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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE

VALERIA BOLANOS, as an individual on
behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

NEWPORT FAB, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Corporation; TOWER
SEMICONDUCTOR NEWPORT BEACH,
INC., a Delaware Corporation; JAZZ
SEMICONDUCTOR TRUSTED
FOUNDRY, INC., a Delaware Corporation;
TOWER SEMICONDUCTOR USA, INC., a
California Corporation; JAZZ
SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., an unknown
entity; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2022-01280696-CU-OE-CXC

Assigned for all purposes to:

Hon. Lon Hurwitz

Dept. CX103

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

[Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion and
Motion, Declarations of Michael Jones, John G.
Yslas, Valeria Bolanos, Fanny Thorng, and Sean
Hartranft; [Proposed] Order]

Date: September 20, 2024

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: CX-103

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Contents

I. INTRODUCTION..... 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 1

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS..... 4

 A. Certification of the Settlement Class 5

 B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class..... 5

 C. Settlement Administration..... 6

 D. The Class Notice 6

 E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object 7

 F. Release of Claims 7

 G. Attorney’s Fees and Costs, and Plaintiff’s Enhancement Award..... 7

 H. PAGA Claims and Notice to the LWDA..... 7

IV. ARGUMENT..... 8

 A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement 8

 B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified 9

 C. The Proposed Settlement Meets the Dunk and Kullar Factors and is within
 the Range of Reasonableness..... 10

V. CONCLUSION 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

<u>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</u> (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135.....	16
<u>Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2</u> (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157.....	14
<u>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</u> (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504.....	15
<u>Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle</u> (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, <u>cert. denied</u> , 506 U.S. 953	8
<u>Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc.</u> (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 113 (2014)	14
<u>Delmer Camp v. Home Depot USA, Inc.</u> (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 638.....	12
<u>Donohue v. Amn Servs.</u> (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 58	13
<u>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</u> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....	8, 9
<u>Frlekin v. Apple Inc.</u> (2020) 8 Cal. 5th 1038	12
<u>Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836.....	9
<u>Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc.</u> (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356	15
<u>Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch.</u> (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986.....	10
<u>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</u> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	11
<u>Lane v. Facebook, Inc.</u> (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811	16

1	<u>North County Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. TouchTWC Ins. Servs.</u>	
2	(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085.....	8
3	<u>Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.</u>	
4	(1951) 37 Cal.2d 592	8
5	<u>Saechao v. Landry’s Inc.</u>	
6	(N.D. Cal., Mar. 15, 2016, No. C 15-00815 WHA) 2016 WL 1029479, . [Jones Decl..].....	13
7	<u>See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court</u>	
8	(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889.....	12
9	<u>Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I</u>	
10	(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303.....	15
11	<u>In re Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions</u>	
12	(E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557	15
13	<u>Van Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc.</u>	
14	(N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182	15
15	<u>Wershba v. Apple Computer</u>	
16	(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	8, 9, 16
17	<u>White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.</u>	
18	(C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086	17
19	<u>White v. Starbucks Corp.</u>	
20	(N.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1080	12
21	<u>Williams v. Superior Court</u>	
22	(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353.....	10
23		
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Statutes

California Rule of Court. 3.769 8

California Rule of Court 3.769(c) 8

California Rules of Court 3.766(d) 6

California Rules of Court 3.769(f) 6

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 9

Labor Code sections 15

Labor Code § 203..... 14

Labor Code sections 203 14

Labor Code sections 226 14

Labor Code sections 510 14

Labor Code sections 512 14

Labor Code § 2699(e)(2)..... 15

Labor Code section 2699(l)(2) 8

Labor Code section 2802 14

Other Authorities

Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010),
available at [http:// www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)..... 17

Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41 8

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs Valeria Bolanos and Fanny Thorng hereby move the Court for an order
3 granting preliminary approval to a proposed non-reversionary class action settlement to resolve
4 wage and hour claims on behalf of approximately 1,195 individuals employed by Defendant
5 Newport Fab, LLC (“Newport Fab” or “Defendant”) as non-exempt employees during the
6 period of March 21, 2018 to April 13, 2024. The proposed \$3,900,000.00 settlement will
7 provide at least \$2,435,000.00 in cash payments to the settlement class, with an average award
8 of about \$2,037.00. The balance of approximately \$1,465,000.00 will cover modest
9 enhancement awards to Plaintiffs, reasonable attorney’s fees and actual litigation costs,
10 settlement administration costs, and payment of civil penalties to the state and allegedly
11 aggrieved employees. The settlement is the product of Plaintiffs’ pre- and post-filing
12 investigation, a pre-mediation exchange of information, and arms-length and adversarial
13 negotiations overseen by experienced and well-regarded mediator Todd Smith, Esq.

