

MARALLE MESSRELIAN (SBN 316974)

maralle@mmlawapc.com

MM LAW, APC

500 N. Brand Blvd., Ste 2000

Glendale, CA 91203

Telephone (818) 810-7747

Facsimile (818) 230-9018

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

DANIEL A. TARACENA ROBLEDO, and all others similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

(UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

DANIEL A. TARACENA ROBLEDO, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and the general public, and as an
“Aggrieved Employee” on behalf of other
“Aggrieved Employees” under the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

PLENITUDE FOOD CRAFTS, LLC; and
DOES 1 to 25, inclusive,

Defendant(s).

Case No.: 25CV133325

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFF’S
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
STIPULATION FOR CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE OF
CLAIMS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES**

Action filed: 07/22/2025
Hearing Date: 08/04/2026
Hearing Time: 2:30 p.m.
Hearing Dept: 21, Hon. S. Raj
Chatterjee

Reservation ID: 500844714572

Submitted Herewith Under Separate Cover

1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities;
2. Declaration of Maralle Messrelian;
3. Declaration of Daniel A. Taracena Robledo;
4. Declaration of Lisa Mullins; and
5. [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 4, 2026 at 2:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 the matter may be heard, in Department 21 of the above-entitled court, located at 1221 Oak
4 Street, Oakland, CA 94612, Plaintiff Daniel A. Taracena Robledo (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby
5 does move this Court for an order: (1) granting class certification of the Class solely for
6 settlement purposes pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) preliminarily approving the
7 Stipulation for Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release of Claims (the “Settlement”)¹,
8 (3) appointing Maralle Messrelian of MM Law, APC as Class Counsel; (5) appointing Plaintiff
9 as Class Representative; (6) approving the use of the proposed notice procedures and related
10 forms; (7) directing that notice be mailed to the proposed Class; and (8) scheduling a hearing
11 date for motion for final approval of class action settlement and awards of attorneys’ fees and
12 costs.

13 The “Settlement Class” or “Class Member(s)” means all current and former non-exempt,
14 hourly paid employees who worked for Defendant Plenitude Food Crafts, LLC in California at
15 any time during the Class Period. “Class Period” means the time from July 22, 2021 to June 30,
16 2025.

17 This Motion, unopposed by Defendant, is made on the following grounds: (1) the Class
18 meets all the requirements for class certification for settlement purposes only under Code of
19 Civil Procedure § 382; (2) Plaintiff and his counsel are adequate to represent the Class; (3) the
20 Settlement reflects a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of all disputed claims in view of
21 Defendant’s potential liability exposure as compared against the risks of continued litigation; (4)
22 the proposed notice procedures and related forms adequately apprise Class Members of their
23 rights under the Settlement and fully comport with due process; and (5) in view of the foregoing,
24 notice should be disseminated to Class Members and a hearing date for a motion for final
25 approval of class action settlement and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs should be set.

26 The Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of
27 Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Maralle Messrelian, Daniel A. Taracena Robledo,
28 and Lisa Mullins, the exhibits, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all
29 matters judicially noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in

¹ The Settlement is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Maralle Messrelian (“MM”), which is submitted herewith under a separate cover.

1 connection with the hearing on the Motion.

2 Respectfully submitted,

3 MM LAW, APC

4
5 Dated: July 10, 2026

By: Maralle Messrelian
6 MARALLE MESSRELIAN
7 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	vi
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.....	2
A. Plaintiff’s Claims and Procedural History.....	2
B. Mediation with Professional Neutral Lisa Klerman, Esq.	2
III. OVERVIEW OF SETTLEMENT.....	3
A. Settlement Class Definition.....	3
B. Monetary Terms	3
C. Release of Claims	5
D. Class Notice and Settlement Administration.....	7
1. Procedures for Class Member Disputes	8
2. Procedures for Opting Out of the Class.....	8
3. Procedures for Objecting to the Settlement.....	8
E. Uncashed Checks.....	9
IV. CERTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED CLASS IS APPROPRIATE.....	9
1. The Settlement Class Is Objectively Ascertainable.....	9
2. The Membership of the Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.	10
3. Class Members Share a Well-Defined Community of Interest.	10
4. Plaintiff Is Typical of the Settlement Class.....	11
5. Plaintiff Will Adequately Represent the Settlement Class.....	12
6. Class Action Treatment Is the Superior Means for Resolving the Claims of the Class Members.	13
V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE, AND THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL.....	13
A. Legal Standard.....	13

1	B. The Settlement Is Presumptively Fair	13
2	C. The Settlement Satisfies the <i>Kullar</i> Factors for Approval.	14
3	1. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Case.....	14
4	2. Allocation of the PAGA Payment	20
5	3. Presence of Governmental Participant	20
6	4. Reaction of Class Members to Proposed Settlement.....	21
7	VI. THE SETTLEMENT FAIRLY, REASONABLY, AND ADEQUATELY COMPENSATES	
8	CLASS MEMBERS BECAUSE EACH CLASS MEMBER WILL BE PAID BASED ON	
9	THE POTENTIAL EXTENT OF HIS OR HER INJURY COMPARED TO OTHER CLASS	
10	MEMBERS.....	21
11	VII.....ALLOCATION FOR CLASS COUNSEL’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IS	
12	APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED.	21
13	VIII. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF IS	
14	FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY	
15	APPROVED.	22
16	IX. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR AND	
17	REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED.	23
18	X. THE PROPOSED NOTICE AND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION PLAN SHOULD	
19	BE APPROVED BECAUSE IT IS REASONABLY CALCULATED TO GIVE ACTUAL	
20	NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS AND SUFFICIENT TIME TO EXERCISE THEIR	
21	RIGHTS.....	23
22	XI. CONCLUSION	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases	Page(s)
<i>Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc.</i> (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723	10
<i>Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co.</i> (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 1	18
<i>Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange</i> (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715	22
<i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	10
<i>Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court</i> (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004	17
<i>Capitol People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services</i> (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676	10
<i>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</i> (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504	20
<i>Cartt v. Superior Court</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960	23
<i>Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC</i> (N.D.Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) 2011 WL 67245	20
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	11
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695	10
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	9, 14
<i>Hebbard v. Colgrove</i> (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1017	10
<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> (N.D.Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) 2009 WL 928133	20
///	

1	<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands, Inc.</i>	
2	(N.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2008) 2008 WL 3385452	20
3	<i>Hypolite v. Carleson</i>	
4	(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566	9
5	<i>In re Activision Sec. Litigation</i>	
6	(N.D.Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp. 1373	22
7	<i>In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation</i>	
8	(D.D.C. 1981) 526 F.Supp. 494	22
9	<i>Ketchum v. Moses</i>	
10	(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122	21
11	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i>	
12	(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116	13, 14
13	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Intl, Inc.</i>	
14	(2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480.....	22
15	<i>Laguna v. Coverall N. Am., Inc.</i>	
16	(9th Cir. June 3, 2014) 2014 WL 2465049	20
17	<i>Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.</i>	
18	(N.D.Cal. July 11, 2013) 2013 WL 3541217	20
19	<i>Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.</i>	
20	(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19	21-22
21	<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i>	
22	(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	12
23	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.</i>	
24	(2022) 13 Cal. 5th 93	18
25	<i>Nordstrom Com. Cases</i>	
26	(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576	20
27	<i>Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pacific Enterprises)</i>	
28	(9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373	22
	<i>Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.</i>	
	(1981) 29 Cal.3d 462	9
	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i>	
	(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	9

