or select an earlier end date for the Class Period to avoid triggering the Escalator Clause. Defendant elected the latter option, setting March 20, 2026 as the end date for the Class Period, which results in 13,493 Workweeks.

B. Amount of Settlement

The Parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims at issue in the Operative Complaint for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($295,000.00), exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.q).

C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount

The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees, and other allocations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.q). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Class Counsel's fees in the amount of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., $98,333.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is $295,000.00); (2) Class Counsel's actual litigation costs and expenses, not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($20,000.00); (3) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000); (4) Enhancement Payment in the amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($7,500.00); and (5) PAGA Amount in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($13,000.00). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.q, 13.a, 13.b, 13.c, and 13.d). After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount that will be available for Class Members is currently estimated to be One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Seven dollars ($150,167). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18).

The Net Settlement Amount will be distributed and paid to all Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion ("Settlement Class Member(s)") on a *pro rata* basis based on their number of Workweeks. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.mm and 15). The *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Amount that a Settlement Class Member may be eligible to receive under the Class Settlement ("Individual Settlement Share") will be calculated by the Settlement Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.t and 15).

Additionally, 35% of the PAGA Amount ("PAGA Employee Amount"), which is $4,550.00 out of $13,000.00, will be fully distributed to "all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period"

("PAGA Employee(s)"). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.x, 9.y, 9.z, and 13.c). The "PAGA Period" is defined as the period from March 21, 2024 through the date on which the Court enters the order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.aa). The PAGA Employee Amount will be distributed and paid to all PAGA Employees on a *pro rata* basis based on the number of pay periods each PAGA Employee worked for Defendant as an hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employee in California during the PAGA Period ("Pay Periods"). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.z, 9.y, and 9.cc). The *pro rata* share of the PAGA Employee Amount that a PAGA Employee may be eligible to receive under the PAGA Settlement ("Individual PAGA Payment") will be calculated by the Settlement Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.r, 9.kk, and 16).

Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as five percent (5%) wages, five percent (5%) reimbursement, and ninety percent (90%) in consideration for the release and to settle claims for penalties, interest, and non-wage damages. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17). The portion allocated to wages will be reported on an IRS Form W-2 and the portions allocated to penalties, interest, and non-wage damages will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17). The Settlement Administrator will withhold the employee's share of taxes and withholdings with respect to the wages portion of the Individual Settlement Shares, and issue checks to Settlement Class Members for their net payment of their Individual Settlement Share ("Individual Settlement Payment"). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.s and 17). The employer's share of taxes and contributions in connection with the wages portion of Individual Settlement Shares will be paid by Defendant separately and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.l and 17). Each Individual PAGA Payment will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17).

The Settlement Agreement is a non-reversionary and non-claims made settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.q and 36). The Net Settlement Amount will be fully distributed to Settlement Class Members and the PAGA Amount will be fully distributed to the LWDA and PAGA

Employees, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 9.v and 9.x). No money will revert to Defendant. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 12).

Each Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, shall be canceled. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 36). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Employee. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 36).

D. Released Claims

Upon the Effective Date and full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff and all Settlement Class Members will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released Class Claims. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 37).

Upon the Effective Date and full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff, the State of California with respect to all PAGA Employees, and all PAGA Employees will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released PAGA Claims. (*Id*., ¶ 38).

"Released Class Claims" means any and all claims which were alleged or which could have been reasonably alleged based on the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period. This shall include, but not be limited to, claims for Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business-related expenses and any associated California Labor Code Sections including, but not limited to, 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 221, 226, 226.7, 246, 248, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1185, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2800, and 2802, the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order, and California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200, *et seq*. (*Id*., ¶ 9.ff).

"Released PAGA Claims" means any and all claims arising from any of the factual allegations in the PAGA Letter and the Operative Complaint, arising during the PAGA Period, for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698 *et seq*. This shall include, but not be limited to, claims for Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, provide compliant wage statements, maintain complete and accurate payroll records, and reimburse necessary business-related expenses and any associated California Labor Code Sections including, but not limited to, 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 221, 226, 226.7, 246, 248, 510, 512, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1185, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2800, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. (*Id*., ¶ 9.gg).