14 As demonstrated below, the settlement is within the “range of reasonableness” for
15 preliminary approval. Plaintiffs’ counsel believes the settlement is a significant result for the
16 class given the substantial risks inherent in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request the Court
17 enter an order: (1) granting preliminary approval to the proposed class action settlement; (2)
18 conditionally certifying the settlement class as defined below; (3) appointing Zachary M.
19 Crosner, Jamie K. Serb, and Michael Jones, and Crosner Legal, PC, and John G. Yslas, Jeffrey
20 C. Bils, Aram Boyadjian, and Andrew Sandoval, and Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class
21 Counsel; (4) appointing plaintiffs Valeria Bolanos and Fanny Thorng as the Class
22 Representatives; (5) appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement
23 Administrator; (6) approving the form of notice to the class and the procedure for providing
24 such notice; and (7) scheduling a final fairness hearing.

25 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE**

26 Newport Fab, LLC (dba Jazz Semiconductor) is located in Newport Beach, and
27 manufactures electrical equipment and components. It has been doing business for over 20
28 years and is a subsidiary of an Israel-based company called Tower Semiconductor, which is the

1 leading foundry of “high value analog semiconductor solutions.” Plaintiff Fanny Thorng was
2 hired by Defendant as a “Fab Operator Assistant” with an hourly rate of \$13.65 on May 22,
3 2017. She was promoted on August 20, 2018 to a “Photo/Fab Operator Assistant.” Her
4 scheduled shifts were Sunday – Monday and every other Saturday from 5:30 p.m. to 5:36 a.m.
5 She was terminated on February 10, 2022. Plaintiff Valeria Bolanos was hired by Defendant on
6 July 7, 2020 as an Operator Assistant and subsequently promoted to a “Photo/Fab Operator” on
7 December 7, 2020. Bolanos also worked a night shift from 5:30 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. Sometime in
8 2021 she was injured and went on medical leave. Plaintiffs and the majority of the class
9 members are unionized employees and operated under various Collective Bargaining
10 Agreements applicable to different time periods and positions. [Declaration of Michael Jones
11 (“Jones Decl.”), ¶ 4.]

12 On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff Bolanos commenced this Action by filing a Complaint
13 alleging causes of action against Newport Fab for (1) Recovery of Unpaid Minimum Wages and
14 Liquidated Damages; (2) Recovery of Unpaid Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal
15 Periods or Compensation in Lieu Thereof; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Periods or Compensation
16 in Lieu Thereof; (5) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (6) Failure to
17 Timely Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment; (7) Failure to Reimburse
18 Business Expenses; and (8) Unfair Competition.¹ After providing notice to the Labor &
19 Workforce Development Agency (LWDA”) and exhausting administrative remedies, Plaintiff
20 Bolanos filed a separate PAGA action on or about October 8, 2022, seeking PAGA civil
21 penalties based on the same alleged Labor Code violations. [Jones Decl., ¶ 5.]

22 On October 19, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in the Action alleging
23 both the class and PAGA claims. On or about February 14, 2024, the Court consolidated the
24 Bolanos class action and the separately filed PAGA action into Case No. 30-2022-01280696.

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26
27 ¹On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff Thorng filed a class action lawsuit against Defendant (Orange County
28 Superior Court Case No. 30-2022-01279796), alleging various Labor Code violations. The Parties
subsequently stipulated to dismiss this Thorng action without prejudice and add Plaintiff Thorng as a
named plaintiff in the Bolanos action. [Jones Decl., ¶ 5.]

1 The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action, and all defendants other
2 than Newport Fab have been dismissed. [Jones Decl., ¶ 6.]

3 Plaintiffs allege Defendant committed multiple Labor Code violations. First, they claim
4 Newport Fab failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages due to a time rounding policy that
5 systematically deprived employees of all wages, and failing to pay for “off the clock” work such
6 as donning and doffing protective gear, going through security checkpoints, etc. Plaintiffs next
7 contend Defendant failed to provide meal breaks prior to the end of the 5th hour of work and
8 rounding meal break time punches such that employees did not receive a full 30-minute break,
9 and by failing to provide second lunch breaks on shifts exceeding 10 hours of work. Plaintiffs
10 further allege Defendant failed to provide rest breaks by, inter alia, prohibiting employees from
11 leaving the premises while on break. Lastly, Plaintiffs allege they regularly used their personal
12 phones for work purposes without reimbursement. [Jones Decl., ¶ 7.]

