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[Additional Counsel Listed after Caption]

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

ARMANDO MUNIZ, HARRY ROBERT
CHILTON, MICHAEL ANTHONY
FITCH, CESAR EDUARDO LICEA
CASTRO, individually and on behalf of
other persons similarly situated and
similarly aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOT LLC, dba LOT MANAGEMENT
LLC (fka RED COW, INC.), an active
California Limited Liability Company;
HARVEY USA LLC dba HARVEY
GENERAL CONTRACTORS (fka
HARVEY, INC.), an active California
Limited Liability Company; VIVO LLC
dba VIVO dba VIVO LANDSCAPE dba
VIVO LANDSCAPE SERVICES (fka
VIVO GROUP, INC.), and active
California Limited Liability Company;
RCMS LLC dba RED COW
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, an active
California Limited Liability Company;
and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCV32901

CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION

*[Assigned to Hon. Laura A. Seigle
in Dept. SS-17]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT,
CLASS REPRESENTATIVES'
ENHANCEMENT AWARDS, CLASS
COUNSEL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
COSTS, SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION COSTS, AND
LWDA PAYMENT**

[FILED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE
COMPENDIUM OF DECLARATIONS BY:
(1) HAIK HACOPIAN, (2) ZORIK
MOORADIAN, (3) HARVEY C. BERGER,
(4) SAMUEL DAGAN, (5) JAMES CLARK,
(6) JOHN G. YSLAS, (7) ARMANDO
MUNIZ, (8) ROBERT HARRY CHILTON,
(9) MICHAEL ANTHONY FITCH, (10)
CESAR EDUARDO LICEA CASTRO; (11)
LLUVIA ISLAS; AND [PROPOSED]
ORDER]

Date: September 25, 2025

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: SS-17

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6 behalf of other persons similarly situated and similarly aggrieved
7 employees
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1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, on
2 September 25, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in
3 Department SS-17 of the above-entitled Court located at 312 North Spring Street, Los
4 Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff Armando Muniz, Plaintiff Harry Robert Chilton, Plaintiff
5 Michael Anthony Fitch, and Plaintiff Cesar Eduardo Licea Castro ("Plaintiffs"), individually
6 and on behalf of a similarly-situated class of individuals, will and hereby do move this Court
7 for entry of an Order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California
8 Rules of Court, rule 3.769:

9 1. Confirming the certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes
10 under Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, defined as follows:

11 All current and former non-exempt employees employed by
12 Defendants in California or continuing to be employed by
13 Defendants in California between October 6, 2018 to July 1, 2024
14 ("Class Period");

15 2. Confirming the appointment of Plaintiff Armando Muniz, Plaintiff Harry
16 Robert Chilton, Plaintiff Michael Anthony Fitch, and Plaintiff Cesar Eduardo Licea Castro as
17 Class Representatives;

18 3. Confirming the appointment of Mooradian Law, APC, Berger & Williams,
19 LLP, The Law Offices of Samuel Dagan, Lavi & Ebrahimian, LLP, and Wilshire Law Firm
20 as Class Counsel;

21 4. Granting final approval of the Amended Class and Representative Action
22 Settlement Agreement and Release ("Settlement Agreement" or "S.A.");

23 5. Approving an award of \$983,333.33 in Attorneys' Fees to Class Counsel;

24 6. Approving an award of \$26,442.86 in litigation costs and expenses to Class
25 Counsel;

26 7. Approving an award of \$14,500.00 in Settlement Administration Costs to
27 Phoenix Settlement Administrators;

28 8. Approving an allocation of \$50,000 for Private Attorneys General Act

1 (“PAGA”) claims with respective division and payments as follows: 75% (\$37,500) to the
2 California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and 25% (\$12,500) to
3 Aggrieved Employees (“all Class Members employed by Defendants from September 21,
4 2021 to July 1, 2024 (“PAGA Period”)); and

5 9. Approving an Enhancement Awards of \$10,000 to each Plaintiff, or \$40,000
6 total, for their services as the Class Representatives.

7 This Motion is made on the following grounds: (1) the Class continues to meet the
8 requirements for class certification for settlement purposes only under Code of Civil
9 Procedure § 382; (2) Plaintiffs and previously appointed Class Counsel continue to be
10 adequate representatives of the Class; (3) the Settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable
11 compromise of disputed wage and hour claims; (4) the requested awards of Class Counsel
12 Attorneys’ Fees, Class Counsel Costs, Enhancement Awards, and Settlement Administration
13 Costs, are all fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (5) in light of the foregoing, the [Proposed]
14 Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement submitted herewith should be
15 entered so as to give finality to, and allow for disbursements from, the Settlement.

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1 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of
2 Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Haik Hacopian, the Declaration of Zorik
3 Mooradian, the Declaration of Harvey C. Berger, the Declaration of Samuel Dagan, the
4 Declaration of James Clark, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Armando
5 Muniz, the Declaration of Robert Harry Chilton, the Declaration of Michael Anthony Fitch,
6 the Declaration of Cesar Eduardo Licea Castro, the pleadings and other papers filed in this
7 action, and on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument presented at the time of
8 hearing.

9 Dated: Sept. 3, 2025

MOORADIAN LAW, APC
BERGER & WILLIAMS LLP
THE LAW OFFICES OF SAMUEL
DAGAN
LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

13
14 By: /s/Haik Hacopian

15 Zorik Mooradian, Esq.,
16 Haik Hacopian, Esq.,
17 Harvey C. Berger, Esq.,
18 Shelby Harris, Esq.,
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20 Joseph Lavi, Esq.,
21 Nick Ebrahimian, Esq.,
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26 Jeffrey C. Bills, Esq.,
27 Aram Boyadjian, Esq.,
28 Andrew Sandoval, Esq.,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, individually and on
behalf of other persons similarly situated and
similarly aggrieved employees

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs, Armando Muniz, Harry Robert Chilton, Michael Anthony Fitch, and Cesar
4 Eduardo Licea Castro (hereinafter “Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives”), hereby request
5 final approval of the non-reversionary class action settlement entered into with Defendants
6 Lot LLC dba Lot Management LLC (fka Red Cow, Inc.), Harvey USA LLC dba Harvey
7 General Contractors (fka Harvey, Inc.), Vivo LLC dba Vivo dba Vivo Landscape dba Vivo
8 Landscape Services (fka Vivo Group, Inc.), and RCMS LLC dba Red Cow Management
9 Services (hereinafter “Lot” or “Defendants”) which resolves the subject class and
10 representative action on behalf of the Class defined as follows:

11 All current and former non-exempt employees employed by
12 Defendants in California or continuing to be employed by Defendants
13 in California between October 6, 2018 to July 1, 2024 (“Class Period”).

