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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

OSCAR MEJORADO, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAINBOW SANDALS, INC.; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2022-01283098-CU-OE-CXC

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Melissa
R. McCormick, Dept. CX-105]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed with the Declaration of Benjamin H.
Haber, Declaration of Oscar Mejorado, and
Proposed Order]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: September 4, 2025

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Dept: CX-105

Court Reservation No. 74611574

Complaint filed: September 28, 2022

FAC filed: December 15, 2022

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 4, 2025 at 2:00 p.m., in Department CX-105
3 of the Orange County Superior Court, located at 751 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, Santa Ana,
4 California 92701, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769
5 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Oscar Mejorado (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting
6 preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant
7 Rainbow Sandals, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:


- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
9 and Class Notice;
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes only;
11 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Oscar Mejorado as Class Representative for settlement purposes
13 only;
14 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber and Daniel J. Kramer of Wilshire
15 Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes only;
16 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

18 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
19 authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber and Oscar Mejorado, filed concurrently
20 herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the
21 Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: July 17, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

24 By: 
25 Benjamin H. Haber
26 Daniel J. Kramer

27 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Oscar Meorado (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$250,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class and representative action settlement with Defendant Rainbow Sandals, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 127 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement that was finalized and fully executed in March 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes only, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is a footwear manufacturer who makes 2,000,000 pairs of sandals per year with a reputation of making quality and comfortable sandals. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based

1 on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage
2 statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
3 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.) Defendant denies all allegations.

4 On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint
5 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204,
6 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3)
7 failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and
8 permit rest periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination
9 (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code
10 § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair
11 business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.). On September 29, 2022,
12 Plaintiff sent notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
13 (“LWDA”) alleging similar violations pursuant to the PAGA. On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff
14 filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for civil penalties under
15 PAGA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.)

16 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

17 Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information
18 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sampling of time and pay records for
19 putative class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and
20 practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and
21 former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

22 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
23 analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class
24 Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and
25 Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also
26 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)
27 Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

28 ///

1 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

2 On September 26, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced
3 class action mediator Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted
4 via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
5 professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore
6 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
7 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
8 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and
9 Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement the material terms of which are
10 encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 2 [Class Action and PAGA Settlement
11 Agreement and Class Notice].)

12 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
13 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
14 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
15 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
16 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
17 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

18 Indeed, the \$250,000.00 Settlement represents **46%** of **the realistic maximum recovery**
19 of \$545,183.00. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s maximum
20 potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3.1 million, when the risk of prevailing at
21 certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant’s
22 realistic exposure was \$545,183.00, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery.
23 (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at
24 trial, this is a great result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement,
25 class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable
26 judgment.

27 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

28 The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA

Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all hourly-paid or non-exempt employees employed by Defendant in California who worked for Defendant at any time during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “means the period from April 3, 2018 to December 31, 2023.” (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.34.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: “means an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee employed by Defendant in California who worked for Defendant at any time during the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. PAGA Period: “means the period from April 3, 2021 to December 31, 2023.” (Settlement, § 1.30.)

6. Gross Settlement Amount: “means the amount of \$250,000.00 which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement, subject to Paragraph 8. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administration Expenses Payment.” (Settlement, § 1.21.)

7. Uncashed Checks: “For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b).” (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members: “As of the Effective Date, Plaintiff and all Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective past, present, and future

1 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, and each and all
2 of them, shall fully and finally release and discharge the Released Parties, and each and all of them,
3 from the Class Released Claims, as defined herein. The Class Released Claims include all claims,
4 debts, liabilities, demands, actions, or causes of action under state, federal or local law, whether
5 statutory, common law or administrative, that were alleged in the Operative Complaint and/or
6 PAGA Notice, or reasonably could have been alleged based on the factual allegations contained in
7 the Operative Complaint and/or PAGA Notice, including but not limited to all claims for failure to
8 pay all wages due, including minimum wages, straight time compensation, overtime compensation,
9 double-time compensation, and interest; the calculation of the regular rate of pay; failure to provide
10 meal periods and/or rest periods; failure to pay proper meal and/or rest period penalties or premium
11 wages; payment for all hours worked, including off-the-clock work; failure to provide accurate
12 itemized wage statements; failure to reimburse business expenses; failure to timely pay all wages
13 during employment; failure to timely pay all wages due at separation of employment; failure to
14 maintain accurate records, including payroll records; unfair business practices; declaratory relief;
15 penalties, including but not limited to recordkeeping penalties, wage statement penalties,
16 minimum-wage penalties, and waiting-time penalties; interest; and attorneys' fees and costs. The
17 Class Released Claims also expressly include all claims arising under the California Labor Code
18 (including but not limited to Sections 200-204, 210, 216, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3,
19 226.7, 256, 432, 432.5, 432.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197,
20 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 2800, 2802, 2698 *et seq.*, and 2699 *et seq.*); the Wage Orders of the
21 California Industrial Welfare Commission; the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
22 ("PAGA"); California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, *et seq.*; the California Civil
23 Code, including but not limited to Sections 3287, 3336, and 3294; 8 CCR Section 11070; California
24 Code of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Section 1021.5; and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
25 Section 201, *et seq.* This release excludes the release of claims not permitted by law. The time
26 frame of the Class Released Claims shall be the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release
27 will be deemed effective on the date by which both of the following have occurred: (a) the Court
28 enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval of the Settlement; and (b) the Judgment is