13 Newport Fab has at all times denied Plaintiffs’ allegations and maintained its break and
14 payroll policies and procedures comply with California law, that it provided its employees with
15 required meal and rest breaks, that it properly and accurately tracked employee time and paid
16 Plaintiffs and all other employees all wages due at the correct hourly and overtime rates.
17 Defendant also argues that there would be no need for employees to use their own phones for
18 work purposes. Newport Fab strongly contends the case cannot be maintained as any kind of
19 class or representative action, arguing that to the extent class members missed meal breaks, that
20 such breaks were non-compliant, or that any unpaid “off the clock” work occurred, it was
21 intermittent and infrequent and evidence of such violations would be purely anecdotal, and
22 therefore individualized issues predominate and trial would be unmanageable. [Jones Decl., ¶
23 8.]

24 Once the FAC was on file, the Parties initiated discovery and engaged in substantial
25 meet and confer discussions regarding discovery, potential law and motion, and other case
26 management issues. Following these discussions, the Parties ultimately agreed to attempt early
27 mediation, and thereafter engaged in substantial informal discovery to facilitate an exchange of
28 information necessary to engage in a meaningful mediation. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ counsel

1 reviewed payroll records, personnel policies/handbooks, meal break policies, personnel files,
2 and paystubs and time records produced by Newport Fab for about 75% of the class. Defendant
3 also provided documents and information reflecting the estimated total amount of workweeks
4 and pay periods they worked, number of class members, and average hourly pay rates, among
5 other relevant data. Plaintiffs had this data reviewed and analyzed by Berger Consulting Group
6 to, inter alia, determine potential violation rates and help formulate a damages model. [Jones
7 Decl., ¶ 9.]

8 The Parties then engaged Todd Smith, Esq., a highly respected mediator with extensive
9 wage and hour class action experience and, in October 2023, participated in a mediation with
10 Mr. Smith. The arms-length negotiations were hard-fought and adversarial as the Parties
11 exchanged extensive information on their legal and factual positions, and made numerous offers
12 and counter-offers. Ultimately, the Parties reached agreement on all major issues to resolve the
13 matter on both a class and PAGA basis. The Parties thereafter collaboratively drafted the
14 Settlement Agreement setting forth the full and final settlement terms. [Jones Decl., ¶ 10.]

15 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS**

16 Under the settlement, Newport Fab will pay \$3,900,000.00 into a common fund, the
17 Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”). Reasonable attorney’s fees of up to one-third of the GSA,
18 or \$1,300,000.00, actual litigation costs of up to \$30,000.00, modest enhancement awards of up
19 to \$10,000.00 for each plaintiff, settlement administration costs of no more than \$15,000.00, and
20 \$100,000.00 for alleged civil penalties under PAGA,² all will be paid from the GSA. The
21 remainder of approximately \$2,435,000.00 will be allocated among the Participating Class
22 Members based on their total weeks worked during the Class Period. No portion of the GSA
23 will revert to Newport Fab. [Jones Decl., ¶ 11.]

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27
28 ² Consistent with PAGA, \$75,000 of that amount will go to the LWDA for the State’s share of the civil penalties, and the remaining \$25,000 will be distributed pro rata to the Aggrieved Employees.

1 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class**

2 The settlement provides for conditional certification of a settlement class including all
3 persons who worked for Newport Fab as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time
4 during the Class Period, which runs from March 21, 2018 to April 13, 2024. The Settlement
5 Class consisted of approximately 1,195 individuals. [Jones Decl., ¶ 12.]

6 **B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class**

7 As noted, the settlement obligates Newport Fab to pay \$3,900,000.00 to resolve the
8 Settlement Class's claims, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. At least \$2,435,000.00 from
9 the GSA will be distributed to the Participating Class Members. This is a cash settlement that
10 does not require Participating Class Members to submit a claim form to receive their settlement
11 share. Participating Class Members will receive their settlement checks automatically via First
12 Class U.S. Mail. Twenty percent of each settlement share will be allocated to wages and the
13 remaining eighty percent will be allocated to expenses, penalties and interest. Newport Fab will
14 pay any and all applicable employer-side payroll taxes separately and in addition to the GSA.
15 Subject to the Court's approval, any amounts not claimed (because a class member does not
16 cash his or her settlement check) will be forwarded to the California State Controller's
17 Unclaimed Property Fund. [Jones Decl., ¶ 13.]

