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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

SERGIO CHAVEZ JR, as an individual and
on behalf of all others similar situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DORADO HOLDINGS, LLC d.b.a.
TOOLSHED EQUIPMENT RENTAL, a
California limited liability company; and
DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 37-2023-00048229-CU-OE-CTL

*[Case assigned for all purposes to the Hon.
Gregory W. Pollack, Dept. C-71]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT**

Date: September 12, 2025
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept: C-71

Action Filed: November 2, 2022
Case Transferred: June 12, 2023
Trial Date: None Set

TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, on September 12, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C-71 of the above-entitled Court, located at 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California 92101, Plaintiff Sergio Chavez Jr. (“Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, will and hereby does move this Court for:

1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional certification of the following Settlement Class defined as follows:

All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Dorado Holdings, LLC d.b.a Toolshed Equipment Rental in California from November 2, 2018, until December 31, 2021 (the “Class Period”).

3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiff Sergio Chavez Jr. as Class Representative;
4. Preliminary appointment of Paul K. Haines, Sean M. Blakely, and Joel M. Gordon of Haines Law Group, APC, as Class Counsel;
5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally approved and to permit a Class Representative Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, civil penalties payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), settlement administration costs, and attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel;
6. Appointment of Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the third-party Settlement Administrator for mailing notices; and
7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice and an order that it be disseminated to the proposed Settlement Class as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

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1 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and
2 Authorities, the supporting declarations of Paul K. Haines, Sean M. Blakely, Joel M. Gordon,
3 Plaintiff Sergio Chavez Jr., and Jodey Lawrence of Phoenix Settlement Administrators, and the
4 exhibits attached thereto, the pleadings, and other papers filed in this Action, the Settlement
5 Agreement, and on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument presented at the time
6 of the hearing.

7
8
9 Respectfully submitted,

10 Dated: February 13, 2025

HAINES LAW GROUP, APC

11
12 By: 
13 Paul K. Haines
14 Sean M. Blakely
15 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Sergio Chavez Jr. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) brought this class and representative
4 action for various wage and hour violations on behalf of all current and former non-exempt
5 employees who worked for Defendant Dorado Holdings, LLC d.b.a. Toolshed Equipment Rental
6 (“Dorado”), in California at any time from November 2, 2018 through December 31, 2021 (the
7 “Class Period”). Plaintiff’s primary allegations are that Dorado failed to pay all minimum and
8 overtime wages, and failed to provide all legally compliant meal and rest periods. As a result of
9 these alleged violations, Plaintiff also brought derivative claims for Dorado’s alleged failure to
10 pay all final wages owed, failure to issue accurate and compliant wage statements, and for civil
11 penalties under the Private Attorneys’ General Act (“PAGA”).¹

12 Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this Court preliminarily approve this non-
13 reversionary, common-fund class action settlement,² in which Dorado has agreed to pay Two
14 Hundred Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$200,000.00) to the following Settlement Class:

15 All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Dorado
16 Holdings, LLC d.b.a Toolshed Equipment Rental in California from
November 2, 2018, until December 31, 2021 (the “Class Period”).

17 If the Settlement is approved, Dorado will pay a non-reversionary Maximum Settlement
18 Amount of \$200,000.00. After deducting administration costs, Plaintiff’s requested class
19 representative Enhancement Payment, the amount designated as PAGA civil penalties, and
20 requested attorneys’ fees and costs, the Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$82,333.33 will
21 be distributed to all Settlement Class members who do not opt-out of the Settlement based on the
22 proportionate number of workweeks worked by each Settlement Class member during the Class
23

24 ¹ Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint (“FAC”) pleads
25 the following causes of action: (1) minimum wage violations; (2) failure to pay all overtime
26 wages; (3) meal period violations; (4) rest period violations; (5) wage statement penalties; (6)
waiting time penalties; (7) unfair competition; and (8) civil penalties under the PAGA.

27 ² The Stipulation of Settlement (“Settlement”) is attached to the Declaration of Sean M. Blakely
28 as **Exhibit A**. The proposed Class Notice and Notice of Estimated Settlement Payment are
attached to the Settlement as **Exhibits 1** and **2**, respectively. All defined terms in this motion have
the same definition as that in the Settlement.

1 Period. Additionally, all Settlement Class members who were employed by Dorado at any time
2 from November 2, 2021 to December 31, 2021 (“PAGA Period”) will also receive a portion of
3 the \$1,250.00 PAGA Amount based on the proportionate number of pay periods worked during
4 the PAGA Period.

5 Significantly, Settlement Class members do not need to file a claim to reap the financial
6 benefits of the Settlement, as all Settlement Class members will automatically receive a payment
7 unless they affirmatively opt-out. There are approximately 50 Settlement Class members, and the
8 average payment to participating Settlement Class members is projected to be approximately
9 \$1,646.67.

10 The proposed Settlement is within the range of possible approval in light of the significant
11 legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiff faced, the risks and costs of further litigation, and the
12 tangible monetary benefits to be received by Plaintiff and the Settlement Class. For the reasons
13 discussed herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant preliminary approval of the
14 Settlement.