"Released Parties" means Defendant and its respective past, future, or present agents, employees, representatives, administrators, officers, directors, members, insurers, shareholders, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, owners, attorneys, accountants, receivers, advisors, consultants, partners, partnerships, parents, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, heirs, joint venturers, trustees, investors, fiduciaries, franchisees or franchisors, or commonly controlled corporations. (*Id*., ¶ 9.hh).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

The settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996)). "In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court's broad discretion." (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds)).

The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c)). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of the settlement and the Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members. After notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (Ibid).

The initial evaluation of the settlement at the preliminary approval step "is not a fairness hearing." (*Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980)). Rather, the limited purpose of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, only whether the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval and, as a result, "whether there is any reason to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing." A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*See In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006)).

Preliminary approval does not require a court to make a final determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, that decision is made only at the final approval stage, after notice of the settlement has been given to the class members and they have had an opportunity to object or exclude themselves from the settlement. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g)). In considering a potential class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute and need not engage in a trial on the merits. (*See Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

V. THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR

A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm's-Length Bargaining

California courts recognize that "a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining." (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here, the Parties' settlement negotiations were at all times made at arm's-length and were adversarial. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 24). The Settlement was reached following a full day of mediation with a highly respected mediator with substantial experience mediating wage and hour cases. (Ibid).

B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel

Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801). Prior to mediation, Defendant produced a random nineteen percent (19%) sampling of putative class members' time and pay

records, which contained information for 17 employees and 2,350 workweeks. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 25). Defendant also provided multiple iterations of its employee handbook (which included, *inter alia*, job descriptions, wage and hour policies regarding work schedules, time recording, meal and rest breaks, meal break waivers, overtime, and hand tools; and time-off policies regarding vacation, sick leave, holidays, FMLA/CFRA, and pregnancy disability leave), and information regarding the total number of putative class members, the number of current versus former employees, the total workweeks worked by the putative class members, and the average rate of pay for the putative class members. (Ibid). The policies that Defendant produced prior to mediation are not provided with these Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement papers because they were marked confidential by Defendant. (Ibid). Pursuant to California Code, Evidence Code Section 1119, the documents produced by Defendant are confidential and are not admissible. (Ibid).

The documents provided, as well as the testimony of Plaintiff and Class Member witnesses, reflect that job duties overlapped among distinct job titles. (*Id*., ¶ 25). It was found by Class Counsel, as well as confirmed by Defendant, that the same practices and policies of Defendant applied to all Class Members. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 25; Barnett Decl., ¶ 7).

This allowed Class Counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (*Id*., ¶ 26). Based on information exchanged, the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided their analyses to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate the strengths and weakness of their respective positions. (*Id*., ¶ 27). At all times, Plaintiff was willing and prepared to litigate this matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable resolution. (Ibid). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information and experience to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions and Recovery Risks

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.

(*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).

Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendant has legal and factual grounds for defending the Action. Based upon Class Counsel's experience litigating similar complex matters, Plaintiff reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification and the merits of the Action absent a settlement.

1. Class Counsel's Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages

Class Counsel analyzed all available data and estimated Defendant's maximum potential exposure for the class claims to be approximately $2,728,978, assuming the litigation was successful at trial on all claims at issue and every employee had a violation for each claim on every shift worked. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 28). This maximum potential analysis was then reduced based on the challenges facing the likelihood of obtaining class certification, prevailing at trial, and other attendant risks. (Ibid). This estimate is based off an estimated maximum liability for all claims at issue and the total aggregate workweeks during the relevant time period, less interest, and based on the analysis of the data which was extrapolated out for all class members across the entire putative class period, which included: $157,071 for meal period violations (less meal period premiums paid); $1,602,148 for rest period violations at a 100% violation rate; $289,502 for unpaid off-the-clock work for 1 hour per workweek of off-the-clock work; $61,764 for unpaid sick pay at the regular rate of pay; $88,920 for unreimbursed business expenses; $305,573 for waiting time penalties; and $224,000 for wage statement penalties. (Ibid). Plaintiff further estimated that Defendant faced an additional exposure of $196,300 in potential, non-stacked (i.e., one penalty, per employee, per pay period during the PAGA statutory period) PAGA penalties. (Ibid). Together with the PAGA penalties, Defendant's maximum potential exposure totaled $2,925,278 in damages. (Ibid).

