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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

OSVALDO PALOMARES JR.,
individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly
situated;

Plaintiff,

vs.

INVIVOSCRIBE INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2024-00019330-CU-OE-CTL

Action Filed: April 24, 2024

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT**

Date: June 18, 2026

Time: 10:15 a.m.

Judge: Hon. Wendy M. Behan
Department: C-66

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Osvaldo Palomares Jr. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of the Stipulation of Settlement of Class and PAGA Action Claims and Release of Claims (the “Agreement”)¹, which if approved, would provide valuable monetary relief for 184 Settlement Class Members employed by Defendant Invivoscribe, Inc. (“Defendant”) during the Class Period. Plaintiff and Class Counsel also seek approval of Class Counsel Award in the amount of \$236,635.83, comprised of \$220,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and \$16,635.83 for reimbursement of actually incurred litigation expenses.

An objective evaluation of the proposed settlement of \$660,000.00 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) confirms that the relief negotiated on behalf of the Class is fair, reasonable, and valuable. The Settlement is a product of informed, adversarial, and non-collusive negotiations between experienced counsel, guided by the wisdom and experience of mediator Sonya Goodwin, Esq. an experienced mediator of class and PAGA actions. Declaration of Shani O. Zakay (“SOZ Dec.”), ¶ 18. Plaintiff estimates that the Settlement, if approved, would result in a Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$360,510.00 with an average Individual Settlement Payment of \$1,959.29, a high payment of \$5,079.42, and a low payment of \$18.40. Aggrieved Employees will receive an estimated average Individual Settlement Payment of \$144.37, a high payment of \$184.49, and a low payment of \$5.59. Declaration of Katie Tran (“Apex Dec.”), ¶¶ 15-18.

The relief offered by the Settlement is immediate and is particularly impressive when viewed against the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs pursuing similar wage and hour cases (*see infra*). As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for final settlement approval under California law and falls well within the range of reasonableness. SOZ Dec., ¶ 19.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION

Defendant develops diagnostic products and services for use in the medical and biotechnology sectors in California, including in San Diego County, where Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from approximately April 2021 to April 2022. At all times during his employment, Plaintiff was classified by Defendant as a non-exempt employee, paid on an hourly basis, and was entitled to

¹ The Agreement is attached as Ex “A” to the Declaration of Shani O. Zakay (“SOZ Dec.”) at ¶ 3. All citations to the Agreement incorporate by this reference a citation to the SOZ Dec., ¶ 3. Further, unless indicated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Agreement.

1 legally compliant meal and/or rest periods, and minimum, regular and overtime wages for all hours
2 worked. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was subject to Defendant's written policies and
3 procedures. Declaration of Osvaldo Palomares ("OP Dec.") at ¶ 3.

4 Generally, Plaintiff claims that that Defendant failed to pay for all time worked, provide
5 compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium pay, timely pay wages upon termination of
6 employment, and furnish accurate itemized wage statements. SOZ Dec. at ¶ 20.

7 Following the Parties' agreement to mediate the action, Defendant agreed to informally produce
8 documents and data points subject to the mediation privilege and pertinent written wage and hour
9 policies. SOZ Dec. at ¶ 21. On May 13, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day mediation with the
10 Sonya Goodwin, Esq. The mediation did not result in a settlement; however, the Parties reached an
11 agreement weeks later, following their acceptance of a mediator's proposal prepare by mediator Goodwin.
12 After reaching an agreement in principle, the parties negotiated a long-form settlement agreement, which is
13 the subject of the instant motion. SOZ Dec., ¶ 22.

14 On January 9, 2026, this Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement. SOZ Dec. ¶ 4. On
15 February 17, 2026, the Settlement Administrator mailed Notice Packets to all 184 Settlement Class
16 members. Apex Dec., ¶ 7. The mailing of the Notice Packets triggered a forty-five (45) day Response
17 Deadline for the Settlement Class to submit requests for exclusion or objections to the Settlement.
18 Agreement Addendum at ¶ I(HH). Notably, 100% of the Class Members are participating in the
19 Settlement. Apex Dec., ¶ 14.