15 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

16 **A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

17 In operation since 2008, Dorado was in the business of renting industrial construction
18 equipment and construction tools. *See* Declaration of Sean M. Blakely (“Blakely Decl.”), ¶ 8. On
19 December 7, 2021, Dorado was acquired by Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., and Dorado ceased operating.
20 *Id.* Plaintiff was employed by Dorado as a non-exempt “Driver” from approximately October
21 2019 until December 7, 2021. *See* Declaration of Sergio Chavez Jr. In Support of Approval of
22 Class Action Settlement (“Chavez Decl.”), ¶ 2. As a Driver, Plaintiff’s primary job duties
23 consisted of loading up a truck with equipment and/or tools for delivery to customers and picking
24 up equipment and/or tools to bring back to Dorado’s yard after the customer no longer needed the
25 item(s). *Id.*

26 On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior
27 Court, alleging several wage and hour violations. Blakely Decl., ¶ 9. On that same day, Plaintiff
28 sent his PAGA notice letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). *Id.*,

1 Exhibit B. On January 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Class and
2 Representative Action Complaint (“FAC”) alleging that Dorado: (i) failed to pay all minimum
3 wages; (ii) failed to pay all overtime wages; (iii) failed to provide all lawful meal periods; (iv)
4 failed to authorize and permit all rest periods; (v) failed to issue accurate, itemized wage
5 statements; (vi) failed to pay all wages at the end of employment; (vii) engaged in unfair
6 competition in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*; and (viii) is
7 liable for civil penalties under the PAGA. *Id.* On June 12, 2023, by stipulation of the Parties, the
8 case was transferred for all purposes to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
9 San Diego. *Id.*

10 **B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND DORADO’S DEFENSES**

11 **1. Unpaid Wages Due to Unlawful Timekeeping Policies/Practices**

12 Plaintiff alleges that for a portion of the Class Period, Dorado underpaid Settlement Class
13 members by rounding time punches, despite requiring employees to clock in on a system that
14 recorded hours worked to the minute. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. As a result of these policies/practices,
15 Plaintiff alleges that Dorado failed to compensate Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees for
16 all minimum and overtime wages owed. *Id.*

17 Dorado counters that its timekeeping policies/practices complied with California law and
18 that it has always properly compensated Settlement Class members for all hours worked
19 throughout the Class Period. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Dorado further contends that it utilized an even-
20 handed timekeeping system that, on balance, resulted in employees being paid for all hours
21 actually worked. *Id.* Dorado further argues that it changed its timekeeping policies in or around
22 April 2020 and began afterwards to compensate Settlement Class members to the minute, thereby
23 cutting off any potential liability for this claim. *Id.* Finally, Dorado asserts that Plaintiff would be
24 unable to certify this claim since its timekeeping policies/practices are facially neutral and
25 individualized inquiries would be necessary as to whether employees were in fact underpaid for
26 each workday in question (including whether they were actually working when they were clocked
27 in), resulting in an unmanageable series of mini-trials. *Id.*

28 ///

1 **2. Meal Period Claims**

2 Plaintiff alleges that Dorado failed to provide legally compliant first meal periods because
3 Dorado’s policies/practices failed to provide Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees with a
4 timely, duty-free, and uninterrupted 30-minute meal period commencing before the end of the
5 fifth hour of work. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Plaintiff further alleges that Settlement Class members
6 were not provided with second meal periods when they worked shifts in excess of 10.0 hours in
7 a workday. *Id.*, at ¶ 16.

8 Dorado counters it has maintained compliant written meal period policies throughout the
9 Class Period and has always provided compliant meal periods in line with those policies. Blakely
10 Decl., ¶ 15. Dorado further contends that it always *provides* employees the opportunity to take
11 meal periods and is not required to *ensure* they are taken. *Id.*; see *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Sup. Ct.*,
12 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1034 (2012) (rejecting “ensure” standard). Thus, Dorado argues that any missed,
13 late or short meal periods resulted from lawful employee choice rather than any policy and/or
14 practice of Dorado. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Additionally, Dorado maintains that employees
15 voluntarily waived their second meal period when they worked shifts in excess of 10.0 hours (but
16 less than 12.0 hours), as they are entitled to do under Labor Code § 512. *Id.*, at ¶ 16. Finally,
17 Dorado argues that these claims are not suited for class treatment, as individual inquiries would
18 be needed to assess which employees took non-compliant or missed meal periods, how many
19 meal periods were non-compliant or missed, and the reasons why a particular employee did not
20 take a compliant meal period on a particular shift. *Id.*, at ¶¶ 15-16.

21 **3. Rest Period Claims**

22 Plaintiff alleges that Dorado failed to authorize and permit all required off-duty rest
23 periods. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was not authorized or permitted to
24 take any off-duty rest period during his shifts due to work demands imposed by Dorado. *Id.*

25 Dorado counters that it has maintained compliant written rest period policies throughout
26 the Class Period and has always authorized and permitted employees a 10-minute rest period for
27 each four (4) hours worked, or major fraction thereof, as required under the Wage Order, and that
28 any failure to take rest periods was a result of employee choice rather than any Dorado policy

1 and/or practice. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Dorado also argues that Plaintiff’s claims are unique to his
2 position as “Driver,” and that this claim is not amenable to class treatment, since individual
3 inquiries would be required to determine which employees failed to take rest periods, how many
4 rest periods they failed to take, and the reasons why each employee failed to take rest period(s)
5 on a particular shift. *Id.* These manageability concerns are especially present with respect to rest
6 period claims, Dorado argues, given that rest periods are not recorded. *Id.*

