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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN**

MIGUEL A. VIGIL RUIZ, individually, on  
behalf of all others similarly situated, and on  
behalf of the State of California and other  
aggrieved persons,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

THE DE RUOSI GROUP, LLC dba DERUOSI  
NUT, a California Limited Liability Company,  
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

*Defendants.*

Case No.: STK-CV-UOE-2022-8780

**CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION**

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Barbara  
Kronlund, Dept. 10D]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION  
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed with the Declaration of John G. Yslas,  
Declaration of Plaintiff Ruiz, and Proposed  
Order]*

**PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING**

Date: **NOV 30 2023**  
Time: 9:00 a.m.  
Dept: 10D

Complaint filed: September 30, 2022  
FAC filed: July 10, 2023  
Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on \_\_\_\_\_, as determined by the Court at 9:00  
3 a.m., in Department 10D of the San Joaquin Superior Court, located at 180 E Weber Ave, Stockton,  
4 CA 95202, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*,  
5 Plaintiff Miguel A. Vigil Ruiz ( "Plaintiff") will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary  
6 approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant The De Ruosi  
7 Group, LLC dba DeRuosi Nut ("Defendant"). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement  
9 and Class Notice;  
10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;  
11 3. Approving the Class Notice and the plan for distribution of the Class Notice;  
12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Miguel A. Vigil Ruiz as Class Representative for settlement  
13 purposes;  
14 5. Appointing Plaintiff's Counsel, John G. Yslas, Jeffrey C. Bils, Aram Boyadjian, and  
15 Andrew Sandoval of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;  
16 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and  
17 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

18 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and  
19 authorities, the Declarations of John G. Yslas and Plaintiff Miguel A. Vigil Ruiz, filed concurrently  
20 herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the  
21 Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: October 18, 2023

24 WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

25 By: \_\_\_\_\_

26 John G. Yslas

27 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

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1 wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and  
2 civil penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004  
3 (“PAGA”). Defendant denies Plaintiff’s allegations and denies liability for Plaintiff’s  
4 claims.

5 Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce  
6 Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA  
7 (Labor Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on September 29, 2022. [Yslas Decl., ¶ 4.] On September 30,  
8 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendant for:  
9 (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and  
10 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194, and 1198); (3) failure to  
11 provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest  
12 periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5) failure to pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§  
13 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7)  
14 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and (8) unfair  
15 business practices (Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*). On July 10, 2023,  
16 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding a claim for civil  
17 penalties under Private Attorneys General Act “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698 *et seq.*).

18 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

19 Following the filing of the Complaints, the parties exchanged documents and  
20 information before mediating this action. Prior to mediation, Plaintiff obtained, through  
21 informal discovery, personnel records pertaining to Plaintiff; class data including total  
22 number of current and former hourly paid and non-exempt employees during the statutory  
23 period; total number of workweeks and pay periods; average and median hourly rates of pay;  
24 all timekeeping and payroll records for Class Members; employee handbooks; and other  
25 wage and hour policy documents. Plaintiff’s investigation was sufficient to satisfy the  
26 criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th  
27 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-130  
28 (“Dunk/Kullar”). [Yslas Decl., ¶ 5.]

1 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and  
2 practices, and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was  
3 able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's  
4 maximum monetary exposure for all claims. [*Id.* at ¶ 6.] Class Counsel also investigated  
5 the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. [*Id.*] Class  
6 Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. [*Id.*]

### 7 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

8 On May 2, 2023, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class  
9 action mediator Louis Marlin. [*Id.* at ¶ 7.] The settlement negotiations were at arm's length  
10 and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went into  
11 the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side  
12 was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not  
13 been reached. [*Id.*] After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and  
14 weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement,  
15 the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. [*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 (Class  
16 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice).]

17 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case.  
18 Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation,  
19 Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is  
20 in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and  
21 circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant  
22 both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. [*Id.* at ¶ 16.]

