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Attorneys for Plaintiff, LUZMY BARRIENTOS,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and aggrieved

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

LUZMY BARRIENTOS, an individual and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHENG KEE OF CALIFORNIA., a California
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: C25-01001

[Assigned to the Hon. Benjamin T. Reyes, II in
Dept. 39]

**DECLARATION OF ZACHARY T.
CHRZAN IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
SETTLEMENT AND PROVISIONAL
CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR
SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY**

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1. I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice before all the Courts of the State of California, and I am a principal of Zaghi & Chrzan, LLP, counsel of record for plaintiff LUZMY BARRIENTOS (“Plaintiff”) and all others similarly situated and aggrieved. As such, I am familiar with the file in this matter and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to the following facts of my own personal knowledge.

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9. On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed with the LWDA and served on defendant SHENG KEE OF CALIFORNIA (“Defendant”), a notice under Labor Code section 2699.3 stating Plaintiff

intended to serve as a proxy of the LWDA to recover civil penalties on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees for various alleged Labor Code violations (the “PAGA Notice”).

10. That same day, Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that Defendant: (1) Failed to Pay All Wages Including Minimum and Overtime Wages; (2) Failed to Provide Meal Periods; (3) Failed to Provide Rest Periods; (4) Failed to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code; (5) Failed to Reimburse for Necessary Business Expenditures; (6) Failed to Pay Waiting Time Penalties; (7) Engaged in Unfair Business Practices (the “Class Action”). On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in the Class Action adding all claims alleged in the PAGA Notice (the “Action,” “Litigation” or “Lawsuit”).

11. On June 10, 2025, after sixty (60) days had passed since Plaintiff filed the PAGA Notice, without any action by the LWDA with respect to the alleged Labor Code violations, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in the Action seeking PAGA civil penalties against Defendant for the Labor Code violations alleged in the PAGA Notice.

12. Shortly thereafter, the Parties agreed to exchange informal discovery and attend a mediation, in advance of which Class Counsel was provided with, among other things: (1) time and payroll records of 112 class members (21%); (2) class data points for 112 class members (21%), consisting of their hire dates, termination dates, and workweeks and pay periods worked; and (3) Defendant’s wage and hour policy documents

13. On February 9, 2026, the Parties mediated with Tagore Subramaniam, Esq., a well-regarded mediator with substantial experience mediating complex labor and employment matters. Following extensive, arms-length negotiations, and with the assistance of the mediator’s evaluation and settlement proposal, the Parties reached an agreement in principle, which was later memorialized in a written Memorandum of Understanding and, ultimately, the Settlement.

The Proposed Settlement

14. Subject to Court approval pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, *et seq.*, the Parties have agreed to settle the Action by agreement upon the terms and conditions and for the consideration set forth in the Settlement Agreement. A summary of the terms of the settlement are as follows:

1 • Certification of a class (“Class,” “Settlement Class,” “Settlement Class Members” or “Class
2 Members”), for settlement purposes only, defined as: all persons currently or formerly employed by
3 defendant Sheng Kee of California (“Defendant”), either directly or through any subsidiary, staffing
4 agency, or professional employer organization, as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees in California
5 at any time during the period from April 8, 2021 through November 8, 2025 (“Class Period”).

6 • Defendant will pay \$1,225,000.00 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) to resolve the matter. This
7 is a non-reversionary settlement.

8 • The Gross Settlement Amount is based on Defendant’s representation that Class Members
9 worked no more than 42,808 Workweeks during the Class Period. Consistent with Paragraph 24 of
10 the Parties’ executed MOU, Defendant elected to reduce the release period rather than increase the
11 Gross Settlement Amount, resulting in a Class Period ending on November 8, 2025. Accordingly,
12 no escalator provision is included in the Settlement Agreement or these moving papers.

13 • Defendant will pay the employer’s share of taxes separate and apart from the Gross
14 Settlement Amount.

15 • Class Members will be paid their *pro rata* share of the class action settlement based on the
16 total number of Qualifying Workweeks¹ worked during the Class Period.

17 • The Settlement Administration costs, estimated not to exceed \$12,500.00, will be paid out
18 of the Gross Settlement Amount.

