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8 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

9 **IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

10
11 ROSA ALVAREZ, an individual, on behalf
of himself and on behalf of all persons
12 similarly situated,

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15 BRITEWORKS, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1-100, Inclusive,

16 Defendants.
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Case No. 22STCV35169

CLASS ACTION

*Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. William F. Highberger, Dept. SSC-10*

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

**Date: March 3, 2026
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: SSC-10**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Rosa Alvarez respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the Class
3 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) entered into between Plaintiff and
4 Defendant Briteworks, Inc. (“Briteworks” or “Defendant”). The proposed settlement seeks to
5 resolve claims in the above captioned matter in exchange for a non-reversionary \$500,000 Gross
6 Settlement Amount. The settlement class is comprised of “all current and former non-exempt
7 hourly employees employed by Defendant in California during the Class Period of November 4,
8 2018 to January 9, 2024.”

9 The Agreement and notice distribution plan are the products of adversarial, arm’s-length
10 negotiations by informed counsel and parties, facilitated by an experienced mediator. The
11 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all. Plaintiff has analyzed the strengths and
12 vulnerabilities of the claims with Defendant’s potential exposure and determined the \$500,000
13 proposed settlement is well within the range of reasonableness and is in the Class Members’ best
14 interests. The length and risks of trial and perils of litigation that affect the values of the claims
15 were all carefully weighed. In addition, the defenses asserted by Defendant, the uncertainty of class
16 certification, the difficulties of complex litigation, the lengthy process of establishing specific
17 damages and various possible delays and appeals, were also considered by Plaintiff and counsel in
18 negotiating the proposed settlement. Further, the proposed settlement satisfies the criteria for
19 preliminary approval under California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769.

20 Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks: (1) preliminary approval of the settlement; (2) provisional
21 certification of the Class; (3) appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative; (4) appointment of
22 Crosner Legal, PC as Class Counsel; (5) approval of the Parties’ proposed Notice of Class Action
23 Settlement (“Notice”) and method of notifying the Class Members; (6) a hearing date for Plaintiff’s
24 Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; and (7) entry of an Order Granting
25 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

26 **II. BACKGROUND/LITIGATION HISTORY**

27 Briteworks provides turnkey janitorial services to offices, retail, warehouse industrial and
28 other industries. Plaintiff was employed by Briteworks as a janitor/maintenance worker and

1 assigned to Universal Waste and Coca-Cola in Los Angeles during the Class Period. (Saunders
2 Decl., ¶ 13.)

3 Plaintiff filed her class action lawsuit on November 4, 2022, alleging causes of action for
4 unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, failure to provide meal and rest breaks, wage
5 statement violations, waiting time penalties, business expense reimbursements, and unfair
6 competition. After notice to the LWDA and Defendant, and exhausting administrative remedies,
7 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding a cause of action under PAGA on April 28, 2023.
8 (Saunders Decl., ¶ 14; Exh. 4.)

9 Once the case was at issue, and after extensive meeting and conferring over case
10 management, discovery, and potential law and motion, the Parties eventually agreed to mediation.
11 In January 2024, the Parties mediated with Henry Bongiovi, Esq., a respected wage and hour class
12 action mediator. The mediation lasted a full day and with the mediator's assistance the Parties
13 reached agreement on all major issues and they then formally reduced the proposed settlement to
14 the Agreement now before the Court for approval. The Agreement meets the requirements in the
15 LASC Checklist for Preliminary Approval. As part of the Settlement, Plaintiff filed a First
16 Amended Complaint adding a PAGA cause of action, and the FAC is the Operative Complaint.
17 Both the FAC and the Agreement have been uploaded to the LWDA. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 15; Exhs.
18 4-5.)