1	<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i>	
2	(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319	10
3	<i>Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.</i>	
4	(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112	16
5	<i>Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.</i>	
6	(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 134	24
7	<i>Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.</i>	
8	(N.D.Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294	23
9	<i>Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court</i>	
10	(2001) 248 Cal.4th 906	10
11	<i>Washington v. Joe's Crab Shack</i>	
12	(N.D.Cal. 2010) 271 F.R.D. 629	17
13	Statutes	
14	Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17200 et seq.	2, 6, 11
15	Civ. Code, section 1542	7
16	Code Civ. Proc., section 382	1, 9, 13
17	Lab. Code, section 201	2, 6
18	Lab. Code, section 202	2, 6
19	Lab. Code, section 203	2, 6
20	Lab. Code, section 204	2, 6
21	Lab. Code, section 210	6
22	Lab. Code, section 218.5	23
23	Lab. Code, section 218.6	23
24	Lab. Code, section 226	2, 6, 19
25	Lab. Code, section 226.3	6
26	Lab. Code, section 226.7	2, 6
27	Lab. Code, section 510	2, 6
28		

1	Lab. Code, section 512	2,6
2	Lab. Code, section 558	6
3	Lab. Code, section 558.1	6
4	Lab. Code, section 1174	6
5	Lab. Code, section 1174.5	6
6	Lab. Code, section 1194	2, 6
7	Lab. Code, section 1197	2, 6
8	Lab. Code, section 1197.1	6
9	Lab. Code, section 1198	2, 6
10	Lab. Code, section 2698 et seq.	2,3
11	Lab. Code, section 2699	16, 21
12	Lab. Code, section 2802	2, 6
13	Rules	
14	California Rules of Court, rule 3.766	21
15	California Rules of Court, rule 3.769	13,21
16	Other	
17	Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (4th ed. 2002)	11
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Daniel A. Taracena Robledo (“Plaintiff”) submits this memorandum of points
4 and authorities in support of his unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the Stipulation
5 for Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release of Claims (the “Settlement”)¹, which
6 provides for a Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”) of \$335,000 in compromise of all disputed
7 claims on behalf of all current and former non-exempt, hourly paid employees who worked for
8 Defendant Plenitude Food Crafts, LLC (“Defendant” or “Plenitude”) in California at any time
9 during the Class Period of July 22, 2021 to June 30, 2025. Through this Motion, Plaintiff
10 respectfully requests for this Court to (1) provisionally certify the below-defined Class for
11 settlement purposes only under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) preliminarily approve the
12 Settlement; (3) preliminarily appoint Plaintiff as Class Representative; (4) appoint Maralle
13 Messrelian of MM Law, APC as Class Counsel; (5) approve the proposed notice procedures
14 and related forms; and (6) schedule a final approval hearing.

15 This Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion because: (1) for settlement purposes, the
16 Settlement Class meets the requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure §
17 382; (2) the Settlement warrants preliminary approval based on all indicia for fairness,
18 reasonableness, and adequacy; (3) for settlement purposes, Plaintiff is adequate to serve as
19 Class Representative; (4) Plaintiff’s attorneys are adequate to serve as Class Counsel; (5) the
20 proposed notice procedures, and related forms, fully comport with due process and adequately
21 apprise Class Members of their rights; and (6) a final approval hearing must be scheduled to
22 allow Settlement Class members an opportunity to be heard regarding the Settlement and to
23 give it finality. Accordingly, for the reasons detailed below, this Court should grant Plaintiff’s
24 Motion in its entirety and preliminarily approve the Settlement.

25 ///

26 ///

27 _____
28 ¹ The Settlement is attached as Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1 to the Declaration of Maralle Messrelian (“MM”),
which is submitted herewith under a separate cover.

1 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

2 Defendant first began to employ Plaintiff in or around April 28, 2023 as an hourly, non-
3 exempt bakery worker. During his employment, Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s Starter Bakery
4 located at 901 Gilman Street, Berkeley, CA 94710, where his duties included, among other
5 things, laminating dough and preparing and baking bread. Plaintiff’s employment ended on or
6 around March 4, 2025. MM, ¶ 4.

7 **A. Plaintiff’s Claims and Procedural History**

8 On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff notified Defendant and the California Labor and Workforce
9 Development Agency (“LWDA”), pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act of
10 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”), of alleged Labor Code
11 violations committed by Defendant. MM, ¶ 5, Ex. 2.

12 On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the Alameda County
13 Superior Court, Case No. 25CV133325 against Defendant on behalf of himself and others
14 similarly situated, alleging causes of action on a class-wide basis for (1) Failure to Pay All
15 Wages Earned for All Hours Worked at the Correct Rates of Pay (Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194,
16 1197, and 1198); (2) Failure to Provide Rest Breaks (Lab. Code §§ 226.7 and 1198); (3) Failure
17 to Provide Meal Periods (Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 and 1198); (4) Failure to Indemnify (Lab.
18 Code § 2802); (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Lab. Code § 226);
19 (6) Failure To Pay Wages Owed Every Pay Period (Lab. Code § 204); (7) Failure To Pay
20 Wages When Employment Ends (Lab. Code §§ 201–203); (8) Civil Penalties (Lab. Code §§
21 2698, et seq.); and (9) Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). MM, ¶ 6, Ex. 3.
22 The Parties met and conferred and agreed that it may be in their mutual interests to discuss
23 Plaintiff’s allegations informally, rather than through litigation, and stipulated to stay the
24 Action pending a private mediation. MM, ¶¶ 6, 7., Ex. 4.

25 **B. Mediation with Professional Neutral Lisa Klerman, Esq.**

26 On February 9, 2026, the Parties attended and participated in good faith, arms’ length
27 settlement discussions at a mediation session with Lisa Klerman, Esq., an experienced
28 professional mediator. At the conclusion of the mediation, the Parties agreed to the material

1 terms of the Settlement. MM, ¶ 8. Defendant denies any liability or wrongdoing of any kind
2 whatsoever associated with the lawsuit. MM, ¶ 10.

3 In advance of the mediation, and before agreeing to the terms of the Settlement, the
4 Parties engaged in informal discovery. Through informal discovery, Defendant produced its
5 employee handbook, copies of Defendant’s relevant company written policies, time-keeping
6 records, and time and payroll data for a random sample of putative class members specifically
7 selected by Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff retained a data analyst to assess the records produced
8 by Defendant. Now that the Parties have finalized the long-form Settlement, Plaintiff submits
9 it to this Court for preliminary approval. MM, ¶ 9. It is the desire of the Parties to fully, finally,
10 and forever compromise, and discharge all claims known or unknown related to those alleged
11 in Plaintiff’s lawsuit. MM, ¶ 10.

12 **III. OVERVIEW OF SETTLEMENT**

13 **A. Settlement Class Definition**

14 The “Settlement Class” or “Class Member(s)” means all current and former non-
15 exempt, hourly paid employees who worked for Defendant Plenitude Food Crafts, LLC in
16 California at any time during the Class Period. “Class Period” means the time from July 22,
17 2021 to June 30, 2025. Settlement, I.3, I.8.

