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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF KINGS

JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ; ANTONIA
BLANCO; GRACIELA BLANCO; ELOISA
CASTRO; TOMAS CERVANTES AKA
GUADALUPE CERVANTES; as individuals,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated,

PLAINTIFFS,

v.

PJ FARM LABOR, INC.; CLARKLIND
FARMS; FORTUNE & SONS INC.; AND
MATTOS AND SONS DAIRY; and DOES 1
thru 50, inclusive,

DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 22C-0382

[Case Assigned for All Purposes to Hon.
Valeria R. Chrissakis in Dept. 8]

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

*[Filed concurrently with Motion for Approval
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs; Declarations of
Liane Katzenstein Ly, Mario Martinez, and
Jonathan Paul, Proposed Order and
Judgment]*

Date: July 17, 2024
Time: 8:15 AM
Dept.: 8

Complaint Filed: October 28, 2022
FAC Filed: January 6, 2023
Trial Date: None Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 17, 2024 at 8:15 AM in Department 8 of the above-
3 entitled court, Plaintiffs JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ; ANTONIA BLANCO; GRACIELA
4 BLANCO; ELOISA CASTRO; and TOMAS CERVANTES AKA GUADALUPE
5 CERVANTES (“Plaintiffs”) will, and hereby does, move the Court for an Order of Final Approval
6 of the Class Settlement in this case. Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

7 1. Granting final approval of the settlement in the case pursuant to the Class Action
8 and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release (“Agreement”), a copy of which is attached to the
9 concurrently-filed Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly as Exhibit “1”;

10 2. Affirming Kingsley Szamet & Ly, formerly known as Kingsley & Kingsley, APC,
11 and Martinez Aguilaoscho Law, Inc. as Class Counsel;

12 3. Affirming Plaintiffs JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ; ANTONIA BLANCO;
13 GRACIELA BLANCO; ELOISA CASTRO; and TOMAS CERVANTES AKA GUADALUPE
14 CERVANTES as Class Representatives and awarding an enhancement award of \$25,000.00, with
15 \$5,000.00 to each Plaintiff;

16 4. Awarding Xpand Legal claims administration fees of \$12,000.00 for its services
17 as Administrator; and,


18 5. Entering judgment.

19 This Motion will be made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California
20 Rule of Court, rule 3.769 on the grounds that the proposed Agreement is fair, adequate,
21 reasonable, and in the best interest of the Settlement Class Members and the parties.

22 The Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
23 and Authorities, the Declarations of Liane Katzenstein Ly, Mario Martinez, Jaime Santiago
24 Vasquez, Antonia Blanco, Graciela Blanco, Eloisa Castro, Tomas Cervantes aka Guadalupe
25 Cervantes, Jonathan Paul, all other papers and records on file in this action, and on such oral and
26 documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.

DATED: June 24, 2024

KINGSLEY SZAMET & LY

By: 

Liane Katzenstein Ly
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the proposed class

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ; ANTONIA BLANCO; GRACIELA
4 BLANCO; ELOISA CASTRO; and TOMAS CERVANTES AKA GUADALUPE CERVANTES
5 (“Plaintiffs”) submit this Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement and requests that the
6 Court:

7 1. Grant final approval of the settlement in this case pursuant to the Class Action and
8 PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release (“Agreement”), a copy of which is attached to the
9 concurrently-filed Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly as Exhibit “1”;

10 2. Award attorneys’ fees and costs as detailed in the concurrently-filed Motion for
11 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;

12 3. Award Xpand Legal claims administration fees of \$12,000.00 for its services as
13 Administrator;

14 4. Affirm named Plaintiffs JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ; ANTONIA BLANCO;
15 GRACIELA BLANCO; ELOISA CASTRO; and TOMAS CERVANTES AKA GUADALUPE
16 CERVANTES as Class Representatives and award a cumulative Class Representatives payment
17 of \$25,000.00; and

18 5. Enter judgment.

19 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

20 **A. Litigation Overview and Procedural History**

21 On October 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Jaime Santiago Vasquez, Antonia Blanco, Graciela Blanco,
22 Eloisa Castro, Tomas Cervantes, and Guadalupe Cervantes filed a Class Action Complaint seeking
23 recovery for: (1) failure to pay wages and/or overtime under Labor Code sections 510, 1194, and
24 1199; (2) failure to reimburse expenses pursuant to Labor Code section 2802; (3) failure to provide
25 accurate itemized wage statements pursuant to Labor Code section 226(a); (4) penalties under
26 Labor Code section 203; and (5) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200.
27 (Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly (“Ly Decl.”) ¶5.) Also on October 28, 2022, an in
28 compliance with Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1), Plaintiffs sent a notice letter to the Labor Workforce

Development Agency (“LWDA”) regarding their intent to seek civil penalties for the same Labor Code violations above, under Labor Code section 2699, *et seq.* (Ly Decl. ¶6.)