18 Each Participating Class Member will receive a share of the Net Settlement Amount
19 based on his or her position held and total weeks worked for Newport Fab during the Class
20 Period while employed as a non-exempt employee. Thus, each Class Member's Individual
21 Settlement Payment will be calculated using criteria typically used in determining appropriate
22 amounts of alleged unpaid wages, unpaid premium wages for missed meal breaks, unreimbursed
23 expenses, and potential statutory penalties under applicable law. These methods are intended to
24 ensure each Class Member receives a portion of the available settlement funds corresponding to
25 the relative value of his or her potential claims. The proposed allocation provides a reasonable
26 way to compensate Class Members based on the amount of time they worked for Newport Fab,
27 and the number of instances they missed a break, were not provided compensation in lieu of
28 such missed breaks, or lost wages due to underpaid overtime. The average award across the

1 board will be approximately \$2,037.00. There are approximately 897 Aggrieved Employees also
2 eligible to receive a share of the PAGA civil penalties, and their average PAGA award will be
3 about \$28.00. [Jones Decl., ¶ 14.]

4 As discussed below, the overall settlement amount is reasonable in light of the
5 considerable risks associated with Plaintiffs' claims as well as the delay and risk posed by
6 continuing to litigate such disputed allegations. In Plaintiffs' counsels' judgment, the total value
7 recovered for the class is substantial and in the range of reasonableness.

8 **C. Settlement Administration**

9 Subject to the Court's approval, the Parties have agreed on Phoenix Settlement
10 Administrators ("Phoenix") as the Settlement Administrator. Phoenix is qualified and has
11 significant experience administering class action settlements, including numerous wage and
12 hour matters. Phoenix's fees will not exceed \$15,000.00 and are currently estimated at
13 \$12,500.00. If the Court approves less than the above amount, the difference will remain in the
14 Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating Class Members. [Jones Decl., ¶ 15;
15 Declaration of Michael Moore, ¶¶ 2-17; Exhs. A-B.]

16 **D. The Class Notice**

17 The proposed Notice (Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement) sets out information about
18 this case and explains the basic settlement terms in plain language. The Notice also sets forth
19 the individualized information used to calculate Class Members' Individual Settlement
20 Payments and each Class Member's estimated settlement award. The Notice likewise details
21 the procedures for Class Members to dispute their individual information, the procedure for
22 submitting an objection to the Settlement, and the procedure to request exclusion. In sum, the
23 Notice provides the Class Members with the information necessary to evaluate the Settlement,
24 provides fair opportunity to participate in, opt out of, or object to the proposed Settlement, and
25 otherwise complies with California Rules of Court 3.769(f) and 3.766(d). Coupled with the
26 notice procedure, the proposed Notice provides the Class with the best notice practicable.
27 [Jones Decl., ¶ 16.]

28 / / / /

1 **E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object**

2 Class Members will have sixty (60) days to dispute the information in their Notice used
3 to calculate their settlement award, and also have sixty (60) days to submit any objections to the
4 settlement or to request exclusion. In the event a Class Member disputes their individual
5 information, the Settlement Administrator will review the Class Member's records as well as
6 any additional information submitted, and make a final determination. [Jones Decl., ¶ 17.]

7 **F. Release of Claims**

8 All Participating Class Members will be deemed to release Newport Fab from all claims
9 alleged in the operative complaint, or that could have been brought based on the allegations in
10 the operative complaint from March 21, 2018 to April 13, 2024, including PAGA claims for the
11 period August 23, 2021 through April 13, 2024, . The release is limited to the claims that were
12 actually pleaded or could have been pleaded based on the alleged facts in the operative
13 complaint. [Jones Decl., ¶ 18.]

14 **G. Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Plaintiff's Enhancement Award**

15 The settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a request for reasonable
16 attorney's fees not to exceed one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, or \$1,300,000.00, nor
17 will it oppose a request for reimbursement of actual litigation costs and expenses of up to
18 \$30,000.00. Defendant also will not oppose a request for an enhancement award to Plaintiffs of
19 not more than \$10,000.00 each in recognition of their time spent on this matter, the risks each
20 undertook on behalf of the class, and the benefit conferred to the class. Plaintiffs' counsel will
21 provide the Court with appropriate summaries and evidence of their efforts and time records in
22 anticipation of the Final Approval Hearing, and Plaintiffs have submitted their declarations
23 herewith. If the Court approves less than the above amounts, the difference will remain in the
24 Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating Class Members. [Jones Decl., ¶ 19;
25 Declaration of John Yslas ("Yslas Decl."), ¶¶ 16-25.]