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2. Class Counsel's Risk-Based Analysis and Risk-Based Adjustments

While Plaintiff believes that Defendant faced significant exposure, substantial barriers to a recovery existed. Defendant contended that Plaintiff's claims are not suitable for class certification because individual issues and affirmative defenses would predominate should this case go to trial. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 31; *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012); *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 35-36 (2014); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)). While Plaintiff and Class Counsel disagree with Defendant's predictions, they also recognize that there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 31; *see also*, *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation*, 2000-2006, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf (finding that only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a settlement or as part of a contested certification motion)).

For example, Plaintiff's meal period claims, which were based on Defendant's alleged failure to provide lawful meal periods, presented meaningful litigation and certification risks. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 32). Meal period claims have become increasingly difficult to certify in recent years, particularly where the employer maintains facially compliant written policies and the alleged violations depend on how those policies were implemented in practice. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 32; *See Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1034-35). Plaintiff's theory was that, notwithstanding Defendant's written policies, Defendant failed to implement those policies in a manner that actually permitted Class Members to take timely, uninterrupted, and duty-free meal periods as required by California law. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 32; *See Bradley v. Networkers Int'l, LLC,* 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1150 (2012) (holding that "the lack of a meal/rest break policy and the uniform failure to authorize such breaks are matters of common proof.")). Defendant disputed liability and maintained that its meal period policies and practices were lawful throughout the Class Period. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 32). Defendant further contended that a portion of the workforce executed valid meal period waivers, which would reduce or eliminate liability for certain shifts and require individualized analysis. (Ibid). In addition, Defendant asserted that managers were trained that meal periods were off-duty, employees were permitted to leave the premises, and machinery was turned off during lunch periods, thereby supporting Defendant's position that employees were relieved of all duty during their breaks. (Ibid). Plaintiff's data analysis also presented risk. (Ibid). After offsetting

meal period premiums already paid, Plaintiff's analysis reflected only a 10.1% violation rate for purported unique meal period violations. (Ibid). Defendant would likely argue that this relatively limited violation rate showed substantial compliance and that any remaining alleged violations were sporadic, individualized, or attributable to employee choice rather than a uniform policy or practice. (Ibid). Defendant also would likely contend that determining whether any particular meal period was late, short, waived, interrupted, or otherwise noncompliant would require individualized inquiries into each employee's shift, waiver status, work duties, manager instructions, and actual break experience. (Ibid). These arguments created a risk that the Court could find common issues did not predominate and decline to certify the meal period claim. (Ibid). At the same time, Plaintiff had evidence supporting continued pursuit of the claim. (Ibid). Although Defendant's records facially reflected substantial compliance, many recorded meal periods were exactly 30 minutes in length, which supported Plaintiff's position that the records may not accurately reflect employees' actual break times. (Ibid). Plaintiff also would argue that the recurring nature of these uniform 30-minute entries, together with the alleged failure to implement compliant practices, supported a class-wide inference that employees were not consistently provided lawful, duty-free meal periods. (Ibid). Balancing these competing considerations, Plaintiff recognized a material risk that the Court could credit Defendant's defenses, find that the meal period claim required individualized proof, reduce the potential exposure based on waivers and premiums already paid, or deny certification of the claim altogether. (Ibid).

Additionally, a significant portion of Defendant's potential exposure was attributable to Plaintiff's rest period allegations. (*Id*., ¶ 33). Like the meal period claims, however, the rest period claims presented substantial litigation and certification risks. Defendant maintained that it had a lawful written rest period policy, provided compliant rest breaks, and relieved Class Members of all duties during those breaks as required by California law. (Ibid). Defendant also asserted that its managers were trained to provide off-duty rest periods and that employees were not required to perform work during those breaks. (Ibid). The rest period claim was particularly uncertain because, unlike meal periods, rest periods were not recorded in Defendant's timekeeping system. (Ibid). As a result, Plaintiff lacked a uniform set of time records showing when rest breaks were taken, whether they were timely, whether they were uninterrupted, or whether any premiums should have been paid. (Ibid). This evidentiary gap created meaningful risk both

at certification and on the merits. (Ibid). Defendant would likely argue that, absent time records, Plaintiff could not establish a common method of proving violations on a class-wide basis and that any determination would require individualized testimony regarding each employee's schedule, workload, supervisor, department, and actual break experience. (Ibid). Plaintiff also faced risk in proving damages with sufficient certainty. (Ibid). Because the alleged violations were not reflected in Defendant's records, any damages model would likely depend on representative testimony, sampling, survey evidence, or assumptions regarding the frequency of missed, late, short, or interrupted rest periods. (Ibid). Defendant would likely challenge those assumptions as speculative and contend that the claim could not be valued reliably on a class-wide basis. (Ibid). Defendant also would likely argue that any missed or shortened rest periods resulted from individualized circumstances or employee choice rather than a uniform policy or practice. (Ibid). Although Plaintiff maintained that Defendant's practices resulted in rest period violations, the absence of rest period records, Defendant's facially compliant written policy, and Defendant's anticipated individualized defenses created a real risk that the Court could deny certification, limit the claim, or substantially reduce the recoverable damages. (Ibid). These risks made the estimated value of the rest period claim subject to significant challenge. (Ibid).