14 This settlement has been received positively by the Class with a 100% participation
15 rate by 1,343 Class Members. There are zero objections, zero exclusion requests, and zero
16 disputes.

17 This settlement, if approved, will pay an average of \$1,366.88 to Participating Class
18 Members. Defendants will pay a gross settlement of \$2,950,000 to fund the settlement, plus
19 the employer’s share of payroll taxes on the portion of the net settlement that is allocated to
20 wages.

21 As explained below, the Court should grant Plaintiffs’ Motion in its entirety because:
22 (1) the Class continues to meet the requirements for class certification for settlement purposes
23 only under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) the Settlement warrants final approval because
24 it is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed claims in this case; and (3)
25 the amounts requested for Class Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fees, Class Counsel’s Costs, Plaintiffs’
26 Enhancement Awards, and Settlement Administration Costs are all fair, adequate, and
27 reasonable. In light of the foregoing, this Court should enter the [Proposed] Order Granting
28 Final Approval of Class Action Settlement submitted concurrently herewith.

1 Given the risks of this litigation and the amount of the settlement, the result here is
2 laudable. As detailed below, the work performed by Plaintiffs and Class Counsel was
3 significant. Among other things, Class Counsel:

- 4 • Conducted initial investigations and developed the theories and facts to support
5 Plaintiffs' claims;
- 6 • Conducted informal discovery including review and analysis of significant
7 document and wage related electronic records including employee time and payroll records;
- 8 • Prepared a detailed mediation brief and damages analysis in connection with a
9 mediation session with Mr. Lou Marlin;
- 10 • Engaged in arm's length settlement negotiations with Defendants at the
11 mediation which resulted in this settlement;
- 12 • Worked with Defendants to further perfect the Settlement, to prepare the
13 Settlement Agreement, related forms, and approval motions; and
- 14 • Incurred a minimum of \$26,442.86 in costs pursuing this case on behalf of
15 Class Members that would not have been recoverable had Plaintiffs lost.

16 Moreover, in pursuing this case against Defendants, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel faced
17 serious risks, including but not limited to:

- 18 • The risk of being unable to establish class-wide liability on the meal and rest
19 period claims in light of the defense that all breaks were properly provided under *Brinker*
20 *Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004;
- 21 • The necessity of significant individualized inquiry with respect to any unpaid
22 wage claims and/or meal/rest break claims making certification unlikely and decertification
23 likely;
- 24 • The risk of being unable to establish class-wide liability on the wage statement
25 and waiting time claims on primarily a derivative basis;
- 26 • The risk of being denied the ability to proceed on a class basis in view of the
27 U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes* (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2541, and
28

1 *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend* (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1426, and the California Supreme Court's
2 decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1;

- 3 • The risk of a potentially prolonged and expensive trial;
- 4 • The risk of Plaintiffs being held liable for Defendants' attorneys' fees and/or
5 costs if this case had been unsuccessful;
- 6 • The risk of lengthy appeals; and
- 7 • The risk that Plaintiffs' future employment prospects would be adversely
8 affected by filing their lawsuits.

9 Despite the many risks faced by Plaintiffs and Class Counsel, and the difficulty in
10 prosecuting such a complex case, they nevertheless achieved a positive result for the
11 Settlement Class. Accordingly, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees of \$983,333.33, or
12 one-third (33 1/3%) of the Total Settlement Amount, is fair, adequate and reasonable. This
13 amount is well-earned, supported by controlling case law, and is squarely within the range
14 awarded by California courts in similar complex cases. Such an award is reasonable and
15 supported by the California Supreme Court's ruling in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*
16 (2016) 1 Cal 5th 480. Class Counsel's collective lodestar is \$572,611.50, and the application
17 of a modest 1.72 multiplier would result in the requested fee award. The expenses incurred
18 totaling \$26,442.86 were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this action and the
19 administration of this Settlement and are significantly less than the \$50,000 maximum
20 contemplated by the Settlement Agreement.

22 Likewise, it is fair that the Settlement Administrator be paid its reasonable fee of
23 \$14,500.00 and a payment for \$37,500.00 to the LWDA, for its 75% share of PAGA penalties,
24 be approved.

25 Finally, Plaintiffs' requested Enhancement Award of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff also
26 warrants approval because it is fair and reasonable in view of Plaintiffs' efforts in their case
27 and the risks they have undertaken, especially considering that they jeopardized their future
28

1 job prospects and exposed themselves to the risk of awards for attorneys’ fees and costs
2 against them (which could have potentially totaled several hundred thousand dollars).

3 Accordingly, this Court should grant this Motion in its entirety and finally approve the
4 settlement.

6 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

7 **A. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits**

8 On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff Muniz commenced this Action on a class-wide basis by
9 filing a complaint alleging seven causes of action under the Labor Code and one under the
10 UCL against Defendant Lot, LLC dba Lot Management. On December 28, 2023, the First
11 Amended Complaint was filed which added a cause of action for Failure to Pay for Reporting
12 Time and a representative cause of action for PAGA penalties in accordance with the notice
13 communicated to the Defendant Lot, LLC and the LWDA on October 13, 2022 (LWDA Case
14 No. LWDA-CM-913668-22). Declaration of Haik Hacopian (hereinafter “HH Decl.”), ¶7.