26 **H. PAGA Claims and Notice to the LWDA**

27 The Parties allocated \$100,000.00 to payment of civil penalties under PAGA for such
28 claims against Newport Fab, as addressed in more detail below, and which amount Plaintiffs

1 submit is fair, reasonable and adequate and consistent with PAGA’s underlying purposes. As
2 required by Labor Code section 2699(l)(2), Plaintiffs gave notice of the settlement and
3 preliminary approval hearing to the LWDA via its online portal, and further served the LWDA
4 with this motion. [Jones Decl., ¶ 20; Exh. 3.]

5 **IV. ARGUMENT**

6 **A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement**

7 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can
8 be conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of formal litigation. H. Newberg & A.
9 Conte, 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle
10 (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953; Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber
11 Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 602. Nevertheless, to ensure the rights of absent class members are
12 not unjustly compromised, settlement of a class action requires court approval. Cal. Rule of
13 Court. 3.769; Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; Dunk v. Ford
14 Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. This judicial review protects against fraud or
15 collusion and ensures fairness to the class members. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-01. Judicial
16 review occurs via a two-step process to determine, under all the circumstances, if the proposed
17 settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. Id. at 1801; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

18 The first step is a motion for preliminary approval, through which the parties present the
19 court with the proposed settlement and seek a determination that it is sufficiently fair and
20 reasonable to warrant notice to the class and further proceedings as to its fairness and adequacy.
21 Cal. Rule of Court 3.769(c). This preliminary evaluation determines if the proposed settlement
22 is within the “range of reasonableness” and if notice should be provided to the class regarding
23 the settlement’s proposed terms and conditions, and whether a final fairness hearing should be
24 scheduled. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-35; North County Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v.
25 TouchTWC Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90. Considering the strong judicial
26 policy favoring settlement of class actions, courts generally apply a presumption of fairness to
27 class action settlements when (1) the settlement results from arms-length bargaining, (2)
28 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3)

counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

If the court grants preliminary approval, it then orders the class be given notice in an appropriate manner, establishes a schedule and procedures for class members to request exclusion or object, and sets the matter for a final fairness hearing. Typically, any motion for attorney's fees and costs, and any enhancement for the class representative(s), is filed subsequent to preliminary approval and heard with the motion for final approval, as part of the second step of the two-step approval process. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 232.

The proposed settlement in this matter warrants preliminary approval under the liberal standard discussed above, as it is fair, reasonable and adequate under all the circumstances, and represents a favorable result for the class.

B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified

The purpose of conditional class certification for purposes of settlement is to facilitate provision of notice of the proposed settlement's terms, and the date and time of the final fairness hearing. In this context, courts apply lesser scrutiny than they would otherwise in the context of certifying a class. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1807, n.19; Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 839 ("[I]t is well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class.").

In the present matter, conditional certification is proper since Plaintiffs contend, and Defendant does not dispute for purposes of this settlement, that this matter satisfies all requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. First, Plaintiffs contend that the class is both sufficiently numerous, consisting of approximately 1,195 individuals, and ascertainable by reference to Defendant's personnel and payroll records. [Jones Decl., ¶ 21.] Next, Plaintiffs contend that they are adequate class representatives, as their claims do not conflict with and are not antagonistic to the claims of other class members. Further, Plaintiffs contend that their claims are typical given each is a member of the class and their respective claims arise from the same employment practices and course of conduct giving rise

1 to the claims of the other class members. [Jones Decl., ¶ 22; Declaration of Valeria Bolanos, ¶¶
2 2-9; Declaration of Fanny Thorng, ¶¶ 2-13.] Lastly, Plaintiffs' counsel are experienced and
3 adequate class counsel. [Jones Decl., ¶¶ 39-44; Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 26-36.]