19 **III. INVESTIGATION**

20 Prior to the mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with extensive informal discovery,
21 including Plaintiff's personnel, time, and payroll records, time and payroll records for a randomly
22 selected sampling of Class Members, wage statement exemplars, Defendant's employee
23 handbooks, including Defendant's policies and procedures regarding the payment of wages, the
24 provision of meal and rest breaks, timekeeping policies (including recording hours), issuance of
25 wage statements, and termination wages, expense reimbursement policies, as well as information
26 regarding the number of putative Class Members who are current and former employees, the
27 number of Aggrieved Employees, the number of workweeks throughout the Class Period, and the
28 number of pay periods throughout the PAGA Period. From this information, Plaintiff was able to

1 analyze Defendant's liability for the claims asserted in this case and the potential exposure and
2 damages. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 16.)

3 Based on this informal discovery, Plaintiff contends the Class Members were not paid all
4 wages due, not provided with legally compliant meal and rest periods, did not receive compliant
5 wage statements, did not receive required expense reimbursement, and did not receive all wages
6 due on separation of employment. In considering the reasonableness of the proposed settlement,
7 Plaintiff considered each of Defendant's counterarguments, which sharply contested Plaintiff's
8 claims. Plaintiff and counsel weighed the strength of Defendant's arguments, including the risks of
9 prevailing at class certification and on the merits, and determined that the proposed settlement is in
10 the best interests of the Class. Although remaining confident in the strength of her claims, these
11 factors led Plaintiff to discount the exposure analysis, as discussed below. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 17.)

12 **IV. TERMS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

13 **A. Deductions from the Settlement**

14 The Parties have agreed (subject to the Court's approval) to resolve this matter for the non-
15 reversionary total sum of \$500,000.00 ("Gross Settlement Amount" or "GSA") (Agreement, § 3.1.),
16 which includes: (a) reasonable attorney's fees of up to \$166,667 (1/3 of the GSA)¹ to compensate
17 Class Counsel for work already performed and all work remaining to be performed (Agreement,
18 § 3.2.2.); (b) actual litigation expenses as documented and not to exceed \$20,000.00² (Agreement,
19 § 3.2.2.); (c) an Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in an amount not to exceed \$10,000.00
20 (Agreement, § 3.2.1.); (d) Administration Costs to Atticus Administration, LLC (the proposed
21 settlement administrator) in an amount not to exceed \$10,000.00 (Agreement, § 3.2.3.); and (e)
22 PAGA penalties to the LWDA of \$37,500 (which is 75% of the \$50,000.00 PAGA Payment, with
23 the remaining 25% or \$12,500.00 to Aggrieved Employees) (Agreement, § 3.2.5.). Employer-side
24 payroll taxes (including FICA, FUTA, and SDI) will be paid by Defendant separate and apart from
25

26 ¹ The percentage method, with or without a lodestar cross-check, may be used in common fund cases like this one.
27 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503. In support of their fee request at Final Approval, Class
28 Counsel will provide the Court with lodestar information to permit the Court to do a lodestar cross-check in connection
with Class Counsel's request for attorney's fees.

² At Final Approval, Class Counsel will provide documentation regarding actual expenses incurred to support Class
Counsel's request for reimbursement of actual expenses.

the GSA. (Agreement, § 3.1.)

B. Calculation of the Individual Settlement Payments to Class and Aggrieved Employees

After all Court-approved deductions from the GSA, about \$243,333 (“Net Settlement Amount” or “NSA”), less all applicable employee-side taxes, will be distributed to the estimated 766 Class Members, with an average individual settlement amount of around \$317.³ Additionally, the 25% PAGA Payment (\$12,500.00) will be distributed to the estimated 447 Aggrieved Employees, resulting in an average payment of about \$28.⁴ per Aggrieved Employee. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 19.) Under no circumstances will any portion of the GSA revert to Defendant. (Agreement, § 3.1.)

Atticus will calculate and issue Individual Class Payments to Participating Class Members by “(a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Agreement, § 3.2.4.) Additionally, Atticus will calculate and issue payments to Aggrieved Employees based (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$12,500) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. (Agreement, § 3.2.5.1.)

Each Class Member’s settlement award will be apportioned as follows: twenty percent (20%) wages and eighty percent penalties and interest. (Agreement, § 3.2.4.1.) Atticus will be responsible for issuing Form W-2s for amounts deemed wages and Form 1099s for the portions allocated to penalties and interest. (Agreement, §§ 3.2.4.1. and 3.2.5.2.)