On January 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint, adding CLARKLIND FARMS, FORTUNE & SONS, INC. and MATTOS AND SONS DAIRY as named Defendants pursuant to Labor Code § 2810.3. (Ly Decl. ¶7.)

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint, adding an additional cause of action for penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, *et seq.*, the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) based on the underlying Labor Code violations already pled. (Hereafter, the “Action”.) (Ly Decl. ¶8.)

The Parties scheduled mediation on August 7, 2023 but were able to reach an agreement in principle to settle the matter before mediation. (Ly Decl. ¶9.)

Defendant informally produced time and pay data for mediation purposes only. (Ly Decl. ¶10.)

B. The Discovery Process

Plaintiffs and Defendants engaged in extensive informal discovery and settlement discussions in an effort to resolve the Action by negotiating an to end the case by agreement (settle the case) rather than continuing the expensive and time-consuming process of litigation. (Ly Decl. ¶11.) The negotiations were successful. (Ly Decl. ¶12.) By signing a lengthy written settlement agreement (“Agreement”) and agreeing to jointly ask the Court to enter a judgment ending the Action and enforcing the Agreement, Plaintiffs and Defendants have negotiated a proposed Settlement that is subject to the Court’s Final Approval. Both sides agree the proposed Settlement is a compromise of disputed claims. (Ly Decl. ¶13.) By agreeing to settle, Defendants do not admit any violations or concede the merit of any claims. (Ly Decl. ¶14.)

Prior to negotiating the Settlement, Plaintiffs obtained, through informal discovery, pertinent documents and data for the Class and PAGA Members so that the Parties could fully investigate the claims at issue and understand their strengths and weaknesses. Plaintiffs’ investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008)

1 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-130 (“*Dunk/Kullar*”).

2 Defendant denies any liability or wrongdoing of any kind associated with the claims
3 alleged in the Action, disputes the damages and penalties claimed by Plaintiffs, and further
4 contends that, for any purpose other than settlement, Plaintiffs’ claims are not appropriate for class
5 or representative action treatment. (Ly Decl. ¶15.) Defendants contend, among other things, that,
6 at all times, it has complied with the California Labor Code, and the Industrial Wage Commission
7 Orders. (*Id.*)

8 Based on their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the
9 opinion that the Agreement with Defendant is fair, reasonable and adequate, and in the best interest
10 of the settlement classes in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of
11 significant delay, defenses asserted by Defendant, uncertainties regarding a class and
12 representative action trial on the merits, and numerous potential appellate issues. (Ly Decl. ¶16.)
13 Although Defendant denies any liability, Defendant is agreeing to this Agreement solely to avoid
14 the cost of litigation. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the Parties and their counsel desire to fully, finally, and
15 forever settle, compromise and discharge all disputes and claims arising from or relating to the
16 Action on the terms set forth here. (*Id.*)

17 C. Preliminary Approval

18 On February 5, 2024, the Court issued an Order preliminarily approving the settlement in
19 this case, approving the proposed Class Notice, ordering that the Administrator send notice to the
20 Settlement Class, and setting a date for the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing. (Ly Decl. ¶17.)

21 **III. THE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED SETTLEMENT**

22 A. The Settlement Class

23 For purposes of Agreement, the settlement class is defined as: “all current and former non-
24 exempt agricultural workers employed by Defendant PJ FARM LABOR, INC. who performed
25 labor on an hourly or piece rate basis for the benefit of Defendants CLARKLIND FARMS,
26 FORTUNE & SONS, INC., and/or MATTOS AND SONS DAIRY, LLC in the state of California
27 from October 28, 2018 through September 24, 2023.” (“Settlement Class Members” or “Class”)
28 The “Settlement Class Members” means a member of the Class, as either a Participating Class

Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non-Participating Class Member who qualifies as an Aggrieved Employee). (Ly Decl. ¶18; Agreement, Ex. 1 at ¶1.5;1.9.)

The Class Settlement Period is October 28, 2018 to September 24, 2023, or the date of preliminary approval, whichever comes first. (Ly Decl. ¶19; Ex. 1 at ¶1.12.) As of October 2023, and based on documents and other information produced by Defendant, there are approximately 315 Settlement Class Members. (Ly Decl. ¶20; Ex. 1 at § 4, ¶4.1.)