15 On January 23, 2023, Plaintiffs Michael Hudson and Robert Harry Chilton filed a
16 representative PAGA complaint in San Diego County. On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff Fitch filed a
17 class action against Lot in San Diego County and then filed a PAGA action August 14, 2023.
18 On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff Castro filed a class action against Lot in San Diego County and
19 filed a PAGA action on July 21, 2023. HH Decl. ¶8.

20 In March of 2024, prior to mediation, Plaintiffs and their counsel entered into a Joint
21 Prosecution Agreement. Declaration of Harvey C. Berger (hereinafter “HCB Decl.”), ¶¶13-
22 14, Exh. “A”. Declaration of Samuel Dagan (hereinafter “SD Decl.”), ¶8.

23 On October 18, 2024, in accordance with the Parties’ agreement to effectuate this
24 comprehensive global settlement, the operative Second Amended Complaint was filed which
25 added Plaintiffs Chilton, Fitch, and Castro as named class representatives and added Harvey
26 USA LLC, Vivo LLC, and RCMS LLC, related Lot entities named in the other actions, as
27 named defendants. HH Decl. ¶9.
28

1 **B. Discovery and Mediation**

2 The Parties have conducted investigation of the operative facts and applicable law
3 during the pendency of the case through informal discovery. Prior to mediation, Plaintiffs
4 obtained a sample of timesheets and payroll data that covered 13.5% of class shifts, as well as
5 exemplar wage statements and relevant employee handbooks. This production is underscored
6 by Lot’s representation that all class data was retained only in physical form and that it
7 expended significant resources to convert the records to usable and producible electronic
8 form. Plaintiffs were also provided with all pertinent class data points. Plaintiffs retained the
9 assistance of an expert through whom potential class wide damages were assessed. HH Decl.
10 ¶10, HCB Decl. ¶7.

11 On April 3, 2024, Plaintiffs and Lot participated in a full-day mediation before Mr.
12 Lou Marlin. The Parties were able to reach a resolution at the mediation and entered into a
13 Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). The Parties ultimately entered into their Class and
14 Representative Action Settlement Agreement and Release incorporating the MOU’s terms, a
15 true and correct copy of the final executed version of which was including as part of Plaintiffs’
16 filings in support of Preliminary Approval. HH Decl. ¶11.

17 **C. Grant of Preliminary Approval**

18 This Court entered the Preliminary Approval Order on April 18, 2025 after holding
19 hearings on February 19, 2025, and April 4, 2025. Prior to the hearings, on January 10, 2025,
20 Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Approval and supporting papers. On March 27,
21 2025 and March 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed supplemental papers to clarify points raised by the
22 Court at the February 19, 2025 hearing which also included the operative Settlement
23 Agreement. On April 14, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s request at the April 4 hearing, the
24 Parties filed a report indicating that the escalator clause had not been triggered, after which
25 approval was granted. A true and correct copy of the April 22, 2025 Notice of Entry of Order
26 Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement is attached as **Exhibit “1”** to the
27 Declaration of Haik Hacopian. HH Decl. ¶12, Exh. 1.
28

Preliminary Approval Motion filings were submitted to the LWDA online, proofs for which were provided with each respective filing. These submissions were in addition to the PAGA Notice Letters communicated by Plaintiffs to Defendants and the LWDA.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE PROCESS

A. Monetary Terms

This Settlement provides for Defendants to pay the non-reversionary settlement amount of \$2,950,000 (“Total Settlement Amount”), in addition to the employer share of payroll taxes on the wage component of this Settlement. S.A. ¶¶I(34), III(9). The Net Settlement Amount is the amount remaining from the Total Settlement Amount after deducting Class Counsel fees (\$983,333.33 or one-third of the Total Settlement Amount), Class Counsel costs (\$26,442.86), the Enhancement Awards to named Plaintiffs (\$40,000.00), settlement administration costs (\$14,500.00), the LWDA’s 75% share of the PAGA allocation (\$37,500.00), and aggrieved employees 25% share of same (\$12,500.00). S.A. ¶III(9). The foregoing deductions from the Total Settlement Amount result in an estimated Net Settlement Amount of \$1,835,723.81. The simple average class settlement payment calculates to \$1,366.88 ($\$1,835,723.81 \div 1,343$). HH Decl. ¶13.

The Individual Settlement Payment to be paid to a Participating Class Member shall be determined by dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members collectively during the Class Period to determine the settlement value for each workweek. Then this value will be multiplied by the number of workweeks for a Participating Class Member to determine their Individual Settlement Payment. S.A. ¶¶ (I)15 and III(10)(a). At 89,324 workweeks, the settlement value for each workweek comes to \$20.55 ($\$1,835,723.81 \div 89,324$). HH Decl. ¶13.

The Individual PAGA Payment will be calculated as follows: 25% of the PAGA Payment (\$12,500) will be divided by the number of PAGA Settlement Group Members Pay Periods, then multiplied by the number of PAGA Settlement Group Member Pay Periods attributable to the specific PAGA Settlement Group Member. S.A. ¶¶ (I)14 and III(11)(a). At

1 49,614 weekly pay periods, the settlement value for each PAGA workweek comes to \$0.25
2 (\$12,500 ÷ 49,614). HH Decl. ¶13.

3 The average Individual Settlement Payment per the administrator (which assumes a
4 maximum \$50,000 award for costs) is \$1,349.34, the highest is \$6,248.57, the lowest is
5 \$20.29. Declaration of Lluvia Islas (hereinafter “Islas Decl.”) ¶13. Individual Class Payments
6 will be allocated ten percent (10%) to wages and eighty percent (90%) to reimbursement of
7 business expenses, interest, and penalties. Individual PAGA Payments will be reported on
8 1099 Forms. S.A. ¶III(4).

9 **B. Summary of Notice Process and Response from the Settlement Class**

10 On April 28, 2025, Phoenix received a data file from Defense Counsel that contained
11 names, last known mailing addresses, telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, and weeks
12 worked for each Class Member (“Class List”) during the Class Period. Islas Decl. at ¶3.