7 **4. Wage Statement Claims**

8 As a result of the unpaid wages and unpaid meal and rest period premium wages described
9 above, Plaintiff alleges that Dorado is liable for wage statement penalties. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18.
10 However, Dorado argues that any alleged wage statement violations were not “knowing and
11 intentional,” and that Plaintiff cannot show he or other employees “suffer[ed] injury” due to the
12 alleged wage statement violations, as required by Labor Code § 226(e) for the imposition of
13 penalties. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18. Further, Dorado contends its wage statements always accurately
14 reflected hours worked and amounts paid as well as all other required information, precluding
15 liability for wage statement penalties under *Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc.*, 22 Cal.App.5th
16 1308, 1336-37 (2018) (agreeing with employer’s “commonsense position that the pay stubs were
17 accurate in that they correctly reflected the hours worked and the pay received...The purpose of
18 section 226 is to *document the paid wages* to ensure the employee is fully informed regarding the
19 calculation of those wages.”) (*Italics in original*). Blakely Decl., ¶ 18.

20 **5. Waiting Time Penalties**

21 As a further result of the unpaid wages and unpaid meal and rest period premium wages
22 described above, Plaintiff alleges that Dorado failed to comply with its final pay obligations set
23 forth in Labor Code §§ 201-203. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19.

24 Dorado argues that it possesses strong, good-faith defenses to Plaintiff’s underlying
25 claims, thus precluding recovery of waiting time penalties, which are only available for the
26 “willful” failure to pay wages. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19; *see also* 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 13520 (“[A]
27 good faith dispute that any wages are due will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under
28 Section 203 . . . A ‘good faith’ dispute that any wages are due occurs when an employer presents

1 a defense, based in law or fact which, if successful, would preclude any recovery on the part of
2 the employee”). Dorado further asserts that Plaintiff’s waiting time penalty exposure was grossly
3 inflated as not every former employee experienced the alleged Labor Code violations. Blakely
4 Decl., ¶ 19.

5 **6. PAGA Civil Penalties**

6 As a result of the foregoing Labor Code violations, Plaintiff alleges that Dorado is liable
7 for civil penalties under the PAGA. Blakely Decl., ¶ 20. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is
8 derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Dorado asserts the PAGA claim would fail with
9 those claims. *Id.*; see *Price v. Starbucks Corp.* 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147 (2011) (“Because the
10 underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail”). Dorado further
11 maintains that, given its good-faith defenses, this Court would exercise its discretion to
12 substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Dorado liable for any of Plaintiff’s
13 claims. Blakely Decl., ¶ 20; see Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt.,*
14 *Inc.* 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (2012) (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming v.*
15 *Covidien Inc.*, Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
16 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations);
17 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018) (affirming PAGA civil penalty
18 of just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with the law).

19 **C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION**

20 After filing the case, Plaintiff propounded Requests for Production and Special
21 Interrogatories on Dorado. Blakely Decl., ¶ 10. In connection with mediation, Dorado provided
22 Plaintiff’s counsel with a random sampling of timekeeping and payroll records for Settlement
23 Class members. *Id.* Dorado also provided Plaintiff with relevant data points, such as the total
24 number of former employees and the number of aggregate workweeks and pay periods worked
25 by employees during the Class Period. *Id.* Dorado also produced all of its relevant written policies
26 and/or procedures in effect during the Class Period. *Id.* Plaintiff conducted a comprehensive
27 analysis and extrapolation of the payroll and timekeeping data produced by Dorado to create a
28 detailed exposure analysis for all claims at issue. *Id.* This discovery allowed the Parties to assess

the merits and value of Plaintiff’s claims, the chances of certification of Plaintiff’s claims, and Dorado’s potential defenses. *Id.*

On August 16, 2024, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with the Hon. Joan M. Lewis (Ret.), a well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Blakely Decl., ¶ 11. During mediation, the Parties vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiff’s claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Id.* With the assistance of Judge Lewis, the Parties agreed to a classwide settlement. *Id.* During the months that followed, the Parties finalized the terms of the Settlement and executed the long-form Settlement Agreement now before the court. *Id.*

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT

If the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement, Dorado will pay a Maximum Settlement Amount of \$200,000.00. *See* Settlement, ¶ 3. Significantly, this Settlement is non-reversionary, and no Settlement Class member will have to submit a claim form to receive an Individual Settlement Payment. *Id.*, at ¶ 4. Each Settlement Class member will automatically receive an Individual Settlement Payment unless they affirmatively opt out of the Settlement. *Id.* The monetary terms of the Settlement are summarized below:

• Maximum Settlement Amount:	\$200,000.00
• Minus Court-approved attorneys’ fees:	\$66,666.67
• Minus Court-approved verified costs (up to):	\$30,000.00
• Minus Court-approved Enhancement Payment:	\$10,000.00
• Minus amount set aside as PAGA penalties:	\$5,000.00
• <u>Minus estimated settlement administration costs:</u>	<u>\$6,000.00</u>
Net Settlement Amount:	\$82,333.33
• PLUS 25% “PAGA Payment” to Settlement Class:	\$1,250.00
Total Amount Paid to Settlement Class members:	\$83,583.33

1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments

After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs, Class Representative Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, the amount designated as PAGA civil penalties, and settlement administration costs, the Settlement requires Dorado to pay a Net Settlement Amount of at least \$82,333.33 to all Settlement Class members who do not timely opt-

1 out. *See* Settlement, ¶ 4(A). The Net Settlement Amount shall be distributed to each participating
2 Settlement Class member based on their proportionate number of workweeks worked during the
3 Class Period. Settlement, ¶ 4(B)(i). Additionally, One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars
4 (\$1,250.00) of the Maximum Settlement Amount has been designated as the “PAGA Amount”
5 and shall be distributed to the Settlement Class members (including those who submit a valid and
6 timely Request for Exclusion from the class action settlement) who were employed during the
7 PAGA Period (i.e., November 2, 2021, to December 31, 2021) proportionally based on the
8 number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. Settlement, ¶ 4(C).