4 Next, Plaintiffs contend that common questions of law and fact predominate –
5 particularly for purposes of a settlement class – as the Class Members were all subject to the
6 same meal and rest break policies, the same rounding policy that allegedly shorted them on
7 hours worked, etc. Since the focus of the claims against Newport Fab concerns the legality of
8 common policies applied uniformly to the entire class, common issues predominate over
9 individualized inquiries concerning liability. Newport Fab's time rounding policy is company-
10 wide policy applied equally and consistently to all class members, and this policy is either
11 compliant with California law or it is not. Regardless of that determination, it will decide
12 liability for all class members one way or another. Similarly, whether Newport Fab's break
13 policies resulted in non-compliant meal periods presents another common issue. [Jones Decl., ¶
14 23]

15 By now it is well-settled that a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform
16 policy violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification.
17 Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform
18 policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are
19 of the sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior
20 Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question
21 of fact or law that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is the
22 superior means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. [Jones Decl., ¶ 24.]

23 C. **The Proposed Settlement Meets the Dunk and Kullar Factors and is**
24 **within the Range of Reasonableness**

25 The proposed settlement resulted from serious, arms-length negotiations facilitated by
26 respected mediator Todd Smith, Esq., who has extensive experience mediating wage and hour
27 class actions. [Jones Decl., ¶ 10.] Plaintiff's counsel Zachary Crosner, Jamie Serb and Michael
28 Jones, and Crosner Legal, PC, and John Yslas, Jeffrey Bills, Aram Boyadjian, and Andrew

1 Sandoval and Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, all have years of litigation experience, including litigating
2 wage and hour class actions. Plaintiffs' counsel are well-qualified to evaluate the risks and
3 benefits of pursuing further litigation or settling the matter. [Jones Decl., ¶¶ 39-44; Yslas Decl.,
4 ¶¶ 26-36.]

5 California law recognizes several factors bearing on the fairness, adequacy, and
6 reasonableness of a proposed class settlement. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
7 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. In relevant part, these factors include: 1) the amount offered in settlement
8 2) the strength of plaintiff's case; 3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
9 litigation; 4) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout trial; 5) the experience and
10 views of counsel; and 6) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. Id. As
11 demonstrated below, the proposed settlement satisfies these requirements.

12 Prior to mediation, the parties engaged in extensive informal discovery to facilitate
13 settlement discussions. As a result, Plaintiffs reviewed documents and information regarding
14 Newport Fab's payroll practices, pay stubs and time records for a sampling of class members,
15 meal and rest break policies, etc., and information from Defendant regarding class size and
16 breakdown of job positions, work weeks, rates of pay, and other information used to formulate a
17 damages model. This extensive information was then analyzed by a consulting expert to look for
18 meal and rest break violation rates, time lost due to rounding, time spent working off the clock
19 due to donning/doffing, security checks, etc., and other issues relevant to liability and damages.
20 Plaintiffs' counsel are confident they obtained sufficient information to enable them to understand
21 the law and facts of this case and make an informed decision regarding the proposed settlement
22 and whether it is in the best interests of the class. [Jones Decl., ¶¶ 9, 25; Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.]

23 Using that data, Plaintiffs ran various calculations and estimated Newport Fab's likely
24 maximum exposure on the class claims at approximately \$33.18 million, including about
25 \$58,500 on the rounding claim, \$2.372 million on the off the clock/unpaid wage claims,
26 approximately \$10.022 million on the meal period claims, about \$13.163 million on the rest
27 period claims, approximately \$895,000 on the expense reimbursement claim, around \$3.712
28 million on the wage statement claims, and \$2.957 million on the waiting time penalty claims.

1 [Jones Decl., ¶¶ 26-27.] Plaintiffs and their counsel substantially discounted the value of these
2 claims, however, in light of Defendant’s multi-layered defenses on both class certification and
3 on the merits, and the multiple and considerable risks posed by proceeding with the litigation.

4 The unpaid wage claims focus primarily on Newport Fab’s alleged failure to pay Class
5 Members at least minimum wages and/ or overtime wages for all of their hours worked.
6 Per Defendant’s CBAs, employees had to be at their workstation at the beginning of their shift,
7 meaning they typically clocked in a few minutes early in order to be at their station on time. Per
8 Plaintiffs, this policy, when coupled with Defendant’s rounding policy, resulted in employees
9 losing a few minutes of time per shift even though Defendant’s time keeping system captured
10 every minute on the clock. Delmer Camp v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th
11 638, 660 (employer should pay for exact amount of time worked during a shift if employer
12 captures that time). Second, Plaintiffs’ allege a policy requiring them to go through a lengthy
13 donning/doffing process with required protective equipment, and also undergoing a security
14 checkpoint process when entering and leaving the work facility. *E.g.*, Frlekin v. Apple Inc.
15 (2020) 8 Cal. 5th 1038 (finding time undergoing mandatory bag checks compensable). Per
16 Plaintiffs, Defendant required employees to go through the donning and doffing process and
17 security checkpoint *before* clocking in at the beginning of their shifts, and *after* clocking out at
18 the end of their shifts, which could take several minutes each shift. [Jones Decl., ¶ 28.]

