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15
16 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
17
18 **FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA**
19

20 KAREN HECKER, individually and on
21 behalf of all others similarly situated,

22 Plaintiff,

23 vs.

24 MATHEW ENTERPRISE, INC.; and DOES
25 1 through 20, inclusive,

26 Defendants.

Case No. 22CV405334

Assigned for all purposes to:

Hon. Charles F. Adams

Dept. 7

27 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
28 **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF**
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Date: June 4, 2026

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Dept: 7

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769 (d) and (e), Plaintiff Karen Hecker (“Plaintiff”)
3 requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims,
4 including a claim under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, codified at Labor Code
5 §§ 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), against Defendant Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (“Defendant”) (collectively,
6 Plaintiff and Defendant referred to as the “Parties”). The settlement releases claims on behalf of all
7 persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a nonexempt employee in the State of California
8 at any time during the Class Period (individually, “Class Member”; collectively, the “Class”) from May
9 1, 2018 to November 13, 2025 (the “Class Period”). The basic terms of the Class Action and PAGA
10 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement” or “Settlement”)¹ provide for the following:

- 11 (1) A non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,300,00.00 allocated to
12 approximately 1,100 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the number
13 of weeks each Class Member worked during the Class Period;
- 14 (2) An award of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently
15 \$433,333.33) and up to \$40,000.00 in reimbursement of costs to Plaintiff’s
16 Counsel for services rendered as counsel on this matter;
- 17 (3) Service Payment of up to \$15,000.00 to the Named Plaintiff;
- 18 (4) Settlement Administration fees and costs of up to \$12,550.00; and
- 19 (5) Allocations of \$70,000.00 for resolution of civil penalties under PAGA. Seventy-
20 five percent (75%) of this payment will be paid to the California Labor and
21 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA Payment”), and twenty-five percent
22 (25%) will be paid to Class Members who worked for Defendant during the PAGA
23 Period (the “Aggrieved Employees”).

24 With each Class Member allocated an average recovery of approximately \$675.00 from the Net
25

26 ¹ A true and correct copy of the fully-executed “Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
27 Class Notice” is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Julia M. Toscano in Support of Plaintiff’s
28 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Toscano Decl.”), filed concurrently
herewith. Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms in this Motion will be used as such terms
are defined and used in the Settlement.

Settlement Amount, the Settlement satisfies the criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness given the risks and costs of continued litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arms-length bargaining at and after mediation between experienced attorneys. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to send notice of the Settlement, and set a final approval hearing date.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION

On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of Defendant's non-exempt employees alleging the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks; (5) failure to reimburse business expenses; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to pay wages timely during employment; (8) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment; (9) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, *et seq.*; for the preceding claims. Toscano Decl., ¶ 3. On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff's counsel provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant regarding Defendant's alleged Labor Code violations, as required by Labor Code section 2699.3(a). *Id.* at Ex. 2. The LWDA did not respond to this notice, indicating it did not intend to investigate, thus allowing Plaintiff to bring a PAGA claim against Defendant. *Id.* On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding a PAGA claim. *Id.*

Through formal discovery, Defendant produced a significant number of documents and information, including Plaintiff's personnel files, policy documents, the class members' contact information, and class members' timekeeping and pay records. Toscano Decl., ¶ 4. After resolving discovery disputes, administering a *Belaire-West* notice, and completing an initial round of formal discovery, the Parties agreed to attend a private mediation session. *Id.*

On October 14, 2025, the Parties attended a mediation session with Eve Wagner, a respected mediator. Toscano Decl., ¶ 5. After a full day of negotiations, the Parties agreed to a settlement amount and executed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the material terms of the agreement. *Id.* The Parties spent the next couple weeks negotiating the terms of the Settlement, which was finalized in October

1 of 2025. *Id.* The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts
2 of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.*

3 On May 12, 2026, Plaintiff submitted the Settlement to the LWDA pursuant to Labor Code
4 section 2699(1)(2). *Id.* at ¶ 6, Ex. 3.