#### 23 **1. Settlement Consideration**

24 Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed to settle the Lawsuit in exchange for the Gross  
25 Settlement Amount of \$425,000.00. The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) attorneys'  
26 fees in the amount of \$141,666.67 and reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs and  
27 expenses in the amount of up to \$14,000.00 to Class Counsel; (2) Class Representative  
28 Service Payment to Plaintiff in the amount of up to \$5,000.00; (3) fees and expenses of

1 administration of the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator in an amount not to exceed  
2 \$6,950.00; (4) \$20,000.00 to PAGA with twenty-five percent (25%) share of the PAGA  
3 Penalties to be a part of the Net Settlement Sum that will be distributed to Class Members  
4 in the PAGA Group in the amount of \$5,000; and (5) the seventy-five percent (75%) share  
5 of PAGA penalties (“LWDA Payment”) in the amount of \$15,000.00 to the LWDA. (See  
6 Settlement Agreement generally).

7 Indeed, the \$425,000.00 Settlement represents **77.58%** of **the realistic maximum**  
8 **recovery of** \$547,803.8. [*Id.* at ¶ 25.] Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s  
9 maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3,014,404, when the risk of  
10 prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes  
11 that Defendant’s realistic exposure was \$547,803.80, meaning the Settlement achieves a  
12 significant recovery. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.] Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at  
13 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. [*Id.* at ¶ 25.] Indeed,  
14 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief  
15 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

16 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

17 The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action and PAGA  
18 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. A document showing edits the parties made to the  
19 template in redline is attached to the Declaration of John G. Yslas as **Exhibit 2**. The  
20 Settlement’s key terms include:

21 1. Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a  
22 class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed  
23 by De Ruosi in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who  
24 worked for De Ruosi during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

25 2. Class Period: This is defined as “the period from April 5, 2018 to the earlier of  
26 the date of an order approving Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,  
27 or August 1, 2023.” (Settlement, § 1.12.)  
28

1           3.     Participating Class Members: This is defined as “a Class Member who does not  
2 submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

3           4.     PAGA Group Member or Aggrieved Employee: This is defined as “a person  
4 employed by De Ruosi in California and classified as a nonexempt employee who worked for  
5 De Ruosi during the PAGA Period,” “from September 29, 2021 to the earlier of the date of an  
6 order approving Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, or August 1, 2023.”  
7 (Settlement, §§ 1.4, 1.31.)

8           5.     Gross Settlement Amount: This means “\$425,000.00 which is the total amount  
9 DeRuosi agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 9 [of the  
10 Settlement Agreement]. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class  
11 Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class  
12 Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Payment and the Administrator’s Expenses.”  
13 (Settlement, § 1.22.)

14          6.     Uncashed Checks: This is defined as any check for any Class Member whose  
15 Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled  
16 after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to a  
17 Court approved nonprofit organization or foundation consistent with Code of Civil Procedure  
18 section 384, subdivision (b) (“Cy Pres Recipient”). The Parties, Class Counsel and Defense  
19 Counsel represent that they have no interest or relationship, financial or otherwise, with the  
20 intended Cy Pres Recipient. (Settlement, § 4.4.3.) Through this Motion, the Parties propose as  
21 the Cy Pres Recipient Legal Aid at Work, a nonprofit organization that provides civil legal  
22 services to the indigent.

23          7.     Release:

24               (a)     In consideration for his Class Representative Award, Plaintiff and his  
25                        respective former and present spouses, representatives, agents, attorneys,  
26                        heirs, administrators, successors and assigns generally, fully, finally, and  
27                        forever settles and releases any and all of the Released Claims (as defined  
28                        in Settlement, §§ 5.2 and 5.3), whether known or unknown, suspected