20 **III. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

21 The Court preliminarily approved a Gross Settlement Amount of \$660,000.00. The Gross
22 Settlement Amount is all-in with no reversion to Defendant. Agreement, ¶ I(O). The Net Settlement
23 Amount shall be used for the payment of all Individual Settlement Payments to satisfy all Released Class
24 Claims. The Settlement Administrator will calculate Individual Settlement Payments by adding up the
25 total number of Workweeks for all Class Members. The respective Workweeks for each Class Member
26 will be divided by the total Workweeks for all Class Members, resulting in the Payment Ratio for each
27 Class Member. Each Settlement Class Member's Payment Ratio is then multiplied by the Net Class
28 Settlement Amount to calculate each Class Member's estimated Individual Settlement Payment.

1 Agreement at ¶ III(N)(1). The Settlement Administrator estimates the average Individual Settlement
2 Payment is \$1,959.29 and the highest Individual Settlement Payment is \$5,079.42. Apex Dec., ¶ 16.

3 In exchange for valuable consideration, as of the funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, the
4 Settlement Class Members will release the Released Parties from the Released Class Claims for the
5 Class Period. Plaintiff, the LWDA, and the State of California will release the Released Parties from the
6 Released PAGA Claims for the PAGA Period. Agreement at ¶¶ III(B), III(C). Apex Class Action, LLC,
7 was appointed as the Settlement Administrator for the class. The Settlement Administration Costs are
8 \$6,490.00. Apex Dec., ¶ 19. These expenses shall be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
9 Agreement at ¶¶ I(KK), III(N)(12). Subject to Court approval, Class Counsel shall seek attorneys' fees
10 in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$220,000.00), equal to one-
11 third of the Gross Settlement Amount, and attorneys' expenses in the amount of \$16,635.83 for actually
12 incurred litigation expenses. Agreement at ¶ III(N)(10).

13 Subject to Court approval, the Agreement provides for a Service Award in an amount of up to
14 \$10,000.00 for Plaintiff in consideration of his time, risk, and efforts as the Class Representative on
15 behalf of the Settlement Class and a broad release of claims, including a waiver of Civil Code section
16 1542. Agreement at ¶ III(N)(9).

17 As set forth in the Agreement, \$33,000.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount has been allocated for
18 civil penalties under the PAGA ("PAGA Payment"). Sixty-five percent (65%) of the PAGA Payment
19 will be paid to the California Labor Workforce and Development Agency. The Settlement Administrator
20 shall distribute the remaining thirty-five (35%) of the PAGA Settlement to the Aggrieved Employees.
21 (Agreement at ¶ III(N)(11).). The Settlement Administrator estimates that aggrieved employees will
22 receive an average Individual Settlement Payment of \$144.37, and a high payment of \$184.49. Apex
23 Dec., ¶ 18. As explained in further detail below, given the complexities of this case, the defenses
24 asserted, and the uncertainty of class certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and
25 appeal, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval.

26 **IV. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
27 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

28 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. (*Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259,

265 (1997).). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. (*7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000).). “[T]o prevent fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class action requires court approval.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996) citing *Malibu Outrigger Bd. Of Governors v. Superior Court*, 103 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578-579 (1980).). The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. (See also *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001).).

In *Wershba*, appellants argued that the settlement was too low given the “clear” liability, however, the Court rejected this argument and held that “the merits of the underlying class claims are not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” (*Wershba, supra*, at 246; see also *7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.). In these cases, Courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that the compromise is fair and reasonable. (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.). The presumption of fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801, citing *Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions*, (3d ed. 1992) §11.41, pp. 11-91.). Here, all of these factors support a presumption of fairness.

V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE

The court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); see also *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com’n*, 688 F. 2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).). The purpose of the requirement is “the protection of those class members, including the named plaintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, at 1801.).

The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is fair. (*Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1138 (1990).). “The well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include ‘the

1 strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk
2 of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
3 completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
4 governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.' [Citations.]"