18 **B. Monetary Terms**

19 In consideration for settlement of the Class Action, Defendant agree to pay a total of
20 Three Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$335,000.00) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”
21 or “GSA”). The GSA will be all-inclusive and includes: (1) all Individual Settlement Payments
22 to Class Members; (2) a Class Representative Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, as class
23 representative and private attorney general, for up to \$10,000; (3) Class Counsel’s Attorneys’
24 Fees of not more than one third of the GSA (\$111,666.67) and for litigation costs not to exceed
25 \$16,000; (4) Settlement Administration Costs of not more than \$7,950; and (5) \$30,000 for the
26 PAGA Penalties under California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (65% or \$19,500 will be paid to
27 the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA Payment”) and 35% or
28 \$10,500 (“PAGA Fund”) will be distributed to the PAGA Settlement Class Members,

1 regardless of whether they request to be excluded from the Settlement Class. The GSA is non-
2 reversionary. The Settlement is not a claims-made settlement. The GSA shall be exclusive of
3 Defendant's employer-side payroll taxes, which Defendant shall pay in addition to the GSA.
4 Settlement, I.15, I.22, III.1. The "Net Settlement Amount" ("NSA") will equal the net amount
5 available for payment of claims to Class Members after deducting the above-referenced costs
6 from the Gross Settlement Amount. Settlement, I.17.

7 Individual Settlement Payment Calculations: Individual Settlement Payments will be
8 calculated and apportioned from the Net Settlement Amount and PAGA Fund based on the
9 number of Workweeks a Class Member worked during the Class Period and the number of
10 PAGA Pay Periods a PAGA Member worked during the PAGA Period, respectively. Specific
11 calculations of Individual Settlement Payments will be made as follows:

12 Payments from the Net Settlement Amount:

- 13 • Defendant will calculate the total number of Workweeks worked by each Class
14 Member during the Class Period and the aggregate total number of Workweeks
15 worked by all Class Members during the Class Period. To determine each Class
16 Member's estimated "Individual Settlement Payment" from the Net Settlement
17 Amount, the Settlement Administrator will use the following formula: The Net
18 Settlement Amount will be divided by the aggregate total number of Workweeks
19 during the Class Period, resulting in the "Workweek Value." The Net Settlement
20 Amount portion of each Class Member's "Individual Settlement Payment" will
21 be calculated by multiplying each individual Class Member's total number of
22 Workweeks by the Workweek Value.

23 Payments from the PAGA Fund:

- 24 • Defendant will calculate the total number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each
25 PAGA Member during the PAGA Period and the aggregate total number of
26 PAGA Pay Periods worked by all PAGA Members during the PAGA Period. To
27 determine each PAGA Member's estimated "Individual Settlement Payment"
28 from the PAGA Fund the Settlement Administrator will use the following
formula: The PAGA Fund will be divided by the aggregate total number of
PAGA Pay Periods during the PAGA Period, resulting in the "PAGA Pay
Period Value." The PAGA Fund portion of each PAGA Member's "Individual
Settlement Payment" will be calculated by multiplying each individual PAGA
Member's total number of PAGA Pay Periods by the PAGA Pay Period Value.
The entire PAGA Fund will be disbursed to all PAGA Settlement Class
Members.

Settlement, III.11(a), (b).

1 All Individual Settlement Payments will be allocated as follows: (a) Fifteen Percent
2 (15%) of each Individual Settlement Payment will be allocated as wages for which IRS Forms
3 W-2 will be issued; and (b) Eighty-Five Percent (85%) of each Individual Settlement Payment
4 will be allocated as interest, penalties, and liquidated damages for which IRS Forms 1099-
5 MISC will be issued. One Hundred Percent (100%) of payments issued to PAGA Settlement
6 Class Members from the PAGA Fund will be treated as penalties and interest for which IRS
7 Forms 1099 will be issued. Settlement, III.11(a), (c).

8 Defendant shall be required to fund the GSA no later than fifteen (15) calendar days
9 after the Effective Date of the Settlement.² Settlement, III.11. The date on which Defendant
10 fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount is referred to herein as the “Funding Date.” *Id.* No
11 later than thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date, the Settlement Administrator will
12 issue payments to: (a) Participating Class Members and PAGA Settlement Class Members; (b)
13 the Labor and Workforce Development Agency; (c) Plaintiff; (d) Class Counsel, and (e) itself,
14 as approved by the Court. Settlement, III.11(a), (b), (f)–(h).

15 **C. Release of Claims**

16 Releases by Participating Class Members: Upon the Funding Date, and except as to
17 such rights or claims as may be created by this Settlement Agreement, each Participating Class
18 Member, together and individually, on their behalf and on behalf of their respective
19 representatives, heirs, executors, successors, assignees, administrators, agents, and attorneys,
20 shall fully and forever release and discharge Defendant, and each of its former and present
21 directors, officers, principals, trustees, shareholders, owners, managers, managing agents,
22 attorneys, insurers, predecessors, successors, assigns, DBAs, parents, subsidiaries, and
23 affiliates)(the “Released Parties”) or any of them, from each of the Released Class Claims
24 arising during the Class Period. Settlement, I.28, I.30, III.2.

25 _____
26 ² “Effective Date” means the later of: (a) if no timely objections are filed, or are withdrawn prior to Final
27 Approval, then the date of Final Approval; or (b) if a Class Member files an objection to the Settlement, the
28 Effective Date shall be the sixty-first (61st) calendar day after the date of Final Approval, provided no appeal is
initiated by an objector; or (c) if a timely appeal is initiated by an objector, then the Effective Date will be the date
of final resolution of that appeal (including any requests for rehearing and/or petitions for certiorari), resulting in
final judicial approval of the Settlement. Settlement, I.14.

1 The Released Class Claims include:

2 Any and all claims that arose during the Class Period and that were or could have been
3 pleaded in the Complaint in the Action based upon the factual allegations therein. The
4 “Released Class Claims” include, but are not limited to, those for: (1) Failure to pay all
5 wages earned for hours worked at the correct rates of pay (Cal. Labor Code §§ 510,
6 1194, 1197 and 1198, Wage Order 1, paragraphs 2(H), 3 and 4,); (2) Failure to provide
7 rest breaks (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 1198); (3) Failure to provide meal periods
8 (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 and 1198 and Wage Order 1, paragraph 12); (4) Failure
9 to indemnify (Cal. Labor Code § 2802 and Wage Order 1, paragraph (9 (A) and (B)));
10 (5) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Cal. Labor Code § 226); (6)
11 Failure to pay wages owed every pay period (Cal. Labor Code § 204); (7) Failure to pay
12 wages when employment ends (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203); (8) Unfair competition
13 under Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq; (9) claims for failure to comply
14 with the overtime, minimum wage, meal period, rest period, expense reimbursement or
record keeping provisions in the applicable California IWC Wage Order; and (10)
claims premised upon the alleged failure to include bonuses and other nondiscretionary
income in the regular rate of pay when paying overtime, meal or rest premiums, paid
sick leave or other wages that applicable law requires be paid at the regular rate or a
multiple thereof, based on the Labor Code sections alleged and with respect to the
statutory penalties claimed in the Action or any source of obligation as a basis for
claiming such penalties during the Settlement Period against the Released Parties.

15 Settlement, I.28.

16 Releases by PAGA Members. Upon the Funding Date, and except as to such rights or
17 claims as may be created by this Settlement Agreement, each PAGA Member, together and
18 individually, on their behalf and on behalf of their respective representatives, heirs, executors,
19 successors, assignees, administrators, agents, and attorneys, shall fully and forever release and
20 discharge all of the Released Parties, or any of them, from each of the Released PAGA Claims
21 arising during the PAGA Period. The Released PAGA Claims will forever be binding on, and
22 shall have res judicata and preclusive effect in, all past, pending, and future lawsuits maintained
23 by either the LWDA or PAGA Members for any and all of the Released PAGA Claims.