5 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT**

6 **A. Terms of Settlement**

7 Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to settle the class claims in exchange for a Gross Settlement
8 Amount of \$1,300,00.00. Settlement Agreement, § 3.1. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to
9 make payments for the following: (1) Individual Settlement Payments to Participating Class Members;
10 (2) attorneys' fees to Class Counsel of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount; (3)
11 reimbursement of Class Counsel's litigation costs of up to \$40,000.00; (4) a Service Payment to Plaintiff
12 of up to \$15,000.00; (5) Settlement Administration fees and costs of \$12,550.00 ; and (6) a payment to
13 the LWDA of \$70,000.00 pursuant to PAGA. *Id.* at § 3.2.1 – 3.2.5.

14 Class Members do not need to submit a claim form to participate in the Settlement. Settlement
15 Agreement, § 3.1. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will fully fund the Gross Settlement
16 Amount within 14 days of the date the Court grants final approval of the settlement and enters judgment,
17 or a later date if the judgment is appealed. *Id.* at § 4.3. Class Members' Individual Settlement Payments
18 will be distributed within 14 days after Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 4.4.
19 Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated by comparing the total number of Workweeks for the
20 Class to each individual Class Member's number of Workweeks. *Id.* at § 3.2.4. The Settlement
21 Administrator will calculate the actual estimated recovery to include in the Class Notice and provide
22 the estimated low and high range of possible recovery at final approval. *Id.* at § 7.4.2; Settlement
23 Agreement, Ex. A (Notice of Class Action Settlement). The class notice will be provided in English and
24 Spanish. *See* Settlement Agreement, § 1.11.

25 The Individual Settlement Payments to Class Members will be allocated for tax purposes as
26 follows: 20% to wages; 80% to penalties and interest. Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.4.1. The employer-
27 side payroll taxes on the portion allocated to wages will be paid by Defendant separately from, and in
28 addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 3.1. No portion of the Gross Settlement Amount will

1 revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1. Funds from uncashed or undeliverable checks will be tendered by the
2 Settlement Administrator to the State Controller Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class
3 Member for whom the funds are designated. *Id.* at § 4.4.3.

4 **B. Proposed Opt-Out and Objection Process**

5 Once the Court grants preliminary approval, Defendant will have fifteen days to deliver the Class
6 Data to the Settlement Administrator. Settlement Agreement, § 4.2. The Settlement Administrator will
7 then have fourteen days to send Class Members the Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”)
8 by first-class mail after checking for updated addresses through the National Change of Address database.
9 *Id.* at § 7.4.2. The Class Notice provides information regarding the nature of the lawsuit, a summary of
10 the substance of the settlement terms, the formula for calculating Individual Settlement Payments, the
11 individual’s estimated payout, a statement that Class Members who take no action will release their
12 claims and receive settlement checks, instructions regarding how to dispute the calculations, instructions
13 regarding how to request exclusion or object to the Settlement, the date for the final approval hearing,
14 the amounts sought for attorneys’ fees and costs, the Settlement Administration Costs, the Class
15 Representative’s Service Payment, and the PAGA allocation. *See* Settlement Agreement, Ex. A (Class
16 Notice).

17 The Class Notice provides instructions for Class Members who choose to exclude themselves
18 from the Settlement. *See* Settlement Agreement § 7.5.1. To opt out, Class Members are instructed to
19 submit a Request for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator by a specified date (60 days after the date
20 of mailing of the Class Notice). *See* Settlement Agreement, Ex. A (Class Notice), pp. 1, 6. Class Members
21 do not need to submit a claim form to participate in the Settlement. *Id.* at p. 2. Class Members are informed
22 of how they can object to the Settlement, and the Class Notice informs Class Members of the date, time,
23 and location of the final fairness and approval hearing so that they can appear in person. *Id.* at pp. 2, 8.
24 The Class Notice also informs Class Members to check the Administrator’s website or contact Class
25 Counsel to verify the date and time of the Final Approval Hearing. *Id.* at p. 8. Accordingly, the content of
26 the Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.766(d).

27 If Class Notice packets are returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will perform a
28 skip-trace or other search, and re-mail the Class Notice with an extended deadline, to opt out or object, of

1 14 days from the date of the original deadline. Settlement Agreement, § 7.6. The initial 60-day notice
2 period and extension process ensures the notice program provides due process by giving Class Members
3 enough time to determine whether they want to participate in the Settlement. This means of notice is
4 reasonably calculated to apprise Class Members of the pendency of the action. *See* California Rules of
5 Court Rule 3.766 (d)-(f).