Plaintiff also faced meaningful challenges in certifying and proving liability for the minimum wage and overtime claims. (*Id*., ¶ 34). These claims were largely based on alleged unrecorded, off-the-clock work performed before and after shifts and during purported meal periods. (Ibid). For example, it was reported that employees were regularly expected to perform work-related tasks while off the clock, including answering work-related phone calls, setting up workstations, and cleaning up projects before or after shifts or during meal periods. (Ibid). Defendant disputed these allegations and maintained that it paid employees for all compensable time worked, including overtime. (Ibid). Defendant also contended that overtime was paid at a properly calculated regular rate, including applicable bonuses in the hourly rate calculation. (Ibid). In addition, Defendant asserted that when a meal period was noncompliant and a premium was paid, the premium was included, or "rolled into," the employee's regular rate calculation. (Ibid). Plaintiff questioned this practice, and Plaintiff's expert identified issues with aspects of Defendant's regular rate calculations. (Ibid). Despite those concerns, the claims presented significant risk. Because the alleged work was unrecorded, Plaintiff lacked a uniform

timekeeping record showing when off-the-clock work occurred, how often it occurred, how long it lasted, whether managers knew or should have known about it, and whether it resulted in unpaid minimum wages or overtime. (Ibid). Defendant would likely argue that any alleged off-the-clock work depended on individualized circumstances, including the employee's position, department, supervisor, shift, worksite practices, specific tasks performed, and whether the employee was instructed or permitted to perform the work. (Ibid). Defendant also would likely contend that some alleged tasks were not compensable, were de minimis, were voluntarily performed, or were not known to management. (Ibid). Damages also posed a substantial risk. (Ibid). Plaintiff's estimated damages were based on the assumption that all Class Members performed at least one hour of off-the-clock work per week. (Ibid). Defendant would likely challenge that assumption as overinclusive and speculative, particularly in the absence of uniform records confirming the frequency or duration of the alleged unpaid work. (Ibid). These issues created a risk that the Court could find the claims unmanageable, conclude that individualized inquiries predominated, deny certification, or substantially reduce the recoverable damages. (Ibid). Accordingly, while Plaintiff maintained that the minimum wage and overtime claims had merit, the individualized nature of the alleged off-the-clock work presented challenges. (Ibid).

Plaintiff also contended that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiff and the other Class Members for necessary business-related expenses, such as the purchase of hand tools, usage of personal vehicles, and usage of personal cell phones for work-related purposes. (*Id*., ¶ 35). Defendant contended that it had a policy and practice of reimbursing employees for necessary business-related expenses. (Ibid). Defendant further contended that, with respect to the alleged expenses for which Plaintiff and the other Class Members never requested reimbursement from Defendant, it did not know and had no reason to know that alleged business-related expenses had been incurred. (Ibid). Defendant further contended that the reason why a Class Member undertook certain expenses, while not others, and failed to receive reimbursement for certain expenses while not others, would raise individual issues that could not be certified. (Ibid).

There are also substantial risks associated with Plaintiff's waiting time penalties and wage statement claims. (*Id*., ¶ 36). First, these claims were derivative of Plaintiff's claims for unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, and unpaid overtime wages,

and if certification was denied on those underlying claims, these derivative claims for penalties would also likely fail. (Ibid). Further, even if Plaintiff prevailed on his underlying claims, he would still be required to demonstrate that Defendant's violations of California Labor Code section 203 were *willful* violations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 36; *See, e.g.*, *Choate v. Celite Corp*., 215 Cal App. 4th 1460, 1468 (2013) (holding that "an employer's reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed may negate a finding of willfulness")). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the appellate level because such claims have an element of discretion attached to them rather than a pure calculation of damages after liability is proven. (Blanchard Decl. ¶ 36; *Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc*., 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with Price v. Starbucks Corp*., 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2011)). Accordingly, these derivative claims, which comprised a substantial portion of Defendant's estimated liability, were therefore uncertain. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 36).

Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the amount of wages due to Class Members would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id*., ¶ 37). In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel would need to request and analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information, contact them, and obtain their declarations at great expense. (Ibid). Obtaining the cooperation of current employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a current employer. (Ibid). On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the cooperation of its employees. (Ibid). Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification and trial, possible appeal s would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (Ibid).

Class Counsel also contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA claims and potential liability Defendant could face from these claims as part of the global resolution. (*Id*., ¶ 38). Existing case law makes PAGA claims subject to the same defenses and risks as Plaintiff's underlying wage claims. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 38; see, *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("Plaintiff's claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff's other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA claim")). Class Counsel also anticipated that even if successful on the merits at trial, the imposition of cumulative civil penalties based on the alleged wage and hour violations could be considered unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or

confiscatory, and that Defendant would argue that it made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations warranting a reduction in penalties. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 38).[2] Class Counsel also anticipated Defendant would argue that the violations per pay period were low, warranting an additional reduction in civil penalties. (Ibid). Finally, Class Counsel was also mindful of the fact that PAGA is fundamentally not intended to be compensatory in nature but is instead intended to facilitate enforcement of California's labor laws by financing state activities and educating and deterring non-compliance. (Ibid).

After considering this multitude of factors, Plaintiff and Class Counsel concluded that it was in the best interest of the State of California and the PAGA Employees to enter into the Settlement, and to allocate Thirteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($13,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount towards the PAGA claims, which represents approximately 4.4% of the Gross Settlement Amount. (*Id*., ¶ 39). This percentage of the settlement is well within the range of wage and hour settlements regularly approved in both state and federal court for cases that include both a class and PAGA action. (Ibid). Typically, such hybrid cases allocate only 1% of the gross settlement value to resolve PAGA claims, and, indeed, settlements allocations as little as 0.22% of the gross settlement amount have been approved as reasonable by courts. (Ibid). Moreover, the overall relief obtained by the Settlement is significant, not only from a monetary perspective, but also because it fulfills the public policy objectives of PAGA—to promote enforcement of California's labor laws, provide funds to the state, and deter future non-compliance by the employer. (Ibid).

Therefore, taking into account how each of the above risks potentially effected Plaintiff's ability to first obtain class certification, and then prove the underlying violations, the Court's broad discretion in assessing civil penalties, plus the cost and delay in recovering the alleged potential damages, Class Counsel discounted Defendant's estimated liability based on the challenges facing his ability to succeed

[2] See, e.g., *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1131 (2012) (imposition of both statutory and civil penalties for same conduct is impermissible double recovery) (disapproved on other grounds); *Aguirre v. Genesis Logistics*, 2013 WL 10936035, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ("duplicative effect" of penalties is a factor in favor of "reducing ...the PAGA penalty"); *Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc.*, 2013 WL 2932243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (declining to stack penalties based on the same conduct); *Castillo v. ADT, LLC*, 2017 WL 363108, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017); *Sanchez v. McDonalds Restaurants of California, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4620746 (LA Super. Ct. July 6, 2017) (declining to stack penalties arising out of the same conduct); *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.*, 2011 WL 756304718, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (reducing PAGA penalties by 80%); *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F.Supp.3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (indicating that a substantial reduction is warranted where good faith dispute exists in legal obligations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp*., 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018) (approving reduction in penalties from $50 per pay period to $5 per pay period based on good faith attempts to comply with obligations and minimal violations).

on class certification by 75% to $731,319.50. (*Id*., ¶ 40). The merits-based risk factors further reduced Defendant's estimated liability by an additional 60%. (Ibid). This resulted in an adjusted estimated liability of $292,527.80. (Ibid). In light thereof, the settlement amount of $295,000.00 is a significant settlement. (Ibid).

The Settlement is in the best interest of the Class Members, the PAGA Employees, and the State of California and is within the accepted range of recoveries for this type of litigation given the inherent risk of litigation, the risk of obtaining and maintaining class certification, and the costs of further litigation. (*Id*., ¶ 41).

VI. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3) certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class action is superior to other methods. (*See Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Plaintiff contends that the Action, which is based upon Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices, satisfies the class certification requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. Defendant denies Plaintiff's allegations, but for purposes of the Settlement only, Defendant has stipulated to certification of the Class.