C. Uncashed Funds to Cy Pres

Settlement checks must be cashed or deposited within 180 days after issuance. (Agreement, § 4.4.1.) In the event a settlement check remains uncashed, such uncashed funds shall be transmitted

³ \$243,333 estimated NSA/766 Class Members

⁴ \$12,500 (25% PAGA Payment) /447 Aggrieved Employees

1 to the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles as proposed *cy pres* beneficiary, subject to Court
2 approval. (Agreement, § 4.4.3)..

3 **D. Notice and Extended Response Deadline for Re-Mailed Notices**

4 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant
5 will provide Atticus with the Class Data, which Atticus will maintain as private and confidential.
6 (Agreement, § 4.2.)

7 Prior to mailing, Atticus will perform a search for updated addresses in the National Change
8 of Address database, and will use the NCOA database and skip traces to attempt to find current
9 addresses for any Notice returned as undeliverable. (Agreement, § 8.4.2.) If Atticus is unable to
10 obtain a better address for a Class Member, it will be under no obligation to make further attempts
11 to locate or notice the Class Member. (Agreement, § 8.4.3.) Within fourteen days after receipt of
12 the Class Data, Atticus will mail the Notice to all Class Members via First-Class mail. (Agreement,
13 § 8.4.2.)

14 The contents of the Notice are consistent with the terms of the Agreement and California
15 Rule of Court 3.769. The Notice informs Class Members how and when to request exclusion from
16 or object to the settlement and of their estimated payment amount which they will automatically
17 receive a settlement payment if they do nothing. (Saunders Decl., ¶¶ 25-28; Exh. 2.)

18 **E. Responses to the Settlement and Deadlines**

19 Class Members will have forty-five (45) days from the initial mailing of the Notice to
20 respond to the settlement by submitting a challenge to the number of weeks or pay periods attributed
21 to them, objecting, or requesting exclusion. (Agreement, § 8.5.1.) Class Members can object to the
22 settlement in writing via mail or fax by submitting a document with their name, the words “Notice
23 of Objection” or “Formal Objection” and a description of the arguments supporting their objection,
24 or they may be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. (Agreement, § 8.7.)

25 Class Members can also request for exclusion from the settlement by mailing or faxing a
26 written request, including his or her name, address, phone number or email address, last four digits
27 of their Social Security Number or Employment Authorization number, and a statement
28 demonstrating his or her intent to opt out of the settlement. (Agreement, § 8.5.1.)

1 The Notice also informs the Class Members/Aggrieved Employees that they can dispute the
2 number of workweeks/pay periods used to calculate their settlement payments by contacting
3 Atticus before the Response Deadline and providing documentation to support their dispute. Atticus
4 will investigate the dispute, request additional information from Defendant, and make a final
5 decision as to the number of eligible work weeks/pay periods. (Agreement, § 8.6.)

6 **F. Funding and Distribution of the Settlement**

7 Defendant will fund the settlement in two equal payments, the first within thirty (30)
8 calendar days after the Effective Date or by January 1, 2026, whichever is later, and the second
9 payment within 120 days thereafter. Atticus will disburse all payments required under this
10 Settlement within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of the full GSA. (Agreement, § 4.3-4.)
11 Defendant will fund the settlement within fourteen (14) calendar days after the Effective Date, and
12 Atticus will disburse all payments required under this Settlement within ten (10) calendar days of
13 receipt of the full GSA. (Agreement, § 4.3-4.)

14 **G. Release of Claims**

15 Upon final approval, Participating Class Members shall forever release the Released
16 Parties⁵ for the Released Claims for the Class Period, including all claims pleaded in the
17 Operative Complaint, and which could reasonably have been alleged, based on the Class Period
18 facts, allegations, and/or claims stated in the Operative Complaint, for work performed during the
19 Class Period, and as specifically detailed in Section 5.2 of the Agreement. Additionally, the
20 Aggrieved Employees will the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were
21 alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the
22 Operative Complaint, and PAGA Notice, and as more specifically detailed in Section 5.3 of the
23 Agreement.