24 Settlement, I.29, III.2.

25 “Released PAGA Claims” include:

26 All claims for civil penalties arising from the alleged violations of California Labor
27 Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1174,
1174.5, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, and 2802.

28 Settlement, I.29.

1 Plaintiff also provided Defendant with a general release of all claims, whether known or
2 unknown, including unknown claims covered by Civil Code Section 1542. Settlement, III.3.

3 **D. Class Notice and Settlement Administration**

4 Within fifteen (15) days following the Preliminary Approval Date, Defendant shall
5 provide ILYM Group, Inc., the appointed Settlement Administrator, the Class Data with the
6 following information about each Class Member: (1) full name; (2) most recent mailing address
7 and telephone number; (3) Social Security Number; (4) dates of employment; (5) the respective
8 number of Workweeks that each Class Member worked during the Class Period and the number
9 of PAGA Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period. Settlement, I.6, III.10(a).

10 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after the receipt of the Class Data, the Settlement
11 Administrator shall be responsible for calculating the estimated payouts to the Class Members
12 assuming all Class Members participate in the Settlement and shall mail the Class Notice to all
13 Class Members pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, by First Class regular U.S. mail using
14 the most current, known mailing addresses identified in the Class Data. Settlement, III.10(c).
15 Prior to mailing, the Settlement Administrator will perform a search based on the National
16 Change of Address Database for information to update and correct any known or identifiable
17 address changes. Settlement, III.10(c). Any Class Notices returned to the Settlement
18 Administrator as non-deliverable on or before the Response Deadline will be sent promptly via
19 regular First-Class U.S. Mail to the forwarding address affixed thereto and the Settlement
20 Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing on the Class Notice. If no forwarding
21 address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt to determine the
22 correct address using a skip-trace, or other search using the name, address and/or Social
23 Security Number of the Class Member involved and will then perform a single re-mailing.
24 Those Class Members who receive a re-mailed Class Notice will have either (a) fifteen (15)
25 calendar days from the date of re-mailing or (b) until the Response Deadline, whichever is
26 later, to submit a Request for Exclusion, disputes concerning the calculation of the Class
27 Member's Individual Settlement Payment, or an objection to the Settlement. *Id.*

1 The Response Deadline by which Class Members must postmark or email to the
2 Settlement Administrator Requests for Exclusion, postmark or email disputes concerning the
3 calculation of Individual Settlement Payments, or postmark Notices of Objection to the
4 Settlement Administrator will be forty-five (45) calendar days from the initial mailing of the
5 Class Notice by the Settlement Administrator. Settlement, I.32.

6 **1. Procedures for Class Member Disputes**

7 To the extent Class Members dispute their employment dates or the number of
8 Workweeks or PAGA Pay Periods on record, Class Members may produce evidence to the
9 Settlement Administrator showing that such information is inaccurate. Defendant's records will
10 be presumed correct, but the Settlement Administrator shall contact the Parties regarding the
11 dispute and the Parties will work in good faith to resolve it. All disputes must be submitted by
12 the Response Deadline and will be decided by the Court if the Parties cannot agree. Settlement,
13 III.10(e).

14 **2. Procedures for Opting Out of the Class**

15 Any Class Member wishing to opt-out of the Settlement must sign and email or
16 postmark a written Request for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator within the Response
17 Deadline. In the case of Requests for Exclusion that are mailed to the Settlement Administrator,
18 the postmark date will be the exclusive means to determine whether a Request for Exclusion
19 has been timely submitted. Those Class Members who receive a re-mailed Class Notice will
20 have either (a) fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of re-mailing or (b) until the Response
21 Deadline, whichever is later, to submit a Request for Exclusion. Settlement, III.10(g).

22 **3. Procedures for Objecting to the Settlement**

23 To object to the Settlement Agreement, a Class Member may either postmark a valid
24 Notice of Objection to the Settlement Administrator on or before the Response Deadline or
25 appear in person at the Final Approval Hearing. Settlement, III.10(h). For the Notice of
26 Objection to be valid, it must include: (a) the objector's full name, signature, address, and
27 telephone number, (b) a written statement of all grounds for the objection accompanied by any
28 legal support for such objection; (c) copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon

1 which the objection is based; and (d) a statement whether the objector intends to appear at the
2 final fairness hearing. Settlement, III.10(h).

3 **E. Uncashed Checks**

4 Proceeds represented by Individual Settlement Payment checks returned as
5 undeliverable and Individual Settlement Payment checks remaining un-cashed for more than
6 one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days after issuance will be transmitted to the Alameda
7 County Food Bank, a non-profit organization designated by the Parties and to be approved by
8 the Court as the *cy pres* recipient, thereby fully satisfying and discharging Defendant's
9 obligations under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384 and the doctrines of *cy pres*
10 and escheat. Settlement, III.11(e).

11 **IV. CERTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED CLASS IS APPROPRIATE.**

12 Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, a class may be certified if: (1) it is ascertainable
13 and its members are too numerous for joinder to be practical; (2) the representative and absent
14 class members share a community of interest and questions of law and fact common to the class
15 predominate over questions unique to individual class members; (3) the representative's claims
16 are typical of the class' claims; and (4) the representative will fairly and adequately represent
17 the class' interests. *See, e.g., Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.
18 Moreover, in the settlement context, the Court can use a lesser standard to determine the
19 appropriateness of a settlement class as opposed to a litigated class certification. *Dunk v. Ford*
20 *Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1807. As explained below, all of these requirements
21 are met in this case.

22 **1. The Settlement Class Is Objectively Ascertainable.**

23 A class is ascertainable when it may be readily identified without unreasonable expense
24 or time by reference to official records. *Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926,
25 932 (citing *Hypolite v. Carleson* (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 579). Plaintiff maintains that the
26 above-defined Class is ascertainable because its members may be identified by reference to
27 Defendant's records and Defendant has agreed to share the relevant information from its
28

1 records to facilitate the settlement process. MM, ¶ 11; Settlement, I.6, III.10(a). Therefore, the
2 Settlement Class is ascertainable.

3 **2. The Membership of the Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.**

4 The Settlement Class has sufficiently numerous members to render joinder impractical.
5 No set number is required as a matter of law to maintain a class action. *Hebbard v. Colgrove*
6 (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030. Defendant estimates that there are approximately 397 Class
7 Members. MM, ¶ 12. Plaintiff maintains that it would be impractical and economically
8 inefficient to require each Class Member to separately maintain an individual action or be
9 joined as a named plaintiff in this action. The California Supreme Court has upheld a class of
10 as few as 10 individuals. *See Bowles v. Superior Court* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574. In light of these
11 considerations, the Settlement Class' membership is sufficiently numerous. MM, ¶ 12. *See*
12 *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695.

13 **3. Class Members Share a Well-Defined Community of Interest.**

14 The community of interest requirement “embodies three factors: (1) predominant
15 common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
16 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” *Sav-On Drug*
17 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326. It “does not mandate that class
18 members have uniform or identical claims.” *Capitol People First v. Dept. of Developmental*
19 *Servs.* (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 692. Rather, courts focus on the defendant’s internal
20 policies and “pattern and practice . . . in order to assess whether that common behavior toward
21 similarly situated plaintiffs renders class certification appropriate.” *Id.* (citing *Sav-On*, 34 Cal.
22 4th at 333).