The final Settlement Class contained 279 individuals. (Paul Decl. ¶4.)

B. Aggrieved Employees

For purposes of Agreement, the Aggrieved Employees are defined as: “all of Defendants’ current and former non-exempt agricultural workers who performed labor on an hourly or piece-rate basis for Defendants in the state of California from October 28, 2021 through September 24, 2023. (Ly Decl. ¶21.)

The PAGA Settlement Period means the October 28, 2021 through September 24, 2023. (Ly Decl. ¶22.)

C. Settlement Payments

As detailed fully in the Agreement, the Settlement provides for Defendant to pay a Gross Settlement Amount of \$650,000.00, which includes the sum of the Individual Class Payments, the Class Representatives service award, the Class Counsel Award, PAGA Payment, and the Settlement Administration Costs. (Ly Decl. ¶23; Ex. 1 at ¶1.22.)

The Net Settlement Amount is the Gross Settlement Amount, less Class Counsel Award, Class Representatives Enhancement, PAGA Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs. (Ly Decl. ¶24; Ex. 1 at § ¶1.28.)

The Parties estimate the amount of the Net Settlement Amount as follows:

Gross Settlement Amount:	\$	650,000.00
Less Class Representatives Enhancements:	\$	25,000.00
Less Class Counsel’s Fees:	\$	216,666.67
Less Class Counsel’s Costs:	\$	9,138.37 ¹

¹ The Agreement provided for counsel to receive cost reimbursement up to \$10,000.00. However, counsel’s final costs come to \$9,138.37, which includes the anticipated cost of \$600 for filing the instant motion. (Ly Decl. ¶24, Ex. 5). The extra \$861.63 will remain in the net settlement

1 Class Member. (Paul Decl. ¶17.)

2 E. Class Notice

3 The Court approved the proposed Class Notice, and directed the mailing of the Notice by
4 first-class mail to Settlement Class Members in accordance with the proposed implementation
5 schedule. (Ly Decl. ¶25) The procedures for giving notice to the Settlement Class Members, as
6 set forth in the Agreement and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval and approved by the
7 Court, have been fully and properly carried out. (Paul Decl. ¶¶4-5.)

8 To date, Xpand Legal received zero (0) requests to be excluded (“opt-outs”) from the
9 proposed Agreement and zero (0) objections. (Paul Decl. ¶¶9-10.)

10 F. Check Mailed Settlement – No Reversion

11 The Parties agreed to, and the Court preliminary approved, a checks-mailed settlement
12 without the possibility of reversion of settlement funds to Defendant. Under the Agreement, every
13 Settlement Class Member will receive a settlement check and Settlement Class Members do not
14 need to submit a claim in order to receive a settlement check. Any funds that remain uncashed
15 after the void date shall be turned over by the Administrator, with information for each Settlement
16 Class Member who failed to timely cash his/her settlement check, to the State of California
17 Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Fund. (Ex. 1 at § 4, ¶4.4.3.)

18 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT**

19 Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1781(f), “a class action shall not be
20 dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
21 or compromise shall be given to all members of the Class in such manner as the court directs”
22 In deciding whether to grant final approval to a proposed class action settlement under Code of
23 Civil Procedure § 382, the court’s overriding concern is whether the proposed settlement is “fair,
24 adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.)

25 A. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness

26 “A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length
27 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
28 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is

1 small.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.) The proposed Settlement in the present case
2 meets all of the *Dunk* factors and is therefore entitled to a presumption of fairness.

3 As to the first *Dunk* factor, this settlement is the result of adversarial, non-collusive, and
4 arm’s-length negotiations. All settlement discussions were made by experienced and informed
5 counsel, who believe that this settlement represents a favorable resolution for the Settlement Class
6 Members. (Ly Decl. ¶26.) The settlement negotiations have been, at all times, adversarial and
7 non-collusive, and no self-dealing or other type of misconduct by either side has taken place. (Ly
8 Decl. ¶27.)

9 Second, the Parties engaged in informal discovery that permitted Class Counsel to fairly
10 evaluate the strength of the case and the risks associated with ongoing litigation. (Ly Decl. ¶28.)
11 In addition, Defendant produced additional data and documents informally for purposes of
12 settlement. This included Defendant’s invoices and reports, timesheets, and Plaintiffs’ pay stubs.
13 (Ly Decl. ¶29.) Receipt of appropriate discovery allowed Class Counsel to fairly evaluate the
14 exposure and risks associated with each claim alleged in the lawsuit. (Ly Decl. ¶30.)