9 According to Dorado, there are approximately 50 Settlement Class members. Blakely
10 Decl., ¶ 13. Therefore, the average Individual Settlement Payment from the Net Settlement
11 Amount is projected to be approximately \$1,646.67. *Id.* Settlement Class members will have sixty
12 (60) calendar days from the mailing of the Notice Packets to opt-out or object to the Settlement,
13 thereby providing ample time to review the Class Notice without unduly delaying the Settlement.
14 *See* Settlement, ¶¶ 9(C)-(D). Those Settlement Class members who do not opt-out of the
15 Settlement will be bound by its terms and will release all claims against Dorado included within
16 the Settlement. *See Id.*, at ¶ 2(A).

17 **2. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and PAGA Amount**

18 Plaintiff will apply for Class Representative Enhancement Payment at the time of seeking
19 final approval of the proposed class action settlement in the amount of \$10,000.00 for his service
20 to the Settlement Class. *See* Settlement, ¶¶ 3(C)(3), 6; Blakely Decl., ¶ 24. “[I]ncentive awards
21 are fairly typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for
22 work done on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in
23 bringing the action.” *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94
24 (2010). As will be fully briefed at the time of final approval, Plaintiff’s requested Enhancement
25 Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiff expended on behalf of the
26 Settlement Class, including providing substantial factual information and documents to Class
27 Counsel, discussing the claims and theories at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the
28 prosecution of his claims, as well as the significant risks Plaintiff undertook by agreeing to serve

1 as the named plaintiff in this case, and the fact that Plaintiff agreed to a general release of all
2 claims subject to a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *See* Settlement, ¶¶ 3(C)(3), 6; Blakely Decl., ¶
3 24; *see also* Chavez Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.

4 Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys’ fees award of one-third of the Maximum
5 Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be \$66,666.67, and up to \$30,000.00 in
6 verified costs reimbursement. *See* Settlement, ¶¶ 3(C)(4), 5; Blakely Decl., ¶ 23. Plaintiff submits
7 the requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-
8 consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. *Id.* Class Counsel has incurred substantial
9 attorneys’ fees conducting pre-filing investigation, analyzing Plaintiff’s claims, conducting legal
10 research, propounding formal discovery, meeting and conferring with Dorado’s counsel regarding
11 purported deficiencies in Dorado’s discovery responses, conducting extensive informal
12 discovery, analyzing Settlement Class members’ timekeeping and payroll records, creating a
13 comprehensive damages model, preparing for and attending mediation, negotiating and preparing
14 the long-form Settlement Agreement, preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the case. *Id.*
15 Class Counsel expects to expend additional attorney time in attending the hearing on this Motion,
16 overseeing the Notice process and fielding questions from Settlement Class members, preparing
17 the final approval papers, and attending the Final Approval hearing. *Id.*

18 California courts recognize that an appropriate method for awarding attorneys’ fees in
19 class actions is to award a percentage of the “common fund” created as a result of a settlement.
20 *See, e.g., Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016) (holding “the percentage of
21 fund method survives in California class action cases”). Class Counsel’s request for fees of one-
22 third of the Maximum Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and indeed
23 is considered the typical rate for common fund settlements. Historically, courts have awarded
24 percentage fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. *See* 4
25 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th Ed. 2013).

26 Class Counsel submit their request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable when viewed as an
27 overall percentage of the Settlement and in light of the substantial risks and significant work
28 undertaken, the results obtained, and the efficiency with which the litigation has been conducted.

1 Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of attorneys' fees
2 and verified costs upon seeking final approval.

3 Additionally, the parties have agreed to designate \$5,000.00 of the Maximum Settlement
4 Amount as PAGA civil penalties, of which \$3,750.00 (75%) will be paid to the LWDA, with the
5 remaining \$1,250.00 (25%) for distribution to certain Settlement Class members, as the PAGA
6 requires such penalties to be allocated per Labor Code § 2699(i). *See* Settlement, ¶ 3(C)(5).
7 Plaintiff submits this allocation to the LWDA for civil PAGA penalties is appropriate. *See, e.g.,*
8 *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645 at *1 (N.D.
9 Cal. 2011) (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common-fund
10 settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.*, Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217 (N.D.
11 Cal. 2013) (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund
12 settlement).