19 • Class Counsel, Zachary T. Chrzan and Brian Zaghi of Zaghi & Chrzan, LLP, will apply for
20 attorneys’ fees of up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, or \$428,750.00,
21 and actual costs, not to exceed \$25,000.00, which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.

22 • Class Counsel will apply for a service award of \$7,500.00 for the Class Representative,
23 which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.

24 • After deducting the requested attorneys’ fees of \$428,750.00, litigation costs not to exceed
25 \$25,000.00, the \$7,500.00 service award, settlement administration costs not to exceed \$12,500.00,
26 and the \$25,000.00 in PAGA penalties, the estimated Net Settlement Amount available for
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28 ¹ “Qualifying Workweek” means a workweek during which the Class Member was employed by, and worked on one or more days for, Defendant in a non-exempt, hourly position during the Class Period.

1 distribution to Participating Class Members is approximately \$726,250.00, yielding an estimated
2 average Individual Class Payment of approximately \$1,393.95 across the 521 Class Members.
3 Because Individual Class Payments are calculated on a pro rata basis according to each Class
4 Member's Qualifying Workweeks, actual payments will vary, and this Settlement is non-
5 reversionary, so any amounts not awarded by the Court for fees, costs, the service award, or
6 administration will increase the Net Settlement Amount.

7 • “Aggrieved Employees” means all non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for
8 Defendant in California at any time between April 8, 2024 through the date on which the Court
9 grants preliminary approval of the Settlement (“PAGA Period”). The Parties have agreed to allocate
10 \$25,000.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount as PAGA penalties, sixty-five percent (65%) or
11 \$16,250.00 of which will be paid to the LWDA, and thirty-five percent (35%) or \$8,750.00 of which
12 will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees.

13 • Aggrieved Employees will be paid their *pro rata* share of the thirty-five percent (35%) of
14 the PAGA Penalties based on the total number of Qualifying Pay Periods.²

15 • Participating Class Members will receive an Individual Settlement Payment, and Aggrieved
16 Employees will receive an Individual PAGA Payment. Individual Settlement Payment and
17 Individual PAGA Payment checks shall remain valid and negotiable for one hundred eighty (180)
18 calendar days. Thereafter, checks shall be canceled, and the funds associated with such checks shall
19 be deemed unpaid, unclaimed, or abandoned cash residue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §
20 384 (“Unpaid Residue”). The Unpaid Residue, with any accrued interest, shall be transmitted by the
21 Settlement Administrator to Legal Aid at Work for use in Contra Costa County, in accordance with
22 Code of Civil Procedure § 384. The Settlement Administrator shall prepare a report regarding the
23 distribution of the Unpaid Residue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 384, which shall be
24 submitted to the Court by Class Counsel along with a proposed amended judgment. Participating
25 Class Members and Aggrieved Employees shall nevertheless be bound by the Settlement and the
26 Final Approval Order regardless of whether their settlement payments are negotiated.

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28 ² “Qualifying Pay Period” means a pay period worked by an Aggrieved Employee during which he or she was employed
by, and worked on one or more days for, Defendant in a non-exempt, hourly position during the PAGA Period.

- 1 • Plaintiff waived all rights under Civil Code § 1542; Class Members did not.

2 **The Settlement was Negotiated at Arms-Length and Not Collusive**

3 15. Here, the Settlement was reached following meaningful arms-length negotiations
4 between experienced counsel, informed by Class Counsel's investigation of the facts and
5 applicable law. Pursuant to *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802, Class
6 Counsel conducted significant investigation and analysis to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
7 of the claims and defenses, including extensive review and expert analysis of a 21%³ sampling of
8 relevant time and payroll records for the Class Members, as well as applicable policies. The Parties
9 participated in a full-day mediation before Tagore Subramaniam, Esq., an experienced neutral
10 mediator specializing in complex labor and employment matters. After extensive negotiations, the
11 mediator issued a proposal, which after careful consideration, was accepted by both Parties and
12 formed the basis of the Settlement. In short, the Settlement reflects a reasonable compromise of
13 disputed claims and is fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of the risks, uncertainties, and
14 expense associated with continued litigation, including the risks of motion practice, class
15 certification, trial, and appeal. Moreover, the Settlement was followed by further discussions and
16 coordination to finalize the terms and conditions of the general settlement parameters.