15 Third, Class Counsel have significant experience in cases of this type, including several
16 years prosecuting wage, hour, and working condition violations. (Ly Decl. ¶31.) Class Counsel is
17 thus qualified to evaluate the class claims and viability of the defenses. Class Counsel believes that
18 the settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the class and that the average
19 recovery for each Settlement Class Member of over \$1,310.11 is substantial, given the risks
20 inherent in litigation and the defenses asserted. (Ly Decl. ¶32.)

21 Finally, the fourth *Dunk* factor considers the percentage of objectors. Here, there were zero
22 (0) requests to be excluded and no objectors. (Paul Decl. ¶¶9-10). As all of the *Dunk* factors are
23 satisfied, this settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness.

24 B. The Court Should Approve This Class Action Settlement Because it Satisfies Each
25 of the *Kullar* Factors

26 In *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128, the court set forth
27 several factors that should be analyzed in determining whether to approve a class action settlement.
28 These factors include: (1) the strength of plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity and

1 likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status through trial; (4)
2 the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and stage of the
3 proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
4 participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

5 In *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 399,
6 409, the court clarified that a Kullar showing does not require the parties to submit the outer
7 reaches of maximum possible recovery without taking into account the actual risks of certification,
8 decertification, dispositive motions, and trial, so long as there is a record which allows “an
9 understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the
10 litigation.” *Munoz*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 409.

11 The proposed settlement satisfies each of these factors. (Ly Decl. ¶33.) Class Counsel
12 conducted extensive informal discovery before entering into meaningful settlement negotiations
13 in this matter. (*Id* at Ly Decl. ¶¶10-11.) This discovery permitted Class Counsel to fairly evaluate
14 the strength of the case and the risks associated with ongoing litigation. (Ly Decl. ¶34.)
15 Additionally, Class Counsel has spoken to dozens of Class Members about the allegations and
16 their experiences. (Ly Decl. ¶35.) Class Counsel is experienced in handling wage and hour class
17 actions and, after weighing all of the following factors, supports this Agreement. (Ly Decl. ¶36.)

18 1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

19 a) Defendant Failed to Pay Wages and/or Overtime

20 “California employees are entitled to compensation for all hours worked, which means “the
21 time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time
22 the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” (Title 8 Cal. Code
23 of Regs., § 11080(2)(G); *See Troester v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 845, as modified
24 on denial of reh’g (Aug. 29, 2018).) Time is compensable if an employee is “*subject to the control*
25 *of an employer*” even if not working, or if an employee “*is suffered or permitted to work*” even if
26 not “under the employer’s control, provided the employer has or should have knowledge of the
27 employee’s work.” (*Frlekin v. Apple Inc.* (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, 1046, reh’g denied (May 13,
28 2020) (citations omitted.) An employer controls an employee if the employer directs an employee

1 and the employee is unable to use their time how they wish. (*Id.* at p. 1047.) Other factors courts
2 may consider include whether the activity is required, “the location of the activity, the degree of
3 the employer’s control, whether the activity primarily benefits the employee or employer, and
4 whether the activity is enforced through disciplinary measures.” (*Id.* at p. 1056; *Cf. Gibbs v. TWC*
5 *Administration, LLC* (S.D. Cal., Jan. 3, 2020, No. 17CV01513DMSAGS) 2020 WL 42768, at *9
6 (denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment when plaintiff-employees conducted off-the-
7 clock pre-shift activity in preparation to start work right when they clocked in).)

8 In *Troester*, employees spent four to ten minutes completing tasks to close up the store,
9 such as setting the alarm and locking the door. (*Troester*, 5 Cal.5th 829 at p. 843.) The Court held
10 that California law prohibits employers from requiring employees to work off the clock, even for
11 minutes, without compensation. (*Id.* at p. 848.) The Court explained:

12 An employer that requires its employees to work minutes off the clock on a regular
13 basis or as a regular feature of the job may not evade the obligation to compensate
14 the employee for that time by invoking the de minimis doctrine. As the facts here
15 demonstrate, a few extra minutes of work each day can add up. . . . What Starbucks
calls “de minimis” is not de minimis at all to many ordinary people who work for
hourly wages.

16 (*Id.* at p. 847.)

17 Additionally, California workers are statutorily entitled to overtime compensation, unless
18 they are properly classified as falling within one of the narrow exemption categories. Under
19 California law, “[a]ny work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40
20 hours in any one workweek...shall be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half
21 times the regular rate of pay for an employee.” (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a).) Furthermore, “[a]ny
22 work in excess of 12 hours in one day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than twice the
23 regular rate of pay for an employee.” (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a).)