5 (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008); see also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
6 *Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).). The list of factors is not exhaustive and
7 should be tailored to each case. (*Dunk, supra*, at 1801.). Due regard should be given to what is otherwise
8 a private consensual agreement between the parties. (*Id.*). The inquiry "must be limited to the extent
9 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching
10 by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair,
11 reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Id.*). "Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing
12 more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation
13 omitted.]" (*Id.*). These factors are analyzed below and all support final approval of the class and PAGA
14 action settlement before this Court.

15 **A. Class Counsel Conducted a Thorough Investigation.**

16 As detailed in the motion for preliminary approval, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the
17 proposed Class Members' claims, applicable law, and potential defenses. Specifically, Class Counsel
18 assessed the value of the class claims using data and documents provided by Defendant in informal
19 discovery. Class Counsel obtained Class Members' time and payroll data, and pertinent written wage and
20 hour policies. Class Counsel's investigation, research, experience, and damage models informed and
21 guided the mediated negotiations that resulted in this settlement. SOZ Dec., ¶ 23.

22 **B. The Parties Settled After Mediation by Accepting a Mediator's Proposal**

23 The Settlement is the product of a mediation session with a respected mediator and negotiations
24 over the terms of the Settlement. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's length and
25 tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. SOZ Dec., ¶ 24.

26 **C. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation.**

27 Class Counsel in this matter have extensive class action experience in multiple fields and have
28 represented tens-of-thousands of persons in class actions. Class Counsel's experience is summarized in

1 their concurrently filed declarations. Class Counsel has concluded the settlement is fair, adequate, and
2 reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. (SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 25-26; Declaration of Jean-Claude
3 Lapuyade, Esq. (“JCL Dec.”), ¶¶ 13-18; Declaration of Selena Matavosian, Esq. (“SM Dec.”), ¶¶ 15-
4 20).

5 **D. The Settlement Class Responded Positively to the Settlement.**

6 The reaction of the Settlement Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. None
7 of the 184 members of the Class opted-out of the Settlement and there are zero objections. Stated
8 differently, 100% of the Settlement Class has chosen to participate in the Settlement. Apex Dec., ¶¶
9 11-14. The high approval rate by the Settlement Class strongly supports a finding that the Settlement
10 is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F. Supp.
11 2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be
12 viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.”]; *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.* (3d. Cir. 1990)
13 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 [29 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”]; *Laskey*
14 *v. Int’l Union* (6th Cir. 1981) 638 F.2d 954 [The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the
15 proposed settlement should be considered when determining fairness of settlement.]). Consequently,
16 Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court to follow the high participation rate of the Settlement
17 Class and grant final approval of the Settlement.

18 **E. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risks of Continued Litigation**

19 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, they recognize the
20 potential risks both sides would face if litigation of this action continued. SOZ Dec., ¶ 27. As the
21 federal court in *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 WL221862 held, where the parties faced uncertainties
22 similar to those in this litigation:

23 *“In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense,*
24 *complexity, and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the*
25 *settlement.* Regardless of how this Court might have ruled on the merits of
26 the legal issues, the losing party likely would have appealed, and the parties
27 would have faced the expense and uncertainty of litigating an appeal. The
28 expense and possible duration of the litigation should be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement.”

27 With respect to the most immediate challenge, i.e., class certification, the risks attendant to the
28 certification of similar wage and hour claims are demonstrated by *Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.* (2009) 176

1 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of class
2 certification because employees’ declarations attesting to having taken meal and rest breaks
3 demonstrated that individualized inquiries were required to show harm. (See also *Campbell v. Best Buy*
4 *Stores, L.P.*, (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5302217 at *11-13 [following *Brinker* and denying certification
5 of proposed off-the-clock and rest and meal break classes due to lack of uniform policy]; *Brown v. Fed*
6 *Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 587-88 [denying certification of driver meal and rest
7 period claims based on the predominance of individual issues].). Further, even if a class is certified,
8 liability remains uncertain. The risks attendant to the issue of Defendant’s liability in similar wage and
9 hour actions are demonstrated by *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 31.
10 There, the Court reversed a trial verdict in favor plaintiffs in a wage and hour class action. (See also
11 *Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088 “[T]he reason, if any, that
12 employees might not take their breaks were predominantly individualized questions of fact not
13 susceptible to class treatment.”].