17 16. Class Counsel recognized the potential risk, expense and complexity posed by
18 further litigation. Moreover, litigating Plaintiff's claims—which involve approximately 521 Class
19 Members—would require substantial preparation and discovery, and ultimately would involve the
20 deposition and presentation of numerous additional witnesses, as well as the consideration,
21 preparation, and analysis of expert reports. Therefore, should litigation have progressed any
22 further, there would have been significant expense incurred by each side (above and beyond the
23 expense already incurred).

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27 ³ A 21% sample is statistically reliable in this context. The putative class consists of approximately 521
28 members. At a 90% confidence level, a sample of 112 class members (21%) yields an approximate margin
of error of 7%, which is reasonable for purposes of evaluating liability and damages exposure at the
settlement stage.

1 **The Settlement Amount is Well Within the Range of Reasonableness**

2 17. The Settlement provides significant recovery to Class Members and Aggrieved
3 Employees and easily falls within the range of reasonableness. Class Counsel understand there
4 were 42,808 Workweeks in the Class Period. To assist the Court in evaluating the fairness and
5 adequacy of the Settlement, Class Counsel set forth below an analysis of the claims addressed at
6 mediation, the maximum realistic potential recovery for each claim, and the defenses asserted by
7 Defendant, consistent with *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.

8 **1. Unpaid Wages for Failure to Pay Off-the-Clock Work**

9 18. Class Counsel theorized at mediation, based on narrative evidence of Plaintiff and
10 Class Members, and documents produced by Defendant, that Defendant failed to pay all wages
11 due to Class Members due to a policy and/or practice of: (1) maintaining a rounding policy that
12 favored Defendant by failing to compensate employees for all time worked; (2) requiring Class
13 Members to perform compensable pre-shift and post-shift work off the clock without pay; and (3)
14 failing to accurately record and compensate employees for all hours worked.

15 19. Class Counsel estimated approximately five (5) minutes of off-the-clock work each
16 shift. There were approximately 216,738 shifts during the Class Period, 13% of which were over
17 eight (8) hours in length, and Class Members had an average regular rate of pay of \$18.17 and an
18 average hourly rate of pay of \$17.85. Thus, **Defendant's exposure for unpaid off-the-clock**
19 **work is \$622,466.87** [overtime (216,738 shifts x 0.13 shifts over eight hours x 0.083 hours x
20 \$18.17 x 1.5 overtime rate) **\$63,738.63** + **\$558,728.24** minimum wage (216,738 shifts x 0.87
21 shifts under eight hours x 0.083 hours x \$17.85 x 2 in liquidated damages)].

22 20. Defendant disputed these allegations, contending that: (1) Class Members were
23 paid for all hours worked and its written policies prohibited off-the-clock work and required
24 employees to accurately record all time worked; (2) any alleged off-the-clock work or
25 uncompensated time was isolated, unauthorized, voluntary, and contrary to company policy; (3)
26 its rounding policy was facially neutral, applied uniformly to both clock-in and clock-out punches,
27 and did not undercompensate employees; (4) Plaintiff's theories regarding rounding, off-the-clock
28 work, and inaccurate timekeeping are speculative and unsupported by competent evidence; and

(5) any determination of liability would require individualized inquiries into whether uncompensated work was performed, the circumstances under which it occurred, whether Defendant knew or should have known of the work, and the amount of uncompensated time, if any. Accordingly, Defendant maintains that it has no liability for unpaid wages and further contends that Plaintiff's damages model materially overstates any potential off-the-clock work allegedly performed by Class Members.

2. Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Meal Periods

21. Class Counsel argued that Defendant's meal period policies were facially non-compliant because they failed to advise employees that meal periods must be duty-free, omitted any reference to premium pay for missed, late, short, or interrupted meal periods, improperly shifted responsibility to employees to schedule their own meal periods, and relied on meal-period waivers that were unenforceable under California law. Class Counsel further contended that Defendant: (1) maintained unlawful meal period rounding practices that disadvantaged Plaintiff and Class Members; (2) inserted or required employees to record synthetic meal-period entries that did not accurately reflect meal periods actually taken; (3) maintained practices that resulted in late, missed, short, interrupted, and second meal period violations; and (4) failed to pay meal-period premiums despite widespread violations reflected in Defendant's own timekeeping records.