24 **H. The Class Representative Service Award Is Justified Given the Risks and**
25 **Should be Preliminarily Approved**

26 ⁵ “Released Parties” means Defendant and its former and present directors, officers, shareholders, owners
27 consultants, representatives, administrators, fiduciaries benefit plans, agents managing agents, attorneys,
28 insurers, transferees, predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, affiliates, related entities, and assignees of any
of the foregoing, both individually and in their business capacities, and their employee benefit plans and
programs and that the trustees, administrators, fiduciaries and insurers of such plans and programs.
(Agreement, § 1.41.)

1 The Agreement provides for a service payment not to exceed \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff.
2 (Agreement, § 3.2.1.) Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to
3 compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class
4 litigation. *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393 (“These
5 awards are discretionary...and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on
6 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action,
7 and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.”); *Bell v.*
8 *Farmers Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class
9 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n. 971 (noting that service payments are warranted).

10 The requested service award is reasonable in light of the benefits Plaintiff conferred upon
11 the entire Class, resulting in a benefit to all Class Members and the State of California, the time
12 spent assisting counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims, commitment to
13 responding to discovery, and consenting to the proposed Agreement. Furthermore, by attaching her
14 name to this lawsuit, Plaintiff also took on the reputational risk that future employers would learn
15 of her participation in this case and would unfairly associate them with costly litigation, costing
16 them future employment opportunities. Any future employer could easily perform a simple Google
17 search – an unauthorized simple background check unknown to Plaintiff that can still provide a
18 plethora of information – and conclude that Plaintiff is not worth the risk of hiring given her prior
19 involvement in a lawsuit against a former employer. This is the kind of reputational risk, borne only
20 by Plaintiff, that the incentive award is meant to compensate. Furthermore, in pursuing this action
21 on behalf of the Class, Plaintiff risked a judgment against her for attorney’s fees and costs in the
22 event this matter should Briteworks prevail. For these reasons, at final approval, Plaintiff will
23 request the Court award her an enhancement payment in an amount that does not exceed \$10,000.
24 (Saunders Decl., ¶ 31; Declaration of Rosa Alvarez, ¶¶ 2-9.)

25 **IV. ARGUMENT**

26 In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil
27 Procedure section 382, the Court must find that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and
28 reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 [quoting *Officers for*

1 *Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625, cert. den. (1983) 459 U.S.
2 1217]. A proposed class action settlement is **presumed** fair under the following circumstances:
3 (1) the parties reached settlement after arms-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery
4 were sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in
5 similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Id.* at 1802. As the following
6 shows, all of these elements are present here and the Court should grant of preliminary approval.

7 **A. The Settlement was Reached as a Result of Arm's Length Negotiations**

8 The proposed settlement was reached as a result of arm's-length negotiations facilitated by
9 a respected mediator. Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have been, at all
10 times, adversarial and non-collusive. Following mediation, counsel for the Parties conducted
11 further extensive and arm's length negotiations on the settlement terms memorialized in the
12 Agreement. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 32.)

13 While Plaintiff believes in the merits of her case, she also recognizes the inherent risks of
14 litigation and understand the benefit of Class Members receiving significant settlement funds
15 immediately as opposed to risking continued litigation in achieving class certification, the merits
16 of the case before and after trial, the damages awarded and/or an appeal that can take several more
17 years to litigate. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 33.)

18 **B. The Settlement is the Result of Thorough Investigation and Discovery**

19 The Parties thoroughly investigated and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of their
20 factual and legal arguments before reaching the proposed settlement, and engaged in sufficient
21 investigation, research and discovery to support the settlement. The proposed settlement was only
22 possible following significant analysis and evaluation of Defendant's relevant policies and
23 procedures, as well as the data it produced for the putative Class. (Saunders Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, 34.)
24 This litigation has reached the stage where "the Parties certainly have a clear view of the strengths
25 and weaknesses of their cases" sufficient to support the Settlement. *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.
26 Cal. 1979) 485 F. Supp. 610, 617.