19 In response, Defendant contends that its payroll policies are fully compliant, that it
20 properly tracked and paid for all hours worked at the appropriate hourly wage. Defendant also
21 emphasized time rounding is permissible under California law so long it has an overall neutral
22 effect on employee time and compensation. See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012)
23 210 Cal.App.4th 889. Additionally, Defendant contends that any donning/doffing was done on
24 the clock and compensated for and, to the extent it was not on the clock, it was done against
25 company policy and without the company’s knowledge. White v. Starbucks Corp. (N.D. Cal.
26 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083 (employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of the
27 off the clock work). Defendant likewise contends that the issue would not be certifiable since it
28 would require individualized inquiries whether any compensable “off the clock” work occurred,

1 whether for donning/doffing, security checks, or otherwise, and why it was or was not
2 documented and paid for. [Jones Decl., ¶ 29.]

3 On the meal and rest break claims, Plaintiffs contend that Newport Fab's written policies
4 are not fully compliant, and Plaintiffs' review of the time and payroll records provided
5 suggested these deficiencies in the written policies affected employee breaks. For example,
6 Plaintiffs' analysis showed a 76.4% violation rate for "de facto" meal period violations,
7 primarily for late meal periods starting after the fifth hour of work. Indeed, per Plaintiffs, many
8 lunches weren't even scheduled to start until well after the fifth hour, in violation of the Labor
9 Code. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant's rounding policy resulted in shortened meal
10 breaks. Donohue v. Amn Servs. (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 58, 68 (even small intrusion into meal period
11 time results in a violation). Lastly, Plaintiffs emphasized they did not receive second meal
12 periods on shifts greater than 10 hours, and that any waivers of second breaks were invalid and
13 unenforceable. Saechao v. Landry's Inc. (N.D. Cal., Mar. 15, 2016, No. C 15-00815 WHA)
14 2016 WL 1029479, at *4 ("Whether or not California law permits an employer to utilize
15 prospective meal-break waivers remains an open question which can plainly be resolved on a
16 class-wide basis."). [Jones Decl., ¶ 30.]

17 Plaintiffs also contend that employees were consistently required to work in excess of
18 four hours (or major fraction thereof) without receiving lawful rest periods. Plaintiffs argued
19 they did not receive a net ten minute break after accounting for walking from their work station
20 to the break room and back, and further that rest periods were interrupted and/or cut short by
21 management and other employees requiring assistance. [Jones Decl., ¶ 31.]

22 In response, Newport Fab contends that its written break policies and related CBA
23 provisions are fully compliant, that it provided employees with the opportunity to receive all
24 required breaks, and that class members validly waived their second meal periods. Defendant
25 further maintained that, in light of its compliant policies and related CBA provisions, whether a
26 class member missed a meal period, received a late meal period, or missed a rest break would
27 have been aberrational and against company policy. Thus, per Newport Fab, these issues are
28

1 not amenable to class or representative treatment since their resolution would require
2 individualized inquiries as to why a break was missed or non-compliant. [Jones Decl., ¶ 32.]

3 On the expense reimbursement claim, Plaintiffs allege that throughout their
4 employment, they and the class members were required to use their personal cell phones in
5 order to communicate with supervisors and other employees during work hours. The aggrieved
6 employees would not have been able to successfully accomplish their duties without incurring
7 these business expenses. However, Defendant did not reimburse Plaintiffs and the class
8 members for this expense. Cochran v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 113
9 (2014) ("We hold that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work-related
10 calls, Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to reimburse them. Whether the
11 employees have cell phone plans with unlimited minutes or limited minutes, the reimbursement
12 owed is a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills."). On the other hand, Defendant
13 contends that there would be no conceivable need for employees to use their phones for work
14 and that any use of employee phones was purely for personal convenience and therefore not
15 reimbursable. [Jones Decl., ¶ 33.]