22. Class Counsel estimated, that 149,101 of the 180,299 (83%) eligible shifts during the Class Period had unique meal break violations. Notably, Defendant issued no meal period premiums throughout the Class Period. Thus, one conservative calculation advanced at mediation by Class Counsel resulted in Defendant's exposure for non-compliant meal periods in an amount of **\$2,709,165.17** (149,101 x \$18.17/hour).

23. Defendant asserted that it maintained legally compliant meal policies and practices throughout the Class Period, including lawful meal-period waivers where applicable; that its meal period records accurately reflected actual meal periods taken and any rounding practices complied with California law; that employees were provided timely, uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods and any alleged missed, late, short, interrupted, or second meal period violations were isolated, voluntary, waived where permitted by law, or contrary to Defendant's policies; that no meal-

1 period premiums were owed because no violations occurred; and that Plaintiff's meal period
2 theories would require individualized inquiries into each employee's meal periods, any applicable
3 waivers, the circumstances of any alleged violation, and whether premium pay was owed,
4 rendering the claims unsuitable for class treatment or a manageable trial. Accordingly, Defendant
5 maintains that it has no liability for meal-period violations and further contends that Class
6 Counsel's damages model substantially overstates any potential exposure.

7 **3. Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Rest Periods**

8 24. Class Counsel theorized that Defendant's rest period policies throughout the Class
9 Period were facially non-compliant because they failed to advise that rest periods are duty-free,
10 and omitted any reference to premium pay for missed, late, short, or interrupted rest periods. Class
11 Counsel further contended that Defendant's own timekeeping records demonstrated systemic rest
12 period violations, including widespread first, second, and third rest period violations; that Plaintiff
13 and Class Members were not authorized and permitted to take compliant rest periods in practice;
14 and that Defendant failed to pay a single rest-period premium despite the pervasive nature of the
15 violations reflected in its records.

16 25. Based on these contentions, one damages calculation performed by Class Counsel
17 at mediation—assuming a conservative 20% violation rate for rest-eligible shifts—
18 estimated **Defendant's potential exposure for failure to provide compliant rest periods at**
19 **\$783,573.98** (215,623 shifts × 0.20 × \$18.17 per hour).

20 26. Defendant denied these allegations and asserted that: (1) it maintained legally
21 compliant rest period policies and practices throughout the Class Period; (2) Class Members were
22 authorized and permitted to take compliant, duty-free rest periods, and its records accurately
23 reflected employee timekeeping; (3) any alleged missed, late, short, or interrupted rest periods
24 were isolated, voluntary, or contrary to Defendant's policies and did not entitle employees to
25 premium pay; and (4) Plaintiff's rest-period claims would require individualized inquiries into
26 whether any violation occurred, the circumstances surrounding any alleged violation, and whether
27 premium pay was owed, rendering the claims unsuitable for class treatment or a manageable trial.
28 Accordingly, Defendant maintains that it has no liability for rest-period violations and further

1 contends that Class Counsel’s damages model substantially overstates any potential exposure.

2 **4. Wage Statement Violations**

3 27. Defendant’s alleged failure to pay all wages owed—including meal and rest period
4 premium wages—had a derivative impact on the accuracy of wage statements under Labor Code
5 § 226. Under Labor Code § 226, subdivision (e), a non-exempt employee who suffers injury as a
6 result of a knowing and intentional failure to comply with subdivision (a) may recover the greater
7 of actual damages or statutory penalties of fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a
8 violation occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) for each subsequent pay period, subject to a
9 \$4,000 cap per employee. Because penalties under section 226, subdivision (e) are subject to a
10 one-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a)), Class Counsel limited this claim
11 to the pay periods falling within the applicable one-year limitations period, which corresponds to
12 the PAGA Period.

13 28. Assuming, as alleged, that Class Members worked off the clock and that no
14 premiums were paid, each wage statement issued during that period would be non-compliant, and
15 Defendant’s maximum potential exposure for wage-statement penalties was estimated at \$921,400
16 (9,214 pay periods × \$100 per pay period).