1 or unsuspected, contingent or non-contingent, which now exist, or  
2 heretofore have existed, upon any theory of law or equity now existing,  
3 including, but not limited to, conduct that is negligent, intentional, with  
4 or without malice, or a breach of any duty, law or rule, without regard to  
5 the subsequent discovery or existence of such different or additional  
6 facts. Plaintiff releases the Released Parties of all claims, charges,  
7 complaints, liens, demands, causes of action, obligations, damages and  
8 liabilities, known or unknown, arising from his employment with the  
9 Defendant, including, without limitation: (1) the Civil Rights Act of  
10 1964, as amended; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) the California Fair  
11 Employment and Housing Act; (4) Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act  
12 of 1973; (5) the Americans with Disabilities Act; (6) the Fair Labor  
13 Standards Act (including the Equal Pay Act); (7) the California and the  
14 United States Constitution; (8) the California Labor Code; (9) the Family  
15 and Medical Leave Act; (10) the California Family Rights Act; (11) the  
16 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act; (12) the Employee  
17 Retirement Income Security Act; (13) the Immigration Reform and  
18 Control Act; (14) the California Business and Professions Code, sections  
19 17200, et. seq.; (15) the California Government Code; and (16) the  
20 California Wage Orders, which Plaintiff now has, owns or holds, or  
21 claims to have, own or hold, or which the Class Representative at any  
22 time heretofore had, owned or held, or claimed to have, own or hold  
23 against any of the Released Parties. Plaintiff's Release does not extend  
24 to any claims or actions to enforce this Agreement, or to any claims for  
25 workers' compensation benefits that arose at any time. Plaintiff  
26 acknowledges that Plaintiff may discover facts or law different from, or  
27 in addition to, the facts or law that Plaintiff now knows or believes to be  
28 true but agrees, nonetheless, that Plaintiff's Release shall be and remain

1 effective in all respects, notwithstanding such different or additional  
2 facts or Plaintiff's discovery of them. (Settlement, § 5.1.)

3 (b) All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their  
4 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,  
5 administrators, successors and assigns, release Released Parties from (i)  
6 all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged,  
7 based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint  
8 including all claims, charges, complaints, liens, demands, causes of  
9 action, obligations, damages and liabilities, known or suspected, that  
10 each Participating Class Member had, now has, or may hereafter claim  
11 to have against the Released Parties, and that were asserted in the Action,  
12 or that arise from or could have been asserted based on any of the facts,  
13 circumstances, transactions, events, occurrences, acts, disclosures,  
14 statements, omissions or failures to act alleged in the Action that have  
15 arisen during the Class Period ("the Released Claims"). The Released  
16 Claims specifically include, but are not limited to, any claimed violations  
17 of Labor Code §§ 201-204, 226, 226.7, 512, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198,  
18 2698 et. seq. and 2802; Business & Professions Code § 17200, et. seq.;  
19 Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class  
20 Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested  
21 benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and  
22 Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security,  
23 workers' compensation or claims based on facts occurring outside the  
24 Class Period. (Settlement, § 5.2.)

25 (c) All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are  
26 deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former  
27 and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators,  
28 successors and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA

1 penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based  
2 on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the  
3 PAGA Notice, including without limitation any claimed violations of the  
4 California Labor Code during the PAGA Period or recovery of civil  
5 penalties based on any such claimed violations. (Settlement, § 5.3.)

6 8. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to DeRuosi.”  
7 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

8 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s  
9 claims under PAGA, with 75% (\$15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$5,000.00)  
10 being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the  
11 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. [Yslas  
12 Decl., ¶ 10.]

13 10. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that  
14 remains and that shall be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments  
15 after the following amounts are subtracted: (1) Individual PAGA Payments, (2) the LWDA  
16 PAGA Payment, (3) Class Representative Service Payments, (4) Class Counsel Fees Payments,  
17 (5) Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and (6) the Administrative Expenses Payment.  
18 (Settlement, § 1.28.)

19 11. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing  
20 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating  
21 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating  
22 Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will  
23 calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved  
24 Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$5,000) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay  
25 Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the  
26 result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

27 12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will  
28 be allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

1           13.    Class Representative Service Payment: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall  
2 be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$5,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is  
3 for Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the Action, and in exchange for a  
4 general release of all claims. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement,  
5 then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be  
6 distributed between the Participating Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

7           14.    Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not  
8 oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$141,666.67),  
9 plus Litigation Expenses Payment not to exceed \$14,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

10          15.    Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain  
11 terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount  
12 of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the  
13 settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will  
14 be notified by first-class mail of the Settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.2.) ILYM Group, Inc., the  
15 proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is  
16 provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change  
17 of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Yslas Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3  
18 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

### 19    **III.   DISCUSSION**

20           To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action  
21 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This  
22 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v.*  
23 *Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is  
24 reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and  
25 the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the  
26 percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

27           In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider  
28 relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense,

1 complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status  
2 through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage  
3 of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental  
4 participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot*  
5 *Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action  
6 settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of  
7 reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the  
8 maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010)  
9 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the  
10 maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead,  
11 only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes  
12 of the litigation.”].)