14 Finally, even if a class is certified and Defendant is found liable for the class claims alleged,
15 post-certification risks remain, including a reversal of a favorable judgment for Plaintiff and
16 decertification of the class. These post-certification risks are demonstrated by *Magadia v. Wal-Mart*
17 *Associates, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 999 F.3d 668. There, the Ninth Circuit vacated reversed and remanded
18 a \$110 million judgement against an employer for, *inter alia*, inaccurately paying overtime, and
19 directed the trial court to enter judgement in favor of the employer. *See also O’Conner v. Uber*
20 *Technologies, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1087 [decertification of wage and hour misclassification
21 action].

22 Collectively, the examples cited above illustrate the uncertain nature of class litigation.
23 Consequently, the uncertainty of obtaining certification through a contested motion is a significant risk
24 factor favoring settlement. Although Plaintiff is confident about the strength of his claims, Plaintiff
25 nevertheless recognizes that Defendant has factual and legal defenses that, if successful, would
26 potentially defeat or impair the value of the lawsuit. Legally, the fast-changing landscape of wage and
27 hour litigation can drastically affect the value of Plaintiff’s claims and, in fact, already has. (SOZ Dec.,
28 ¶ 28.). In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009

1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at * 19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009), granted approval of an overtime class action
2 settlement and explained:

3 **Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued**
4 **litigation are great.** Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs'
5 principal claim that full-time Service Associates were misclassified as
6 exempt. In addition to the uncertainties raised by Defendants at the
7 preliminary stage regarding Plaintiffs' chance of success in this case,
8 Defendants notes that the question of an employer's duty to provide rest and
meal periods is an open one, signaling even less certainty for
Plaintiffs.....[T]he **Total Settlement amount and the Class Members'**
expected net recovery, after fees and other costs are deducted, appear
to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of litigation.

9 In sum, while other courts have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
10 certification in this action would have been hotly disputed and was by no means a foregone conclusion.
11 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, as here, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
12 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F. 3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the
13 expense and length of a trial against Defendant through possible appeals, which could take another
14 three years. In arriving at their informed belief that the present settlement is fair and adequate, Class
15 Counsel accounted for the uncertain outcome and risk inherent in complex actions such as this one.
16 Class Counsel is also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and alleged
17 defenses to, the claims asserted in the litigation. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would have
18 been inevitable. Costs would have mounted, and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
19 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that the
20 Settlement confers substantial monetary and non-monetary benefits upon the Class. Based upon their
21 evaluation, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement
22 is in the best interest of the Class, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval.

23 **F. The Gross Settlement Amount is Fair and Reasonable.**

24 The Gross Settlement Amount of Six Hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
25 (\$660,000.00) in this case is fair and well within the range of recognized reasonableness. As detailed at
26 the time of preliminary approval, the Gross Settlement Amount is fair and reasonable considering the
27 nature and magnitude of the claims being settled and the various potential impediments to recovery.
28 Class Counsel developed varied economic damages models measuring Defendant's liability exposure

1 while accounting for the uncertainties of continued litigation. The various models were informed by
2 Class Counsel's investigation, including the analysis of Class Members' time and payroll data.

3 The settlement also provides significant relief to the Settlement Class Members. The average
4 Class Member Individual Settlement Payment is approximately \$1,959.29, the highest is approximately
5 \$5,079.42, and the lowest is approximately \$18.40. Apex Dec., ¶ 16. This average net recovery is greater
6 than many wage and hour class action settlements approved by California state and federal courts. (See,
7 *e.g.*, *Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) [average
8 net recovery of approximately \$80]; *Fukuchi v. Pizza Hut*, Case No. BC302589 (L.A. County Super. Ct.)
9 [average net recovery of approximately \$120]; *Contreras v. United Food Group, LLC*, Case No.
10 BC389253 (L.A. County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of approximately \$120]; *Ressler v. Federated*
11 *Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No. BC335018 (L.A. County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of
12 approximately \$90].). Clearly the goal of this litigation to obtain redress for the class has been met by
13 this Settlement. Given the amount of the Settlement, the risks of litigation and the arm's length
14 negotiations between experienced counsel, the settlement is entitled to final approval.