17 29. Defendant contends (1) that the wage statements issued to Class Members fully
18 complied with Labor Code § 226, and (2) because wages were paid, no derivative penalties are
19 recoverable. Class Counsel also considered the risks inherent in this claim, including the
20 possibility that the underlying wage-and-hour claims might not be certified, that a court could find
21 no cognizable injury even if inaccuracies existed, or that Defendant’s conduct was not “knowing
22 and intentional”—each of which is required. The foregoing calculation does not account for the
23 reduced \$50 penalty applicable to initial violations or the fact that not all Class Members worked
24 during every pay period, and therefore may not qualify for the statutory maximum penalty.

25 **5. Failure to Reimburse for Business Expenses**

26 30. Class Counsel contended that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiff and Class
27 Members for necessary business expenses incurred in the course of their employment.
28 Specifically, Class Counsel argued that Plaintiff and Class Members were required to purchase

1 mandatory, non-slip work boots at their own expense and to use their personal cellular phones for
2 work-related purposes, including communicating with managers regarding production issues,
3 scheduling, work assignments, and other job-related matters, without reimbursement.

4 31. Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel estimated **Defendant's**
5 **potential exposure for unreimbursed non-slip work boots at \$428,080.00** (\$10.00 per
6 workweek × 42,808 workweeks) **and for unreimbursed cell phone expenses at**
7 **\$214,040.00** (\$5.00 per workweek × 42,808 workweeks), for a total estimated exposure
8 of **\$642,120.00** for failure to reimburse business expenses. The per-workweek figure for the non-
9 slip work boots reflects Class Counsel's assumption that each pair costs approximately \$120.00
10 and lasts approximately twelve (12) weeks, yielding an estimated cost of \$10.00 per workweek.

11 32. Defendant denied these allegations, asserting: (1) Plaintiff and Class Members were
12 reimbursed for all necessary business expenses as required by law and Defendant's policies; (2)
13 employees were not required to purchase any unreimbursed equipment or use personal cellular
14 phones for work-related purposes; and (3) any reimbursement claims would require individualized
15 inquiries into whether an expense was actually incurred, whether it was necessary for the
16 performance of job duties, whether Defendant knew of the expense, and whether reimbursement
17 was requested, rendering the claims unsuitable for class treatment or a manageable trial.
18 Accordingly, Defendant maintains that it has no liability for unreimbursed business expenses.

19 6. Waiting Time Penalties

20 33. Based on Defendant's documents, Class Counsel theorized that Defendant was
21 liable for waiting-time penalties under Labor Code section 203 based on both direct and derivative
22 violations. Class Counsel contended that Defendant failed to timely pay all wages due upon
23 separation. In addition, because Defendant allegedly failed to pay all wages earned during
24 employment—including off-the-clock wages and meal and rest period premiums—Class Counsel
25 further contended that Defendant necessarily failed to pay all wages due at termination, giving
26 rise to derivative waiting-time penalties.

27 34. Using a full 30-day penalty at an average regular rate of pay of \$18.17 for eight
28 hours per day, one damages calculation performed by Class Counsel at mediation

1 estimated Defendant's maximum potential exposure for waiting-time penalties at
2 \$1,277,714.40 (293 separated Class Members × \$18.17 per hour × 8 hours × 30 days).

3 35. Defendant argued that: (1) Plaintiff's underlying wage-and-hour theories—
4 including the alleged off-the-clock, meal period, and rest period violations—lack merit and
5 therefore cannot support derivative waiting-time penalties; (2) all wages due at separation were
6 timely paid; (3) any failure to timely pay wages was the result of a good-faith dispute and therefore
7 was not “willful” within the meaning of Labor Code section 203; and (4) any waiting-time penalty
8 claim would require individualized inquiries into each employee's separation, wages allegedly
9 owed, and the circumstances of the final payment. Accordingly, Defendant maintains that no
10 waiting-time penalties are recoverable.

11 7. Additional Released Class Claims

12 36. Class Counsel also evaluated potential claims under Labor Code sections 96, 98.6,
13 210, 212–213, 221, 223, 226.3, 227.3, 232, 232.5, 245 *et seq.*, 432 *et seq.*, 558, 1102.5, 1174,
14 1174.5, 1182.12, 1197.1, 1197.5, 1198.5, 2810.3, 2810.5, 3366, 6401 *et seq.*, 6432, and 8397.4,
15 as well as California Business and Professions Code sections 16600 *et seq.*, 16700 *et seq.*, and
16 17200 *et seq.*, California Government Code section 12952, and the applicable Industrial Welfare
17 Commission Wage Order provisions. While that investigation did not identify evidence of
18 systemic, classwide violations, because these statutory theories could plausibly have been
19 asserted, the Settlement includes them to provide comprehensive finality as to all claims that were
20 asserted or reasonably could have been asserted in this Action, without increasing the settlement
21 consideration or reducing Class Members' recovery.

