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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

CARL DAVIS, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOMETOWN AMERICA MANAGEMENT,
L.P., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 34-2022-00327467-CU-OE-GDS

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Lauri A.
Damrell, Dept. 22]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed with the Declaration of Justin F.
Marquez, Declaration of Carl Davis, and
Proposed Order]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: February 16, 2024

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept: 22

Reservation No.: A-327467-001

Complaint filed: September 29, 2022

FAC filed: January 17, 2023

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 16, 2024 at 9:00 a.m., in Department 28 of the
3 Sacramento Superior Court, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento, California 95814, pursuant to
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Carl Davis
5 will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action
6 settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Hometown America Management, L.P. (“Defendant”).
7 Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA
9 Settlement and Release and Class Notice;
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Carl Davis as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
13 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Justin F. Marquez, Christina M. Le, and Arsiné
14 Grigoryan of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
15 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
16 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

17 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
18 authorities, the Declarations of Justin F. Marquez and Carl Davis, filed concurrently herewith, the
19 records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may
20 properly receive at or before the hearing.

21 Respectfully submitted,

22 Dated: January 24, 2024

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

23 By: 
24 Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
25 Christina M. Le, Esq.
26 Arsiné Grigoryan, Esq.
27 Attorneys for Plaintiff
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	iv
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A. Plaintiff’s Claims	1
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C. Settlement Negotiations	2
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	3
III. DISCUSSION	7
A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	8
1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	8
2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	9
3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	10
B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	10
C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	10
1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	10
2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	11
3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	12
4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	12
D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable.....	13
IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	15

1	A. Legal Standard	15
2	B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
3	Settlement Purposes.	15
4	1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous	15
5	2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate.....	16
6	3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class.....	17
7	4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement	17
8	5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	17
9	V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	18
10	A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	18
11	B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative	18
12	VI. CONCLUSION	19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> , (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	16
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> , (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	18
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	12
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> , (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105	11
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> , (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27.....	17
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> , (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	16
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> , (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	16
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> , (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	11
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> , (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695	15
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....	7
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> , (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443	13
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> , (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	7
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> , (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480	11
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429	15
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> , (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	7
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> , (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442.....	17

1	<i>Miller v. Woods,</i>	
2	(1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862.....	17
3	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,</i>	
4	(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399.....	7, 13
5	<i>Quinn v. State of California,</i>	
6	(1995) 15 Cal.3d 162	11
7	<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.,</i>	
8	(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462	15
9	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward,</i>	
10	(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926.....	16
11	<i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>	
12	(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25	11
13	<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct,</i>	
14	. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	8
15	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.,</i>	
16	(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	9
17	<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.,</i>	
18	(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952.....	16
19		
20	<u>FEDERAL CASES</u>	
21	<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.,</i>	
22	(W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	14
23	<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.,</i>	
24	(9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510.....	18
25	<i>Priddy v. Edelman,</i>	
26	(6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438.....	8
27	<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.,</i>	
28	(9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948.....	13
	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company,</i>	
	(N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	12
	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,</i>	
	(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759.....	11
	<u>STATE STATUTES</u>	
	Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	15, 16

1	Labor Code § 1194	12
2	Labor Code § 90.5	13
3	<u>RULES</u>	
4	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	18
5	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	10
6	<u>TREATISES</u>	
7	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.).....	8, 11, 18
8	<u>OTHER SOURCES</u>	
9	Eisenberg & Miller, <i>Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study</i> ,	
10	(2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303	14

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Carl Davis (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$495,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Hometown America Management, L.P. (“Defendant”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 189 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Hon. Raul A. Ramirez (Ret.), over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement on November 14, 2023. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is a nationwide company that owns and manages several mobile home parks in the State of California. (Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Marquez Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil

1 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

2 On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
3 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204,
4 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3)
5 failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and
6 permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at
7 termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
8 (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802);
9 and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.) On January 17,
10 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for civil
11 penalties under Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) Plaintiff
12 sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
13 (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§
14 2699, *et seq.*) on September 28, 2022. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 4.)

15 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

16 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
17 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class
18 members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices
19 during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former
20 employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

21 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
22 analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
23 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
24 Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also
25 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
26 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

27 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

28 On July 6, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class

1 action mediator, Hon. Raul A. Ramirez (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via
2 Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
3 professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore
4 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
5 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
6 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and
7 Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement the material terms of which are
8 encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 [Joint Stipulation of Class Action and
9 PAGA Settlement and Release Between Plaintiff and Defendant].)

10 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
11 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
12 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
13 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
14 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
15 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

16 Indeed, the \$495,000.00 Settlement represents **61% of the realistic maximum recovery**
17 **of \$812,127.35.** (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's maximum
18 potential liability for all claims was approximately \$4 million, when the risk of prevailing at
19 certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's
20 realistic exposure was \$812,127.35, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery.
21 (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at
22 trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed, because of the proposed
23 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
24 unfavorable judgment.