27 **C. Counsel for the Parties are Experienced in Similar Litigation**

28 Counsel for the Parties are particularly experienced in wage and hour employment law,

1 class actions and PAGA actions. Plaintiff's Counsel has prosecuted numerous cases on behalf of
2 employees for wage and hour violations and thus are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class
3 and PAGA claims, evaluate settlement versus trial on a fully informed basis, and to evaluate the
4 viability of the defenses. This experience informed Plaintiff's Counsel on the risks and uncertainties
5 of further litigation and guided their determination to endorse the proposed settlement.⁶ (Saunders
6 Decl. ¶¶ 4-12.)

7 **D. The Proposed Settlement is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims**

8 An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor into whether the
9 settlement "of the class members' claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of
10 the claims and the risks of the particular litigation." *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
11 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
12 Cal.App.4th 399, 409. The most important factor in this regard is "the strength of the case for
13 plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement." *Kullar*, 168
14 Cal.App.4th at 129.

15 In weighing the strength of Plaintiff's case, *Kullar* instructs that the court is not to "decide
16 the merits of the case or to substitute its evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of
17 the attorneys." 168 Cal.App.4th at 133. Further, this analysis does not require an explicit statement
18 of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims, provided
19 there is a record which allows "an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the
20 realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." *Munoz*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 409. Put differently, "as
21 the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section
22 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the 'ballpark' of
23 reasonableness." *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 133 citing *Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde &*
24 *Associates* (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499-500. As shown below, the Parties' investigation and
25 discovery revealed several reasons to discount claims and agree to this settlement.

26 **E. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable Based on the Strengths of Plaintiff's**

27 ⁶ The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* - the number of objectors - is not determinable until the Notice of Class Action
28 Settlement has been provided to the Class and they have had an opportunity to respond. This information will be
provided to the Court in conjunction with the Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Case and the Risks and Costs of Further Litigation

The proposed settlement was only possible following significant analysis and evaluation of Defendant's relevant policies and procedures, as well as the data that Defendant produced for the Class. This permitted Plaintiff's Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. The discovery conducted resulted in Plaintiff's central theories of liability, which are based on Plaintiff's claims that Defendant failed to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages, failed to provide accurate, itemized wage statements and failed to pay all wages due on separation of employment. As explained above, Defendant maintains that the discovery produced demonstrates it likely would prevail on both class certification and the merits. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff believes this case is suitable for certification as she contends there are company-wide policies that violate California law and uniformly affect the Class Members. Defendant's counterarguments, however, raise uncertainties with respect to both class certification and success on the merits. As the California Supreme Court emphasized in *Sav-On v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, class certification is always a matter of the trial court's sound discretion, and decisions following *Sav-On* have reached different conclusions with respect to certification of wage and hour claims.⁷ While remaining confident in the strengths of her claims, all of these factors led Plaintiff to discount the following maximum potential damage claims. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 37.)

1. The Settlement Amount is Reasonable

Defendant provided Plaintiff with class-wide data from which Plaintiff's Counsel extrapolated a damage analysis in preparation of mediation. For purposes of the mediation, there were a total of 766 Class Members who worked approximately 47,485 work weeks in the limitations period, and 447 aggrieved employees and 8,934 pay periods within the PAGA Period. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 38.)

⁷ E.g., *Harris v. Superior Court*, 154 Cal.App.4th 164 (2007) (reversing decertification of class claiming misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees), *review granted*, 171 P.3d 545 (2007) (not cited as precedent, but rather for illustrative purposes only); *Walsh v. IKON Solutions, Inc.*, 148 Cal.App.4th 1440 (2007) (affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification); *Aguilar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 144 Cal.App.4th 121 (2006) (reversing denial of certification); *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.*, 141 Cal.App.4th 1422 (2006) (affirming denial of certification).