22 8. PAGA Penalties

23 37. There were approximately 9,214 pay periods and 322 Aggrieved Employees during
24 the PAGA Period. Plaintiff's claims under PAGA are similar to the claims described above. PAGA
25 provides for civil penalties for initial violations and higher penalties for subsequent violations.
26 Defendant contends only initial-violation penalties apply. Thus, because Class Counsel's
27 investigation and discovery did not establish that Defendant was ever previously cited or
28 otherwise formally notified of violations of the Labor Code provisions alleged in the PAGA

1 Notice and claims, Class Counsel adjusted the PAGA exposure model to apply only initial-
2 violation penalties. Class Counsel believes it is reasonable and appropriate to estimate
3 Defendant's maximum potential exposure for PAGA penalties as follows:

4 38. Overtime Violations: Applying the initial-violation rate to all pay periods, and
5 assuming a violation in every pay period during the PAGA Period, Class Counsel calculated a
6 maximum potential exposure of \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

7 39. Minimum Wage Violations: Using the initial-violation rate, and assuming a
8 violation in every pay period during the PAGA Period, Class Counsel calculated a maximum
9 potential exposure of \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

10 40. Meal Period Violations: Using the initial-violation rate and assuming a violation
11 in every pay period during the PAGA Period, Class Counsel calculated a maximum potential
12 exposure of \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

13 41. Rest Period Violations: Using the initial-violation rate and assuming a violation in
14 every pay period during the PAGA Period, Class Counsel calculated a maximum potential
15 exposure of \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

16 42. Waiting Time Penalties: Defendant's data reflect that approximately 113 Aggrieved
17 Employees separated during the PAGA Period. Class Counsel calculated a maximum potential
18 exposure of \$11,300 (113 Aggrieved Employees × \$100).

19 43. Wage Statement Violations: Using the initial-violation rate and assuming a
20 violation in every pay period during the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of
21 \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

22 44. Failure to Reimburse Work Expenses: Using the initial-violation rate and assuming
23 a violation in every pay period during the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of
24 \$921,400 (9,214 pay periods × \$100).

25 45. Class Counsel also evaluated Labor Code §§ 96, 98.6, 98.7, 1102.5, 1174, 1174.5,
26 1198.5, 232, 232.5, 432 *et seq.*, 6401 *et seq.*, 6432, 3366, and 8397.4, and California Business and
27 Professions Code sections 16600 *et seq.*, 16700 *et seq.*, and 17200 *et seq.*, as well as Government
28 Code section 12952 and the applicable Wage Order provisions. That investigation did not identify

1 evidence supporting systemic, classwide violations warranting additional PAGA penalties beyond
2 the theories addressed above. Nevertheless, because these statutory theories could have been
3 asserted or further developed from the same factual nucleus, the Settlement includes them in the
4 PAGA Release to provide comprehensive finality as to all PAGA civil-penalty claims that were
5 asserted or reasonably could have been asserted based on the facts alleged in the Operative
6 Complaint and/or PAGA Notice, without increasing the settlement consideration.

7 46. In sum, Class Counsel estimated a total maximum exposure for PAGA violations
8 (assuming a 100% violation rate every pay period and no reduction of any penalties) to be
9 \$5,539,700.

10 47. Defendant contends that no PAGA penalties are likely to be awarded and, even if
11 they were, the maximum exposure calculated is vastly overstated. Defendant argues that PAGA
12 penalties cannot and should not be stacked. Second, Defendant asserts that individualized issues
13 predominate the PAGA claims, making the claims unmanageable for trial. Third, Defendant
14 denies that a violation for each pay period can be established. Fourth, Defendant contends that a
15 Court is unlikely to award civil penalties under PAGA where, as here, there is no conduct shown
16 by Plaintiff that would show any "knowing" or "intentional" misconduct.