13 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold  
14 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the  
15 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

16 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**  
17 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

18 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and**  
19 **Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

20 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement,  
21 unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations  
22 were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) §  
23 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed.  
24 (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989)  
25 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been  
26 fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

27 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a of mediation  
28 with experienced employment mediator, Louis Marlin. [Yslas Decl. ¶ 7.] The settlement

1 negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were  
2 adversarial. [*Id.*] The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a  
3 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through  
4 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. [*Id.*] After extensive negotiations and  
5 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's  
6 defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. [Yslas Decl. ¶ 8.]

7 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery  
8 concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping  
9 and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages,  
10 the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at  
11 separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix  
12 of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest  
13 period premium wages paid to class members. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.] In conjunction with their  
14 extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the  
15 claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. [*Id.*] Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able  
16 to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. [*Id.*]

17 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with  
18 litigating wage and hour class actions. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-50.] Again, this supports the position that  
19 the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and  
20 weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued  
21 litigation of this action.

## 22 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties'** 23 **Respective Legal Positions**

24 A settlement is not judged against what plaintiff might recover had he prevailed at trial,  
25 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.  
26 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is  
27 inherent and necessary in the settlement process ... even if the relief afforded by the proposed  
28 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully

1 litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served  
2 by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding  
3 litigation.”].)

4 The PAGA portion of this Settlement also is “fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of  
5 PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize  
6 enforcement of state labor laws” (*Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.* (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77), in  
7 light of the discretionary nature of penalties, and the risks and uncertainty of prevailing at trial.  
8 [Yslas Decl., ¶ 24.] Plaintiff submits that this Settlement, in its entirety, serves to remediate  
9 labor law violations and deter future ones through its significant recovery for the proposed  
10 Class. [*Id.*, ¶ 16.]

11 Further, this Settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further  
12 litigation. [*Id.*, ¶ 27.] While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate  
13 controversy exists as to each cause of action. [*Id.* at ¶ 26.] Plaintiff also recognizes that proving  
14 the amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and  
15 uncertain proposition. [*Id.*]

16 The proposed Settlement of \$425,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery  
17 when compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.] Because of  
18 the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid  
19 the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties  
20 involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability,  
21 the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the Settlement amount of  
22 \$425,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is  
23 appropriate. [*Id.*] ***Indeed, each Participating Class Member is eligible to receive an average***  
24 ***net benefit of approximately \$1,404.63, without factoring in payroll taxes.*** [*Id.* at ¶ 28.]

### 25 3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

26 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly skilled and experienced counsel.  
27 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and  
28 have extensive experience in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. [Yslas

Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.] Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the matter, counsel supports this proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

**B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for dissemination to the Class. The Notice informs the Class of the Settlement terms and of their rights to be excluded from the Settlement. Additionally, if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action Settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

**C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$141,666.67, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$14,000.00 in Litigation Expenses Payment. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

**1. Class Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method**

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which

1 creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear  
2 a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San*  
3 *Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the  
4 common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by  
5 one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

6 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1  
7 Cal.5th 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of  
8 the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of  
9 that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate  
10 percentage of the fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized  
11 advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of  
12 incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a  
13 contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and  
14 avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable  
15 tool that should not be denied our trial courts.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

## 16 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

17 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on  
18 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit  
19 on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume  
20 a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger  
21 percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd  
22 Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the  
23 upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is  
24 relatively small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995)  
25 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller”  
26 settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

27 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount,  
28 which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic

1 literature, and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162  
2 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage  
3 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of  
4 the recovery.”].;

### 5                   **3.       This Matter Involves a “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

6           Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime  
7 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under  
8 this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those  
9 fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This Settlement is  
10 beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and  
11 resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision  
12 to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant  
13 financial risk for Class Counsel. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.] Class Counsel undertook this matter  
14 solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. [*Id.*] Once counsel undertook this  
15 litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing  
16 its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

### 17                   **4.       The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support** 18                   **the Requested Fee Award**