13 **IV. ARGUMENT**

14 **A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED**

15 California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval,
16 which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal
17 Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles*, 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337
18 (2012) (Rule 3.769 requires trial court to determine “that the settlement is fair, reasonable and
19 adequate to all concerned”); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule
20 23(e) requires the trial court to determine “whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair,
21 adequate, and reasonable”). Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly
22 in complex class action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.
23 2008). The Court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the
24 agreement taken as a whole is fair. *See e.g., Hanlon*, supra, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial
25 presumption of fairness where, as here, the Settlement was negotiated at arm’s-length by class
26 counsel and with the assistance of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g.,*
27 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (2008).

28 ///

1 **1. Standard for Preliminary Approval**

2 To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider several factors, including:
3 “the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
4 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
5 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the
6 experience and views of counsel.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
7 “The list of factors is not exclusive, and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing
8 of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*,
9 91 Cal.App.4th at 245 (2001). As discussed below, the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and
10 reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

11 **a. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case**

12 Although Plaintiff steadfastly maintains that his claims are meritorious, Plaintiff
13 acknowledges that there were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. As
14 described above in section II.B., *supra*, Dorado presented multiple defenses to Plaintiff’s claims,
15 both on the merits and with respect to class certification. Thus, while Plaintiff was prepared to
16 litigate these claims through class certification and ultimately trial, success was far from certain.

17 **b. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation**

18 Although the parties engaged in significant informal discovery prior to mediation, the
19 parties still had additional formal discovery to complete had the matter not been settled. Blakely
20 Decl., ¶ 22. This would have required the expenditure of substantial time and resources by both
21 Parties that would have very likely spanned several years. *Id.* Even if Plaintiff were to certify the
22 proposed classes, the parties would incur considerably more attorneys’ fees and costs through a
23 possible decertification motion, trial, and possible appeal. *Id.* The Settlement avoids those risks
24 and the accompanying delay and expense, and thus this factor supports preliminary approval. *Id.*

25 **c. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status**

26 Plaintiff has not yet filed his motion for class certification, and as such, the extent to which
27 Plaintiff’s proposed classes were certifiable is somewhat speculative. Absent settlement, there
28 was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial, or if there were, it would

1 consist of a significantly smaller group of employees than the proposed Settlement Class (either
2 due to a narrowing of the class definition in a Court order on a contested motion for class
3 certification or through settlement agreements entered into by Dorado with individual class
4 members by way of *Pick-up-Stix* type settlement agreements³), and the expected recovery could
5 be significantly reduced, given the settlement amounts that are typically offered through the *Pick-*
6 *up-Stix* process. Thus, this factor, too, supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

7 **d. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

8 The Settlement provides a positive recovery for the Settlement Class in the face of
9 disputed claims. Plaintiff conducted a detailed analysis of underpaid wages, potential meal and
10 rest period premium payments owing, wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and
11 PAGA civil penalties. A summary of the results of Plaintiff's exposure analysis are discussed
12 below:

13 **Unpaid Wages Due to Unlawful Timekeeping Policies/Practices: \$4,144**

14 Plaintiff alleges that for a portion of the Class Period, Dorado underpaid Settlement Class
15 members due to its unlawful timekeeping policies/practices. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Based on
16 Plaintiff's review of Dorado's timekeeping and payroll records, Plaintiff estimated Dorado's
17 alleged rounding practices resulted in approximately 296 hours of unpaid time. *Id.* Therefore,
18 Plaintiff estimates Dorado's maximum exposure for this claim at approximately \$7,400 (296
19 unpaid hours * \$12.50 average weighted minimum wage * 2 for liquidated damages pursuant to
20 Labor Code § 1194.2). *Id.*

21 However, as argued above, Dorado argues that its timekeeping policies/practices
22 complied with California law and that it compensated Settlement Class members for all hours
23 actually worked. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Dorado also asserts that Plaintiff would be unable to certify
24 this claim since its timekeeping policies/practices are facially neutral and individualized inquiries

25
26 ³ In *Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, Inc.*, 171 Cal.App.4th 796 (2009), the Court of Appeal held an
27 employer may enter into pre-certification settlement agreements with individual putative class
28 members in which the putative class members release claims for past unpaid wages and penalties
in exchange for consideration. The Court further held that such settlements could preclude those
individual employees from recovery in class action litigation against the employer for the same
wage claims.

1 would be necessary as to whether employees were in fact underpaid for each workday in question
2 (including whether they were actually working when they were clocked in), resulting in an
3 unmanageable series of mini-trials. *Id.* Given these defenses, Plaintiff discounted this maximum
4 amount by 20% for risk of non-certification and an additional 30% for a risk of being unsuccessful
5 on the merits or of failing to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic
6 exposure of approximately \$4,144. *Id.*

7 **First Meal Period Violations: \$110,065**

8 Based on Plaintiff's review and extrapolation of Dorado's timekeeping records, there are
9 approximately 21,693 shifts that reflected a potential first meal period violation. Blakely Decl., ¶
10 15. Therefore, Plaintiff estimates Dorado's maximum exposure for first meal period violations at
11 approximately \$444,707 (21,693 non-compliant first meal periods * \$20.50 average meal period
12 premium). *Id.*

13 However, Dorado contends that it has maintained compliant written meal period policies
14 throughout the Class Period and has always provided its employees the *opportunity* to take legally
15 compliant meal periods, and that it is not required to "ensure" meal periods are taken. Blakely
16 Decl., ¶ 15. Dorado also argues this claim is not suited for class treatment, as individual inquiries
17 would be needed to assess which employees took non-compliant meal periods or missed meal
18 periods, how many meal periods were non-compliant or missed, and the reasons why a particular
19 employee did not take a compliant meal period on a particular shift. *Id.* Based on these defenses,
20 Plaintiff discounted the maximum amount by 45% for risk of non-certification, and an additional
21 55% for risk of losing on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an
22 estimated exposure of approximately \$110,065. *Id.*