17 48. Class Counsel maintain that it is possible to recover the subsequent-violation rate
18 for penalties, that stacking is permissible, and that there is no manageability requirement under
19 PAGA. Class Counsel believe a 90% discount of this claim to be reasonable, resulting in a
20 valuation of \$553,970 as a reasonable estimate of the likelihood of what Plaintiff may recover at
21 trial for PAGA penalties ($\$5,539,700 \times .10$).⁴

22 MAXIMUM EXPOSURE

23 49. When including derivative penalties and discretionary PAGA penalties, Class
24 Counsel theorized Defendant's maximum exposure to be approximately **\$12,496,140.42**. In all,

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26 ⁴ The allocation of \$25,000.00 to resolve the PAGA claims is fair and reasonable. PAGA penalties are
27 discretionary, subject to reduction, and intended primarily to vindicate the State's interests rather than provide
28 full compensatory relief. (*Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.* (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77.) In light of risks of
continued litigation, the relatively limited PAGA exposure, and the fact that Aggrieved Employees also
recover through the class settlement, the agreed-upon allocation reflects a reasonable compromise that
adequately serves PAGA's enforcement and deterrent purposes.

1 Class Counsel obtained a Gross Settlement Amount of **\$1,225,000**, which is nearly 10% of
2 Defendant's maximum exposure. In light of the obstacles to class certification, risks related to
3 liability, issues with manageability at trial, the discretionary nature of PAGA penalties, and the
4 case law regarding fair, reasonable, and adequate settlements, the Settlement is fair, reasonable,
5 adequate, and in the best interest of Class Members.

6 **The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs are Reasonable**

7 50. Class Counsel seek attorneys' fees of up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
8 Settlement Amount, which would amount to \$428,750.00. Class Counsel also seek reimbursement
9 of costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. The requested fees fall well within the historical range of
10 attorney's fees awards under the common fund theory, which is generally from 25% to 50%. The
11 requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive and time-consuming
12 litigation on a contingent fee basis.

13 51. Thus, the Court should preliminarily approve the requested attorneys' fees and
14 costs, which are justified by the results achieved, the complexity of the issues, the difficulty of the
15 case and the great risks undertaken by Class Counsel. The requested attorneys' fees will not be
16 opposed by Defendant and are well within established guidelines.

17 **The Requested Enhancement Award to the Class Representative Is Reasonable**

18 52. Plaintiff is entitled to an enhanced award for her service as class representative, for
19 answering extensive questions by Class Counsel, for being available and answering questions
20 during mediation, for the risks in being the named plaintiff, and for providing Defendant with a
21 more expansive release of claims, including a waiver based upon California Civil Code section
22 1542, in exchange for the enhancement award. Plaintiff risked intrusive discovery and the payment
23 of employer costs. Class Counsel seek an enhancement of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff for her service.

24 53. In the experience of Class Counsel, the typical enhancement award in wage and
25 hour class actions ranges from approximately \$5,000.00 to \$15,000.00, although some awards are
26 higher. Thus, the extremely limited enhancement of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff, for her service, is
27 reasonable.

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1 Counsel in this matter consists of experienced class action attorneys, has been appointed as class
2 counsel in other class actions, and has a successful “track record” in litigating class actions.

3 7. Superiority of Class

4 60. With at least 521 Class Members, a class action allows claims of many individuals
5 to be resolved at the same time, eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and affords small
6 claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which otherwise would be too insufficient
7 to warrant individual litigation.

8 Class Counsel are Experienced Class Action Litigators

9 61. Class Counsel is an experienced class action attorney, has been appointed as class
10 counsel in other class actions, and has a successful track record in litigating class actions.

11 62. I graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree from Indiana University in 2015.

12 63. I received my juris doctor from Michigan State University College of Law in 2019.

13 64. I was admitted to practice law in the State of California in December 2019 and have
14 continuously practiced as a plaintiff-side attorney since that time.

15 65. For several years, I practiced at Clarkson Law Firm, P.C., a well-known plaintiff-
16 side boutique with a national practice devoted to complex class action litigation. While at
17 Clarkson, my practice focused almost exclusively on representing plaintiffs in class actions.

18 66. In that role, I managed and litigated a substantial caseload of class actions,
19 participated in numerous mediations and high-stakes settlement negotiations, drafted and opposed
20 dispositive and class-related motions—including motions for class certification, motions for
21 summary judgment, and motions to dismiss—argued motions before state and federal courts,
22 conducted written discovery, and took and defended both fact and expert depositions.