6 **C. Proposed Release**

7 The release to be given by Class Members is limited to Defendant and each of its former and
8 present directors, officers, shareholders, owners, members, attorneys, insurers, predecessors,
9 successors, assigns subsidiaries and affiliates (the “Released Parties”). Settlement Agreement, § 1.41.
10 Under the proposed release, Class Members who do not exclude themselves from the Settlement will
11 be deemed to have released the following:

- 12 (i) all claims arising during the Class Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have
13 been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint.

14 *Id* at § 5.2.

15 Aggrieved Employees will release the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties
16 arising during the PAGA Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the
17 facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the PAGA Notice. regardless of whether the Aggrieved
18 Employee opts out of the Class portion of the Settlement, § 5.3.

19 Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release of any and all claims, whether known or unknown,
20 which exist or may exist on Plaintiff’s behalf as of the date of the Settlement, and a waiver of Civil Code
21 section 1542. Settlement Agreement, § 5.1.1.

22 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

23 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

24 Class certification is appropriate when there exists (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous
25 class, (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members, and (3) when certification would
26 be a fair and efficient means of adjudicating the action, rendering class litigation superior to alternative
27 means. *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012).

28 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

Whether a class is “ascertainable” is “determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members.” *Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors*, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1271 (1987). Here, the Class consists all persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee in the State of California at any time from May 1, 2018 to November 13, 2025. Settlement Agreement, §§ 1.5, 1.12. Defendant’s records show the Class consists of approximately 1,124 individuals, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Toscano Decl., ¶ 7. Further, the Class is readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business records because all Class Members are current or former employees of Defendant. *Id.*

2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists Among Class Members

“[T]he ‘community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (2007) (quoting *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981)).

a. Common Questions Predominate

To assess whether common questions predominate, courts focus on whether the theories of recovery advanced are likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 327 (2004). In other words, courts determine whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible of common proof, even if the class members must individually prove their damages. *Brinker, supra*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022, 1024.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant maintained uniform employment policies and/or practices that illegally deprived Class Members of lawful wages, meal periods, rest breaks, accurate wage statements, and waiting time pay. Toscano Decl., ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s allegations present common legal and factual questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, minimum and overtime pay, meal period, and rest break policies to all Class Members; whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations; whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional; and whether Class Members are entitled to penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members’ schedules, time punches, and payroll records, Defendant’s corporate representative’s testimony, written communications between Defendant and Class Members, and Class Member

1 declarations. *Id.* Thus, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class
2 certification for settlement purposes.

3 *b. Plaintiff's Claims are Typical of the Class Claims*

4 The typicality requirement is satisfied when the legal theories and facts supporting Plaintiff's
5 claims are substantially similar to other class members. *See Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46
6 (1983). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she and other Class Members were employed by Defendant and
7 injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's
8 scheduling, timekeeping, minimum wage pay, overtime pay, meal period, and rest break practices and
9 policies. Toscano Decl., ¶ 10. Through documents and information exchanged in discovery, including
10 production of thousands of pages of documents produced by Defendant, Plaintiff confirmed that these
11 common policies and practices similarly affected Plaintiff and the Class. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiff's claims
12 arise from the same employment practices and are based on the same legal theories as those applicable
13 to other Class Members, as further explained in Plaintiff's exposure analysis below.

14 *c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Interests of*
15 *the Proposed Class*

16 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative(s) and proposed class
17 counsel. With respect to the class representative, a plaintiff must adequately represent and protect the
18 interests of other members of the class and demonstrate that his or her claim is not inconsistent with the
19 claims of other members of the class. *See Capitol People First v. State Dep't of Developmental Servs.*,
20 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 696-697 (2007). Here, Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with the interests of
21 the Class. Plaintiff demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of the Class by litigating this
22 action, gathering documents and information, responding to written discovery, being available on the
23 day of mediation to answer questions, meeting with her attorneys on several occasions to understand
24 the claims and theories of liability at issue, assisting attorneys in preparing for mediation, reviewing the
25 proposed settlement agreement to understand its legal effect, and obtaining a fair settlement on behalf
26 of Class Members who stand to recover a substantial amount under the Settlement. Toscano Decl., ¶ 19.