13 On May 19, 2025, the Notices were mailed via U.S. first class mail, in English and
14 Spanish, to all 1,343 Class Members on the Class List after conducting a National Change of
15 Address (NCOA) search to update addresses. *Id.* at ¶¶4 & 5 (See Exhibit “A” – Notice Packet).
16 Ultimately, only fifteen (15) Notices were undeliverable after a skip trace. *Id.* at ¶7.

17 Class Members had until July 18, 2025 to submit objections, disputes, and/or requests
18 for exclusion. *Id.* at ¶¶8-10. As of August 7, 2025, Phoenix has not received any objections,
19 disputes to the settlement, or requests for exclusion. *Id.*

20 The average payment, per the administrator, to each Participating Class Member is
21 estimated at \$1,349.34, the highest payment is estimated at \$6,248.57, and the lowest at
22 \$20.29. *Id.* at ¶13. The average individual PAGA Payment is estimated to be \$13.38, the
23 highest at \$36.53, and the lowest at \$0.25. *Id.* at ¶14. On account of Class Counsel seeking
24 less than the maximum of \$50,000 allotted for costs, the final payments will be higher with
25 the average class payment at \$1,366.88. HH Decl. ¶13.

26 **C. Timing of Payments and Uncashed Checks**

27 Defendants shall fund the Total Settlement Amount with \$1,000,000 due by April 30,
28

2025 and \$1,950,000 due by October 31, 2025. S.A. at ¶9. The administrator received the initial \$1,000,000 payment on May 5, 2025. Islas Decl. at ¶16. The disbursement date shall be the later of fourteen (14) days after Defendants fully fund the Settlement or November 14, 2025. S.A. at ¶9.

After one hundred and eighty (180) days of the mailing of the individual payments, funds attributable to unclaimed, undeliverable, or expired checks (“Unclaimed Settlement Payments”) shall be deposited as follows: any unclaimed settlement checks over \$200 shall escheat to the State Treasury as unclaimed property pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law (UPL); and any unclaimed settlement checks \$200 or less shall be paid to California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA), which provides legal services to low income workers. The Parties represent and warrant they have no affiliation with either of these entities. S.A. ¶12.

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM ITS CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES BECAUSE IT MEETS ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 382

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, a class may be certified if: (1) it is ascertainable and its members are too numerous for joinder to be practical; (2) the representative(s) and absent class members share a community of interest and questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over questions unique to individual class members; (3) the representative’s claims are typical of the class’s claims; and (4) the representatives will fairly and adequately represent the class’s interests. See *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470. Here, this Court found that the Class meets all the requirements for class certification for settlement purposes when it granted preliminary approval of the Settlement on April 18, 2025. No new circumstances have cast any doubt on the propriety of the preliminary approval determination. HH Decl. ¶14. In fact, the reaction of the Class Members to the notice of the Settlement to date has been entirely in support of the Settlement, with not a single Class Member objecting or requesting exclusion. Islas Decl. ¶¶8 & 9. Accordingly, this Court should confirm its conditional certification of the Settlement Class.

1 A. **This Court Should Finally Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
2 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage and Hour**
3 **Claims**

4 California courts have a strong policy in favor of settlement. See e.g., *Stambaugh v.*
5 *Superior Court* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236. Unlike individual settlements, class action
6 settlements involve a court approval process that exists to prevent fraud, collusion, and
7 unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court* (1980)
8 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-79. This approval process consists of preliminary settlement
9 approval, notice being given to class members, and a final fairness and approval hearing at
10 which class members have the opportunity to be heard with respect to the settlement. *Id.* Now
11 that notice has been provided to the Settlement Class Members, and the notice process is
12 complete, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court finally approve the Settlement as fair,
13 adequate, and reasonable.

14 1. ***The Settlement Was Reached Via Arm's-Length Bargaining***
15 ***Through Experienced Counsel and an Experienced Mediator and***
16 ***Was Based on Sufficient Information to Intelligently Negotiate a***
17 ***Fair Settlement in Light of the Claims Asserted and Risks of***
18 ***Continued Litigation***

19 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arm's-length bargaining,
20 based on sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act
21 intelligently, counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors to
22 the settlement is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802. In
23 deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to determine
24 if the proposed settlement is fair under the circumstances of the case. *Mallick v. Superior*
25 *Court* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438. In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is
26 to ensure that a proposed settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." *Dunk, supra*, 48
27 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted). Relevant factors for the Court to consider
28 include, but are not limited to:

 [T]he strength of Plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and
 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the
 extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the

1 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
2 participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
3 settlement.

4 *Id.* These factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive and, as such, trial courts should tailor
5 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual
6 agreement between the parties.” *Id.*

7 “In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount Plaintiff
8 might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable
9 under all of the circumstances.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
10 250. Because settlements inherently involve compromise, even settlements providing for
11 substantially narrower relief than likely would be obtained if the suit were successfully
12 litigated can be reasonable because “the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary
13 settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.” *Id.* (quoting
14 *Air Line Stewards, etc., Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.* (7th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 101,
15 109). In addition, courts review the discovery process and information received through it to
16 aid them in assessing whether the parties sufficiently developed the claims and their
17 supporting factual bases before reaching settlement. See *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail Inc.*
18 (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-31. Information is sufficient where it allows the parties and
19 the court to form “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range
20 of outcomes of the litigation.” See *Clark v. American Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175
21 Cal.App.4th 785, 801. This requirement exists so that the parties can provide the court with
22 “a meaningful and substantiated explanation of the manner in which the factual and legal
23 issues have been evaluated.” *Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 132.

24 Here, the Settlement resulted from extensive arm’s-length settlement negotiations
25 between and among qualified and experienced counsel, with the assistance of a well-respected
26 mediator, and is fair, adequate, and reasonable for all Settlement Class Members. As
27 discussed, the parties participated in a mediation session before Mr. Lou Marlin and agreed to
28 their Settlement. HH Decl. ¶11, HCB Decl. ¶8 While Plaintiffs steadfastly maintain that their
claims are meritorious, they also appreciate that there are tremendous risks that continued

1 litigation would entail thereby resulting in a loss in value under the maximum exposure
2 analysis, as extensively briefed in Plaintiffs' papers in support of Preliminary Approval.

