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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA**

DAGIM WOLDETSADIK, an individual,
on behalf of himself and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE MILLENNIUM GROUP OF
DELAWARE, INC., a Corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE No. **23CV049184**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARD**

Hearing Date: July 15, 2025

Hearing Time: 2:30 p.m.

Reservation ID: 615810168307

*[Hearing scheduled by Order dated February 11,
2025]*

Judge: Hon. Somnath Raj Chatterjee
Dept.: 21

Action Filed: October 25, 2023

Trial Date: Not set

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and on November 20, 2024, the Court
3 preliminarily approved the First Amended Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
4 (“Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman
5 Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated February
6 11, 2025 (“Preliminary Approval Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the
7 Class.²

8 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
9 should be finally approved. Plaintiff Dagim Woldetsadik (“Plaintiff”) respectfully moves for final
10 approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service award, and the proposed entry of the Final
11 Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent result for
12 the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the notice to
13 the 237 members of the Class, **there were no objections and no requests for exclusion from the**
14 **Class, which means that the entire Class (100%) has elected to participate in the**
15 **Settlement.** Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class evidencing their collective
16 approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the settlement should be finally
17 approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable,
18 and adequate.

19 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

20 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
21 The Millennium Group of Delaware, Inc. (“Defendant”) is One Million Two Hundred Fifty
22 Thousand Dollars (\$1,250,000) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”) (Agreement at ¶ 1.23.) Under the

24 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

25 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant in
26 California, including any employees staffed with Defendant by a third party, who were classified as
27 non-exempt in California and who did not execute Arbitration Agreements at any time during the Class
28 Period.” The “Class Period” is defined as “October 25, 2019, through February 11, 2025.”(Preliminary
Approval Order at ¶ 6; Agreement at ¶ 1.14.)

1 Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of the
2 Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and
3 Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Service
4 Award to Plaintiff; and (5) the PAGA Penalties payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.23.) Blumenthal Decl.
5 ¶3(a). The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. *Id.* The Gross
6 Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. *Id.* Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The
7 following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

8 **\$1,250,000 (Gross Settlement Amount)**

- 9 - \$15,000 (Plaintiff's proposed service award not to exceed \$15,000)
10 - \$55,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
11 - \$416,666 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
12 - \$25,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
13 - \$8,490 (Administration Expenses Payment)

14 **\$729,844 (Net Settlement Amount)**

15 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
16 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

17 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
18 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
19 is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 3.) In sum, the Settlement valued
20 at \$1,250,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact
21 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted
22 by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class
23 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,
24 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

25 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
26 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

27 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
28 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are
the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

1 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable
2 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
3 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
4 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
5 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
6 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
7 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

8 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
9 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
10 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
11 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
12 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
13 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
14 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
15 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

16 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

17 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v. Ford*
18 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688
19 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement
20 is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The well-recognized
21 factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement
22 agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
23 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
24 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views
25 of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
26 proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008) (internal
27 citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408
28 (2010).

1 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
2 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
3 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement
4 is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that
5 the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.* “Ultimately, the
6 [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross
7 approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

8 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
9 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

10 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

11 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
12 and the Court to Act Intelligently

13 Over more than a year of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of the claims,
14 including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full and
15 complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history and
16 investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval. The
17 Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations through an
18 all-day mediation presided over by David Rotman, Esq. The details of the litigation are set forth in the
19 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

20 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

21 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
22 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continue to deny any
23 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and Class
24 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
25 Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class Counsel
26 who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

27 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with David Rotman, Esq., a respected
28 and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement. In

1 preparation for the mediation, Defendant provided to Plaintiff and Class Counsel payroll and
2 employment data and other information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and
3 other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the
4 assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting. Blumenthal Decl. 7(b). Both Plaintiff and Defendant
5 prepared and submitted mediation briefs to the mediator. Following this all-day mediation, the Parties
6 agreed to this Settlement based upon a mediator's proposal. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

7 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
8 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
9 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (where settlement was "negotiated
10 and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the litigation, with the assistance of a
11 well-respected mediator" this factor supports approval of the settlement").

12 From September 2024 to November of 2024, the original settlement agreement and exhibits
13 thereto were finalized and executed. On December 17, 2024, the Court issued a Tentative Ruling on
14 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval that requested an amended settlement agreement to address
15 certain concerns raised by the Court. Subsequently, the Agreement was executed in January 2025 that
16 addressed all the Court's concerns. On February 11, 2025, the Court entered the Order granting
17 preliminary approval of the settlement as fair and reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

18 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

19 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
20 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
21 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
22 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
23 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
24 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the Blumenthal
25 Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement discussions and
26 have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and in the best interests of the Class.
27 Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

1 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

2 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On March 18,
3 2025, the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided
4 each class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the
5 financial terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being
6 sought, how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment
7 amount to that individual. See Declaration of Madely Nava ("Nava Decl.") ¶ 7, Exh. A. In
8 disseminating the notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in
9 its Preliminary Approval Order. Significantly, there have been no objections and no requests to opt-out.
10 Nava Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. As such, the entire Class (100 %) will participate in the Settlement and will be
11 sent a settlement check. See Nava Decl. at ¶¶ 13-15; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

12 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
13 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
14 2000) ("If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
15 adequacy of the settlement."); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
16 objections out of 281 member class "strongly favors settlement"); *Laskey v. Int'l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
17 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
18 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
19 approval of the class is evident.