24 Here, Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to pay wages and/or overtime to
25 Plaintiffs and all aggrieved employees. Plaintiffs and other aggrieved employees were not properly
26 compensated for all hours worked over eight (8) hours in one day or forty (40) hours in one week.

27 Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class were not properly compensated for all hours worked
28 because Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class for each and every hour worked.

1 Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class routinely worked “off the clock” and performed compensable
2 activities before working each shift for which no pay was provided. (Ly Decl. ¶37.) Plaintiffs and
3 the Proposed Class are not paid any wages for these pre-shift activities. (Ly Decl. ¶38.) Plaintiffs
4 and the Proposed Class were not properly compensated for all hours worked at the beginning of
5 their shift due to the fact that Defendants required Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class to report to
6 the job site and perform work before the scheduled start of each shift. (Ly Decl. ¶39.) Specifically,
7 Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class would have to attend the “escuelita” or school before working
8 each shift, with no pay provided by Defendants. (Ly Decl. ¶40.) The time spent was “clocked out”
9 and as such, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are not compensated for this time worked even
10 though this time is compensable.

11 Additionally, Defendants had a consistent policy of failing to compensate Plaintiffs and all
12 Proposed Class for their time spent traveling from field to field. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
13 were not properly compensated for their travel time between fields, despite performing
14 compensable activities. (Ly Decl. ¶41.) This time was spent “clocked out” and as such, Plaintiffs
15 and the Proposed Class are not compensated for this time worked even though this time is
16 compensable.

17 Furthermore, Defendants had a consistent policy of failing to pay for wages and/or
18 overtime in compliance with California law when an employee worked over eight hours in a day.

19 The off the clock claims could be difficult to certify given that the Class worked for
20 different growers with different policies, however, the failure to pay overtime for hours worked
21 about eight was the strongest claim. (Ly Decl. ¶42.)

22 b) Defendant Failed to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenditures

23 Under California Labor Code§ 2802(a) an employer "shall indemnify his or her employee
24 for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the
25 discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer." An
26 employee acts in "discharge of his duties," for purposes of this Section when the employee acts
27 within the "course and scope of employment." See *O'Hara v. Teamsters Union Local No. 856*,
28 C.A.9 (Cal.)1998, 151 F.3d 1152.

1 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant required employees to incur business expenditures for
2 which they were never reimbursed, including the costs of using protective gloves and other tools
3 that were not provided by Defendants but were necessary for the performance of Plaintiffs and the
4 Proposed Class's job duties. (Ly Decl. ¶43.)

5 Defendant argues that all tools were provided. (Ly Decl. ¶44.)

6 c) Defendant Failed to Issue Lawful Itemized Wage Statements

7 California Labor Code §226(a) requires Defendants to provide its employees with an
8 accurate, itemized written wage statement that shows, in relevant part, total hours worked by the
9 employee, the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, and all applicable hourly
10 rates and the corresponding number of hours worked.

11 Defendants issued wage statements that violate Labor Code §§ 226(a)(2), (8) and (9). Labor
12 Code § 226(a) specifically requires that the employer shall, semimonthly or at the time of each
13 payment of wages, furnish each of his or her employees, an accurate itemized statement in writing
14 showing all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number
15 of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.

16 Defendants furnish Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class itemized wage statements that do not
17 accurately show total hours worked or all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period
18 and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate in violation of the Labor Code.
19 (Ly Decl. ¶45.) As a result of Defendant's failure to pay wages as described above, Defendant has
20 failed to accurately show total hours worked and all applicable hourly rates in effect during the
21 pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee on
22 itemized wage statements issued to Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class. Defendants' failure to
23 provide accurate itemized wages statements according to Labor Code § 226(a) was all done on a
24 regular and consistent basis.

25 This is a derivative wage statement claim, and its success hinges on the other claims. (Ly
26 Decl. ¶46.)

27 d) Defendant Failed to Provide All Wages Due at the Time of
28 Termination

1 This claim alleges that Defendants failed to pay all wages due and owing upon
2 termination or resignation. Labor Code § 203(a) provides:

3 If an employer willfully fails to pay ... any wages of an employee
4 who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall
5 continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until
6 paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall
7 not continue for more than 30 days.

8 Under Labor Code § 203, a “‘willful’ failure to pay wages ... occurs when an employer
9 intentionally fails to pay wages to an employee when those wages are due.” Cal. Code Regs., tit.
10 8, § 13520; *see also Diaz v. Grill Concepts Services, Inc.* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 859 (“willful”
11 simply means that “the employer intentionally failed or refused to perform an act which was
12 required to be done[.] Willful ... does not necessarily imply anything blameable, or any malice or
13 wrong toward the other party”).