3 First, there are risks with respect to obtaining, and maintaining, class certification for
4 trial purposes that support the fairness of the Settlement. For example, in the case of *Koval v.*
5 *Pacific Bell Telephone Co.* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1050, the plaintiffs were unable to certify
6 claims for failure to provide meal and rest periods due to their inability to show that managers
7 applied allegedly illegal policies consistently on a class-wide basis. See also *Ali v. U.S.A. Cab,*
8 *Ltd.* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1350. Moreover, the California Supreme Court's decision
9 in *Duran v. U.S. Bank* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, makes class certification even less certain given
10 its antipathy towards using "sampling" as a basis for ascertaining class-wide liability and/or
11 damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs would likely encounter extreme difficulty in certifying most
12 of the claims in this case because, while they may present substantial common liability issues,
13 they also give rise to individual damages issues. HH Decl. ¶15. Thus, there is a significant
14 risk that this case would not proceed to completion as a class action absent the Settlement.

15 Second, there are substantial risks with respect to establishing the merits of Plaintiffs'
16 claims. As explained in the briefing in support of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the
17 primary claim for unpaid wages required determinations at the individual level as to "why"
18 any off-the-clock work was performed, a major impediment to class certification. Defendants
19 contended that they satisfied their obligations under *Brinker*. Moreover, engaging in the
20 inquiry of whether any late, short, or missed break was a result of employee choice or
21 employer coercion would entail significant individualized inquiries affecting class treatment
22 of the claims. Defendants vehemently denied that they engaged in any unlawful activity, failed
23 to comply with the law in any respect, or have any liability to any person or entity under the
24 claims asserted in the lawsuit. HH Decl. ¶15.

25 Third, Defendants' defenses and the uncertainty surrounding the merits of Plaintiffs'
26 underlying claims could potentially preclude most of the penalties sought in this case. For
27 instance, Labor Code § 203 requires proof of "willful" or "knowing and intentional" Labor
28 Code violations for liability to be imposed. Thus, the existence of a good faith dispute that

1 could preclude any recovery of wages (even if the plaintiff ultimately prevails) can preclude
2 such penalties from being awarded. 8 Cal. Code Regs. §13520(a); *Road Sprinkler Fitters*
3 *Local Union No. 669 v. G&G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 765, 782; see also
4 *Choate v. Celite Corp.* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1460 (reversing award of waiting time
5 penalties based on employer's good faith defense notwithstanding that the plaintiffs prevailed
6 on the underlying wage claims). Additionally, gross wages earned (as unpaid hourly and
7 premium wages are potentially here) are not included in the list of faults for which an
8 employee is deemed to suffer injury under Lab. Code. Sec. 226(e)(2)(B).

9 Each of these considerations bore heavily on the negotiations allowing for the
10 Settlement, and furthermore confirm that the Settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable
11 compromise in view of the risks of further litigation. HH Decl. ¶16. As detailed in the papers
12 supporting the Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiffs carefully vetted the claims at issue
13 by reviewing policies, records and data regarding the size and makeup of the class. Thus,
14 while the risks discussed herein are far from exhaustive, they demonstrate that the Settlement
15 is fair, adequate, and reasonable in view of them.

16 **2. The Settlement Fairly, Reasonably, and Adequately Compensates**
17 **Settlement Class Members Because Each Participating Class**
18 **Member Will Be Paid Based on the Extent of His or Her Injury as**
19 **Compared to Other Class Members**

20 The Net Settlement Amount will be paid to all Participating Settlement Class Members
21 based on the number of workweeks worked during the Class Period. S.A. ¶3.2.4. Such an
22 allocation method is fair, adequate, and reasonable because it correlates to the extent of harm
23 allegedly suffered based on the asserted claims. HH Decl. ¶17. All checks not cashed within
24 180 days shall be deposited as follows: any unclaimed settlement checks over \$200 shall
25 escheat to the State Treasury as unclaimed property pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law
26 (UPL); and any unclaimed settlement checks \$200 or less shall be paid to California Rural
27 Legal Assistance (CRLA). S.A. ¶12.

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3 **3. *The Absence of Any Objections or Exclusion Requests Further***
4 ***Confirms That the Settlement Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable***
5 ***Compromise of the Disputed Claims at Issue***

6 The response of class members to a settlement is relevant in evaluating whether it
7 merits final approval. *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801. Notably, the absence of objections
8 or exclusion requests supports a fairness presumption. In *7-Eleven Owners for Fair*
9 *Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, it was found that 9 objections and 80 opt-outs, from a class
10 of 5,454, showed a “particularly impressive” favorable response from class members
11 supporting final approval. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1152-53. Here, none of the 1,343
12 Class Members opted out of the settlement. *Islas Decl.* ¶8. Notably, not even a single member
13 of the Class filed an objection to the Settlement. *Id.* at ¶9. Thus, the favorable response of the
14 Class is completely positive and further confirms that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and
15 reasonable and merits final approval.

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18 **V. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES SHOULD BE APPROVED**

19 **A. Class Counsel’s Fees Should be Approved as a Percentage of the**
20 **Total Common Fund Created for the Class**

21 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated as a percentage of the total value of the
22 settlement for successful prosecution and resolution of all existing claims. Both California
23 State and Federal Courts have recognized that an appropriate method in determining an
24 attorney fee award may be based on the percentage on the total value of the benefits the class
25 members receive from the settlement. *Serrano v. Priest* (1997) 20 Cal. 3d 25-34 [*Serrano III*];
26 *Boeing Company v. Van Gemert* (1980) 344 U.S. 472, 478; *Vincent v. Hughes Airwest, Inc.*
27 (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769. The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust
28 enrichment and to “spread litigation costs proportionately among all the beneficiaries so that
the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” *Id.* at 768. The monetary benefits
will then be paid from a common fund.

 The California Supreme Court endorsed a fee award as a percentage of the common
fund; the Court clarified “that when an attorney fee is awarded out of a common fund

1 preserved or recovered by means of litigation (internal citation omitted), the award is not per
2 se unreasonable merely because it is calculated as a percentage of the common fund.” *Laffitte*
3 *v. Robert Half Int’l. Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 480, 486. Also “[t]hat the recognized advantages
4 of the percentage method...convince us that the percentage method is a valuable tool that
5 should not be denied in our trial courts.” *Id.* at 503.