19           As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of  
20 consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class  
21 actions. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.] Class Counsel and the firm have been involved as lead  
22 counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions of dollars in recovery.  
23 [*Id.*] Because it is reasonable to compensate Class Counsel commensurate with their skill,  
24 reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

25           Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating  
26 the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the  
27 Settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and  
28 knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the

1 procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel's  
2 firm has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class.  
3 Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

4 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

5 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments  
6 to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other  
7 members of the class." (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant  
8 approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class  
9 representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are  
10 appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See*  
11 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

12 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because  
13 they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong  
14 policy is codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of  
15 this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not  
16 required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions...."). Nonetheless, the  
17 California Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory  
18 rights under the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect  
19 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class  
20 representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class  
21 members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

22 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agreed to  
23 pay a Service Award in the amount of \$5,000 to each Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange  
24 for Plaintiff's general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff devoted a great deal of  
25 time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for  
26 litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during  
27 the mediation. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.] This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the  
28 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. [*Id.*]

1 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount  
2 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive  
3 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per  
4 class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.”  
5 (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An  
6 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named  
7 plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850  
8 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions  
9 received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The  
10 authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish  
11 to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service  
12 to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

#### 13 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

##### 14 **A. Legal Standard**

15 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims  
16 derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations.  
17 For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies  
18 the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides:  
19 “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties  
20 are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue  
21 or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to  
22 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined  
23 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be  
24 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To  
25 clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil  
26 Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three  
27 factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or  
28

1 defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the  
2 class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

3 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action  
4 device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class  
5 actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the  
6 rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any  
7 doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification.  
8 (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

9 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied**  
10 **for Settlement Purposes.**

11 **1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

12 The proposed Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes  
13 approximately 169 employees of Defendant.

14 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable Class, defined by objective and  
15 precise criteria. Because Class Members are identified using specific criteria in the regular  
16 business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the Class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset*  
17 *Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of  
18 product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

19 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties  
20 to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward*  
21 (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons,  
22 an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in  
23 fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the  
24 maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing  
25 the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v.*  
26 *Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a  
27 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

1                                   **2.       Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

2           The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on  
3 the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all Class Members predominate over any  
4 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to  
5 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987)  
6 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

7           Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant  
8 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally  
9 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;  
10 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to pay for all hours worked,  
11 including overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses;  
12 whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal  
13 period premium wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were  
14 consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same  
15 for all of the identified Class Members, including Plaintiff. Further, all Class Members suffered  
16 from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

17                                   **3.       Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

18           The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or  
19 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class,  
20 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the  
21 defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he  
22 only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class  
23 representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims  
24 are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if  
25 the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a  
26 former employee of Defendant; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and  
27 practices as other similarly situated employees.

1                                   **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

2           The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first,  
3   a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation;  
4   second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v.*  
5   *Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

6           All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained  
7   counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class  
8   actions that previously settled. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.] Class Counsel unquestionably is  
9   “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v.*  
10   *Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff  
11   has, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing his  
12   dedication. Plaintiff's willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious  
13   commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the Class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60  
14   Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

15                                   **5. A Class Action Is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

16           Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class  
17   action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the  
18   litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this  
19   Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves  
20   the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class  
21   treatment, similarly situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for  
22   damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and  
23   expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443,  
24   457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of  
25   settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

26   **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

27           **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

28           Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,

1 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an  
2 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is  
3 no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this  
4 matter, the Class Members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has  
5 explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial  
6 percentage of the Class Members....” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed  
7 Settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

8 **B. The Notice Is Accurate and Informative**

9 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S.  
10 first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members  
11 of the terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there  
12 are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action Settlement, they will have  
13 the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

14 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte &  
15 Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to  
16 date and the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, in an informative and  
17 coherent manner. It makes clear that the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an  
18 admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this  
19 Court has not ruled on the merits of the Action. It also states that the final settlement  
20 approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of  
21 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class  
22 notice.

23 **VI. CONCLUSION**


24 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant  
25 preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in March  
26 2024.

1  
2 Dated: October 18, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

3  
4 By:

  
John G. Yslas  
Jeffrey C. Bils  
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*Attorneys for Plaintiff*