1 final. (Settlement, § 1.18.)

2 9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “As of the Effective Date, Plaintiff, the LWDA,
3 and all Aggrieved Employees, on behalf of themselves and their respective past, present, and
4 future representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, and each
5 and all of them, shall fully and finally release and discharge the Released Parties from all claims
6 and causes of action for civil penalties pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys
7 General Act of 2004 (California Labor Code section 2698, *et seq.*) that were alleged in the
8 Operative Complaint and/or PAGA Notice, or reasonably could have been alleged based on the
9 factual allegations contained in the Operative Complaint and/or PAGA Notice, including any and
10 all claims involving any alleged failure to accurately pay for all hours worked, including
11 minimum wages, straight-time compensation, overtime compensation, double-time
12 compensation, and interest, payment for off-the-clock work, calculation of the regular rate of
13 pay, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to pay
14 proper meal and rest period penalties or premium wages, failure to provide accurate wage
15 statements, failure to timely pay all wages during employment, failure to pay all wages due at
16 separation, failure to maintain accurate records, including records of hours worked and meal
17 periods, failure to reimburse business expenses, and all claims for civil penalties arising under or
18 based upon alleged violations of California Labor Code sections 201-203, 204, 210, 216, 218.5,
19 218.6, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 256, 432, 432.5, 432.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1174,
20 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 2698 *et seq.*, 2699 *et seq.*, 2699.3,
21 2802, and 2810.5, and any duplicative or similar provisions arising under the Wage Orders of the
22 California Industrial Welfare Commission, and any other PAGA penalty claims whatsoever
23 alleged in the Operative Complaint and/or PAGA Notice, whether known or unknown.
24 Aggrieved Employees only release these claims for the duration of the PAGA Period.”
25 (Settlement, § 5.3.)

26 10. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
27 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

28 ///

1 11. PAGA Allocation: “PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$20,000.00 to be paid from
2 the Gross Settlement Amount, with 75% (\$15,000.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment and
3 25% (\$5,000.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class
4 Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary
5 Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.)

6 12. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
7 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
8 Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
9 Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be
10 paid to Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis as Individual Class Payments.”
11 (Settlement, § 1.27.)

12 13. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment will be calculated by (a)
13 dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating
14 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
15 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
16 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
17 share of PAGA Penalties (\$5,000.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by
18 all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each
19 Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

20 14. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
21 allocated as 33% wages, 33% to penalties, and 34% to interests and fees. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

22 15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
23 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$7,500.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for
24 Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
25 release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.)
26 If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert
27 into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the Participating Class Members on a
28 pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

1 16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
2 a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$83,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-
3 pocket costs not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

4 17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
5 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys'
6 fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
7 are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class
8 mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.) ILYM Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement
9 Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current
10 addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-
11 mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Haber Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3 [Settlement Bid].)

12 **III. DISCUSSION**

13 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
14 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
15 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
16 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
17 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
18 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
19 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

20 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
21 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
22 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
23 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
24 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
25 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
26 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
27 that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
28 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*

1 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
2 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
3 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
4 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

5 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
6 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
7 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

8 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
9 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

10 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
11 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

12 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
13 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
14 conducted in good faith. (*Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
15 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
16 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
17 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
18 to approve the settlement.”].)

19 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
20 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq. (Haber Decl. ¶
21 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional
22 manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential
23 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position
24 through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations
25 and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s
26 defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Haber Decl. ¶ 8.)