6 The Common Fund Doctrine is predicated on the principle of preventing unjust
7 enrichment. When a litigant’s efforts create or preserves, or generates a fund from which
8 others derive benefits, he may require the passive beneficiaries to compensate those who
9 created the fund. Both California State and Federal Courts have embraced this Doctrine.
10 *Serrano III, supra*, at 35; *Vincent, supra*, at 769.

11 Since *Serrano III, supra*, there has been a ground swell of support for mandating the
12 percentage of the fund approach in common fund cases. Both State and Federal courts have
13 found the percentage approach preferable to the Lodestar because; (1) it aligns the interest of
14 class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation
15 by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demand
16 on judicial resources. *In re Activision Sec. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F Supp. at 1378-79.
17 The Ninth Circuit now routinely uses the percentage of the common fund approach to
18 determine the award of attorney fees. *Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
19 19, 30-31.

20 Collectively, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks \$983,333.33 which is one-third (33 1/3%) of the
21 \$2,950,000 Total Settlement Amount. Class Counsel’s request for one-third of the monetary
22 fund recovered is well within the range customarily approved by California courts in
23 comparable class actions and other class actions as well as with contingency contracts
24 negotiated by plaintiff and their counsel. “Empirical studies show that regardless of whether
25 or not the percentage method or Lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average
26 around one-third of the recovery.” See e.g., *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 66,
27 fn. 11; *In re California Indirect Purchases* (October 22, 1998) WL1031494 at *9 (*citing In re*
28 *Milk Antitrust Litigation* (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1998) Civ. Case No. BC070061 (33 1/3% award); *In*
re Facsimile Paper Antitrust Litigation (San Francisco Sup. Ct. 1997) Civ. Case No. BC

0070061 (33 1/3% award); *In re Liquid Carbon Dioxide Cases* (San Diego Sup. Ct. 1996) J.C.C.P. 3012 (33 1/3% award); *Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. November 14, 2007) WL 3492841 at *4 (“fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”) (*Quoting Newberg on Class Actions* § 14.6 (4th ed. 2007)).

In *Lealao, supra*, at 46-47, the Court indicated that in defining a “reasonable” fee in representative actions, the law should “mimic the market.” The Court went on to state:

“Given the unique reliance of our legal system on private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law through class and derivative actions, attorneys providing the essential enforcement services must be provided incentives roughly comparable to those negotiated in the private bargaining that takes place in the legal marketplace as it will otherwise be economic for Defendant’s to increase injurious behavior. *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 46-47, and *Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.* (2006) 144 Cal. App.4th 140, 163.

For the following reasons, awarding one-third of the gross settlement for attorney fees is fair, reasonable and appropriate.

B. Factors Supporting the Fee Award

1. The Amount of the Settlement

In Class Counsel’s experience, a gross non-reversionary settlement of \$2,950,000 in a wage and hour case for a class size of 1,343 is a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement in light of the asserted claims, Defendants’ defenses, and the strong possibility that the class would not recover anything without this settlement. Declaration of Zorik Mooradian (hereinafter “ZM Decl.”) ¶7, HH Decl. ¶6, HCB Decl. ¶¶7-8, SD Decl. ¶8.

The fact that there presently are no objections, no exclusion requests, no disputes, and Participating Class Members are expected to be paid 100% of the value of their individual claims shows that the settlement has been well received by the Class Members. Islas Decl. ¶¶8-10. The average amount expected to be paid amongst the 1,343 Participating Settlement Class Members is \$1,349.34 and the highest estimated settlement payment is \$6,248.57. *Id.* at ¶13.

2. The Named Plaintiff Signed a Retainer Agreement

Plaintiff Muniz signed a single retainer with Mooradian Law, APC. The Retainer Agreement had language providing a maximum of forty-five percent (45%) in attorneys’ fees,

1 of course, subject to court approval of class wide issues. The Retainer Agreement also had a
2 provision for recovery of costs in relation to the representation. ZM Decl. ¶8.

3 In *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 46-47, the court indicated that in defining a
4 “reasonable” fee in representative actions, the law should “mimic the market.” Here, as for
5 the representation of the individual rights of Mr. Muniz, a proposed retainer agreement for
6 recovery of fees could be one-third of the gross recovery. That would be consistent with the
7 market rate, and there is no reason to believe that, if any of the other 1,343 class members had
8 signed an individual retainer, it would be any different. ZM Decl. ¶9.

9 In, *In re Cont’l Ill. Secs. Litig.*, Judge Posner endorsed a market-based approach to
10 evaluating fee requests, stating that the function of judges in fee litigation “is to determine
11 what the lawyer would receive if he were selling his services in the market rather than being
12 paid by court order.” (7th Cir. 1992) 962 F.2d 566, 568. In a law review article (Silver) entitled
13 “A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions (1991) 76 Cornell L.Rev. 656,
14 702-703 (it stated that the goal “is to pay attorneys on terms they would probably accept in an
15 ex ante bargain, before the outcome of litigation is known”).

16 3. Defendants and the Class Do Not Object to the Attorney Fee 17 Agreement

18 In almost all the mediations that Mr. Mooradian has attended, a one-third to 35%
19 attorney fee percentage is generally agreed upon by the defendant and the plaintiff subject to
20 court approval. In this matter, the Parties agreed that Class Counsel may request up to one
21 third and Defendants would not oppose same. ZM Decl. ¶10.

22 Of most importance, notice was provided to each of the Class Members that the
23 attorneys would be seeking attorney fees in the amount of \$983,333.33 or one-third of the
24 settlement. The fact that no Class Members had any objection to the settlement or any of its
25 terms, speaks pretty strongly to the notion that class members are extremely happy with the
26 settlement. ZM Decl. ¶11.

27 Here, it is beyond any reasonable dispute that, if class counsel had been able to
28 negotiate directly with the class members, the class would have found that a one-third fee
arrangement was eminently reasonable. ZM Decl. ¶12.