23 67. I also practiced as an attorney at Bibiyan Law Group, P.C. for over a year, where
24 my practice was devoted exclusively to representing plaintiffs, with a primary focus on wage-and-
25 hour class and representative actions. In that role, I litigated and managed dozens of wage-and-
26 hour class actions at various procedural stages, including case evaluation, pleading, discovery,
27 class certification, mediation, and settlement. I also managed a team of five (5) lawyers.

28 68. In August 2025, I co-founded Zaghi & Chrzan, LLP, a plaintiff-side litigation firm

1 dedicated to representing employees in complex disputes against employers, with a particular
2 focus on wage and hour class and representative actions.

3 69. My firm has the experience, resources, and means necessary to allow us to provide
4 adequate representation as Class Counsel to all class members in this litigation.

5 70. I have served as Class Counsel for numerous class actions filed in state and federal
6 courts in California and have been appointed Class Counsel by the Superior Court of California
7 in the past for purposes of certifying a class. In other cases, I have served in the capacity of Class
8 Counsel throughout the litigation, including investigation, discovery, mediation, motion practice,
9 and settlement stages. Examples of actions in which I have supervised, served as, or been
10 appointed Class Counsel include, without limitation:

- 11 • *Garcia v. United Site Services of California, Inc.*, Case No. 2:23-CV-03019-MRA-SK,
12 United States District Court for the Central District of California, Honorable Mónica
13 Ramírez Almadani, presiding.
- 14 • *Brooks v. Atlas Disposal*, Case No. 25CV004770, California Superior Court, County
15 of Sacramento, Honorable Lauri A. Damrell, presiding.
- 16 • *Hightree v. Amplify Ltd.*, Case No. 20CV01532, California Superior Court, County of
17 Santa Barbara, Honorable Thomas P. Anderle, presiding.
- 18 • *Hezi, et al. v. Celsius Holdings Inc.*, Case No. 1:21-CV-9892-JHR, United States
19 District Court for the Southern District of New York, Honorable Jennifer H. Rearden,
20 presiding.
- 21 • *Chan v. Panera.*, Case No. 23STCV09024, California Superior Court, County of Los
22 Angeles, Honorable William F. Highberger, presiding.
- 23 • *Arnett v. Traditions Health LLC, et al.*, Case No. CVRI2305219, Riverside Superior
24 Court, Honorable Harold W. Hopp, presiding.
- 25 • *Easton v. Sunset Tower Management, LLC, et al.*, Case No. 22STCV34112, Los
26 Angeles Superior Court, Honorable Laura A. Seigle, presiding.
- 27 • *Kim v. Barefoot Dreams, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 23STCV03111, California Superior
28 Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Judge Theresa M. Traber, presiding.

1 • *Rigsby v. Reyes Coca-Cola Bottling, LLC.*, Case No. 23CV010356, California Superior
2 Court, County of Sacramento, Honorable Lauri A. Damrell, presiding.

3 71. Currently, my firm is acting as counsel in dozens of other wage and hour class
4 actions and representative PAGA actions.

5 72. After a thorough investigation and settlement discussions, Class Counsel arrived at
6 terms that they viewed was in the best interest of both the class members and the parties.

7 73. Should the Court refuse to grant preliminary approval of this Settlement, many of
8 the Class Members may be denied any recourse for Defendant's alleged violations.

9 74. For these reasons, as well as the reasons provided in the declarations concurrently
10 filed, Class Counsel are sufficiently experienced and qualified to evaluate the class members'
11 claims and viability of Defendant's defenses.

12 75. As further set out in the declarations concurrently filed, the settlement presented
13 here only resulted after having engaged in extensive informal and formal discovery and
14 investigation, and is the product of extensive arm's-length negotiations.

15 76. I believe, based on my experience as class counsel, that the Settlement is fair,
16 reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of class members.

17 77. The parties have agreed to use Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions
18 ("Phoenix"), an experienced Settlement Administrator, to administer the settlement.

19 78. Class Counsel have no interest in or conflict with the settlement administrator,
20 Phoenix.

21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the
22 foregoing is true and correct this July 10, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

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/s/ Zachary T. Chrzan
Zachary T. Chrzan