1 First, Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to pay all wages due because it paid employees
2 based on their scheduled hours rather than their actual hours worked. Plaintiff alleges she and the
3 class members regularly performed worked both before and after their scheduled times to, inter
4 alia, gather and return cleaning supplies, and to report to their assigned locations within a facility,
5 and that Defendant's written policies required class members to be at their "work location at the
6 start of their scheduled shifts, ready to work," which resulted in having to perform "off the clock"
7 work. Per Plaintiff, these practices systematically underpaid employees for both regular and
8 overtime hours. On the other hand, Defendant contends it paid class members all wages due as
9 required under applicable law, and that it accurately tracked and paid for all employee hours worked
10 at the correct hourly rates. It further argued its policies strictly prohibited "off the clock" work, and
11 if any employees worked off the clock it was done without the company's authorization or
12 knowledge. White v. Starbucks Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083 (employer must
13 have actual or constructive knowledge of the off the clock work). Finally, Briteworks argued that
14 determining if any off the clock work occurred, and the reasons therefor, would require innumerable
15 individualized inquiries and therefore class certification would be improper. Without taking into
16 consideration any of Defendant's defenses to certification or on the merits, Plaintiff's expert
17 calculated Defendant's maximum exposure for this claim **\$676,660** in damages for unpaid wages
18 based on a total of 6,149.6 uncompensated hours. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 39.)

19 Plaintiff next contends Defendant failed to provide legally compliant meal and rest breaks.
20 Specifically, as to meal breaks, Plaintiff contends class members did not receive legally compliant
21 thirty (30) minute first and second meal periods, and consistently were unable to take timely, off
22 duty, thirty-minute, uninterrupted meal periods. She alleges class members frequently had to work
23 through part or all their meal periods due to understaffing, pressure to complete their job duties
24 before having a meal, and commentary from supervisors instructing them to take short meal periods
25 or to skip meal periods completely, but were required to note a 30-minute meal period on time sheet
26 for thirty minutes regardless of whether they received a lawful 30-minute meal period. Plaintiff
27 also contends Briteworks failed to provide duty-free rest periods to Class Members for the same
28 reasons, and that employees were pressured to complete their assigned tasks as quickly as possible

1 and skip breaks as a consequence. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 40.)

2 Defendant denies Plaintiff's contentions, claiming it made meal and rest breaks available to
3 Class Members in compliance with California law. Defendant contends its meal and rest break
4 policies are lawful and that Class Members were frequently reminded they were required to take
5 all meal and rest breaks. Defendant also contends that time records demonstrate that Class Members
6 took duty-free, timely meal and rest breaks. Defendant also contends its meal and rest break policies
7 and practices comported with the flexibility the *Brinker* court held was integral to California's meal
8 and rest period requirements. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims
9 are not susceptible to common proof, as the claims would require individualized inquiry, including
10 whether there was an unlawful companywide policy, whether employees had the opportunity to
11 take meal and rest periods, whether they voluntarily chose to forego their meal and rest periods,
12 and whether Defendant ever prevented them from taking meal and rest periods. Accordingly,
13 Defendant contends these claims are vulnerable to a ruling that class treatment is not appropriate.
14 Without taking into consideration any of Defendant's defenses to certification or on the merits,
15 Plaintiff estimates Defendant faces around **\$3,387,862.50** in damages for meal period violations
16 assuming a 100% violation rate and after accounting for meal period premiums paid. On the rest
17 period claims, Plaintiff estimates around **\$3,387,862.50** in damages, again assuming a 100%
18 violation rate. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 41.)

19 For the expense reimbursement claims, Plaintiff argued Briteworks required Class Members
20 to use their personal cell phones to communicate with supervisors and coworkers throughout their
21 shifts without reimbursement. In response, Briteworks contended there was no need to use a
22 personal cell phone in the performance of Class Member job duties, and if anyone did so it was
23 purely for personal convenience and not a job requirement. Without accounting for any potential
24 defenses, Plaintiff estimates she and the Class Members are entitled to over **\$237,425** in expense
25 reimbursement. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 42.)