27 Likewise, Aegis Law Firm, PC has expended considerable time and effort on this case and will
28 continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Toscano Decl. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be

1 appointed Class Representative, and Plaintiff's Counsel should be appointed Class Counsel

2 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

3 Class treatment is superior to other methods of adjudication when the probability is small that
4 each class member will come forward to prove his or her claim and when the class approach would deter
5 and redress the alleged wrongdoing. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435, 446 (2000);
6 *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1537-1538 (2008). Here, none of the other
7 1,124 Class Members had shown any interest in bearing the expense and burden of litigating their own
8 claims. Toscano Decl. ¶ 19. Thus, a class action is the superior method for seeking relief.

9 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

10 Preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a "reasonable range." *See North*
11 *County Contractor's Ass'n., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1089-90 (1994);
12 Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions*, § 11.26 (4th ed. 2002). In reviewing the fairness of a
13 class action settlement, due regard should be given to what is "otherwise a private consensual
14 agreement between the parties." *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1389
15 (2010). The inquiry "must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
16 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
17 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." *Id.*

18 Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where (1) the settlement is reached through "arms-
19 length bargaining"; (2) investigation and discovery are "sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
20 intelligently"; (3) counsel is "experienced in similar litigation"; and (4) the percentage of objectors "is
21 small." *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802 (1996). The Settlement satisfies the first
22 three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at the final approval stage.

23 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

24 *a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm's-Length Negotiations*

25 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
26 evidence to the contrary is offered. Thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are
27 conducted in good faith. Here, the Settlement was the product of thorough investigation and a full day
28 mediation session with a respected mediator after extensive discovery. Toscano Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. The

1 negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to
2 serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* at ¶ 5. The amount of Plaintiff's requested Service Award was not
3 negotiated until after the Parties agreed to the Gross Settlement Amount and many other terms. *Id.* at ¶
4 20.

5 *b. Plaintiff's Counsel Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Discovery*

6 Plaintiff's Counsel thoroughly investigated the class claims, applicable law, and potential
7 defenses. *See generally*, Toscano Decl. In particular, Plaintiff's Counsel assessed the value of the class
8 claims using Defendant's data and documents produced through discovery. Toscano Decl., ¶ 9.
9 Plaintiff's counsel reviewed policy documents and Class Members' time and pay records to perform a
10 thorough analysis. *Id.* Further, Plaintiff's Counsel engaged an expert to quantify the potential exposure
11 using the time and payroll records, and then assessed the risks associated with each of the claims
12 meriting reductions in the likely recovery at trial. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel fully understood
13 the strengths and weaknesses of the claims before the Parties reached a settlement. *Id.*

14 *c. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation*

15 Plaintiff is represented by Aegis Law Firm, PC ("Class Counsel"). Class Counsel prosecute wage
16 and hour class actions on behalf of employees and others who have had their rights violated. Toscano
17 Decl. ¶¶ 22-36. The attorneys working on this case have been appointed class counsel in many cases,
18 through both contested motions and settlement approval motions. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiff's Counsel has
19 extensive experience in similar litigation and should be appointed as Class Counsel.

20 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's Claims and**
21 **the Risks and Expense of Litigation**

22 Courts have discretion to approve class settlements by assessing several factors, including the
23 "strength of plaintiffs' case, risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation and risk
24 of maintaining the class action through trial." *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.*, 186 Cal.
25 App. 4th 399, 407 (2010); *see Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129 (2008).

26 While Plaintiff and her counsel believed and continue to believe this is a strong case for
27 certification, they considered the significant risks and expenses associated with class certification and
28 liability proceedings. Toscano Decl., ¶ 11. To determine if the settlement amount offered at mediation

1 was reasonable, Plaintiff’s Counsel weighed the figure offered against many risk factors. If Plaintiff
2 continued to prosecute the claims rather than accept a settlement, Plaintiff would have been required to
3 engage in additional written discovery, conduct depositions, expend time and resources resolving
4 disputes, prepared and filed potential dispositive motions and/or discovery motions, prepare for and
5 meet the filing deadline for a motion for class certification, and engage in extensive trial preparation.
6 An adverse ruling at any one of these stages could have prevented the Class from obtaining any recovery.
7 *Id.* at ¶ 12.