14 Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to properly pay overtime for any work in
15 excess of eight (8) hours per day and/or any work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. (Ly
16 Decl. ¶47.) The risk analysis for the section 203 claim flows from the risk analysis for the
17 underlying wage claim discussed above. (Ly Decl. ¶48.) If Defendants could prove, as they
18 contend, that class members were paid for all hours worked, there would be no recovery of wages
19 and no waiting time penalties that flow therefrom. (Ly Decl. ¶49.)

20 Further, to establish liability for waiting time penalties, Plaintiffs would have to establish
21 not only that the underlying violations occurred, but also that Defendant’s conduct was “willful.”
22 Labor Code § 203.

23 e) Defendants are Liable for Penalties Pursuant to the Private
24 Attorneys General Act of 2002 (“PAGA”)

25 California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.*, permits
26 private litigants to recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. PAGA provides that
27 plaintiffs may recover previously established civil penalties (section 2699(a)) or, if none were
28 established, plaintiffs may recover default penalties provided in section 2699(f) in the amount of
\$100 per employee per pay period for the initial violation and \$200 for subsequent violations.

The Parties discounted the PAGA claim for multiple reasons. First, the aggrieved

employees' PAGA claims are derivative of all the foregoing class claims. (Ly Decl. ¶50.) Second, a court has discretion to award less than the maximum penalty. (Ly Decl. ¶51.) Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) ("a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory"). See e.g., *Carrington v. Starbucks Corporation* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 669 (affirming award of 10% of maximum PAGA penalty). Finally, the settlement Class is compensated for these violations in the proposed Agreement, and thus any PAGA recovery for these same violations would be duplicative. (Ly Decl. ¶52.) As such, the Agreement's contemplated PAGA payment of \$15,000.00 is appropriate. (Ly Decl. ¶53.) See *Nordstrom Commissions Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010) (affirming settlement allocating \$0 of \$6.4 million settlement to PAGA penalties).

2. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

There is significant expense associated with the class certification process, which the Parties can avoid by entering into the contemplated Agreement now. (Ly Decl. ¶54.) If the Court did eventually certify a class, trial of a case involving approximately 315 Settlement Class Members would require the retention of expensive expert witnesses, the accrual of extensive litigation costs, and a significant time overlay by the parties. (Ly Decl. ¶55.) Moreover, given the complexity and unsettled nature of the issues in this case it is likely that any outcome at trial would have resulted in a lengthy and costly appeal. (Ly Decl. ¶56.) An appeal would result in further delay for the Settlement Class Members who are waiting for a resolution in this matter. (*Id.*)

3. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status through Trial

This case has not been certified to be tried as a class action. (Ly Decl. ¶57.) While Plaintiffs believe there is strong evidence to support certification of several possible subclasses, certification is always hard fought and subject to judicial discretion. Moreover, in class actions, decertification is always a possibility. (*Id.*) In attempting to certify a class, the parties would need to conduct multiple depositions, including of the Class Representatives and of several person(s) most knowledgeable regarding Defendant's wage policies. (*Id.*) There is a risk for both sides as to what these depositions will reveal and whether they will support class certification to the extent

1 expected. (*Id.*)

2 4. The Amount Offered in Settlement

3 It was very difficult for the Parties to reach this Settlement of \$650,000.00. (Ly Decl. ¶58.)
4 This Settlement is the result of adversarial, non-collusive, and arms-length negotiations. (Ly Decl.
5 ¶59.) The Parties arrived at it after extensive investigation and discovery, careful evaluation of
6 the law, risks, and all information substantiating the amount of penalties reasonably likely to be
7 awarded to the class were the trier of fact to find Defendant liable. (*Id.*)

8 a) Plaintiffs' Assessment of Defendant's Maximum Exposure

9 Plaintiffs assessed full value of the Minimum Wage/Overtime claim, without any discount,
10 at approximately \$315,000. (Ly Decl. ¶60.) This calculation accounted for the instances where
11 overtime was incorrectly paid and also estimated 30 minutes of "off the clock" work per week and
12 utilized an average hourly rate of \$14.00 an hour. (Ly Decl. ¶61.)

13 With regard to the Reimbursement Claim analysis, Plaintiffs believed that it was reasonable
14 to value the potential reimbursement at \$5.00 per work week for reimbursement of tools. This
15 brought the damages for this claim to \$15,000.00. (Ly Decl. ¶62.)