23 To justify certification, the class proponent “must show ... that questions of law or fact
24 common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual members”
25 *See, Arenas v. El Torito Rests., Inc.*, 183 Cal. App. 4th 723, 732 (2010) (citing *Washington*
26 *Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court*, 248 Cal. 4th 906, 913 (2001)). In light of the more lenient
27 standard for certification of a settlement class, the Parties agree that for the purposes of the
28 Settlement only, the claims of the Class Members all stem from the same sources. MM, ¶ 13.

1 In this case, Plaintiff asserts all class members were subject to the same or similar
2 operations and employment policies, practices, and procedures. The claims arise from
3 Defendant's alleged uniform policy of failing to properly account for all time worked and
4 failing to, among other things, properly pay minimum and overtime wages, provide off-duty
5 meal and rest periods, indemnify Class Members for business expenses, timely pay wages upon
6 termination, and provide compliant wage statements, all of which Plaintiff claims constitute
7 unfair business practices and give rise to PAGA penalties. Plaintiff asserts that common
8 questions include, but are not limited to: (1) Whether Defendant failed to pay all wages earned
9 to Class Members for all hours worked at the correct rates of pay; (2) Whether Defendant failed
10 to provide the Class with all meal and rest periods in compliance with California law; (3)
11 Whether Defendant failed to pay the Class one additional hour of pay on workdays they failed
12 to provide the class with one or more meal or rest periods in compliance with California law;
13 (4) Whether Defendant failed to indemnify the Class for all necessary business expenditures
14 incurred during the discharge of their duties including, but not limited to, kitchen tools and
15 personal mobile phones; (5) Whether Defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to provide
16 the Class with accurate and complete itemized wage statements; (6) Whether Defendant
17 willfully failed to provide the Class with timely final wages; and (7) Whether Defendant
18 engaged in unfair competition within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section
19 17200, et seq., with respect to the class. MM, ¶ 13. Therefore, common questions predominate.

20 **4. Plaintiff Is Typical of the Settlement Class.**

21 The class representative must be similarly situated to the rest of the purported class. *See*
22 *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46 (stating "it has never been the law in
23 California that the class representative must have identical interests with the class members.
24 The only requirements are ... that the class representative be *similarly* situated") (emphasis in
25 original); *See also* Newberg, § 3:29 (typicality "focuses on whether there exists a relationship
26 between the Plaintiffs claims and the claims alleged on behalf of the class"). Plaintiff contends
27 that his claims are typical for the purposes of certifying the Settlement Class. Plaintiff asserts
28 that he, like absent Class Members was subject to the same relevant policies and procedures

1 governing his compensation, hours of work and meal and rest periods. Because Plaintiff
2 contends that he was subject to the same general course of conduct as absent Class Members,
3 resolving the common questions as they apply to Plaintiff will determine Defendant's *prima*
4 *facie* liability to all Class Members. Moreover, Plaintiff's claims could potentially be subject to
5 the same primary affirmative defenses as those of absent Class Members. Accordingly,
6 Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Class. MM, ¶ 14.

7 **5. Plaintiff Will Adequately Represent the Settlement Class.**

8 The adequacy requirement is met where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified
9 to conduct the litigation and the plaintiff's interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to the
10 class' interests. *McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451. In other words,
11 where the plaintiff has adequate counsel, the plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any
12 disabling conflicts of interest that might hinder the plaintiff's ability to represent the class. MM,
13 ¶ 15.

14 First, Plaintiff's counsel has supplied the Court with a declaration to show that they are
15 adequate to represent the Settlement Class and that they have significant experience in
16 employment litigation generally, and wage and hour and employment-related class action
17 litigation specifically. *See* MM, ¶¶ 17-21. Thus, Plaintiff's counsel is adequate to serve as Class
18 Counsel.

19 Second, Plaintiff contends that he is an adequate class representative. Plaintiff and the
20 Class Members have strong and co-extensive interests in this litigation because they all worked
21 for Defendant during the relevant time period, allegedly suffered the same alleged injuries from
22 the same alleged course of conduct, and there is no evidence of any conflict of interest between
23 Plaintiff and the Class Members. MM, ¶ 16. Moreover, Plaintiff has demonstrated his
24 commitment to the Settlement Class by, among other things, retaining experienced counsel,
25 providing counsel with documents and extensively speaking with them to assist in identifying
26 the claims asserted in this case, and exposing himself to the risk of attorneys' fees and costs
27 awards against him if this lawsuit had been unsuccessful. MM, ¶15; *See generally* Declaration
28 of Daniel A. Taracena Robledo submitted herewith under separate cover. Thus, Plaintiff is
adequate to serve as Class Representative. Accordingly, this Court should find that Plaintiff and

his counsel are adequate to represent the Settlement Class as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

6. Class Action Treatment Is the Superior Means for Resolving the Claims of the Class Members.

Plaintiff further contends that a class action is also superior to other means adjudicating the issues in this action. The predominance of common legal and factual questions shows that this Court could fairly adjudicate the claims of Class Members through a single class action. In view of the *theoretical* alternatives that proposed class members could potentially utilize – representative PAGA action (where there is less relief available), individual civil lawsuits or wage claims through the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (where there would be relatively little money at stake, but the claims would be time-consuming to litigate) – a class action is plainly superior to all of them. Thus, this consideration supports conditional class action treatment for purposes of this Settlement only. MM, ¶ 22.

V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE, AND THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL.

A. Legal Standard

A class action settlement requires court approval. California Rules of Court (“CRC”), Rule 3.769 provides three steps for approval:

- 1) Preliminary approval after submission of a written motion for preliminary approval, the proposed class settlement, and the proposed class notice;
- 2) Issuance of notice of settlement to class members; and
- 3) A final settlement approval hearing where class members may be heard regarding the settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement is presented.

The decision to approve or reject a class settlement is committed to the Court’s broad discretion. *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. The decision to approve class settlement may be reversed only upon a showing of “clear abuse of discretion.” *Id.*

B. The Settlement Is Presumptively Fair

In assessing preliminary approval, a court evaluates if the settlement process has certain indicia of fairness. A “presumption of fairness exists where (1) the settlement is reached

1 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
2 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
3 percentage of objectors is small.” *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 128, quoting *Dunk v. Ford*
4 *Motor Co.*, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th at 1794.

5 The class settlement here satisfies all of these factors. MM, ¶ 23. The Settlement
6 resulted from thorough, arms' length negotiations between experienced counsel with the
7 assistance of a respected mediator after sufficient discovery was exchanged to assess the
8 relative strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases and Defendant's estimated exposure.
9 *Id.* Both defense counsel and Plaintiff's counsel are particularly experienced in employment
10 law and wage and hour class actions and are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class
11 claims, the viability of the defenses, and the risks and benefits of settlement versus trial on a
12 fully informed basis. Counsel on both sides share the view that the Settlement is a fair and
13 reasonable settlement in light of the complexities of the case and uncertainties of class
14 certification and litigation, and a fair result for the Class Members. *Id.*

15 **C. The Settlement Satisfies the *Kullar* Factors for Approval.**

16 The *Kullar* case sets forth several factors a court should consider in determining
17 whether to approve a class settlement. These factors include: (1) the strength of plaintiff's
18 case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
19 maintaining class action status through trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the
20 extent of discovery completed and stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of
21 counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class
22 members to the proposed settlement. 168 Cal.App.4th at 128. As demonstrated herein, the
23 Settlement satisfies each of these factors.