23 **Second Meal Period Violations: \$20,124**

24 Plaintiff's analysis of the timekeeping data showed that during the Class Period, there
25 were approximately 8,726 shifts worked in excess of 10.0 hours with a second meal period
26 violation. Blakely Decl., ¶ 16. Therefore, Plaintiff calculates Dorado's maximum exposure for
27 second meal period violations at approximately \$178,883 (8,726 second meal period violations *
28 \$20.50 meal period premium). *Id.*

1 However, Plaintiff's theory of liability carried significant risks of both non-certification
2 and on the merits if Plaintiff was able to certify this claim, based on, *inter alia*, Dorado's argument
3 that it has maintained compliant written meal period policies throughout the Class Period, and
4 Settlement Class members voluntarily waived their second meal period on shifts in excess of 10.0
5 hours but less than 12.0 hours per Labor Code § 512. Blakely Decl., ¶ 16. In light of these risks,
6 Plaintiff discounted the maximum amount that the class could potentially recover by 55% for a
7 risk of non-certification, and an additional 75% for a risk of losing on the merits, or having
8 exposure reduced due to Dorado's waiver arguments, to arrive at estimated exposure of
9 approximately \$20,124. *Id.*

10 Rest Period Violations: \$63,675

11 As indicated above, Plaintiff alleges that Dorado failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff
12 and other non-exempt employees to take duty-free 10-minute rest periods for every four hours
13 worked, or major fraction thereof, due to Dorado's work demands. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Based on
14 Plaintiff's analysis and extrapolation of Dorado's timekeeping records, Plaintiff estimates there
15 were approximately 25,356 shifts in excess of 3.5 hours during the Class Period, entitling
16 employees to at least one (1) rest period. *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiff estimates Dorado's maximum
17 potential exposure for rest period violations at approximately \$519,798 (25,356 rest period
18 violations * \$20.50 average premium). *Id.*

19 However, Dorado contends it has maintained and enforced compliant written rest period
20 policies/practices and has always authorized and permitted employees a 10-minute rest period for
21 each 4 hours worked, and that any failure to take rest periods was as a result of employee choice,
22 rather than any Dorado policy and/or practice. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Dorado further argues that
23 Plaintiff's rest period claim is not amenable to class treatment, since individual inquiries would
24 be required to determine which employees failed to take rest periods, how many rest periods they
25 failed to take, and the reasons why each employee failed to take rest period(s) on a particular shift.
26 *Id.* These manageability concerns are especially present with respect to rest period claims, Dorado
27 argues, given that rest periods are not recorded. *Id.* Given these defenses, Plaintiff discounted this
28 maximum amount by 65% for risk of non-certification, and an additional 65% for a risk of being

1 unsuccessful on the merits or of failing to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated
2 realistic exposure of approximately \$63,675. *Id.*

3 **Wage Statement Penalties: \$735**

4 Plaintiff alleges that Dorado is liable for wage statement penalties as a result of the unpaid
5 wages and unpaid meal and rest period premiums. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18. Those penalties are
6 calculated as \$50 for each “initial” violation and \$100 for each “subsequent” violation, with a
7 maximum of \$4,000 per employee. *Id.*; see Labor Code § 226(e). Plaintiff’s analysis reflected
8 that there were approximately 28 unique employees and approximately 56 pay periods worked
9 during the liability period applicable to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim. *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiff
10 calculated Dorado’s maximum wage statement exposure at approximately \$4,200 ([28 “initial”
11 violations * \$50] + [28 “subsequent” violations * \$100]). *Id.*; see also Labor Code § 226(e).

12 In light of Dorado’s arguments that no violations occurred, that employees suffered no
13 “injury,” that any alleged violations were not “knowing and intentional,” that the wage statements
14 always accurately reflected hours worked and amounts paid to employees, as well as risks
15 associated with Plaintiff’s underlying claims discussed above, Plaintiff discounted the maximum
16 exposure by 50% for risk of non-certification, and by an additional 65% for risk of being
17 unsuccessful on the merits, for an estimated realistic exposure of approximately \$735. Blakely
18 Decl., ¶ 18.

19 **Waiting Time Penalties: \$30,750**

20 Dorado’s records reflected approximately 50 former Settlement Class members who are
21 eligible for waiting time penalties. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19. Based on an hourly rate of \$20.50, Plaintiff
22 estimated the average waiting time penalty per former employee to be approximately \$4,920
23 (\$20.50 * 8 hours per day * 30 days). *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiff calculated Dorado’s maximum
24 exposure for potential waiting time penalties to be approximately \$246,000 (50 former employees
25 * \$4,920 average penalty). *Id.*

26 However, Dorado presented several defenses to this claim, most notably their assertion
27 that because they possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying claims, any failure to pay wages
28 was not “willful” as a matter of law. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19. Dorado further asserts that Plaintiff’s