16 Plaintiffs valued the Wage Statement Claim, without discount, at \$130,000 (for the one
17 year period). (Ly Decl. ¶63.) This figure is overstated because Labor Code §226(e)(1) uses \$50
18 for the initial pay period (not \$100) and puts a \$4,000 cap on wage statement penalties per
19 employee. (Ly Decl. ¶64.) Due to the risk discussed above that 226(a) liability wouldn't attach
20 under *Naranjo* and *Maldonado*, Plaintiffs determined that a steep discount of this claim was fair
21 for settlement purposes. (Ly Decl. ¶65.)

22 Plaintiffs valued the Waiting Time Claim, tied to the Wage/Overtime claim, at
23 \$1,058,400.00 (each employee is a former employee). (Ly Decl. ¶66.) Considering the derivative
24 nature of Labor Code §203 and the dispute over whether class members were owed any wages,
25 Plaintiffs determined that accepting a discount on this claim was appropriate. (Ly Decl. ¶67.)

26 Finally, Plaintiffs calculated the value of the PAGA claim at \$130,000.00 for Settlement
27 Class Members (using \$100 per pay period). (Ly Decl. ¶68.) The main risk taken into account
28 with PAGA is the discretionary nature of the penalty award. (Ly Decl. ¶69.) A judge can award

1 the statutory maximum of \$100 for the initial violation and \$200 thereafter or – in theory – one
2 cent per wage statement. (Ly Decl. ¶70.) While there is a dearth of available authority, in
3 Plaintiffs’ view, were they to succeed on any of the underlying Labor Code violations, it is not
4 likely that a Judge would also award a large amount of penalties of top of any damages recovered.
5 (Ly Decl. ¶71.)

6 Per Plaintiffs’ assessment, the maximum potential value of all of Plaintiffs’ and the
7 Settlement Class Members’ claims was approximately \$1,648,400.00. (Ly Decl. ¶72.) If you
8 eliminate penalties and simply look at the value of the underlying claims, it comes to \$330,000.00.
9 As a result of the forgoing risks on the merits, Class Counsel believes the Gross Settlement Amount
10 of \$650,000.00 is fair and reasonable. (Ly Decl. ¶73.)

11 5. The Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the proceedings

12 As outlined above, Class Counsel conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the
13 claims. (Ly Decl. ¶74.) The agreement to settle did not occur until Class Counsel exchanged and
14 possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgement. (*Id.*)

15 6. The Experience and Views of Counsel

16 Kingsley Szamet & Ly, formerly known as Kingsley & Kingsley, APC is very experienced
17 in prosecuting employment litigation, and the firm has focused its practice since 2000 on wage,
18 hour, and working condition violations. (Ly Decl. ¶¶75-77.) The firm is well versed in class action
19 litigation and has diligently and aggressively pursued this action. (*Ibid.*) Kingsley Szamet & Ly
20 currently serves as Class Counsel for dozens of pending class action lawsuits in Northern, Central,
21 and Southern California. (*Ibid.*) A list of representative cases that Kingsley Szamet & Ly has
22 handled is included in the accompanying declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly. (Ly Decl. ¶¶75-76.)
23 After factoring in the risks explained above, Class Counsel believes that the proposed settlement
24 is fair and reasonable. (Ly Decl. ¶77.)

25 7. The Presence of a Governmental Participant

26 There is no governmental participant in this action. (Ly Decl. ¶78.)

27 8. The Proposed Plan of Allocation Is Fair and Reasonable

28 Plans of allocation are subject to the same standard of review as class action settlements;

they must be “fair, adequate and reasonable.” (*See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 624–625, 629–630.) Here, the proposed plan of allocation compensates Settlement Class Members pro rata based on the number of Workweeks worked by the Settlement Class Member during the Class Settlement Period. The lump sum payment to each member of the settlement Class not excluding him/ herself will be determined by dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Settlement Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks. This allocation distributes Settlement funds proportionally to each class member’s damages, and should therefore be approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Ly Decl. ¶79; Ex. 1 at § 3, ¶3.2.4.)

9. The Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

To date, there are zero (0) requests to be excluded from the proposed Agreement and zero (0) objections. (Paul Decl. ¶¶9-10.) Such indicates that the reaction of Settlement Class Members on the whole is positive and weighs in favor of approval.