A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is Impracticable

Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. (*See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 873 (1983)). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class is defined as "all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the Class Period (excluding any employee who, before the inception of this Action, signed a severance or settlement agreement containing a full release of claims." (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.b). This provides a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

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Next, the Class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity requirement. Courts have certified classes with as few as ten or twenty-eight class members. (*Blanchard v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981); *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal. 2d 574 (1995); *Hebbard v. Colgrove*, 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972)). Here, the estimated Class size of one hundred and eleven (111) individuals meets the numerosity requirement.

Finally, the question of whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff can establish "the existence of an ascertainable class." (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal.2d 695 at 706 (1967)). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendant's payroll records, and the Class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the parameters of the Class. (Barnett Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 605, 617 (1987)).

B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Here, all three requirements are easily satisfied.

The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. (*See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706). What is required is that a common question of fact or law exists which predominates over issues unique to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case arising from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. (*See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987)).

Here, Plaintiff's claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate and warrant class certification. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied compliant meal and rest periods to employees, required employees to perform work off-the-clock, and failed to fully compensate employees for all time actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendant allegedly failed to pay minimum and overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiff alleged, and Defendant confirmed, that Defendant's

policies and practices were uniform as to all Class Members. (Barnett Decl., ¶ 7). Thus, class treatment is appropriate.

To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that plaintiffs' claims be identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct. (*See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007)). The typicality requirement for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. (*See* Ibid).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his claims are similar to those of the other Class Members and that Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same alleged course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other Class Members. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected him to the same wage-and-hour violations, the same unlawful policies, and the same practices that affected every member of the proposed Class. Because Plaintiff's claims are based upon the same alleged conduct and business practices as those of Class Members, the typicality requirement has been satisfied.

Finally, the question of adequacy of representation "depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney is qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and the plaintiff's interests are not antagonistic to the interests of the class." (*McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976)). Here, these considerations are satisfied. Class Counsel is well-regarded and is qualified and experienced in employment-related, class-action litigation. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Plaintiff will vigorously, adequately, and fairly represent the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has, at all times, throughout the course of the litigation considered the interests of the Class and understood that he must take steps to adequately represent the Class and their interests. (Lujan Decl., ¶ 20). Because Plaintiff's claims are typical of other Class Members' and are not based on unique circumstances, there is no antagonism between the interests of Plaintiff and the Class.

C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute, as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as

the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. (*See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429, 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward to prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress the alleged wrongdoing)). Further, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class action proceedings are superior to individual litigation.

VII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS REASONABLE

Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as compensation "for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010)). Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representative, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See In re Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times larger than individual payments where incentive award made up a mere .17% of the settlement); *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding service award of $15,000 to be "fair and reasonable")).

Plaintiff initiated this litigation on behalf of his former co-workers who will now be entitled to receive payment from the Settlement. Plaintiff invested substantial time and effort into litigation, including his own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class Counsel. (*See generally*, Lujan Decl.). Further, the requested amount for Plaintiff is also reasonable given the average award and the benefit gained by other Class Members. For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that an Enhancement Payment of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($7,500.00) to Plaintiff be preliminarily approved by the Court. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 42; Lujan Decl., ¶ 22).

VIII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE

Trial courts have "wide latitude" in assessing the value of attorneys' fees and their decisions are "not to be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion." (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000)). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent to fees

paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. (*Id*. at 47). In cases where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees to a percentage of the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. (*Id.* at 32).

Here, the requested attorneys' fees of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., $98,333.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is $295,000.00) is disclosed to Class Members in the proposed Class Notice. (Settlement Agreement, Exh. A). The requested fee was freely negotiated, is common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by Defendant. The Motion for Final Approval will elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also support Class Counsel's request for the reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($20,000.99). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 43). The Attorneys' Fees and Costs that are not ultimately approved by the Court shall instead be included in the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed to Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13.a).

IX. THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

The Parties have jointly drafted the Class Notice, which will be mailed to the Settlement Class Members. (*Id*., Exh. A). The Class Notice will include information regarding the nature of the Action, a summary of the terms of the Settlement, the Class definition, information on how to object to and/or opt-out of the Class Settlement and to dispute Workweeks and/or Pay Periods, and the date of the Final Approval Hearing. (Ibid). The Class Notice will list each Class Member's total Workweeks and their estimated Individual Settlement Share and each PAGA Employee's total Pay Periods and their estimated Individual PAGA Payment. (Ibid).