15 **VI. THE PENALTIES UNDER THE PAGA ARE REASONABLE**

16 Courts routinely approve amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the
17 settlement. (See *id.* at *1, 9 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%]; *Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*,
18 No. 09cv1683 MMA (JMA), 2011 WL 4899942, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) [approving a PAGA
19 payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.*, No. CV 10-02420 GAF (PLAx), 2012 WL
20 12882124, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim
21 settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].). Here, Plaintiff and Defendant
22 negotiated a good faith PAGA Payment in the amount of \$33,000.00 which is 5% of the Gross
23 Settlement Amount. This amount falls well within the range of approved PAGA Payments. Sixty-Five
24 percent (65%) of the PAGA Payment (\$21,450.00) will be paid to the LWDA with the remaining
25 thirty-five percent (35%) of the PAGA Payment (\$11,550.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved
26 Employees, which is within the range of PAGA Payment approved by courts and should be approved.
27 The Settlement Administrator estimates that aggrieved employees will receive an average Individual
28 Aggrieved Employee Payment of \$144.37 and a high payment of \$184.49. Apex Dec., ¶ 18.

Further, on December 12, 2025, Class Counsel gave the LWDA notice of this Settlement and proposed allocation by filing a copy of the Settlement and the Motion for Preliminary Approval with the LWDA. On May 22, 2026, Plaintiff gave the LWDA notice of this motion seeking final approval of this settlement. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 5-6. By not registering an objection with either Class Counsel or the Court, the LWDA has accepted and approved of the proposed PAGA Payment.

VII. CLASS COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR FEES AND COSTS

As part of the settlement, the parties agreed to a payment of Attorneys’ Fees in the amount of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount of \$660,000.00 and Attorneys’ Expenses in an amount of up to \$30,000.00. The requested attorneys’ fees equal to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount is fair compensation and, respectfully, should be approved. Class Counsel undertook complex, risky, and time-consuming wage and hour litigation on a contingent basis. The attorneys’ fees are within the historically recognized range attorneys’ fees awarded in common fund class action settlements – between 25% and 50% – and are supported by Class Counsel’s lodestar cross-check with a reasonable 1.19 multiplier. That is within the recognized multiplier range of between 2 and 4², and there is additional work to be performed. Thus, the reasonableness of the requested attorneys’ fees is confirmed by reference to the lodestar with a reasonable multiplier with significant additional work still to be performed. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 10 - 14.

A. Common Fund

Courts have long recognized that when class counsel’s efforts result in the creation of a common fund that benefits plaintiffs and unnamed class members, class counsel have an equitable right to be compensated from that fund. (See, e.g., *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) [“recogniz[ing] consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund...is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole”]; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 488-89 [common fund doctrine “long recognized” under California law]). The common fund doctrine rests on the understanding that attorneys should normally be paid by their clients and that, unless attorneys’ fees

² See *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) (“multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.”); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved range of 2 to 4).

1 are paid out of the common fund, those who benefit from the fund will be “unjustly enriched.” (*Boeing*,
2 444 U.S. at 478.). As noted above, in *Laffitte*, the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
3 award of 33.33% of the settlement amount of \$19 million with a 2.13 multiplier and affirmed that
4 “empirical studies show the percentage method with a lodestar cross-check is the most prevalent form
5 of fee method in practice.” (*Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 496-97.). In fact, courts have historically awarded
6 between 25% and 50% of the common fund as attorneys’ fees class action settlements. (*In re Warner*
7 *Communications*, 618 F.Supp. 735, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y 1985).).