24 **1. Evaluation of Plaintiff's Case**

25 The Parties reached the Settlement through arm's-length bargaining with the aid of a
26 respected mediator. The Parties conducted sufficient investigation and discovery to allow
27 Counsel and the Court to act intelligently. Plaintiff considered various sources of information in
28 the lead-up to and during the mediation of February 9, 2026 that enabled Plaintiff to achieve

1 the Settlement at issue.

- 2 • Defendant produced and Plaintiff's counsel reviewed Plaintiff's timekeeping and
3 payroll records.
- 4 • Plaintiff's counsel requested that Defendant produce any and all policies regarding
5 overtime and double-time wages, off the clock work, expense reimbursement, meal
6 periods, rest breaks, meal period waivers and agreements, compensation plans, and
7 complaints about working conditions in effect during the relevant time period
8 beginning in July of 2021. Defendant produced its pertinent wage and hour policies,
9 including those contained within its employee handbook.
- 10 • Plaintiff's counsel requested that Defendant provide the total number of employees,
11 paychecks, and the pay cycles during the relevant period. Defendant provided the
12 answers to each of these questions.
- 13 • Plaintiff's counsel requested sample time and payroll records for the relevant time
14 period. Defendant produced a twenty percent (20%) random sampling of the putative
15 class members' time and pay records that Plaintiff's counsel selected from a list
16 provided by the defense.
- 17 • Plaintiff's counsel then retained a professional data analyst, James Toney, to examine
18 the records and determine if there was any pay discrepancy in timesheet hours versus
19 paid hours, meal violations, and if there was any rounding/time shaving issues. Plaintiff
20 is prepared to provide the Court with the data analysis for *in camera* inspection upon its
21 request.
- 22 • Plaintiff's counsel analyzed the state of caselaw on meal and rest break claims, claims
23 for off-the-clock work, and claims for unreimbursed expenses.

24 MM, ¶ 24.

25 Defendant disclosed that there were approximately 15,718 workweeks during the Class
26 Period. Based on this information and with the aid of the data analyst, Plaintiff's counsel
27 prepared "damages" estimates to determine Defendant's maximum exposure in connection with
28 the settlement negotiations. Applying the highest supportable violation rates to Defendant's
time and payroll data, Plaintiff's counsel calculated the maximum potential damages, inclusive
of interest, for meal period violations to be \$526,062.69, rest period violations to be
\$1,611,345.28, off-the-clock and unpaid wage violations to be \$370,127.97, and unreimbursed
business expense violations to be \$212,707.54; maximum damages for derivative claims of
\$289,050.00 for wage statement penalties and \$1,112,126.40 for waiting time penalties. The
estimates are in essence "home run" projections that do not factor in any of the risks involved
in litigating this Action and are not in line with reality, especially when considering

1 Defendant's policies and its position on the issues. MM, ¶ 25.

2 Plaintiff also estimated approximately \$1,464,400 in potential civil penalties under the
3 PAGA. MM, ¶ 25. This estimate does not reflect the realities of this case and did not take into
4 account any of the risks discussed above and assumed a violation for every single pay period.
5 As such, the Parties discounted potential civil penalties for multiple reasons. For one, Plaintiff's
6 PAGA claims are predicated on the wage underpayment, meal, rest, business expense
7 reimbursement, and wage statement violations described above, and thus subject to the same
8 disputes and defenses. Plaintiff's counsel also assessed multiple penalties for the same pay
9 period for the same alleged violations of different Labor Code provisions and derivative
10 violations. Plaintiff's counsel is not aware of any California state courts awarding plaintiffs
11 multiple PAGA penalties for the same violation for the same pay period under different Labor
12 Code provisions. This may be because the PAGA does not provide for what many employers
13 characterize as claim splitting and not merely stacking. Additionally, PAGA states a court has
14 discretion to award a lesser amount than the maximum penalty. Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2);
15 *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (reducing
16 PAGA award).

17 The Settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of
18 some or all of Plaintiff's claims. Even if Plaintiff obtained certification of some or all of the
19 claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and
20 would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the Class Members. While Plaintiff is
21 confident in the merits of his case, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action.
22 MM, ¶ 26. To illustrate this consideration, below is brief summary of some of Defendant's
23 arguments, all of which Plaintiff disputes, but nevertheless acknowledges as potential threats to
24 the Settlement Class' claims.

- 25 • Defendant contends that, to establish a violation for missed meal periods, a plaintiff
26 must do more than show that a meal break was not taken. *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.*
27 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004. So long as an employer provides employees
28 with a "reasonable opportunity" to take a duty-free meal period, it has no further duty to

1 “police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is performed.” *Id.* at 1040-41.
2 Instead, a plaintiff must show the employer impeded, discouraged, or prohibited the
3 employee from taking a proper break, or otherwise failed to release the employee of all
4 control. *Id.* “Thus, the crucial issue with regard to the meal break claim is the reason
5 that a particular employee may have failed to take a meal break.” *Washington v. Joe’s*
6 *Crab Shack* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 271 F.R.D. 629, 641. Defendant contends that
7 individualized proof will be needed to establish liability on Plaintiffs’ meal period
8 claims. Defendant argues that Settlement Class Members will testify that they were
9 plainly advised by their supervisors, and fully understood, that they were authorized to
10 take meal periods within each five-hour period worked and, in fact, took such breaks.
11 Defendant contends that it maintained compliant meal period policies throughout the
12 time period at issue, all employees received timely meal periods of sufficient duration
13 on most days and any small delay or shortening of meal periods was the result of the
14 employee’s choice to take a later or shorter meal period. Moreover, Plenitude’s
15 timekeeping data shows daily meal period start and end times. Furthermore, Plenitude
16 started paying automatic meal period premiums to address any inadvertent failure to
17 provide meal periods when required and implemented a system whereby employees
18 could not punch back in until they had taken a meal period of at least 30 minutes.
19 Defendant had obtained a substantial number of declarations from employees, after duly
20 advising the employees of their rights, which supported Defendant’s compliant meal
21 period policy and practice.

- 22 • Defendant contends that it maintained a compliant rest period policy throughout the
23 time period at issue and that employees regularly took rest periods. Employees took
24 rest periods with sufficient alacrity that Defendant sometimes had to counsel or
25 discipline employees for taking rest periods of 20 minutes or more. Furthermore, rest
26 period claims are difficult to certify as class actions. *Koval v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co.*, 181
27 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 (2014), *Flores v. Lamps Plus, Inc. (In re Lamps Plus Overtime)*, 209
28 Cal.App.4th 35 (2012). Certifying the class would be particularly difficult given the
substantial number of declarations that Defendant had declarations obtained from
employees, after duly advising them of their rights, that Defendant’s rest period policy
and practice were compliant with the applicable legal requirements.