Within fifteen (15) business days after entry of the preliminary approval order, Defendant will provide a list in a formatted readable Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet to the Settlement Administrator containing the following information for each Class Member and PAGA Employee: full name; last known mailing address; Social Security number; hire and termination dates; and number of Workweeks and Pay Periods (collectively referred to as the "Class List"). (*Id*., ¶¶ 9.d and 25). Within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the Class List from Defendant, the Settlement Administrator will perform a search based on the National Change of Address Database or other similar services available, such as provided by

Experian, for information to update and correct for any known or identifiable address changes, and will mail a Class Notice in English and Spanish to all Class Members via First-Class U.S. Mail, using the most current, known mailing addresses identified by the Settlement Administrator. (*Id*., ¶ 26.a).

After obtaining competing bids from multiple potential settlement administrators, which included CPT Group, Inc. ($7,500.00), Apex Class Action LLC ($5,500.00), and ILYM Group, Inc. ($5,000.00), the Parties agreed to use ILYM Group, Inc. ("ILYM" or "Settlement Administrator"), which was the lowest bidder, to handle the notice and settlement administration process. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 50; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.kk). However, the original bid from ILYM was based on an outdated Class Member count. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 50). Accordingly, the Parties obtained an updated bid, which is now Five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($5,250.00). (Ibid).

In determining whether to approve a settlement of a class action, a trial court has virtually complete discretion as to the manner of giving notice to class members, and review on appeal is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. (*See In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380 (2010)). Here, Class Counsel is not aware of an alternative method of providing notice to the Class which would result in a higher likelihood of actual notice. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 51). The original source of the mailing addresses is from each Class Member, who provided the information to Defendant. (Ibid).

Class Members will have forty-five (45) calendar days from the initial mailing of the Class Notice by the Settlement Administrator to submit a Request for Exclusion, Notice of Objection, and/or Dispute ("Response Deadline"). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9.jj).

Any Class Notice returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable on or before the Response Deadline will be sent promptly via First-Class U.S. Mail to the forwarding address affixed thereto and the Settlement Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing on the Class Notice. (*Id*., ¶ 26.b). If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt to determine a correct address using a skip-trace or other search, using the name, address, and/or Social Security number of the Class Member and/or PAGA Employee, and perform a single re-mailing within five (5) calendar days. (Ibid). In the event that a Class Notice is re-mailed to a Class Member, the Response Deadline for that Class Member shall be extended fifteen (15) calendar days from the original Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶ 9.jj).

Class Members will have an opportunity to dispute the number of Workweeks and/or Pay Periods to which they have been credited, as reflected in their respective Class Notices, by submitting a timely and valid letter ("Dispute") to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶¶ 9.j and 27). A Dispute must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Action; (b) contain the Class Member's full name, signature, address, telephone number, and the last four (4) digits of the Class Member's Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the Class Member disputes the number of Workweeks and/or Pay Periods credited to that Class Member and what the Class Member contends is the correct number; and (d) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶ 9.j).

Any Class Member wishing to be excluded from the Class Settlement must submit a timely and valid letter ("Request for Exclusion") to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶¶ 9.ii and 28). A Request for Exclusion must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Action; (b) contain the Class Member's full name, signature, address, telephone number, and last four (4) digits of the Class Member's Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the Class Member does not wish to be included in the Class Settlement; and (d) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶ 9.ii). Notwithstanding the above, all PAGA Employees will be bound by the PAGA Settlement and will be issued their Individual PAGA Payment, irrespective of whether they submit a Request for Exclusion. (*Id*., ¶ 28).

To object to the Class Settlement, Settlement Class Members must submit a timely and complete written objection ("Notice of Objection") to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶¶ 9.w and 29). A Notice of Objection must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Action; (b) contain the objector's full name, signature, address, telephone number, and the last four (4) digits of the objector's Social Security number; (c) contain a written statement of all grounds for the objection accompanied by any legal support for such objection; (d) contain copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection is based; and (e) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id*., ¶ 9.w). Settlement Class Members, individually or through counsel, may also

present their objection orally at the Final Approval Hearing, regardless of whether they have submitted a Notice of Objection. (*Id*., ¶ 29).

X. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and the relief requested herein.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 15, 2026

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