4. The Contingent Risk Factor

For Class Counsel, the fees in this case are entirely contingent in nature. As the 9th Circuit noted, class counsel who take a case on a contingency basis bears a “double contingency: first they must prevail on the class claims, and then they must find some way to collect what they win.” *Torrissi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.* (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1370, 1377. The fees received from one case, are often used to finance and move forward other cases that have failed and bring in revenue for counsel. ZM Decl. ¶13, HCB Decl. ¶10.

C. The Lodestar/Multiplier Cross-Check

Even though class counsel is requesting fees with the percentage of the benefit approach, some courts nevertheless use a Lodestar/Multiplier cross check to confirm the fees’ reasonableness. *Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19-45; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051. The Lodestar Analysis (Lodestar-Multiplied Method) begins with a calculation of time spent in reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney and paralegal who worked on the case and then to compensation counsel for risk, quality and result, courts commonly apply a “multiplier” to the Lodestar in awarding attorney fees.

The first step is to determine the Lodestar individually for each attorney and/or paralegal that has worked on the case and is claiming fees. The Lodestar analysis for each attorney appears in their own Declaration(s), summarized below:

Attorney(s)	Billable Rate(s)	Hours	Lodestar
MOORADIAN LAW, APC			
Zorik Mooradian ZM Decl. ¶¶15-19	\$650	187.2	\$121,680.00
Haik Hacopian HH Decl. ¶18	\$450	163	\$73,350.00
		350.2	\$195,030.00
BERGER & WILLIAMS, LLP			

Harvey C. Berger HCB Decl. ¶12	\$450	75.7	\$34,065.00
Shelby Harris HCB Decl. ¶12	\$350	71.4	\$24,990.00
Tim Williams HCB Decl. ¶12	\$495	0.2	\$99.00
		147.3	\$59,154.00
THE LAW OFFICES OF SAMUEL DAGAN			
Samuel Dagan SD Decl. ¶¶3-4	\$450	147	\$66,150.00
		147	\$66,150.00
LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP			
James Clark JC Decl. ¶10	\$675	37	\$24,975.00
Joseph Lavi JC Decl. ¶12	\$1,000	43.5	\$43,500.00
Vincent C. Granberry JC Decl. ¶13	\$750	38	\$28,500.00
Jordan D. Bello JC Decl. ¶14	\$750	15	\$11,250.00
William Tran JC Decl. ¶15	\$675	18.5	\$12,487.50
		152	\$120,712.50
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM			
Samantha A. Smith JGY Decl. ¶¶11 & 21	\$1,000	1.0	\$1,000.00
Jeffrey C. Bils JGY Decl. ¶¶ 12 & 21	\$850	3.1	\$2,635.00

Lisa B. Iturriaga JGY Decl. ¶¶17 & 21	\$550.00	4.0	\$2,200.00
Andrew Sandoval JGY Decl. ¶¶18 & 21	\$500.00	5.2	\$2,600.00
Aram Boyadjian JGY Decl. ¶¶15 & 21	\$600.00	8.5	\$5,100.00
Mariam Nazaretyan JGY Decl. ¶¶16 & 21	\$550.00	14.8	\$8,140.00
Harry Erganyan JGY Decl. ¶¶14 & 21	\$600.00	22.4	\$13,440.00
Diego Aviles JGY Decl. ¶¶13 & 21	\$750.00	40.2	\$30,150.00
John G. Yslas JGY Decl. ¶¶10 & 21	\$1,500	44.2	\$66,300.00
		143.4	\$131,565.00
Total Class Counsel Lodestar	939.9		\$572,611.50

In this matter, the total present and anticipated lodestar tallies to \$572,611.50 and results in the requested \$983,333.33 fee award after the application of a modest 1.72 multiplier. HH Decl. ¶16. To the extent higher Laffey Matrix Rates are applied, the lodestar may even exceed the requested fee award.

D. A Lodestar Multiplier of 1.72 is Reasonable

“It is an established practice in the private legal market to reward attorneys for taking the risk of non-payment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases.” *Fischell v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of U.S.* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 997, 1008. In the Ninth Circuit, a lodestar amount is “routinely enhanced...to reflect the risk of non-payment in common fund cases.” *Craft v. County of San Bernardino* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 624 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1125 (awarding multiplier of 5.2 and collecting cases with cross-check multipliers ranging from 4.5 to 19.6); *Morgret v. Applus Tech., Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2015)

Case No. 1:13-cv-01801-JLT, 2015 WL 3466389 at *17 (awarding multiplier of 3.9, “which is within the range typically awarded in the Ninth Circuit.”); *Torchia v. W.W. Grainger, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014) 304 F.R.D. 256, 277 (Thurston, J.) (awarding multiplier of about 3.6).

Here, the lodestar multiplier of approximately 1.72 is well within the range of reasonableness, as has been held by numerous courts, especially in light of the significant work performed in this case and the efficiency with which it was done.

E. Attorneys Fees v. Class Benefit

While it’s generally true that the greater the attorney fees, the less funds there will be for distribution to class members as damages, nevertheless, a balance must be achieved. In the instant matter, the class got a very balanced and fair settlement. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the case, they will be receiving a fair sum of money. The results and the case law support that the settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate. The class had an affirmative response to the settlement, where there was not a single objection or exclusion request. In light of the favorable settlement, giving more money to the class after an excellent settlement had been achieved punishes the attorneys without whom such a settlement would not have been attained but for the efforts of good lawyering. Punishing lawyers when they do well is potentially sending the wrong message and serves as a disincentive and unjustly enriches the class that has already received a fair and adequate amount of benefits. ZM Decl. ¶14.

VI. PAYMENT OF COSTS TO CLASS COUNSEL SHOULD BE APPROVED

Class Counsel has incurred \$26,442.86 in total costs which is significantly less than the \$50,000 maximum contemplated per the Settlement Agreement and is the amount that Plaintiffs are requesting the Court approve. S.A. ¶III(14). All costs are necessary and reasonable, as reflected by the declarations submitted by counsel. ZM Decl. ¶20 (\$16,578.40); HH Decl. ¶19 (\$938.24); HCB Decl. ¶11 (\$528.39); SD Decl. ¶3 (\$1,752.56); JC Decl. ¶17, Exh. 9 (\$3,085.50); JGY Decl. ¶23, Exh. 1 (\$3,559.77).