25 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

26 The Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release Between
27 Plaintiff and Defendant is attached to the Marquez Declaration in Support of the Motion for
28 Preliminary Approval as **Exhibit 1**. The Settlement's key terms include:

1 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
2 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed
3 by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt employee from April 4, 2018 through
4 preliminary approval of the Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 5.)

5 2. Class Period: “from April 4, 2018 through the date the Court preliminarily approves
6 of the Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 4.)

7 3. Participating Class Members: “The Settlement Class, however, shall not include any
8 person who previously settled or released the claims covered by this Settlement, or any person who
9 previously was paid or received awards through civil or administrative actions for the claims
10 covered by this Settlement, or any person who submitted a timely and valid Request for Exclusion
11 as provided in this Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 5.)

12 4. Aggrieved Employees: “All Class Members who worked any hours for Defendant
13 in California during any pay period from April 4, 2021 through the date the Court preliminarily
14 approves the Settlement are aggrieved employees with respect to PAGA (“PAGA Members”), and
15 will be paid their PAGA Award and release the Released PAGA Claims (defined below), regardless
16 of whether they submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.”
17 (Settlement, ¶ 6.)

18 5. Gross Settlement Amount: “The total payment under the Settlement is \$495,000.00
19 (the “Maximum Settlement Amount”), which includes all payments to Class Members and PAGA
20 Members, Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees, Class Counsel’s litigation expenses and costs, the
21 enhancement award to the class representative, penalties of any nature, including PAGA penalties,
22 and settlement administration expenses.” (Settlement, ¶ 14.)

23 6. Uncashed Checks: “Any residue from uncashed Settlement Award or PAGA Award
24 checks after the expiration date will be paid within fourteen (14) calendar days after the one
25 hundred twenty (120) day check cashing period expires pursuant to California Code of Civil
26 Procedure section 384(b)(93) to Koinonia Family Services, a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization with
27 child advocacy programs in the State of California, as the *cy pres* recipient, subject to Court
28 approval.” (Settlement, ¶ 21.)

1 7. Release: “Effective upon the date of final approval by the Court of this Stipulation
2 of the Settlement, and except as to such rights or claims as may be created by this Stipulation of
3 Settlement, the Settlement Class and each member of the Settlement Class who has not submitted
4 a valid Request for Exclusion fully release and discharge the Released Parties from all claims under
5 state, federal and local law that were or could have been asserted based on the facts and allegations
6 made in the Action, and any amendments thereto, as to the Class Members, including without
7 limitation, California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, 226.7,
8 510, 512, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2698, *et seq.*, 2699, 2802, California
9 Industrial Commission Wage Orders, Cal. Code Regs., Title 8, section 11040, *et seq.*, California
10 Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et*
11 *seq.*, and including all claims for or related to alleged unpaid wages, overtime or double time
12 wages, minimum wages, regular rate of pay, timely payment of wages during employment, timely
13 payment of wages at separation, meal periods and meal period premiums, rest periods and rest
14 period premiums, off-the-clock work, payroll deductions, wage statements, payroll records and
15 recordkeeping, failure to pay additional 401(k) benefits and/or deferred compensation benefits
16 and/pr matching benefits for payments received under the Settlement, unfair competition, unfair
17 business practices, unlawful business practices, fraudulent business practices, conversion, class
18 actions, representative actions, aggrieved party claims, injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
19 accounting, punitive damages, liquidated damages, penalties of any nature (including but not
20 limited to civil penalties, waiting-time penalties, and PAGA penalties), interest, fees, costs, as well
21 as all other claims and allegations alleged in the Action (collectively “Released Class Claims”),
22 from April 4, 2018 through the date the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement (“Class
23 Release Period”). Expressly excluded from the release are claims for retaliation, discrimination,
24 unemployment insurance, disability, workers’ compensation, and claims outside the Released
25 Claims.” (Settlement, ¶ 24.)

26 8. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$30,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
27 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$22,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
28 (\$7,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, ¶ 15(b)(ii).) Class Counsel

submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Marquez Decl., ¶ 10.)

9. Net Settlement Amount: “The “Net Settlement Amount”, the amount available for potential distribution to Class Members, shall be calculated by deducting from the Maximum Settlement Amount: (i) Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses and costs; (ii) the enhancement award to the class representative; (iii) the PAGA penalty payment to the LWDA as described further below; and (iv) settlement administration expenses.” (Settlement, ¶ 15(c).)

10. Tax Allocation: “The Parties have agreed, based on the allegations in the Action, that individual Settlement Awards payable to eligible Class Members will be allocated from the Net Settlement Amount and paid as follows: one-third (1/3) will be allocated to alleged unpaid wages for which IRS Forms W-2 will be issued; two-thirds (2/3) will be allocated to alleged unpaid interest and penalties for which IRS Forms 1099-MISC will be issued.” (Settlement, ¶ 15(c)(iii).)