8 a. Exposure Analysis

9 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered a fair and
10 reasonable settlement. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Rather,
11 compromise is expected:

12 Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if “the relief afforded
13 by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be
14 successfully litigated,” this is no bar to a class settlement because “the public interest may indeed
be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding
litigation.”

15 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 250 (2001) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff
16 contends that her claims are based on Defendant’s common, class-wide policies and procedures, and
17 that liability could be determined on a class-wide basis without dependence on individual assessments
18 of liability. Toscano Decl., ¶ 10. Although the amount of Defendant’s potential exposure—if proven—
19 is substantial, the legitimate and serious risks of succeeding at class certification and trial compelled a
20 serious consideration of the benefit of a settlement. *Id.* at ¶¶ 11-18.

21 Minimum Wage: Plaintiff’s minimum wage claim was premised on the theory that Defendant
22 failed to separately compensate commissioned class members for rest and recovery time, as required by
23 *Vaquero v. Stoneledge Furniture, LLC*, 9 Cal. App. 5th 98 (2017). Plaintiff’s expert analyzed the
24 Defendant’s timekeeping records, which show recorded rest breaks, and used a 36% weighted rest break
25 violation rate based on 100% violation rate up to 2020 and a 6.2% rest break violation rate after 2020,
26 to calculate a maximum exposure of unpaid wages for rest and recovery hours of \$431,134.00. However,
27 Defendant argued that it corrected this issue early on in the Class Period by paying separately paying
28 rest and recovery. As such, this claim may only affect a small portion of the class and could be difficult

1 to certify. As such, Plaintiff assumed there was a 30% chance of success at class certification and 20%
2 chance of success on the merits at trial, rendering the claim worth approximately \$25,868.04. Toscano
3 Decl., ¶ 13.

4 Unpaid Overtime Wages: Plaintiff's unpaid overtime wages claim was based on the theory that
5 Defendant failed to properly pay overtime to hourly employees based on an invalid alternative
6 workweek schedule. Plaintiff's expert analyzed Defendant's timekeeping and payroll data and
7 calculated that this claim was worth approximately \$160,013.00. However, Defendant argued that it
8 maintained a valid alternative workweek schedule, and the number of affected employees is so small
9 that they are not representative of the class. With evidence refuting Defendant's common failure to pay
10 overtime to all class members, this claim could be difficult to certify. As such, Plaintiff assumed there
11 was a 50% chance of success at class certification and 40% chance of success on the merits at trial,
12 rendering the claim worth approximately \$32,002.60. Toscano Decl., ¶ 14.

13 Meal Period Claims: Plaintiff's meal period claim was potentially worth about \$1,490,317.00 in
14 light of the violations shown in the records. However, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant
15 written policies and that employees could waive their meal periods. Thus, Plaintiff discounted this claim
16 for the risk that the damages could at least be reduced, and that the claim would be hard to certify with
17 a compliant policy. As such, Plaintiff's counsel believed there was a 60% chance succeeding at class
18 certification and a 40% chance at trial, resulting in a value of \$357,676.08. Toscano Decl., ¶ 15.

19 Rest Break Claim: Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to authorize timely rest breaks due to
20 the productivity requirements imposed on class members. Defendant's timekeeping records showed
21 recorded rest breaks, therefore, Plaintiff's expert was able to calculate damages for this claim in the
22 amount of \$5,940,160.00. However, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant written rest break
23 policies and class members could choose to waive their rest breaks. Defendant also argued that only a
24 small group of class members recorded rest breaks, therefore Defendant's extrapolations based on the
25 violations shown in the recorded rest breaks were skewed. As such, this claim would have relied on
26 Class Member testimony, making it a riskier claim at class certification and liability stages. Plaintiff's
27 counsel believed there was a 30% chance succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance at trial,
28 resulting in a value of \$356,409.60. Toscano Decl., ¶ 16.