20 5. The Strength of Plaintiff's Case

21 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiff and other Class Members were not properly paid all
22 overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate, were not provided meal and rest periods, were
23 not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not
24 provided accurate itemized wage statements, were not paid all sick pay at the correct rate, and were not
25 paid all wages at the time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees,
26 litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiff and the other
27 Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

28 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*

1 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
2 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
3 that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that Class
4 Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded. Defendant
5 argued there was no miscalculation of the regular rate when paying wages. Defendant contends that its
6 meal and rest period policies fully complied with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide
7 the opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendant contends that there was no failure
8 to pay for business expenses and any cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that
9 reimbursement was not legally required. Finally, Defendant could argue that the Supreme Court
10 decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's claims, on liability,
11 value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also argues that based
12 on its facially lawful practices, Defendant acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted
13 would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo*
14 *v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1065 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good
15 faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage statement in compliance with the
16 requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage
17 statement law.") If successful, Defendant's defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any
18 recovery to the Class. While Plaintiff believes that these defenses could be overcome, Defendant
19 maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class.
20 Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

21 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

23 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
24 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
25 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

26 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007 U.S.
27 Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
28 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
approval.").

1 As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

2 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
3 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
4 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
5 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
6 payment to class members. ...the Court agrees, the actual recovery confers substantial
7 benefits on the class that outweigh the potential recovery through full adjudication.

8 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
9 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

10 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
11 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf
12 of any employees other than himself. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed the
13 propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as
14 demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59
15 Cal.4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the
16 class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims,
17 class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial
18 was by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

19 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
20 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
21 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. The maximum and average class member
22 allocation (in addition to their Individual PAGA Payment) are \$14,574.04 and \$3,079.51, respectively.
23 *See Nava Decl.* ¶15. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of
24 proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally
25 approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

26 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

27 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
28 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event of
an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years to
resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case
could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh

1 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

2 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant
3 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have
4 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
5 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
6 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
7 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
8 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
9 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement
10 set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

11 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
12 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
13 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
14 to those in this litigation:

15 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
16 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
17 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
18 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
19 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
20 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

21 *Id.* at *12.

22 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

23 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
24 to Plaintiff's claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
25 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
26 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon the 237 Participating Class Members who collectively
27 worked 13,421 Workweeks, which were the estimated class figures at mediation, the Gross Settlement
28 Amount provides a value of \$5,274 per Class Member and \$93 per Workweek and after deductions, the
Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$3,079.51 per Class Member and a recovery
of \$54.38 per Workweek. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

1 The calculations to compensate for the amount due to the Class Members at the time the
2 Settlement was negotiated were calculated by Plaintiff's expert, Berger Consulting, in advance of
3 mediation. Class Counsel analyzed the data for putative class members and determined the potential
4 maximum damages for the class claims. For the Class, the maximum value of the claim for unpaid
5 wages due to alleged rounding practices was \$145,718, the maximum potential damages were calculated
6 to be \$59,242 for the alleged unpaid wages due to rounding practices, \$707 for the alleged unpaid wages
7 due to the alleged regular rate miscalculation, \$525,215 for the alleged for alleged meal period damages
8 based upon a 30% potential violation rate for shifts worked, \$552,567 for alleged rest period damages
9 based upon the same potential 30% violation rate observed for meal periods, \$148,740 for alleged
10 unreimbursed business expenses at \$30 per month. As a result, the total damage valuation was
11 calculated that Defendant was subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$1,286,470. As
12 to potential penalties, Plaintiff calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum of
13 between \$122,733 and \$608,758, depending on the predicate violation giving rise to the penalty, and
14 potential maximum wage statement penalties were \$444,000.³ Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiff's
15 calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 8(d).

16 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,250,000 represents more than 97% of the
17 maximum value of the alleged damages, and more than 53% of the combination of the maximum
18 damages and statutory penalties, at the time this Settlement was negotiated. Importantly, the recent
19 decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*,
20 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for waiting time and wage statement
21 penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum calculations should then be
22 adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class certification and the risk of establishing class-wide
23
24

25 ³ While Plaintiff alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code §§ 203 and 226, these
26 claims were subject to additional, separate defenses asserted by Defendant, including, a good faith
27 dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for meal or rest periods or other wages were owed
28 given Defendant's position that Class Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom
Commission Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the
employer and employee have a good faith dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

liability on all claims.⁴ Given the amount of the Settlement as compared to the potential value of the claims, the Settlement is most certainly fair and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met.