27 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
28 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll

1 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
2 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
3 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
4 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
5 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
6 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
7 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
8 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

9 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
10 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-47.) Again, this supports the position that the
11 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
12 in light of the risks, expenses, and time to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

13 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 14 **Respective Legal Positions**

15 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
16 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
17 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
18 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
19 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
20 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
21 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

22 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Haber
23 Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists
24 as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages
25 due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

26 The proposed settlement of \$250,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
27 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed
28 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an

1 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
2 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
3 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$250,000.00 is within
4 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
5 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
6 ***\$918.64.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

7 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

8 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
9 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
10 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 40-47.)
11 Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
12 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

13 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

14 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
15 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
16 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
17 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
18 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
19 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

20 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

21 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
22 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$83,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the gross
23 Settlement Amount, and up to \$15,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class
24 members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

25 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”** 26 **Method**

27 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
28 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number

1 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
2 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
3 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
4 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

5 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
6 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
7 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
8 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
9 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
10 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
11 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
12 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
13 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
14 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

15 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
16 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
17 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
18 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
19 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
20 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
21 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
22 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
23 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
24 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

25 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

26 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "No general rule can be articulated on what
27 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
28 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a

disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlements of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover her actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers

1 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Haber
2 Decl., ¶¶ 40-47.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
3 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
4 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee
5 award is supported here.

6 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
7 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
8 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
9 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
10 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
11 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
12 is reasonable and fair.

13 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

14 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and “there is no
15 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other” class members,
16 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
17 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
18 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
19 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; see also *Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
20 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
21 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
22 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,
23 the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved
24 by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (See, e.g. *Zubia*
25 *v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
26 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008) 2008
27 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking,*
28 *Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving

1 a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$20,000.00,
2 75% percent of which (\$15,000.00) will be paid to the LWDA, with 25% (\$5,000.00) to be
3 distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement at §1.33.) The \$20,000.00 settlement amount
4 equates to approximately 8% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are
5 routinely approved. The parties negotiated to allocate 8% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in
6 good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were
7 estimated at \$287,800.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Haber Decl. ¶ 24.)

8 **E. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

9 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
10 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
11 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
12 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
13 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
14 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
15 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

16 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
17 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
18 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
19 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
20 work under substandard unlawful conditions”). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court
21 has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
22 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
23 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
24 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
25 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

26 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
27 a Service Award in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
28 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Courts routinely approve up to a

1 \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v.*
2 *Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes
3 a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11,
4 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for
5 each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time
6 and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation
7 and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the
8 mediation. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the
9 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

10 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
11 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
12 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
13 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
14 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
15 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
16 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
17 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
18 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
19 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
20 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
21 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

22 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY IS WARRANTED**

23 **A. Legal Standard**

24 The proposed Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a
25 core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons
26 set forth more fully below, and for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites
27 for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question
28 is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it

1 is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
2 of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1) There must be
3 an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions
4 of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967)
5 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme
6 Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest
7 requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class
8 representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can
9 adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

10 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
11 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
12 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
13 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
14 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*,
15 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

16 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
17 **Settlement Purposes.**

18 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

19 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
20 approximately 127 employees of Defendant (as of August 25, 2023).

21 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
22 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
23 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
24 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
25 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

26 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
27 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
28 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action

1 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
2 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
3 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
4 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
5 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
6 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

7 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

8 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
9 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
10 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
11 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
12 Cal.App.3d 605.)

13 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
14 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
15 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
16 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
17 overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
18 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
19 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
20 compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified
21 class members, including Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff alleges that all class members suffered from,
22 and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries. Defendant denies all such allegations.

23 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

24 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
25 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
26 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
27 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
28 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly

1 situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they
2 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
3 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
4 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other employees.

5 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

6 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
7 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
8 a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

10 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
11 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
12 previously settled. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 40-47.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
13 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
14 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
15 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing his dedication. Plaintiff’s
16 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing about the
17 best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

18 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

19 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
20 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
21 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
22 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
23 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
24 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
25 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
26 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
27 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
28 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
7 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
8 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
9 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided
10 by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

11 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

12 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
13 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
14 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
15 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
16 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
18 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
19 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
20 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
21 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
22 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
23 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
24 combined settlement-certification class notice.

25 **VI. CONCLUSION**

26 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
27 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in January 2026.

28 ///

Dated: July 17, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

Oscar Mejorado v. Rainbow Sandals, Inc., et al.
30-2022-01283098-CU-OE-CXC

I, Rebecca Padilla, am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 660 S. Figueroa St, Sky Lobby, Los Angeles, California 90017. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

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- (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- (X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **July 17, 2025**, at Los Angeles, California.


Rebecca Padilla