1 Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties: Plaintiff’s Counsel also considered the arguable
2 presence of various derivative penalties, and weighed the potential recoveries against probable defenses.
3 Specifically, Defendant could argue that Plaintiff could not prove the “willful” prong needed to obtain
4 waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203. Additionally, Defendant could argue that Plaintiff could
5 not show that Class Members suffered an “injury” as a result of wage statement violations, as required by
6 Labor Code § 226, or that the wage statements correctly reflected the wages paid and owed. Moreover,
7 Plaintiff would not recover any of these derivative penalties if he failed to prove the underlying claims.
8 Although the Class arguably could have seen a payout of approximately \$5.2 million for waiting time
9 penalties and \$1.5 million for wage statement penalties, Plaintiff would not recover any of these derivative
10 penalties if he failed to prove the underlying claims. Thus, Plaintiff discounted these claims assuming a
11 30% chance of class certification and 20% chance at the merits for both claims, resulting in a realistic
12 value of \$312,000.00 for the waiting time claim and \$90,000.00 for the wage statement claim. Toscano
13 Decl. ¶ 17.

14 PAGA Claim: The PAGA claim presented even higher hurdles. Although Plaintiff’s Counsel
15 found Defendant’s exposure could potentially reach approximately \$4.9 million under Lab. Code §
16 2699(f), assuming the initial penalty rate of \$100 for each pay period, Plaintiff would have to prove a
17 violation in every pay period. Most importantly, the Court would have discretion to reduce the PAGA
18 award based on whether the amount of the award would be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
19 confiscatory.” Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2). In theory, the Court could reduce the award by 99% if it so
20 wished. Plaintiff was doubtful he could recover any PAGA penalties, especially if a large class judgment
21 was entered for the same violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff could not place a high value on the PAGA
22 penalties, and therefore allocated \$70,000.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount to settle these claims.
23 Toscano Decl. ¶ 18.

24 **C. The Requested Service Award for Plaintiff**

25 Plaintiff seeks a Service Award of up to \$15,000.00 for accepting the responsibilities of
26 representing the interests of the Class and assuming risks and potential costs that were not borne by any
27 other Class Members. A named plaintiff is eligible for payment that reasonably compensates him or her
28 for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone*

1 *Termination Fee Cases*, *supra*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 1393; *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal. App. 4th
2 715, 726 (2004).

3 Here, Plaintiff had the option to pursue her claims individually, but instead chose to pursue this
4 class action, delaying individual recovery until approval of a class action settlement. Toscano Decl., ¶
5 19. Throughout the case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in gathering the evidence necessary to prosecute the
6 class claims, responded to written discovery, maintained regular contact with counsel, was available on
7 the day of mediation and communicated with his attorneys during the day of mediation to answer critical
8 questions, and reviewed the Settlement to make sure it was fair to the Class. *Id.* No action would likely
9 have been taken by Class Members individually, and no compensation would have been recovered for
10 them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class. *Id.*

11 By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing
12 the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc.*, *supra*, 34 Cal. 4th at 340. The requested
13 Service Award for Plaintiff's service as the class representative and for a general release of all
14 employment claims is reasonable and should be preliminarily approved. At the final approval stage,
15 Plaintiff will further support the request for the Service by declarations addressing the factors for the
16 award. Toscano Decl., ¶ 25.

17 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs**

18 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who invested
19 in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the class.
20 Attorneys' fees are awarded as a matter of equity. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees
21 equaling one-third or more of the potential value of the common fund. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162
22 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008) ("Empirical studies show that, regardless of whether the percentage
23 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
24 recovery").

25 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Aegis Law Firm, PC as Class Counsel. The attorneys performed
26 significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting the matter with no guarantee of any
27 payment. Toscano Decl., ¶ 35. Plaintiff's Counsel seeks preliminary approval for \$433,333.33 in
28 attorneys' fees, which is up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$40,000.00 in

1 reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the extensive information
2 exchange, and substantial recovery obtained on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff's Counsel
3 achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Toscano Decl. At final
4 approval, Plaintiff's Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys' fees
5 and litigation costs. *Id.* at ¶ 36.

6 **V. CONCLUSION**

7 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable Settlement of the class claims in light of the
8 risks present in this case. Plaintiff has appropriately presented the materials and information necessary
9 for preliminary approval, and therefore, respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the
10 Settlement and schedule a date to conduct the final approval hearing.

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12 Dated: May 12, 2026

AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC

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14 By: /s/ Julia M. Toscano

15 Julia M. Toscano

16 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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