V. ENHANCEMENT TO PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs’ Counsel request an enhancement of \$25,000.00 to the Class Representatives for their work on behalf of the Settlement Class. (Ly Decl. ¶124.) “Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.” *Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Company*, 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In *Coca-Cola*, the Court approved service awards of \$300,000 to each named plaintiff in recognition of the services they provided to the class by responding to discovery, participating in the mediation process, and taking the risk of stepping forward on behalf of the class. *Coca-Cola*, 200 F.R.D. at 694; *see also, e.g. Van Vranken*, 901 F. Supp. at 299 (approving \$50,000 participation award to plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.*, Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 227862, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (approving \$25,00 enhancement to each named plaintiff).

The Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives because they have diligently, adequately

1 and fairly represented the Settlement Class and have not placed their interests above any member
2 of the Settlement Class. (*see* Declarations of Jaime Santiago Vasquez, Antonia Blanco, Graciela
3 Blanco, Eloisa Castro, and Tomas Cervantes aka Guadalupe Cervantes (“Client Decls.”) ¶¶4-9.)

4 Here, Class Counsel requests an enhancement for Jaime Santiago Vasquez; Antonia
5 Blanco; Graciela Blanco; Eloisa Castro; and Tomas Cervantes aka Guadalupe Cervantes’ valiant
6 efforts and time expended in this matter. The time spent by Jaime Santiago Vasquez; Antonia
7 Blanco; Graciela Blanco; Eloisa Castro; Tomas Cervantes; and Guadalupe Cervantes is significant
8 and includes researching and retaining competent counsel; providing information to Class Counsel
9 regarding the nature of the work at Defendant; compiling relevant documents; working closely
10 with Class Counsel to develop the theories of liability and martial relevant evidence; regularly
11 discussing the status of the case with Class Counsel; discussing the case via telephone with many
12 Settlement Class Members; providing informal discovery responses; and responding promptly to
13 Class Counsel’s communications regarding settlement. (Ly Decl. ¶125; Client Decls. ¶¶6-9.) Thus,
14 in addition to the sums paid to Settlement Class Members, Plaintiffs request a proposed litigation
15 enhancement in the amount of \$5,000.00 each to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount. (Ex.
16 1 at § 3, ¶3.2.1.) As set forth in the Agreement, Plaintiffs will also be entering into a general release
17 of liability pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Ly Decl. ¶126; Ex. 1 at § 6, ¶6.1.)

18 Class Counsel considers this to be a fair and reasonable enhancement. (Ly Decl. ¶127.)
19 The enhancement takes into consideration the time, effort, and expense incurred by Plaintiffs in
20 coming forward to litigate this matter on behalf of all Settlement Class Members. (*Id.*)
21 Additionally, the Class Representatives were at risk for paying for Defendant’s legal fees and costs
22 in the event that Defendant prevailed at trial. (Ly Decl. ¶128.)

23 **VI. SUBMISSION TO THE LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY**


24 As indicated on the Proof of Service, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
25 Settlement (“Motion”) will be concurrently uploaded to the Labor and Workforce Development
26 Agency’s (“LWDA”) website as required by statute. Proof of submission of Plaintiff’s Motion,
27 all related documents, and copy of the email from the LWDA confirming receipt is attached to the
28 Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly as Exhibit “6.” (Ly Decl. ¶133.)

1 **VII. CONCLUSION**

2 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed Agreement is fair, adequate, reasonable,
3 and in the best interest of the Settlement Class Members. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests
4 that the Court (1) grant Final Approval of the Agreement and all of its terms; (2) award attorneys'
5 fees and costs in the amount detailed in the concurrently filed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
6 Costs; (3) award Xpand Legal claims administration fees of \$12,000.00; and (4) award the Class
7 Representatives an enhancement of \$25,000.00; and (5) enter judgment.

8
9 DATED: June 24, 2024

KINGSLEY SZAMET & LY

10
11 By: 

12 Liane Katzenstein Ly

13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the proposed class
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(PROOF OF SERVICE)

[CCP 1013(a)(3)]

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200, Encino, California 91436.

On June 24, 2024, I served all interested parties in this action the following documents described as: **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF** by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

[XX] BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: I caused a true and correct copy thereof to be electronically filed using the Labor and Workforce Development Agency Electronic Filing ("EF") System (<https://dir.tfaforms.net/315>) and service was completed by electronic means by transmittal of the documents referenced herein on the EF System.

[XX] BY ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION: I caused the document to be send to the persons at the e-mail address(es) listed on the attached service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. A pdf copy of which was sent via email to the below email address(es).

[XX] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on June 24, 2024, at Woodland Hills, California.



Michelle Tanzer

PROOF OF SERVICE LIST

*JAIME SANTIAGO VASQUEZ ET AL. V. PJ FARM LABOR, INC. ET AL.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF KINGS
Case No. 22C-0382*

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