8 Here, the fairest way to calculate a reasonable fee when contingency-fee litigation has produced
9 a fixed settlement amount for the Settlement Class Members is by awarding Settlement Class Counsel
10 a percentage of the total settlement sum. (See, e.g., *In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig.*, 654
11 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011).). More importantly, a fee award under the common fund method here
12 would achieve the two underlying goals of the common fund doctrine by: (1) equitably requiring the
13 beneficiaries of the common fund to pay their pro rata share of fees incurred in creating the fund; and
14 (2) providing an incentive to attract competent counsel to handle wage and hour class actions, which
15 California courts recognize as a fundamental tool to ensure the effective enforcement of the Labor
16 Code and minimum labor standards. (See, e.g., *Gentry v. Super. Ct.*, 42 Cal. 4th 443, 455-56 (2007)
17 [overruled on other grounds by *Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC*, 59 Cal.4th 348
18 (2014) emphasizing the indispensable value of private enforcement of California’s wage-and-hour
19 laws through class actions].).

20 The Agreement provides for payment of the Class Counsel Award from the common fund.
21 Accordingly, it is well within the Court’s discretion to award fees to Class Counsel under the common
22 fund doctrine. Class Counsel requests attorneys’ Fees in the amount of \$220,000.00, representing one-
23 third of the Gross Settlement Amount. Class Counsel’s request is consistent with many fee awards in
24 similar wage and hour class actions. Moreover, the requested Attorneys’ Fee award is in the middle
25 of historically recognized range of attorneys’ fees awarded in common fund settlements. The
26 attorneys’ fees request should be awarded based upon the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance
27 with *Laffitte*, i.e., percentage of the fund with a lodestar cross check.
28

1 **B. Class Counsels' Lodestar Supports the Requested Attorneys' Fees**

2 Class Counsel's lodestar to date is \$185,580.00 *exclusive of costs*, with significant work
3 remaining. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 10 - 14; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 5-10; SM Dec. ¶ 21. Thus, Class Counsel's fee request
4 is equal to Class Counsel's lodestar with a 1.19 multiplier –well within the recognized multiplier range
5 between 2 and 4. (See also *Taylor v. FedEx Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal.
6 2016) [following *Laffitte*, approved 30% fee award with cross-check lodestar multiplier of 2.26];
7 *Emmons v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27249 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
8 [following *Laffitte*, approved 33% fee award with cross-check lodestar multiplier of 1.7].). Because
9 the Settlement in this case is a pure common fund case, and the percentage of the fund is the
10 comparable marketplace for fee awards in common fund cases, *Laffitte* supports an award based upon
11 the percentage of the common fund. Moreover, Class Counsel's lodestar supports the requested
12 attorneys' fees with a multiplier well within the recognized range reasonableness, and in fact, below
13 what the California Supreme Court approved in *Laffitte*.

14 Although no rigid formula applies, an analysis of each of the following “basic factors” that
15 California courts typically consider further supports the reasonableness of a fee request: (1) the result
16 class counsel obtained; (2) the time and labor required of the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of
17 the case and the delay in payment to class counsel; (4) the extent to which the nature of the litigation
18 precluded other employment by class counsel; (5) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
19 attorneys who performed the services, the skill they displayed in the litigation, and the novelty,
20 complexity and difficulty of the case; and (6) the informed consent of the clients to the fee agreement.
21 (*Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49 (1977); *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1810 n.2.).
22 Those factors support Class Counsel's request and are addressed in more detail in Counsel's
23 declarations submitted concurrently herewith. In short: (1) Considering the issues presented in the
24 case, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$660,000.00 is an excellent result for the Settlement Class, (2)
25 Collectively, Class Counsel worked hard on this case and expended approximately 242.5 hours in the
26 prosecution of this litigation in the two years since it was filed for a total lodestar of \$185,580.00, (3)
27 Class Counsel undertook this litigation on a contingent-fee basis, assuming a significant risk that the
28 litigation would yield no recovery after many years of work, (4) Class Counsel negotiated a one-third