1 waiting time penalty exposure was grossly inflated as not every former employee experienced the
2 alleged Labor Code violations. *Id.* Moreover, because the waiting time claim is derivative of
3 Plaintiff's underlying wage claims, Plaintiff would need to overcome Dorado's defenses, both as
4 to class certification and on the merits, as to his underlying claims. *Id.* To account for Dorado's
5 defenses, Plaintiff discounted the maximum exposure by 50% for the risk of non-certification,
6 and an additional 75% for the risk of losing on the merits and/or not receiving the maximum
7 penalties sought, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately \$30,750. *Id.*

8 **PAGA Penalties: \$5,600**

9 Plaintiff estimated a maximum total PAGA exposure of approximately \$5,600 (56 pay
10 periods * \$100 "initial" penalty). Blakely Decl., ¶ 20; *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163
11 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (2008) (finding "initial" violation rate applies until employer is notified
12 that it is violating a Labor Code provision).

13 Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiff predicted
14 that the potential recovery for the Settlement Class would be approximately \$235,093. Blakely
15 Decl., ¶ 21. The proposed Settlement of \$200,000.00 represents approximately 85% of the
16 reasonably forecasted recovery for the Settlement Class. *Id.* Preliminary approval is appropriate
17 since the Settlement will provide significant monetary relief to the Settlement Class, which is
18 consistent with what Plaintiff's counsel believes could have been recovered had the case
19 proceeded through trial.

20 **e. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

21 "Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
22 settlement that fairly reflects each party's expected outcome in litigation." *In re Pacific*
23 *Enterprises Securities Litigation* 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiff is represented
24 by competent, experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending
25 wage-and-hour class actions and who have been appointed as class counsel in numerous cases
26 alleging similar claims. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 2-6. *see also* Declaration of Paul K. Haines ("Haines
27 Decl."), ¶¶ 2-8; Declaration of Joel M. Gordon ("Gordon Decl."), ¶¶ 2-4. Class Counsel
28 conducted an in-depth review of Dorado's timekeeping and payroll records and drew on their

extensive experience in similar cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's case. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 14-21. The Settlement was also reached with the assistance of an experienced and respected wage-and-hour class action mediator. This factor strongly supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

2. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met

At this stage, the Court can grant preliminary approval of the Settlement and direct that notice be given if the proposed Settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval; (2) appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has no obvious deficiencies. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995); 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

a. The Settlement Is Within the Range of Possible Approval

The proposed Settlement reflects approximately 85% of the estimated recovery the Settlement Class could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation risks and will provide tangible, substantial monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the percentage of the liability exposure recovered in this case far exceeds percentages routinely approved by courts. *See, e.g., Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.*, Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (approving settlement representing about one-sixth of potential recovery); *Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("it is well-settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be available to the Settlement Class members at trial"). Further, the average Individual Settlement Payment of approximately \$1,646.67 is in line with average payments achieved in other wage and hour class action settlements.⁴ Thus, Plaintiff submits that the proposed settlement is within the

⁴ *See e.g., Bercea v. AE Retail West*, Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9, 2012) (average net recovery of approximately \$105); *Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No. BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009) (average net recovery of approximately \$90); *Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) (average net recovery of approximately \$80); *Doty v. Costco*

1 range of possible approval, such that notice should be provided to the Settlement Class members
2 so that they can consider the Settlement. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the
3 reasonableness of the Settlement after the Settlement Class members have had the opportunity to
4 opt-out or object.

5 **b. The Settlement Resulted from Serious, Informed Negotiations**

6 The Settlement resulted from an exchange of substantial information, arm's-length
7 negotiations by counsel, a full-day mediation before an experienced wage and hour mediator, and
8 additional months of negotiating the long-form settlement agreement. Thus, the Settlement is
9 entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130. As
10 discussed above, Plaintiff carefully vetted the claims at issue, reviewed extensive timekeeping
11 and payroll data, and conducted a detailed statistical analysis of the data to arrive at his estimated
12 class-wide damages figures. *See Blakely Decl.*, ¶¶ 14-21. Thus, this factor supports preliminary
13 approval.

14 **c. The Settlement Is Devoid of Obvious Deficiencies**

15 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
16 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary relief to Settlement Class
17 members. The amounts proposed for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, LWDA payment,
18 and Plaintiff's class representative Enhancement Payment, are all reasonable and appropriate
19 based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of obvious deficiencies, this
20

21
22 *Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2007) (average recovery
23 of approximately \$65); *Lim v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213 (Orange
24 County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (average net recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus*
25 *Salon, Inc.*, Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010) (average net
26 recovery of approximately \$20); *Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-
27 DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (wage and hour class action settlement approved where average
28 recovery was approximately \$60); *Schiller v. David's Bridal, Inc.*, Case No. 1:10-cv-00616-AWI-
SKO, 2012 WL 2117001 at *17 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) ("Class Members will receive an
average of approximately \$198.70...[T]his is a substantial recovery where Defendants asserted
compelling defenses to liability; Plaintiff also notes several similar actions where the gross
recoveries per class member were less than \$90...[T]he Court finds that the results achieved are
good"); and *Williams v. Centerplate, Inc.*, Case Nos. 11-CV-2159-H-KSC, 12-CV-0008-H-KSC,
2013 WL 4525428 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (average recovery of approximately \$108).

factor supports preliminary approval.