- Defendant contends that there is no common proof for Plaintiff's claim that he was required to work off-the-clock ("OTC") and that some of that OTC work, if properly accounted for, would have resulted in work to be compensated at overtime rates. In fact, Defendant contends that the alleged OTC work consisted of calls between employees and their supervisors about work schedules and such calls were idiosyncratic, infrequent, highly dependent on the relationship between an individual employee and his or her supervisor and often initiated by employees. Defendant argues, time records do not provide common proof because, by definition, they do not show such time. Defendant argues that one would have to examine, and cross-examine for credibility, each individual's separate claims of supposed OTC work. Further, Defendant argues, each Class Member would need to overcome this credibility hurdle in the face of his/her own time records, which show no OTC work and further would have to prove that his/her individual manager knowingly suffered or permitted the work. Defendant had obtained declarations from employees, after duly advising them of their rights, that communications outside of regular work hours were infrequent to the point of being non-existent for many employees.
- Defendant did not engage in any "willful" conduct as would be required for Plaintiffs to recover waiting time penalties. Under the Labor Code, if an employer willfully fails to pay an employee all wages due and owing at the time of separation, the employee is owed up to 30 days' wages as a penalty. Labor Code. §§ 201-203. A violation is deemed willful if the employer intentionally fails to pay wages when they are due. Notably, the failure to pay, by itself, cannot constitute willfulness where there is good faith belief of compliance with the law at the time. *Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co.*, 125 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-9.
- Defendant contends that it is not liable for wage statement penalties based on the "good faith" defense as set forth by the California Supreme Court in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.* (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 93 (holding that an employer's objectively reasonable, good faith belief that it was providing compliant wage statements can preclude the imposition of penalties under Labor Code section 226(e) for inaccurate wage statements).

- There is a risk that Plenitude Food Crafts, which was founded and is owned and managed by a single individual, may have been forced to cease operations or seek bankruptcy protections if the case continued or in the event of an adverse verdict.

MM, ¶ 26.

As noted above, Defendant contests liability, as well as the propriety of certification, and is prepared to vigorously oppose certification and to defend against Plaintiff's claims if the Action is not settled. Given the potential damages, as well as the substantial risks to recovery discussed herein, including the uncertainties in achieving class certification, Plaintiff's counsel had to dramatically discount the value of the claims during settlement negotiations. Plaintiff's counsel estimates a 50 percent likelihood of obtaining and maintaining certification of all of Plaintiff's claims, which reduces the value of these claims from approximately \$5,585,819.88 to approximately \$2,792,909.94. Defendant, however, asserts that there are significantly lower prospects of certification. Plaintiff's counsel further estimates that there is a 50 percent chance that Plaintiff will prevail at trial on his claims, further reducing the value of the claims to approximately \$1,396,454.97. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's prospects of success at trial are much lower. If this case advanced to trial and Class Counsel succeeded on all of Plaintiff's claims, attorney's fees and costs may have significantly reduced the recovery awarded to the Class. Furthermore, there is always a risk that a trial of this magnitude can become unmanageable. A settlement of \$335,000 (approximately 6% of the maximum exposure and 24% of the potential recovery) is a great result and a proportion sanctioned by existing case law. *See In re Cendant Corp., Derivative Action Litig.*, 232 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D. N.J. 2002) (approving settlement that only provided a 2% recovery based on the estimated liability exposure). MM, ¶ 27.

While Plaintiff believes the evidence gathered through Plaintiff's discovery supports the merits of the claims asserted in this lawsuit, Plaintiff recognizes that continued litigation presents significant risks that support a downward departure from Defendant's estimated liability exposure. Among those risks were that Plenitude Food Crafts, a family-run business, may have been forced to cease operations or seek bankruptcy protections if the case continued or in the event of an adverse verdict. In view of the risks, the Settlement reflects Class Counsel's estimate of the total amount of damages, monetary penalties or other relief that the class could reasonably expect to be awarded at trial, taking into account the likelihood of

1 prevailing and other attendant risks. It also represents a fair, adequate, and reasonable
2 compromise amount for these claims and warrants preliminary approval. *See Laguna v.*
3 *Coverall N. Am., Inc.*, Case No. 12-55479 (9th Cir. June 3, 2014) 2014 WL 2465049, * 3. MM,
4 ¶ 28.

5 **2. Allocation of the PAGA Payment**

6 The settlement of PAGA penalties in the sum of \$30,000, of which 65% (\$19,500) will
7 be paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$10,500) will be distributed to the PAGA Settlement Class
8 Members, is reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances. MM, ¶ 29. The Parties
9 negotiated a good faith amount for PAGA penalties to be paid to the LWDA and to the
10 Settlement Class. *Id.* The portion to be paid to the LWDA was not the result of self-interest at
11 the expense of other Class Members. *Id.* Where settlements “negotiate[] a good faith amount”
12 for PAGA penalties and “there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at
13 the expense of other Class Members,” such amounts are generally considered reasonable.
14 *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL
15 928133, at *9. Likewise, where the employer did not act willfully, and made good faith
16 attempts to comply with wage and hour laws, a reduction or lesser penalty is warranted because
17 imposing maximum PAGA penalty for each violation would have been unjust, arbitrary, and
18 oppressive. *Id.* *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 528-529 (affirming
19 trial court’s award of only 10% of maximum PAGA penalty for meal break violations). *Id.* The
20 amount to be paid to the LWDA comports with PAGA settlement amounts approved by other
21 courts. See, e.g., *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC* (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2011) 2011 WL
22 67245, 81 (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common fund);
23 *Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.* (N.D. Cal., July 11, 2013) 2013 WL 3541217 (approving PAGA
24 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common fund settlement); *Hopson v.*
25 *Hanesbrands, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008) 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 (approving PAGA
26 settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500); see *Nordstrom Com. Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 589
27 (approving PAGA settlement and release that allocated \$0 to PAGA claim).

28 **3. Presence of Governmental Participant**

As required under Labor Code section 2699(1)(2), Plaintiff will provide notice of this
settlement to the LWDA. MM, ¶ 39, Ex. 6.

///

1 **4. Reaction of Class Members to Proposed Settlement**

2 If the settlement is preliminarily approved, Class Members will be provided with the
3 Class Notice (attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement) and an opportunity to object. MM, ¶ 35.
4 The Parties’ proposed notice fully complies with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and
5 3.769(f) and will allow Class Members to make informed responses to the proposed settlement.

6 *Id.*

7 **VI. THE SETTLEMENT FAIRLY, REASONABLY, AND ADEQUATELY**
8 **COMPENSATES CLASS MEMBERS BECAUSE EACH CLASS MEMBER**
9 **WILL BE PAID BASED ON THE POTENTIAL EXTENT OF HIS OR HER**
10 **INJURY COMPARED TO OTHER CLASS MEMBERS.**

11 Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated and apportioned from the Net
12 Settlement Amount and PAGA Fund based on the number of Workweeks a Class Member
13 worked during the Class Period and the number of PAGA Pay Periods a PAGA Member
14 worked during the PAGA Period, respectively. MM, ¶ 34; Settlement, III.11(a), (b). Because
15 this method compensates Class Members based on the extent of their potential injuries, in that
16 Class Members who worked for Defendant longer would have been subject to more alleged
17 violations, it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Id.*

18 **VII. ALLOCATION FOR CLASS COUNSEL’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS**
19 **IS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED.**

20 The settlement states Class Counsel may seek attorneys’ fees of \$111,666.67 (one-third
21 of the GSA) and up to \$16,000.00 for actual reasonable litigation costs and expenses incurred
22 in prosecuting the Action. Settlement, III.11(g). These amounts are reasonable, given the facts
23 and circumstances of the case. MM, ¶¶ 30-32.