1 contingency fee arrangement, which is a reasonable arrangement to obtain competent counsel in the
2 marketplace for representation in wage and hour class actions of this nature, and it is only equitable
3 that Settlement Class who share in the excellent results achieved by this Settlement bear his/her pro
4 rata share of the attorney's fees award to Class Counsel, (5) Class Counsel possesses significant
5 experience litigating complex wage and hour class actions and the way this Settlement was achieved
6 is demonstrative of the highly efficient way this litigation was managed and resolved (See Class
7 Counsel's declarations for a detailed outline of their skills and experience), and (6) Settlement Class
8 Counsel's hourly rates are well within the range of rates billed by comparable attorneys in this market
9 and reasonably compare with rates approved by other trial courts in wage and hour class action
10 litigation. (SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 15 - 16; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 5-10; 13-18, SM Dec., ¶¶ 14-20).

11 **C. Class Counsel's Costs**

12 Common fund fee and expense awards include counsel's incurred expenses because those who
13 benefit from their effort should share in the cost. (See *Rider v. City of San Diego*, 11 Cal. App. 4th
14 1410, 1423 n.6 (1992).). The appropriate analysis in deciding if costs are compensable is whether the
15 costs are of the type typically billed by attorneys to paying clients in the marketplace. (See *Harris v.*
16 *Marhoefer*, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).). Class Counsel has expended a total of \$16,635.83 in
17 prosecuting this action. All of Class Counsel's out-of-pocket expenses are the types of expenses
18 normally charged to paying clients including the following: filing fees; copying; postage; mediation
19 fees; and expert costs, which were all incurred during, and were necessary for the successful
20 prosecution of, the litigation and, therefore, should be reimbursed. (SOZ Dec. ¶ 17; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 11-
21 12; SM Dec., ¶ 21).

22 **D. Plaintiff's Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

23 Courts routinely approve service awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they
24 provide and the risks they incur during the class litigation. (*Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115
25 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).). The factors courts use in determining the amount of service awards
26 include: (1) a comparison between the service awards and the range of monetary recovery available to
27 the class; (2) time and effort put into the litigation; (3) whether the litigation will further the public
28 policy underlying the statutory scheme; and (4) risks of retaliation. (*Clark v. American Residential*

1 *Services, LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-805 (2009).). As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff granted
2 Defendant a broad and general release of all claims arising from his employment. In exchange, the
3 Plaintiff's Service Award is, in part, intended to compensate Plaintiff for executing this general
4 release. This release is far broader than the release that binds the remainder of the Settlement Class.
5 Agreement at III(B); III(D).


6 Regarding the amount of the requested award, courts frequently approve awards of \$10,000.00
7 or more. See, e.g., *In re Cellphone*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380. The amount of the requested Service
8 Award to Plaintiff for \$10,000.00 is reasonable by reference to the amounts that California courts
9 (both federal and state) have repeatedly awarded in similar class action settlements. Further, the
10 unanimous consent by the Class Members favors the Court's approval of the requested Service Award.
11 Equally important, the time, effort, and services provided to the Settlement Class justifies the requested
12 Service Award. The Class Representative performed his duties to the Settlement Class admirably.
13 Plaintiff's work is summarized in his declaration filed concurrently herewith. Plaintiff assumed the
14 serious risk of liability for Defendant's costs and potentially fees if the case was unsuccessful.
15 Nevertheless, Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily undertook the risk to vindicate the rights of the
16 Settlement Class. OP Dec., ¶¶ 1-17.

17 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

18 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
19 established by California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate
20 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment submitted herewith. Further, based on the
21 foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests approval of the attorneys' fees payment in the amount of
22 \$220,000.00 and Attorneys' Expenses in in the amount of \$16,635.83, as supported by Class Counsel's
23 billing records. Class Counsel and the Class Representative also respectfully request approval of the
24 requested Service Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff.

25 Dated: May 22, 2026

ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC

26
27 By: 

Jaclyn Joyce, Esq.

Attorney for PLAINTIFF