26 As a result of the above alleged violations, Plaintiff also alleges Defendant failed to provide
27 accurate wage statements and timely pay all wages that were due and owing upon separation of
28 employment. Thus, should the primary claims fail, Plaintiff's claims for wage statement violations

1 and waiting time penalties would also fail. Defendant also contends it would not be liable for
2 waiting time penalties because a “good faith dispute” exists over the payment of past wages. *Amaral*
3 *v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201. Further, Defendant contends Plaintiff
4 would have to prove Defendant “willfully” failed to pay Class Members appropriate wages due
5 upon separation of employment. Without taking into consideration any of Defendant’s defenses to
6 certification or on the merits, Plaintiff calculated Defendant’s maximum exposure for wage
7 statement violations at about **\$913,800** and exposure for waiting time penalties at about **\$1,686,960**.
8 (Saunders Decl., ¶ 43.)

9 As far as potential PAGA liability, the theoretical civil penalties likely are around \$1.4
10 million should Plaintiff prevail on all claims and establish violations of the multiple Labor Code
11 sections at issue. (Saunders Decl., ¶ 44.) As with the class claims, Plaintiff discounted the potential
12 PAGA penalties based on Defendant’s various defenses on the merits and also accounted for the
13 Court’s wide discretion to reduce such penalties, or to decline to award penalties at all. Labor Code
14 § 2699(e)(2); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (trial court awarded
15 penalties of \$5 per pay period after a bench trial, which decision was upheld on appeal); *In re Taco*
16 *Bell Wage and Hour Actions* (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 (PAGA
17 penalties denied after trial). Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$50,000 to PAGA penalties.
18 (Agreement, § 3.2.5.)

19 Plaintiff submits this amount is reasonable under the circumstances and in line with
20 comparable settlements in other wage and hour class actions in California. *E.g.*, *Van Kempen v.*
21 *Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final
22 approval of \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement);
23 *Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I* (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303
24 (finding a \$7,500 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of
25 \$345,000 and the possible weaknesses in plaintiffs’ case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement).
26 Additionally, the LWDA has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement,
27 and will be able to weigh in as necessary. *Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
28 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6%

1 where "[p]laintiffs [have] submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has
2 not objected to the settlement.

3 Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the
4 risks discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially
5 greater benefit if the litigation continued. Plaintiff and counsel concluded – in light of these very
6 real and substantial risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly
7 litigation was in the best interests of the class. The overall \$500,000 recovery represents a
8 significant percentage of Defendant’s potential exposure. Given Defendant’s multi-layered
9 defenses and all other potential risks of continued litigation, a total recovery for the class of
10 \$500,000, which will result in average award of at least \$317 per class member, plus additional
11 sums under PAGA, is a significant result well within the range of reasonableness considering all
12 potential outcomes, and it will provide direct monetary awards to all Class Members without further
13 delay. [Saunders Decl., ¶¶ 45-46.]

14 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might be
15 achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
16 Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement
17 process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it
18 would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because
19 the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground
20 in the interest of avoiding litigation”); 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.
21 (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150 (“The fact that a proposed settlement may amount to only a
22 fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is
23 grossly inadequate and should be disapproved”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
24 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and
25 reasonable even though it represented 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims); Lane
26 v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 (“[T]he question whether a settlement is
27 fundamentally fair . . . is different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the
28 estimation of the reviewing court”). Importantly as well, the proposed settlement is non-

1 reversionary and will provide immediate benefits to the Class Members without a claims process.
2 White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A
3 Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at [http://](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)
4 www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome
5 claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and her counsel submit the settlement is
6 within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

7 **F. Provisional Class Certification Should be Granted**

8 A class action is appropriate when the class is ascertainable and there is “a well-defined
9 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
10 represented.” Code Civ. Proc. § 382. Class certification requirements under Section 382 follow
11 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and require: numerosity, typicality of the class
12 representatives’ claims, adequacy of representation, predominance of common issues, and
13 superiority. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(b)(3); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011,
14 1019. While a court must certify a class for settlement purposes if a class has not already been
15 certified, “it is well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the
16 propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser
17 standard of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Glob. Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*
18 (2013) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 *citing Dunk*, Cal.App.4th 1794, 1807, n.19; *Wershba v. Apple*
19 *Computer* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 237-38.