VII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY APPROVE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT AWARDS BECAUSE THEY ARE FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE IN VIEW OF PLAINTIFFS' EFFORTS AND THE RISKS THAT THEY ASSUMED IN THIS LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

Courts routinely approve enhancement awards to compensate named Plaintiff(s) for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation. See, e.g., *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (upholding "service payments" to named Plaintiff for their efforts in bringing the case); see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 (approving a \$50,000 incentive payment).

Here, pursuant to the Settlement, Plaintiffs seek Enhancement Awards totaling \$10,000 each. S.A. ¶III(13). This request is a reasonable portion of the Total Settlement Amount given Plaintiffs' efforts in litigating this case and the risks they undertook on behalf of the Class. See, e.g., *Staton v. Boeing Co.* (9th Cir.2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977 (affirming that courts should consider "the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation and reasonable fear[s of] workplace retaliation").

Plaintiffs' proposed Enhancement Awards in proportion to the Total Settlement Amount and standing alone are well within the range of reasonable. The requested Enhancement Awards represent only 1.4% of the Total Settlement Amount. (\$40,000 ÷ \$2,950,000). See, e.g., *Bond v. Ferguson Enters., Inc.* (E.D.Cal. June 30, 2011) Civ. No. 1:09–1662 OWW MJS, 2011 WL 2648879, at *2, 15 (approving an \$11,250 incentive award to each of the two named Plaintiffs); *Ross v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n* (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2010) Civ. No. 3:07–2951 SI, 2010 WL 3833922, at *3 (approving an award of \$20,000 to each of four named Plaintiffs based on their contributions to litigation and the risk that being a class representative would harm their reputation); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, at *17 (finding "requested payment of \$25,000 to each of the named plaintiffs is appropriate" in wage and hour settlement); *Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) No. CV 08 1365 CW (EMC),

1 2010 WL 1687832, at *17 n.8 (“Numerous Court in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have
2 approved Enhancement Awards of \$20,000 or more where, as here, the class representative
3 has demonstrated a strong commitment to the class”).

4 Plaintiffs have also spent time assisting in the prosecution of this action, which
5 deserves compensation. See e.g., *In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig.* (7th Cir.1992) 962 F.2d 566, 571
6 (“Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be
7 necessary to induce him to participate in the suit...”). It is important that all four Plaintiffs are
8 paid a fair amount for their services to the class and out of 1,343 employees, they were the
9 only ones that stepped forward stuck with the case for over a two-year and half year period.
10 If it was not for them, the \$2,950,000 settlement would not have been obtained for the class.
11 ZM Decl. ¶21.

12 Plaintiffs have put a significant amount of time into this case spanning a period of over
13 two and half years. Plaintiff Muniz estimates that he has spent 40-42 hours participating in his
14 case. Declaration of Armando Muniz (hereinafter “Muniz Decl.”) ¶5. Plaintiff Castro has
15 spent approximately 50 hours in this litigation since July 2022. Declaration of Eduardo Licea
16 Castro (hereinafter “Castro Decl.”) ¶6. Plaintiff Fitch has spent 60 to 65 hours. Declaration of
17 Michael Anthony Fith (hereinafter “Fitch Decl.”) ¶8. Plaintiff Chilton has spent numerous
18 hours participating in his case. Declaration of Harry Robert Chilton (hereinafter “Chilton
19 Decl.”) ¶13.

20
21 Moreover, by the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs subjected themselves to the risk of
22 retaliation both by current and potential future employers who may learn of the lawsuit. Fitch
23 Decl. ¶9. See, e.g., *Marlo v. United Parcel Service, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2015) 600 Fed.Appx. 551
24 (awarding significant verdict to a former UPS employee who terminated in retaliation for
25 filing a class action lawsuit against his employer, UPS).

26 Significantly, after receiving Class Notice, including notice of the proposed
27 Enhancement Awards to Plaintiffs, not a single Class Member has objected to these proposed
28 awards of \$10,000 to each Plaintiff, or \$40,000 total. Islas Decl. ¶8. Also, Plaintiffs are

1 agreeing to general release of all claims which must be assigned additional value.
2 Accordingly, the \$10,000 Enhancement Award to each Plaintiff is appropriate and justified as
3 part of the Settlement.
4

5 **VIII. THE PAGA ALLOCATION AND PAYMENTS SHOULD BE APPROVED**

6 Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, \$50,000.00 of the Settlement
7 Amount, is to be allocated for the PAGA claim with \$37,500 (75%) payable to the LWDA
8 and \$12,500 (25%) payable to Aggrieved Employees. S.A. ¶III(11) and III(16). This is a fair
9 amount given the nature of the claims and the strengths and weaknesses advanced by the
10 parties regarding this claim, as elaborated upon in the Preliminary Approval Motion and
11 supporting papers. Plaintiffs have also provided notice of the proposed PAGA settlement to
12 the LWDA. A total of 934 Aggrieved Employees will receive a PAGA Payment. The average
13 payment is estimated to be \$13.38, the highest is \$36.53, and the lowest is \$0.25. Islas Decl.
14 ¶14.
15

16 **IX. THE ADMINISTRATION FEE SHOULD BE APPROVED**

17 The administration fee is fair. Phoenix's charge for services rendered to perform its
18 duties and responsibilities pursuant to the terms of the settlement is \$14,500.00 which is to be
19 paid from the Settlement Amount. This includes all costs incurred to date, as well as estimated
20 costs for completing the administration and disbursement of the settlement. Islas Decl. ¶15,
21 Exhibit B (invoice).
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1 **X. CONCLUSION**

2 For the reasons stated herein, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' Motion in its entirety
3 and adopt the [Proposed] Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement submitted
4 concurrently herewith.

5
6 Dated: September 3, 2025

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