11. Class Representative Service Award: “The Enhancement Award paid to the Class Representative cannot exceed \$10,000.00, is subject to Court approval, and is in addition to any claimed individual Settlement Award or PAGA Award to which the Class Representative is entitled under this Stipulation of Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 15(c)(vi).) “Should the Court approve an Enhancement Award to the Class Representative in an amount less than that set forth above, the difference between the lesser amount approved by the Court and the Enhancement Award set forth above shall be added to the Net Settlement Amount.” (Settlement, ¶ 15(c)(vi).)

12. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: “In consideration for settling this Action, in exchange for the release of claims by the Settlement Class, and subject to final approval or modification by the Court, Defendant agrees to pay, from the Maximum Settlement Amount, Class Counsel attorneys’ fees not to exceed thirty-three and one third percent (33.33%) of the Maximum Settlement Amount, or in other words up to \$165,000.00, and attorneys’ costs and expenses not to exceed \$20,000.00” (Settlement, ¶ 17.)

13. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations

are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 19.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Marquez Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

///

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, Hon. Raul A. Ramirez, (Ret.). (Marquez Decl. ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages

1 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
2 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
3 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
4 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

5 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
6 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 46-57.) Again, this supports the position that the
7 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
8 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
9 action.

10 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 11 **Respective Legal Positions**

12 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
13 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
14 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
15 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
16 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
17 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
18 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

19 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
20 (Marquez Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
21 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
22 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
23 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

24 The proposed settlement of \$495,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
25 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed
26 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
27 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
28 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability

1 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$495,000.00 is within
2 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
3 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
4 ***\$1,349.21.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

5 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

6 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
7 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
8 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 46-57.) Although
9 Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation, they support
10 the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

11 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

12 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
13 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
14 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
15 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
16 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
17 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

18 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

19 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
20 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$165,000.00, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
21 Settlement Amount, and up to \$20,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
22 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

23 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”** 24 **Method**

25 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
26 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
27 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
28 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs

1 may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
2 quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

3 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/ common
4 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
5 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
6 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
7 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in
8 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
9 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
10 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
11 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
12 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

13 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
14 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
15 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
16 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
17 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
18 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
19 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
20 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
21 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
22 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

23 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

24 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
25 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
26 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
27 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
28 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)

Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys' fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 44-45.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Marquez

Decl., ¶¶ 46-57.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions”) Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for

1 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
2 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
4 a Service Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
5 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff
6 devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel
7 very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class
8 Counsel during the mediation. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 35-39.) This amount is reasonable particularly
9 in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*) Indeed, in *Karl*
10 *Adams, III, et al. v. MarketStar Corporation, et al.*, No. 2:14-cv-02509-TLN-DB, Class Counsel
11 Justin F. Marquez helped negotiate a \$2.5 million class action settlement for 339 class members,
12 and the court approved a \$25,000 class representative incentive award for each named plaintiff.
13 (*Id.* at ¶ 39.)

14 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
15 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
16 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
17 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
18 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
19 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
20 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
21 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
22 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
23 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
24 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
25 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

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1 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

2 **A. Legal Standard**

3 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
4 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
5 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
6 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
7 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
8 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
9 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
10 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
11 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
12 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
13 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
14 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
15 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
16 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
17 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

18 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
19 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
20 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
21 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
22 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond,*
23 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

24 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
25 **Settlement Purposes.**

26 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

27 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
28 approximately 189 employees of Defendant.

1 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
2 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
3 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
4 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
5 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

6 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
7 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
8 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
9 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
10 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
11 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
12 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
13 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
14 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

15 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

16 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
17 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
18 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
19 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
20 Cal.App.3d 605.)

21 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
22 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
23 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
24 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
25 overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
26 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
27 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
28 compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified

1 class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for,
2 the same alleged injuries.

3 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

4 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
5 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
6 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
7 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
8 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
9 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
10 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
11 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
12 such, she alleges that she was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
13 employees.

14 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

15 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
16 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
17 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
18 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

19 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
20 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
21 previously settled. (Marquez Decl., ¶¶ 46-57.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
22 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
23 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
24 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing her dedication. Plaintiff's
25 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing about the
26 best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

27 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

28 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class

1 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
2 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
3 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
4 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
5 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
6 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
7 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
8 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
9 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

10 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

11 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

12 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
13 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
14 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
15 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
16 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
17 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
18 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided
19 by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

20 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

21 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
22 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
23 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
24 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
25 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

26 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
27 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
28 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It

1 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
2 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
3 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
4 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
5 combined settlement-certification class notice.

6 **VI. CONCLUSION**

7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
8 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing on March 25, 2024.

9 Respectfully submitted,

10 Dated: January 24, 2024

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

11 By: Christina M. Le

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12 Christina M. Le, Esq.

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14 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

Carl Davis v. Hometown America Management, L.P., et al.
34-2022-00327467-CU-OE-GDS

I, Sandy S. Sespene, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is ssespene@wilshirelawfirm.com.

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(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

Executed on January 24, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.


Sandy S. Sespene