B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE SETTLEMENT CLASS

The Settlement Class satisfies the criteria for certification of a settlement class under California law because: (1) the Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder would be impractical; (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions such that class certification is the most efficient and desirable way to maintain this litigation; (3) Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of absent Settlement Class members; and (4) Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent Settlement Class members' interest. *See* Cal. Civ. Proc. § 382.

1. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous

A class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v. Target Corp.* 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (2010) (alterations in original). Here, the proposed class is defined as all current and former non-exempt employees employed by Dorado in California during the Class Period. Therefore, Settlement Class members can be identified from Dorado's personnel and employment records. Dorado represents that the Settlement Class consists of approximately 50 former non-exempt employees. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶ 13. It would therefore be impracticable to bring all Settlement Class members before the Court or for each Settlement Class member to bring an individual lawsuit. Thus, the proposed Settlement Class satisfies numerosity. *See, e.g., Bowles v. Sup. Ct.*, 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (holding a class representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently numerous).

2. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate

The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits but rather on what types of questions, "common or individual," are likely to arise in the Action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)* 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (2004). Plaintiff's claims are predicated on, among other issues, Dorado's meal and rest period policies/practices. These types of claims are commonly held to be proper for class certification. *See e.g., Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.*, 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (2013) (certifying meal and rest period claims).

1 **3. The Claims of the Named Plaintiff Are Typical**

2 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
3 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* 191
4 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (1987) (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiff purchased the
5 same goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, Plaintiff's claims are typical
6 of those held by the Settlement Class members. First, Dorado employed Plaintiff as a non-exempt
7 employee during the Class Period, and Plaintiff was subject to Dorado's wage and hour policies
8 at issue in this case. *See* Chavez Decl., ¶ 2. Second, Plaintiff was injured by the same challenged
9 policies/practices that allegedly injured the Settlement Class as a whole. For example, Plaintiff
10 asserts that he was deprived of all wages and contends that he was deprived of all legally
11 compliant meal and rest periods. Plaintiff further asserts that he did not receive accurate and
12 compliant wage statements and did not receive all wages at the time of separation of employment.
13 *See generally*, Chavez Decl. Because Plaintiff has suffered the same injuries as the other members
14 of the Settlement Class, the typicality requirement is satisfied.

15 **4. Plaintiff and Class Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the**
16 **Class**

17 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
18 class(es) they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services*
19 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697 (2007). Plaintiff and his counsel will adequately represent the
20 Settlement Class, as there are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the proposed Settlement Class,
21 and Plaintiff possesses claims that are in line with those of the Settlement Class. *See McGhee v.*
22 *Bank of America* 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51 (1976) (adequacy satisfied where there was no
23 indication that Class Counsel were not qualified and the named plaintiff had no interests
24 antagonistic to those of the proposed class). Class Counsel also have extensive experience in wage
25 and hour class action litigation. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; Haines Decl., ¶¶ 2-8 Gordon Decl., ¶¶
26 2-4.

27 **C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE NOTICE**

28 This Court should order distribution to the Settlement Class of the proposed Class Notice

1 by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, in English and Spanish, using the last known mailing address
2 information provided by Dorado. *See* Settlement, ¶ 9. This manner of giving notice is the “best
3 notice practicable” under the circumstances because it provides “individual notice to all members
4 who can be identified through reasonable effort.” *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* 417 U.S. 156,
5 173 (1974). Here, the Parties have agreed that the Settlement be administered by Phoenix
6 Settlement Administrators (“Phoenix”), an experienced class action settlement administrator. *See*
7 *generally* Declaration of Jodey Lawrence (“Lawrence Decl.”) and attached exhibits. Settlement
8 Class members’ addresses will be ascertainable through Dorado’s personnel and payroll records,
9 which Dorado will provide to Phoenix within ten (10) business days of preliminary approval of
10 the Settlement. *See* Settlement, ¶ 9(A). Within ten (10) business days of receipt of the Settlement
11 Class members’ addresses, Phoenix will run the names of all Settlement Class members through
12 the National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database to determine any updated addresses, and
13 mail the Class Notice to all Settlement Class members. *Id.*, at ¶ 9(B). To the extent that any notices
14 are returned, Phoenix will perform a “skip trace” to track any Settlement Class member’s current
15 mailing address. *Id.*, at ¶ 9(F).

16 The content of the proposed Class Notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(d)
17 because it advises Settlement Class members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and
18 denials of the parties, and the key terms of the Settlement, the 60-day deadline to opt-out or object
19 to the Settlement and the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and
20 expected recovery amount for each Settlement Class member, and advises them that they will be
21 bound by the terms of the Settlement if they do not opt-out. *See* Blakely Decl., Exhs. 1-2 to Exh.
22 A. The proposed Class Notice will also notify Settlement Class members of the final approval
23 hearing date and provides the Settlement Class contact information for Class Counsel and advises
24 Settlement Class members that they may enter an appearance through counsel if they wish to. *Id.*
25 This manner of giving notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the most reliable and
26 cost-effective method of reaching Settlement Class members.

27 **D. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

28 Finally, this Court should set a hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement on a date

1 appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Settlement Class members must file
2 objections to the Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.

3 **V. CONCLUSION**

4 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily
5 approve the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Settlement Class, and enter the
6 Proposed Order submitted concurrently herewith.

7
8 Dated: February 13, 2025

Respectfully submitted,
HAINES LAW GROUP, APC

9
10 By:



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