24 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their
25 decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” *Lealao v.*
26 *Beneficial Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 41. Indeed, it is long settled that the
27 “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
28 court.” *Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132. California law provides that attorney
 fee awards should be equivalent to fees paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the
 result achieved and risk incurred. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intl, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503
 (citing *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 48-49). The Supreme Court has recently approved

1 fees equal to one-third (1/3) of the common fund. *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th 480. Many
2 courts have similarly approved fee awards equal to or greater than the percentage requested
3 here. *See, e.g., In re Pacific Enterprises* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 379 (award of 33% of
4 the common fund); *In re Activision* (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp. 1373, 1375 (32.8% of the
5 common fund); *In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.* (D.D.C. 1981) 526 F.Supp. 494, 498 (45% of
6 settlement fund).

7 The amount of fees and costs requested are commensurate with (1) the risk Class
8 Counsel took in bringing the case, (2) the extensive time, effort and expense dedicated to the
9 case, (3) the skill and determination Class Counsel has shown, (4) the results Class Counsel
10 achieved, (5) the value of the Settlement Class Counsel achieved for the class, and (6) the other
11 cases Class Counsel turned down to devote time to this matter. MM, ¶ 31. Class Counsel met
12 and conferred with Defendant's counsel on numerous occasions, reviewed and analyzed
13 hundreds of pages of data and documents provided by Defendant, researched applicable law,
14 provided estimates of "damages" for purposes of settlement discussions, and engaged in a full
15 day of mediation, among other tasks. *Id.*

16 Class Counsel have borne all the risks and costs of litigation and will receive no
17 compensation until recovery is obtained. MM, ¶ 32. Class Counsel is well-experienced in
18 wage-and-hour class action litigation and used that experience to obtain a fair result for the
19 Class. *Id.* Considering the amount of the attorney fees requested, the work performed, and the
20 risks incurred, the requested fees and costs are reasonable and should be awarded. *Id.*

21 **VIII. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT TO**
22 **PLAINTIFF IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE**
23 **PRELIMINARILY APPROVED.**

24 Courts routinely approve enhancement awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the
25 services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often in much
26 higher amounts than that sought here. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange* (2004) 115
27 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (upholding "service payments" to named plaintiffs for their efforts in
28 bringing the case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D.Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294
(approving \$50,000 enhancement award). The Settlement provides that Plaintiff may seek a

1 Class Representative Enhancement Payment of \$10,000.00. This amount is entirely reasonable
2 given Plaintiff's efforts in this action and the risks he undertook on behalf of Class Members.
3 MM, ¶ 33. Plaintiff has devoted many hours advancing the interests of the Settlement Class.
4 Plaintiff has done this by, among other things, retaining experienced counsel, providing them
5 with information about his work history with Defendant and Defendant's policies and practices
6 with respect to the wage and hour claims at issue, and being actively involved in the settlement
7 process to ensure a fair result for the Settlement Class as a whole. In doing this, Plaintiff has
8 been exposed to significant risks, including the risk of an order to pay Defendant's attorneys'
9 fees and costs if this action had been unsuccessful (*See* Labor Code §§ 218.5-218.6). The
10 efforts and risks that Plaintiff undertook on behalf of the Settlement Class shows that the
11 proposed Class Representative Enhancement Payment is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and
12 thus warrants preliminary approval. MM, ¶ 33; *See generally* Declaration of Daniel A.
13 Taracena Robledo.

14 **IX. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR**
15 **AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED.**

16 With regard to the settlement administration costs provision, it is reasonable. Before
17 agreeing to ILYM Group, Inc., the Parties sought and reviewed bids from other reputable third-
18 party administrators which provided higher bids. MM, ¶ 37, Ex. 5; *See generally*, Declaration
19 of Lisa Mullins, Ex. C. Thus, the settlement administration costs provision should be given
20 preliminary approval.

21 **X. THE PROPOSED NOTICE AND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION PLAN**
22 **SHOULD BE APPROVED BECAUSE IT IS REASONABLY CALCULATED**
23 **TO GIVE ACTUAL NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS AND SUFFICIENT**
24 **TIME TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS**

25 This Court should approve the proposed plans for giving notice to the Settlement Class
26 and administering the Settlement. The standard for determining the adequacy of notice is
27 whether the notice has "a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class
28 members." *Cartt v. Superior Court* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974. The notice process includes
multiple measures to ensure that as many Class Members as practicable receive actual notice of
the Settlement and have enough time to exercise their rights. The Settlement requires
distribution of the Notice by First Class U.S. mail only. Settlement, III.10(c). Although there
are current employee Class Members, it is uncertain whether Defendant's records of their

1 contact information include email addresses and Class Members, who perform all of their work
2 away from a desk, are not in a position to check their emails. As such, notice by mail alone is
3 fair, adequate, and reasonable. MM, ¶ 35.

4 With respect to its content, “[The] notice given to the class must fairly apprise the class
5 members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to dissenting class
6 members.” *Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 134, 151-152.
7 The purpose of the notice in class settlement context is to give class members sufficient
8 information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue their
9 own remedies, or object to the settlement. *Id.* The Class Notice (Exhibit A to the Settlement)
10 provides Class Members with all pertinent information that they need to fully evaluate their
11 options and exercise their rights under the Settlement. Each Class Notice will provide: (a)
12 information regarding the nature of the Action; (b) a summary of the Settlement’s principal
13 terms; (c) the Settlement Class and PAGA Member definitions; (d) the total number of
14 Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods each respective Class Member and PAGA Member
15 worked for Defendant during the Class Period and PAGA Period; (e) each Class Member’s and
16 PAGA Member’s estimated Individual Settlement Payment and the formula for calculating
17 Individual Settlement Payments; (f) the dates which comprise the Class Period and PAGA
18 Period; (g) instructions on how to submit Requests for Exclusion or Notices of Objection; (h)
19 the deadlines by which the Class Member must postmark or email Request for Exclusions, or
20 postmark Notices of Objection to the Settlement; and (i) the claims to be released. Settlement,
21 III.10(b). Accordingly, the Notice should be approved because it describes the Settlement with
22 sufficient clarity and specificity to explain to Class Members what this action is about, their
23 rights under the Settlement, and how to exercise those rights. MM, ¶ 35.

22 **XI. CONCLUSION**

23 For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant Plaintiff’s Motion in its entirety
24 and adopt the proposed order submitted concurrently herewith.

25 Respectfully submitted,

MM LAW, APC

26
27 Dated: July 10, 2026

By: 
MARALLE MESSRELIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff,
DANIEL A. TARACENA ROBLEDO

28
24



Court Reservation Receipt

Reservation

Reservation ID:
500844714572

Status:
RESERVED

Reservation Type:
Motion re: (for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and
PAGA Settlement)

Number of Motions:
1

Case Number:
25CV133325

Case Title:
TARACENA ROBLEDO vs PLENITUDE FOOD CRAFTS,
LLC

Filing Party:
Daniel A. Taracena Robledo (Plaintiff)

Location:
Rene C. Davidson Courthouse - Department 21

Date/Time:
August 4th 2026, 2:30PM

Confirmation Code:
CR-JJ6DIGYDJO3ZE9FD3

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion re: (name extension)	.00	1	.00
Court Technology Fee	1.00	1	1.00
TOTAL			\$1.00

Payment

Amount:
\$1.00

Type:
MasterCard

Account Number:
XXXX8919

Authorization:
07577Q

Payment Date:
2026-05-30

[◀ Back to Main](#)[🖨 Print Page](#)[Terms of Service](#)[Contact Us](#)[About this Site](#)