16 The claims under Labor Code sections 203 and 226 are derivative of the primary unpaid
17 wage claims, and accordingly are subject to the same risks and uncertainties plus additional
18 risks posed by the need to take into account the discretionary nature of such awards and the
19 "good faith" and other defenses available to Defendant. Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008)
20 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1203-4 (employer did not willfully fail to pay wages under Labor Code
21 § 203 even though class prevailed on underlying claim for failure to pay living wages). Thus,
22 while these claims largely are derivative of the unpaid wage claim, they also are subject to
23 additional defenses. [Jones Decl., ¶ 34.]

24 Finally, Defendant contends that the applicable CBA's controlled and exempted it from
25 liability for meal breaks and overtime under Labor Code sections 510 and 512, and further that
26 the CBA's required arbitration of employment disputes. Plaintiff's countered by noting that
27 such exemptions apply only if the CBA provides for a regular hourly rate of pay of not less than
28 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate, and further noting that in many instances the

1 base hourly wage for class members was less than the required threshold. Thus, per Plaintiffs,
2 the CBAs were inapplicable and did not exempt Newport Fab from potential liability or
3 otherwise impact Plaintiffs' claims in any way. [Jones Decl., ¶ 35.]

4 As far as potential PAGA liability, the allegedly aggrieved employees theoretically are
5 entitled to penalties totaling around \$18 million in civil penalties should Plaintiffs prevail on all
6 claims and establish violations of the multiple Labor Code sections at issue for each and every
7 pay period. [Jones Decl., ¶ 36.] As with the class claims, Plaintiffs discounted the potential PAGA
8 penalties based on Defendant's various defenses on the merits and also accounted for the Court's
9 wide discretion to reduce such penalties, or to decline to award penalties at all. Labor Code §
10 2699(e)(2); Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (trial court awarded
11 penalties of \$5 per pay period after a bench trial, which decision was upheld on appeal); In re
12 Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 (PAGA
13 penalties denied after trial). Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$100,000 to PAGA penalties, and
14 Plaintiffs submit this amount is reasonable under the circumstances and in line with comparable
15 settlements in other wage and hour class actions in California. *E.g.*, Van Kempen v. Matheson
16 Tri-Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final approval
17 of \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement); Slavkov
18 v. First Water Heater Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303 (finding
19 a \$7,500 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of \$345,000
20 and the possible weaknesses in Plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement). Additionally,
21 the LWDA has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement, and will be
22 able to weigh in as necessary. Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018
23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6% where
24 "[p]laintiffs [have] submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has not
25 objected to the settlement.

26 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may find any kind of class or
27 representative resolution unachievable or deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff's claims.
28 Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued

1 litigation would be lengthy and expensive as the parties pursued merits discovery, motion to
2 certify the class, a probable motion to decertify, as well as trial and possible appeals, and would
3 further and substantially delay any recovery by the class with no assurance of recovering
4 significantly more than the proposed settlement. While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of
5 these claims, legitimate controversies exist regarding each one of them. Plaintiffs also recognize
6 that proving the amount of wages and penalties due each Class Member would be an expensive,
7 time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. [Jones Decl., ¶¶ 28-37.]

8 Plaintiffs and their counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the
9 risks discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially
10 greater benefit if the litigation continued. Plaintiffs and counsel concluded – in light of these
11 very real and substantial risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and
12 costly litigation was in the best interests of the class, and the overall \$3,900,000.00 recovery
13 represents a significant percentage of Defendant’s potential exposure. Given these risks, a total
14 recovery for the class of \$3,900,000.00, which will result in average award of over \$2,000.00
15 per class member, is a significant result well within the range of reasonableness considering all
16 potential outcomes, and it will provide direct monetary awards to all Class Members without
17 further delay. [Jones Decl., ¶ 38; Yslas Decl., ¶ 15.]

18 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might
19 be achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
20 adequate. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the
21 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially
22 narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class
23 settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which
24 each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation”); Lane v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir.
25 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 (“[T]he question whether a settlement is fundamentally fair . . . is
26 different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the estimation of the reviewing
27 court”); 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135,
28 1150 (“The fact that a proposed settlement may amount to only a fraction of the potential


recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and reasonable even though it represented 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims). Importantly as well, the proposed settlement is non-reversionary and will provide timely benefits to the Class Members without a claims process. White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at <http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf> (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiffs and their counsel submit that the settlement is within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant this motion, conditionally certify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval to the proposed class action settlement, and enter the [Proposed] Order filed herewith.

Dated: June 12, 2024,

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