V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED

A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method

Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*

⁴ Because the PAGA claim does not provide a recovery to the Class, Plaintiff did not include the PAGA claim in this discussion of the class claim valuation. The PAGA claim was addressed in the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶ 33 filed in support of the motion for preliminary approval.

⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming approval of a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See also *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of maximum valuation).

1 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503 (2016) (“We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
2 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
3 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
4 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund
5 created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the market”
6 in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

7 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
8 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
9 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
10 in legal services. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503 (2016), the California Supreme
11 Court both endorsed the award of a fee as a percentage of that fund, and expressly approved one-third
12 (1/3) as a reasonable percentage in a contingent common fund class settlement. Such similar awards by
13 other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

14 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund.
15 Here, Plaintiff and his counsel secured a \$1,250,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class and none
16 of the Class Members elected to opt out. Similarly, not one Class Member objected. The Settlement was
17 possible only because Class Counsel was able to successfully navigating hurdles and displayed the
18 necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above, there
19 were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*, 297
20 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**
21 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

22 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is
23 relevant to the ... reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
24 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
25 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that
26 Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, to date, there are no objections.

27 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
28 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly

1 contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the
2 risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant
3 who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency**
4 **fee basis, whether in private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above**
5 **their hourly rate in order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g.*
6 *Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk
7 enhancement); *Stetson v. Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply
8 risk multiplier).

9 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
10 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$416,666 is also established by reference to Class
11 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
12 **that through June 17, 2025, Class Counsel's total lodestar is \$197,822.50, with significant**
13 **additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.**
14 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibit #3. The requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to
15 Class Counsel's total lodestar with a reasonable multiplier cross-check of 2.1, and there will be
16 additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the
17 settlement distribution and reports. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12. Such a lodestar cross-check is within the
18 range of positive multipliers approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*,
19 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁶ For such reasons, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in
20 the amount of one-third of the common fund is reasonable and should be approved.

21 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

22 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a "Class Counsel
23 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$55,000." Class Counsel have incurred \$41,193.63 based

24
25 ⁶ See *Laffitte*, *supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
26 *supra*, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278
27 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
28 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
Cases, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as "fair and reasonable"); *Chavez*
v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight,*
Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

1 upon counsel's billing records, which is less than the "not to exceed amount" of \$55,000. Class
2 Counsel, therefore, requests reimbursement for litigation expenses in the capped amount of \$41,193.63.
3 These litigation expenses include the expenses incurred for filing fees, postage, photocopies, mediation
4 expenses, expert expenses (Berger Consulting), and attorney service charges (Knox, OneLegal),
5 Superior Court document purchases, and research charges (LexisNexis), all of which are costs normally
6 billed to and paid by the client.⁷ The details of the expenses incurred are set forth the Blumenthal Decl.
7 at ¶13 and Exhibit #3. Because these expenses were reasonably incurred and necessary to the successful
8 prosecution of these claims, the request is reasonable and should be granted.

9 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

10 Plaintiff respectfully submits that for his service as the class representative, Plaintiff should be
11 awarded the service award of \$15,000 in accordance with the Agreement for his time, risk and effort
12 expended on behalf of the Class as the class representatives. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Defendant has
13 agreed to this payment and there have been no objections to the requested service award. **Notably, the**
14 **requested service award compares favorably to the recovery to the Class because some Individual**
15 **Class Payments exceed \$14,000.** The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent
16 service awards approved in California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case.
17 Plaintiff's Declaration is submitted in support of this request and is attached as Exhibits #5 to the
18 Blumenthal Decl.

19 As the sole representative of the Class, Plaintiff performed his duties to the Class admirably and
20 without exception. Plaintiff worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
21 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
22 settlement documentation. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14. The Plaintiff's Declaration details the
23 involvement, stress and risks he undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiff also assumed the serious
24 risk that he might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational risk of

25
26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties' agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, "[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
28 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits,
documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable." *Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.*, 2012
WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 being “blacklisted” by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of employees.
2 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15. Without the Plaintiff’s participation, cooperation and information, no other
3 employees would be receiving any benefit. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

4 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount
5 is within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews v. Plains All Am.*
6 *Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (service awards of \$15,000 each
7 are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal.
8 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist.
9 LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500). Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests
10 approval of the Service Awards in accordance with the Agreement.

11 **VI. CONCLUSION**

12 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
13 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate
14 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

15 Respectfully submitted,

16 Dated: June 17, 2025

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Attorneys for Plaintiff