20 **1. The Proposed Class is Sufficiently Numerous and Ascertainable**

21 First, the class is both sufficiently numerous, consisting of approximately 766 individuals,
22 and ascertainable by reference to Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. (Saunders Decl.,
23 ¶ 47.) “There is no set number required to maintain a class action, and the statutory test is whether
24 a class is so numerous that ‘it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” *Hebbard v.*
25 *Colgrove* (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 1030 (noting that there is no set minimum to meet the
26 numerosity prerequisite, but that a class of as few as 28 is acceptable); *Bowles v. Superior Court*
27 (1995) 44 Cal. 2d 574 (upholding a class of ten members); *Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126
28 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932 (finding that “Class Members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily

1 identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.”). Thus, the
2 ascertainability requirement is met.

3 **2. The Typicality and Adequacy Requirements Are Met**

4 The typicality requirement is met if the claims of the named representative are typical of
5 those of the Class, though, “they need not be substantially identical.” *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145
6 Cal.App.3d 27, 46-47. Here, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members’ claims because
7 they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the
8 Class Members. Plaintiff further contends Defendant’s policies applied to all Class Members and
9 each Class Member is challenging the same policies and practices. As such, the typicality
10 requirement is satisfied for purposes of settlement. (Alvarez Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Saunders Decl. ¶ 48.)

11 Adequacy requires that the Plaintiff have no interests adverse to the interests of the proposed
12 Class Members and be committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the Class.
13 *McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 70 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51. Plaintiff has been and will continue
14 to be committed to vigorously prosecuting this case, and she has no conflicts of interest with the
15 Class. (Alvarez Decl., ¶¶ 3-7; Saunders Decl., ¶ 48.)

16 **3. The Commonality Requirement is Met**

17 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a
18 settlement class – as the Class Members all were subject to the same meal and rest break policies
19 and alleged “de facto” policies resulting in meal period violations, and similarly subject to the same
20 improper time keeping policies that allegedly failed to accurately record and pay for all hours
21 worked. Since the focus of the claims against Defendant concerns the legality of common policies
22 applied uniformly to the entire class, common issues predominate over individualized inquiries
23 concerning liability. For instance, Defendant’s meal and rest break policy is company-wide policy
24 applied equally and consistently to all class members, and this policy is either compliant with
25 California law or it is not. Regardless of that determination, it will decide liability for all class
26 members one way or another. [Saunders Decl., ¶ 49.]

27 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy
28 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.

1 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy
2 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
3 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court (2013)
4 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question of fact or law
5 that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to other means
6 for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Saunders Decl., ¶ 50.]

7 **G. Atticus Should be Appointed as the Settlement Administrator**

8 The Parties agreed to use Atticus Administration, LLC as the Settlement Administrator in
9 this matter. (Agreement, § 8.1.) Atticus is highly qualified and experienced as a settlement
10 administrator, committed to the security of data (having experienced no data breaches at all), carries
11 insurance for the theft of money or data, and has no relationship with Counsel. (Declaration of
12 Chris Longley, ¶¶ 2-13; Exhs. A-C; Saunders Decl., ¶ 51.)

13 **V. CONCLUSION**

14 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the Class
15 Members, as it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Plaintiff accordingly requests the Court certify the
16 class for settlement purposes, appoint Plaintiff as Class Representatives, appoint Plaintiff’s Counsel
17 as Class Counsel, appoint Atticus Administration, LLC as Settlement Administrator, approve the
18 method of notice and the Notice to be sent to the Class, preliminarily approve the Settlement
19 Agreement, enter the proposed order filed herewith, and set a Final Approval hearing date.

20 **CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.**

21
22 Dated: November 10, 2025

By:



Chad Saunders
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Rosa Alvarez